Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jacquelin Glassie filed a claim against the estate of her father, Donelson Glassie, alleging he breached a property settlement agreement by failing to adequately fund a trust established for her benefit. The executor of Donelson's estate, Paul Doucette, disallowed the claim, leading to a lawsuit in the Superior Court. After Jacquelin's death, her sister Alison, as executrix of Jacquelin's estate, continued the lawsuit. The Superior Court initially granted summary judgment for the estate, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trustee of the trust, Wells Fargo, was the proper plaintiff. Wells Fargo then assigned its claims to Alison.A jury trial in the Superior Court resulted in a verdict for Alison, awarding her $1,164,138.43 in damages, which, with prejudgment interest, totaled $2,856,572.45. The jury also rejected the estate's counterclaim that Jacquelin had forfeited her interest under Donelson's will. The defendant, Doucette, filed a notice of appeal but failed to timely order the trial transcripts, leading Alison to move to dismiss the appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case after the Superior Court granted Alison's motion to dismiss the appeal due to Doucette's failure to timely order the transcripts and follow proper procedures for an extension. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that Doucette's reasons for the delay, including hopes for mediation and cost-saving, did not constitute excusable neglect. The Court noted the extensive litigation history and the trial justice's efforts to move the case forward, concluding that the deadlines were necessary and should be adhered to. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

Carol Wagner, the plaintiff, claims entitlement to a surviving spousal share from the estate of John Chislett, her former husband. She seeks to rescind a quitclaim deed she granted to the decedent, alleging it was obtained through fraud. Additionally, she challenges the validity of a 1974 Dominican Republic divorce decree obtained by the decedent, asserting it is invalid under New Hampshire law. The defendants, Sally Chislett, Kevin Chislett, and Wai Kwan Chislett, contest her claims.The Circuit Court (Kissinger, J.) ruled against the plaintiff, determining that her rescission action was barred by the statute of limitations and that her challenge to the divorce decree was barred by laches due to her forty-seven-year delay in raising the issue. Consequently, the court dismissed her claims.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that the statute of limitations for actions involving real property, RSA 508:2, applied to the plaintiff's rescission claim, which had expired. The court also agreed with the lower court's application of the doctrine of laches, finding that the plaintiff's delay in challenging the divorce decree was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff had remarried in reliance on the divorce decree and waited nearly five decades to contest its validity, during which time both her second husband and the decedent had died.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court's decision effectively barred the plaintiff from claiming a surviving spousal share from the decedent's estate. View "Wagner v. Chislett" on Justia Law

Lea and Ann Brent were married in 1953 and divorced in 1983. As part of their divorce, Lea agreed to pay Ann $5,600 per month in permanent periodic alimony until her death or remarriage. Ann died in 2015, never having remarried. Lea began paying less than the required amount in 2002, but Ann never filed a contempt action for the unpaid alimony. Lea died in 2021, and Ann’s Estate filed a probate claim against Lea’s Estate for unpaid alimony totaling $358,700, covering the period from 2002 to 2015.The Washington County Chancery Court found that the claim for unpaid alimony was valid but limited it to the period from July 2014 to November 2015 due to the seven-year statute of limitations. The court awarded Ann’s Estate $139,104, which included the unpaid alimony for that period plus 8 percent interest per annum. However, the court denied Lea’s Estate credit for partial alimony payments totaling $51,000 made between July 2014 and November 2015 and for a $75,143.28 life insurance proceeds payment made to Ann’s Estate in 2019.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the chancery court erred in denying Lea’s Estate credit for the partial alimony payments and the life insurance proceeds payment. The Supreme Court held that the total amount of credit exceeded the total amount owed for the relevant period, leaving no unpaid alimony to award Ann’s Estate. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s decision and rendered judgment in favor of Lea’s Estate. View "In re The Estate of Brent v. The Estate of Brent" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

Erna Rousey transferred five real properties and nearly $225,000 in cash assets to her son, James “Jimmy” Rousey, Jr., in the last few years of her life. After her death, her estate sought recission of these transfers, alleging undue influence. The estate argued that Erna lacked the mental capacity to make the transfers and that they were the product of fraud, undue influence, or coercion. Jimmy contended that the transfers were valid gifts and that Erna had sufficient mental capacity.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that Jimmy maintained a confidential relationship with Erna and that the property transfers were the result of undue influence. The court concluded that the estate was entitled to recission of the property transfers and awarded attorney’s fees to the estate. Jimmy, representing himself, appealed the recission and attorney’s fee award, arguing that the transfers were valid gifts and that the court erred in its findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the recission of the property transfers. The court held that the estate provided clear and convincing evidence that Jimmy exerted undue influence over Erna, who was susceptible due to her diminished mental capacity, isolation, and reliance on Jimmy. The court found that Jimmy failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence and that the transfers were not gifts. However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the enhanced attorney’s fee award for reconsideration, noting that the superior court may have improperly relied on Jimmy’s actions before the litigation started and did not sufficiently explain why Jimmy’s opposition to the petition was in bad faith. The Supreme Court instructed the lower court to reconsider the attorney’s fee award based on appropriate factors. View "In re Estate of Rousey" on Justia Law

Thomas R. McDonald filed a petition contesting amendments to the Declaration of Trust of Judith E. Stratos 2000 Trust, which named William Goebner as successor trustee. McDonald alleged the amendments, which removed him and his sister as beneficiaries, were due to undue influence, fraud, and financial elder abuse. He sought various remedies under the Probate Code. Two days before a scheduled hearing, Goebner filed a demurrer to dismiss McDonald’s claims, which the trial court overruled as untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.40, requiring demurrers to be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint.The trial court overruled Goebner’s demurrer as untimely, leading Goebner to petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order. He argued that the Probate Code, specifically section 1043, which allows an interested person to make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing, should govern the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, not the Code of Civil Procedure.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Goebner, holding that section 1043 of the Probate Code governs the timing for filing a demurrer in probate proceedings, allowing it to be filed at or before the hearing. The court concluded that Goebner’s demurrer, filed two days before the hearing, was timely. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer as untimely and to consider the demurrer on its merits. Goebner was entitled to recover his costs in the writ proceeding. View "Goebner v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Steven Holte and Sheldon Holte, as co-trustees of the Kermit and Ardella Family Mineral Trust, along with Ardella Holte, filed a lawsuit against Tiah E. Rigby, both individually and as the personal representative of Nathan Holte's estate. The case arose from Nathan Holte's misappropriation of trust income during his tenure as trustee. After Nathan's death, Rigby became the life beneficiary of Nathan's share of the trust income. The Holtes sought to offset Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated funds.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, ruled that the co-trustees could offset Rigby's distribution to recover the misappropriated trust income but could not offset her distribution to recoup non-trust money that Nathan had stolen from Ardella's personal accounts. Rigby appealed, arguing that she should not be held liable for her father's misdeeds, while the Holtes cross-appealed, seeking to offset Rigby's distribution further.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the co-trustees could not withhold Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated trust income, as Rigby had no personal liability for Nathan's actions, and her beneficial interest vested upon Nathan's death. The court emphasized that the trust agreement required monthly distributions to life beneficiaries and that Nathan's life interest terminated upon his death, making it improper to offset against Rigby's distribution.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that the co-trustees could not offset Rigby's distribution to recover the non-trust money stolen by Nathan, as Rigby was not involved in the theft and had no personal liability. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Holte v. Rigby" on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Mary C. Sutphin, filed a complaint alleging statutory violations of the Uniform Trust Code and breaches of fiduciary duties against several defendants, including A. David Abrams and others. The complaint was amended twice, with the second amended complaint containing sixteen counts related to the management of Lewis Chevrolet and interference with the plaintiff’s inheritance. During discovery, the plaintiff received over ten thousand documents, which led to the filing of the second amended complaint. The defendants sought detailed information about the factual basis of the plaintiff’s allegations through interrogatories, but the plaintiff’s responses were deemed insufficient, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders for the plaintiff to supplement her responses.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County referred the discovery disputes to a discovery commissioner, who recommended that the plaintiff supplement her responses with specific references to the complaint and discovery materials. The plaintiff complied, but the defendants were still unsatisfied and sought to depose the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the plaintiff had relied on her counsel for the factual basis of her claims. The discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel, applying the Shelton test, which requires showing that no other means exist to obtain the information, the information is relevant and non-privileged, and the information is crucial to the case. The circuit court partially rejected the discovery commissioner’s decision and ordered the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court committed a clear error of law by not properly applying the Shelton test. The court held that the information sought could be obtained from other sources and that the deposition would invade the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel. View "State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law