Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Paul O’Farrell, individually and on behalf of the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, Skyline Cattle Co., and VOR, Inc., filed a lawsuit against Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, and Kelly O’Farrell. Paul alleged that Kelly manipulated their father, Raymond, to orchestrate improper transactions, including a $3.2 million land sale and the non-renewal of Skyline’s lease, causing financial harm to the family entities and himself.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Grant County, South Dakota, presided by Judge Robert L. Spears, dismissed Paul’s claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendants. Paul had requested a change of judge, which was denied by Presiding Judge Stoltenburg, who cited judicial economy and previous submissions by Paul in related cases as reasons for the denial.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Paul and Skyline followed the proper procedure for seeking a change of judge and that neither had waived their right to do so in this specific action. The court found that Judge Spears was disqualified from further proceedings upon the filing of the affidavit for change of judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated all orders entered by Judge Spears in the case and remanded for the appointment of a replacement judge. View "Estate Of O’Farrell v. Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Martin and Herbert McCray were in a romantic relationship for over four decades until Jacqueline's death in 2020. Jacqueline died without a will, and Herbert sought to administer and inherit her estate, claiming they were common law married. Herbert died before the matter was resolved, and his son, Brian McCray, sought to continue Herbert's claim. Jacqueline's first cousin, Juanita Waller, contested this, arguing that Jacqueline and Herbert were not common law married and that she was the next of kin.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Probate Division, appointed Juanita as the personal representative of Jacqueline's estate, concluding that Juanita had priority over Brian. The court then held a trial to determine if Jacqueline and Herbert were common law married. The trial court limited the evidence to direct proof of an express mutual agreement in the present tense to be permanent partners. The court ruled in favor of Juanita, finding no such express mutual agreement.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by precluding Brian from introducing circumstantial evidence that could infer an express mutual agreement. The appellate court noted that when neither partner is available to testify, such an agreement may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the couple’s relationship, including their cohabitation and reputation in the community. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing Brian to present relevant circumstantial evidence. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of Juanita as the personal representative of Jacqueline's estate. View "In re Estate of Martin" on Justia Law

Buford and Sharon Combs executed a joint will in 2013, intending to distribute their estate equally among their five children from previous marriages. Buford died in October 2020, and Sharon died in January 2021. Most of their assets were held jointly with right of survivorship, and Buford's estate was small enough to dispense with administration. Sharon's sons were initially appointed as co-administrators, but Greg Combs later filed a motion to probate the joint will as a lost will, which was granted by the Jackson District Court.The Napier brothers filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the joint will's provisions only took effect if Buford and Sharon died in a common disaster or close in time, which did not occur. They claimed Sharon died intestate, entitling them to inherit all property. The Combs siblings argued the couple intended to divide the estate equally among all five children and sought to reform the will to remove the qualifying clause.The Jackson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Combs siblings, interpreting the will to distribute the estate equally among the children. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the will was unambiguous and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible. They concluded Sharon died intestate as the conditions in the will were not met.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the presumption against intestacy and the impracticality of administering separate estates supported the interpretation that the estate should be divided equally among the five children. The court reinstated the Jackson Circuit Court's summary judgment. View "COMBS V. NAPIER" on Justia Law

The decedent, Marc F. Thurrell, executed a will in 1997, leaving his estate to his father and, if his father predeceased him, to his uncle. Both the father and the uncle died before the decedent. At the time of the decedent's death, the uncle's children and the decedent's sister (the respondent) were alive. The respondent argued that the estate should pass to her under New Hampshire's anti-lapse statute, RSA 551:12, as the sole surviving lineal descendant of the father, or alternatively, through intestacy.The Circuit Court (Moran, J.) granted a petition for estate administration, listing the uncle's children as beneficiaries and appointing the petitioner as executor. The respondent objected, arguing that the estate should pass to her under the anti-lapse statute or through intestacy. The trial court ruled that the bequest to the father lapsed due to a survivorship requirement, but the bequest to the uncle did not lapse, applying the anti-lapse statute to pass the estate to the uncle's children. The respondent's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion to determine heirs were denied.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the decedent's will did not express an intention for the will to lapse or for the anti-lapse statute to be inapplicable to the uncle's bequest. The will's language indicated that the decedent intended for the anti-lapse statute to apply to the uncle's bequest, allowing the uncle's children to inherit. The court also found that the intentional omission clause in the will did not preclude the uncle's children from inheriting, as they were provided for in the will through the anti-lapse statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying RSA 551:12 to the residual bequest to the uncle and properly denied the respondent's motion to determine heirs. View "In re Estate of Thurrell" on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Allison Littlefield filed a verified petition against her brothers, Scott and David Littlefield, and her aunt, Denise Sobel, who are co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust. The petition sought their removal as co-trustees, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and the Trust, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Allison claimed that the appellants misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, restricted her use of the Ranch, and failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who allegedly harassed Allison and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike the petition under California's anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the appellants failed to show that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that the petition was based on protected activity. The court noted that the appellants' motion failed to identify specific allegations of protected activity and improperly sought to strike the entire petition or all causes of action without distinguishing between protected and unprotected conduct.However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees, finding that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The court held that any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion was totally devoid of merit, as it did not demonstrate that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Silvia Villareal created a revocable living trust in 2005, which she amended twice. The 2018 restatement of the trust, prepared with an attorney, provided that her three children, Leticia Linzer, Arturo Villareal, and Sonia Godoy, would each receive a one-third interest in her home upon her death. In 2019, Silvia amended the trust again, without an attorney, to state that her children could only sell their shares to each other for $100,000, aiming to keep the home within the family. After Silvia's death, Arturo and Sonia petitioned the probate court to declare the 2019 amendment void, arguing it unreasonably restrained their ability to sell their interests.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of Arturo and Sonia, determining that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation in violation of Civil Code section 711. The court declared the amendment void and upheld the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. Leticia, the trustee, objected, arguing that section 711 did not apply to testamentary gifts and that the 2019 amendment did not impose an unreasonable restraint.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court's decision, holding that section 711 applies to testamentary instruments and that the 2019 amendment imposed an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court found that the amendment's restrictions on selling the property only to siblings for a fixed price were unreasonable and void. The court also rejected Leticia's argument that the 2019 amendment created a new testamentary trust, concluding that Silvia intended to add to the existing trust rather than create a new one. The court affirmed the probate court's order, maintaining the 2018 restatement as the operative trust document. View "Godoy v. Linzner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the application, suspending the defendants' powers, appointing an interim trustee, requiring a bond, setting a review hearing, and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization.Defendants appealed the order. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order was not appealable. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appealability of the order. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional and not final, aligning with the broader policy against piecemeal appeals.The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that neither Probate Code section 1300 nor section 1304 provided a basis for appealability. The court also found that defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the use of trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Additionally, the court denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions, despite concerns about defendants' counsel's conduct, which the court found troubling but not sufficient to warrant sanctions in this instance. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

Thomas Dunbar, also known as "Sam," passed away without any direct descendants. Connie Corner, who was not related to Dunbar by blood, probated a will that purportedly left his entire estate to her. Tyler Popplewell, Dunbar's grandnephew, filed a motion in Russell Circuit Court alleging that the will was a product of fraud and undue influence, and requested the court to declare it null and void. Corner later moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Tyler lacked standing to bring the claim. The trial court sustained Corner's motion, leading Tyler to appeal.The Russell Circuit Court initially dismissed Tyler's case on the grounds of lack of standing, as Corner had argued. Tyler then filed a motion to set aside the judgment, claiming he did not receive notice of the hearing. Additionally, Imogene Popplewell, Dunbar's sister and Tyler's grandmother, attempted to intervene as a successor plaintiff, but her motion was denied as untimely. The trial court reaffirmed its dismissal, citing the mailbox rule in denying Tyler's motion to set aside the judgment.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Corner had waived the issue of standing by not raising it in her initial response to Tyler's complaint. The Court of Appeals based its decision on the precedent set in Harrison v. Leach, which emphasized that standing issues must be raised at the outset of litigation. Corner then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing that Corner had waived the standing issue by failing to raise it promptly. The Court emphasized that defendants must address standing issues early in the litigation process to avoid inefficiencies and potential gamesmanship. The case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on its merits. View "CORNER V. POPPLEWELL" on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law