Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte
Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling
The plaintiff, Mary C. Sutphin, filed a complaint alleging statutory violations of the Uniform Trust Code and breaches of fiduciary duties against several defendants, including A. David Abrams and others. The complaint was amended twice, with the second amended complaint containing sixteen counts related to the management of Lewis Chevrolet and interference with the plaintiff’s inheritance. During discovery, the plaintiff received over ten thousand documents, which led to the filing of the second amended complaint. The defendants sought detailed information about the factual basis of the plaintiff’s allegations through interrogatories, but the plaintiff’s responses were deemed insufficient, leading to a motion to compel and subsequent orders for the plaintiff to supplement her responses.The Circuit Court of Raleigh County referred the discovery disputes to a discovery commissioner, who recommended that the plaintiff supplement her responses with specific references to the complaint and discovery materials. The plaintiff complied, but the defendants were still unsatisfied and sought to depose the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the plaintiff had relied on her counsel for the factual basis of her claims. The discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel, applying the Shelton test, which requires showing that no other means exist to obtain the information, the information is relevant and non-privileged, and the information is crucial to the case. The circuit court partially rejected the discovery commissioner’s decision and ordered the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court committed a clear error of law by not properly applying the Shelton test. The court held that the information sought could be obtained from other sources and that the deposition would invade the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Consequently, the court granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the deposition of the plaintiff’s counsel. View "State ex rel. Sutphin v. Poling" on Justia Law
Boykin v. Land
Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law
Bertucci v. Watkins
Two business partners, Anthony Bertucci and Eugene Watkins, developed low-income housing projects through various entities. Bertucci provided funding, while Watkins managed the projects. Watkins managed the entities' funds through a separate account, which led to concerns about mismanagement and personal use of funds. After Bertucci's health declined, his son Christopher, acting under power of attorney, discovered potential mismanagement and removed Watkins from his roles. This led to a legal dispute involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.The probate court granted summary judgment in favor of Watkins on all claims. Bertucci, represented by his son Christopher as executor of his estate, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas reversed the summary judgment on some claims, finding fact issues regarding fiduciary duties and limitations, but affirmed the judgment on the derivative claims, concluding that Bertucci failed to adequately brief those claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Bertucci waived his appeal on the derivative claims due to inadequate briefing. The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Bertucci's individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Watkins's limitations defense and correctly resolved disputes regarding an expert report and the Dead Man's Rule. The Supreme Court reinstated the probate court's summary judgment on the individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the derivative claims. View "Bertucci v. Watkins" on Justia Law
Tingley v. First Financial Bank
An Indiana trust beneficiary sued the trustee, an Indiana bank, in an Indiana trial court over the disposal of trust property. The trust, which holds Illinois real estate, is governed by Illinois law and includes mostly Illinois beneficiaries. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, questioning the appropriateness of resolving Illinois-centered issues in Indiana.The Vigo Superior Court dismissed the case, agreeing with the trustee that Indiana lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the trust was administered in Illinois. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction over the Indiana suit despite the trust's Illinois connections. The appellate court distinguished this case from In re Alford Trust, which held that Indiana courts lack jurisdiction over trusts administered exclusively in another state.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The court clarified that Indiana superior courts have broad civil jurisdiction, including over trust disputes, and that venue provisions do not affect jurisdiction. The court disapproved of the Alford Trust decision for conflating jurisdiction with prudential concerns like venue and choice of law. The court noted that while the trial court has jurisdiction, it may still dismiss the case under doctrines like comity or forum non conveniens if appropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tingley v. First Financial Bank" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Johnston
A man passed away, and his wife made a claim on his estate for half of the money he had removed from their joint bank account before his death. The wife argued that the couple owned the account as joint tenants, and her husband had withdrawn funds exceeding his interest. The district court dismissed her claim, concluding that she was making a claim for conversion sounding in tort and had not met the legal standard.The wife appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and that a standard from caselaw on joint tenancies should apply. The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with her, reversed the district court's decision, and remanded the case. The estate sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The correct standard, as established in Anderson v. Iowa Department of Human Services, involves determining the respective rights of joint tenants based on their agreement and the presumption that each joint tenant is entitled to half of the joint account, which can be rebutted. The court remanded the case for a new trial to allow for proper fact-finding regarding whether the husband removed funds in excess of his interest in the joint account. View "In re Estate of Johnston" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Weeder
Richard Muller filed a claim against the estate of John Weeder, deceased, under the Nebraska Probate Code. Muller’s claim was based on a modified judgment entered in his favor against Weeder in a separate fence dispute action before Weeder's death. The county court appointed Margene Cork as the personal representative of Weeder’s estate in October 2017. Muller filed a "Statement of Claim" in December 2017 and a "Petition for Allowance of Claim" in September 2023. Cork, as the personal representative, resisted the claim and moved to strike it. The county court held a hearing and allowed Muller’s claim against the estate.The county court for Boyd County granted Muller’s petition and allowed his claim. The Estate appealed the decision, arguing that the county court lacked jurisdiction and that the law-of-the-case doctrine should apply based on a prior appeal in the fence dispute action. The appeal was initially directed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals but was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the county court had subject matter jurisdiction over Muller’s claim against the estate. The court noted that the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters relating to decedents’ estates. The court also rejected the Estate’s argument that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied, as the prior decision was made in a different action and not in the current probate case. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s judgment allowing Muller’s claim against the estate. View "In re Estate of Weeder" on Justia Law
Cook v. Marshall
Stephen Cook, a trustee of two charitable trusts, sued Preston Marshall, both personally and in his capacity as a trustee of a related trust, alleging that Preston's failures caused the charitable trusts to incur debt and tax penalties. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss and later granted Cook partial summary judgment. Preston appealed, arguing that the suit should be dismissed because Cook's unnamed co-trustees lacked diversity of citizenship.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially ruled in Cook's favor, ordering Preston to authorize payments from the Peroxisome Trust to the Marshall Heritage Foundation and holding that Preston breached his fiduciary duties. Cook later moved to enforce this judgment, claiming Preston continued to refuse to authorize payments and failed to file tax returns. The district court held Preston in contempt but did not remove him as co-trustee. Cook then filed a new suit against Preston, seeking damages and Preston's removal as co-trustee. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss, which argued that the claims were barred by res judicata and that necessary parties were not joined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that complete diversity of citizenship existed because the trusts themselves were not parties, and only the citizenship of Cook and Preston mattered. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding without joining Elaine and Pierce as parties. Additionally, the court determined that res judicata did not bar Cook's claims because the new claims arose from Preston's post-judgment conduct. Finally, the court rejected Preston's arguments regarding comparative fault and failure to mitigate damages, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Cook v. Marshall" on Justia Law
Callister v. James B. Church & Associates
The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law
In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt
Chester “Chet” Lake contested the probate of his mother’s will, which his sister Mary Chesnutt had filed. Lake doubted the will’s validity, claiming undue influence, and requested a jury trial to determine the issue of devisavit vel non. The Madison County Chancery Court entered a scheduling order but did not specify whether the trial would be a bench or jury trial. After the discovery and motions deadlines passed, Lake filed a Notice of Jury Trial. Chesnutt moved to strike the notice, arguing that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by participating in pretrial proceedings and that the notice was untimely.The Madison County Chancery Court granted Chesnutt’s motion to strike, finding that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by agreeing to the scheduling order and that his notice was untimely. Lake appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that Lake had not waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-19, Lake was entitled to a jury trial upon request before any hearing on the issue of devisavit vel non. The court determined that the entry of the scheduling order did not constitute a hearing on the matter and that Lake’s notice, filed thirty-two days before the trial date, was timely. The court reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt" on Justia Law