Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Two business partners, Anthony Bertucci and Eugene Watkins, developed low-income housing projects through various entities. Bertucci provided funding, while Watkins managed the projects. Watkins managed the entities' funds through a separate account, which led to concerns about mismanagement and personal use of funds. After Bertucci's health declined, his son Christopher, acting under power of attorney, discovered potential mismanagement and removed Watkins from his roles. This led to a legal dispute involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.The probate court granted summary judgment in favor of Watkins on all claims. Bertucci, represented by his son Christopher as executor of his estate, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas reversed the summary judgment on some claims, finding fact issues regarding fiduciary duties and limitations, but affirmed the judgment on the derivative claims, concluding that Bertucci failed to adequately brief those claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Bertucci waived his appeal on the derivative claims due to inadequate briefing. The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Bertucci's individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Watkins's limitations defense and correctly resolved disputes regarding an expert report and the Dead Man's Rule. The Supreme Court reinstated the probate court's summary judgment on the individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the derivative claims. View "Bertucci v. Watkins" on Justia Law

An Indiana trust beneficiary sued the trustee, an Indiana bank, in an Indiana trial court over the disposal of trust property. The trust, which holds Illinois real estate, is governed by Illinois law and includes mostly Illinois beneficiaries. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, questioning the appropriateness of resolving Illinois-centered issues in Indiana.The Vigo Superior Court dismissed the case, agreeing with the trustee that Indiana lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the trust was administered in Illinois. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the trial court had jurisdiction over the Indiana suit despite the trust's Illinois connections. The appellate court distinguished this case from In re Alford Trust, which held that Indiana courts lack jurisdiction over trusts administered exclusively in another state.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The court clarified that Indiana superior courts have broad civil jurisdiction, including over trust disputes, and that venue provisions do not affect jurisdiction. The court disapproved of the Alford Trust decision for conflating jurisdiction with prudential concerns like venue and choice of law. The court noted that while the trial court has jurisdiction, it may still dismiss the case under doctrines like comity or forum non conveniens if appropriate. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tingley v. First Financial Bank" on Justia Law

A man passed away, and his wife made a claim on his estate for half of the money he had removed from their joint bank account before his death. The wife argued that the couple owned the account as joint tenants, and her husband had withdrawn funds exceeding his interest. The district court dismissed her claim, concluding that she was making a claim for conversion sounding in tort and had not met the legal standard.The wife appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and that a standard from caselaw on joint tenancies should apply. The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with her, reversed the district court's decision, and remanded the case. The estate sought further review from the Iowa Supreme Court.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard. The correct standard, as established in Anderson v. Iowa Department of Human Services, involves determining the respective rights of joint tenants based on their agreement and the presumption that each joint tenant is entitled to half of the joint account, which can be rebutted. The court remanded the case for a new trial to allow for proper fact-finding regarding whether the husband removed funds in excess of his interest in the joint account. View "In re Estate of Johnston" on Justia Law

Richard Muller filed a claim against the estate of John Weeder, deceased, under the Nebraska Probate Code. Muller’s claim was based on a modified judgment entered in his favor against Weeder in a separate fence dispute action before Weeder's death. The county court appointed Margene Cork as the personal representative of Weeder’s estate in October 2017. Muller filed a "Statement of Claim" in December 2017 and a "Petition for Allowance of Claim" in September 2023. Cork, as the personal representative, resisted the claim and moved to strike it. The county court held a hearing and allowed Muller’s claim against the estate.The county court for Boyd County granted Muller’s petition and allowed his claim. The Estate appealed the decision, arguing that the county court lacked jurisdiction and that the law-of-the-case doctrine should apply based on a prior appeal in the fence dispute action. The appeal was initially directed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals but was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the county court had subject matter jurisdiction over Muller’s claim against the estate. The court noted that the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters relating to decedents’ estates. The court also rejected the Estate’s argument that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied, as the prior decision was made in a different action and not in the current probate case. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s judgment allowing Muller’s claim against the estate. View "In re Estate of Weeder" on Justia Law

Stephen Cook, a trustee of two charitable trusts, sued Preston Marshall, both personally and in his capacity as a trustee of a related trust, alleging that Preston's failures caused the charitable trusts to incur debt and tax penalties. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss and later granted Cook partial summary judgment. Preston appealed, arguing that the suit should be dismissed because Cook's unnamed co-trustees lacked diversity of citizenship.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially ruled in Cook's favor, ordering Preston to authorize payments from the Peroxisome Trust to the Marshall Heritage Foundation and holding that Preston breached his fiduciary duties. Cook later moved to enforce this judgment, claiming Preston continued to refuse to authorize payments and failed to file tax returns. The district court held Preston in contempt but did not remove him as co-trustee. Cook then filed a new suit against Preston, seeking damages and Preston's removal as co-trustee. The district court denied Preston's motion to dismiss, which argued that the claims were barred by res judicata and that necessary parties were not joined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that complete diversity of citizenship existed because the trusts themselves were not parties, and only the citizenship of Cook and Preston mattered. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding without joining Elaine and Pierce as parties. Additionally, the court determined that res judicata did not bar Cook's claims because the new claims arose from Preston's post-judgment conduct. Finally, the court rejected Preston's arguments regarding comparative fault and failure to mitigate damages, affirming the district court's judgment. View "Cook v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The case involves James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (the Church Firm), which served as legal counsel for Dennis Shogren, the personal representative of the estate of Loren R. Kirk, in a probate action. The estate beneficiaries, including Barbara Sagehorn and the Carter Beneficiaries, alleged that the Church Firm negligently failed to file a protective claim for a refund with the IRS or advise Shogren to do so. This failure purportedly resulted in the estate missing out on a potential $5,000,000 tax refund.The Superior Court of San Bernardino denied the Church Firm's special motion to strike the causes of action under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the firm did not demonstrate that the causes of action arose from its constitutionally protected free speech or petitioning activities. The Church Firm appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court conducted an independent review and agreed with the lower court's ruling. It determined that the alleged acts forming the basis of the petitioners' causes of action—specifically, the Church Firm's failure to file a protective claim for a refund and failure to advise Shogren to file such a claim—were not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute protects statements or writings made before or in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body, not failures to act or speak.Therefore, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the Church Firm did not meet its burden of proving that the causes of action arose from protected conduct. View "Callister v. James B. Church & Associates" on Justia Law

Chester “Chet” Lake contested the probate of his mother’s will, which his sister Mary Chesnutt had filed. Lake doubted the will’s validity, claiming undue influence, and requested a jury trial to determine the issue of devisavit vel non. The Madison County Chancery Court entered a scheduling order but did not specify whether the trial would be a bench or jury trial. After the discovery and motions deadlines passed, Lake filed a Notice of Jury Trial. Chesnutt moved to strike the notice, arguing that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by participating in pretrial proceedings and that the notice was untimely.The Madison County Chancery Court granted Chesnutt’s motion to strike, finding that Lake had waived his right to a jury trial by agreeing to the scheduling order and that his notice was untimely. Lake appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that Lake had not waived his right to a jury trial. The court found that under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-19, Lake was entitled to a jury trial upon request before any hearing on the issue of devisavit vel non. The court determined that the entry of the scheduling order did not constitute a hearing on the matter and that Lake’s notice, filed thirty-two days before the trial date, was timely. The court reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Lake v. Chesnutt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the Carolyn Patricia Young Family Trust, alleged that the defendants, the trust protector and trustee, were conspiring to withhold trust funds improperly. The alleged conspiracy aimed to preserve assets for the trustee, who is also a residuary beneficiary. Plaintiff sought an ex parte application to suspend the defendants' powers and appoint an interim trustee.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the ex parte application, issuing a minute order that suspended the powers of the trustee and trust protector, appointed a private professional fiduciary as interim trustee, required the interim trustee to post a bond, set a review hearing, and prohibited the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization. Defendants appealed this order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that orders suspending trustees and appointing interim trustees in probate court are not directly appealable. The court emphasized that such orders are provisional remedies, not final orders, and thus do not fall under the categories of appealable orders listed in the Probate Code sections 1300 and 1304. The court also found that the defendants lacked standing to appeal the portions of the order imposing a bond requirement and prohibiting the interim trustee from using trust assets for compensation without prior court authorization, as these did not injuriously affect the defendants' rights or interests in an immediate and substantial way.The court dismissed the appeal and denied the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, although it expressed concern over the conduct of the defendants' counsel. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' first request for judicial notice, granted the plaintiff's request for judicial notice, and denied the defendants' second request for judicial notice. View "Young v. Hartford" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute among co-trustees of The Pony Tracks Ranch Trust, specifically Allison Littlefield, her brothers David and Scott Littlefield, and her aunt Denise Sobel. Allison filed a petition alleging various grievances, including the removal of co-trustees, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the Trust. She claimed that the co-trustees misused Trust funds, concealed information, converted her personal property, and restricted her and her husband's use of the Ranch. Additionally, she alleged that the co-trustees failed to address misconduct by an employee, Stacey Limbada, who had been hostile towards her and her husband.The San Mateo County Superior Court denied the appellants' special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights. The court found that the appellants did not meet their burden of showing that Allison's petition arose from protected activity. The court also denied Allison's request for attorney's fees, concluding that the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the petition was based on protected activity. However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Allison's request for attorney's fees. The appellate court found that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous because it was entirely without merit, as no reasonable attorney would conclude that the petition sought to impose liability based on protected activity. The case was remanded for a determination of the appropriate award of attorney's fees for Allison. View "Littlefield v. Littlefield" on Justia Law

Paul O’Farrell, individually and on behalf of the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, Skyline Cattle Co., and VOR, Inc., filed a lawsuit against Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, and Kelly O’Farrell. Paul alleged that Kelly manipulated their father, Raymond, to orchestrate improper transactions, including a $3.2 million land sale and the non-renewal of Skyline’s lease, causing financial harm to the family entities and himself.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Grant County, South Dakota, presided by Judge Robert L. Spears, dismissed Paul’s claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendants. Paul had requested a change of judge, which was denied by Presiding Judge Stoltenburg, who cited judicial economy and previous submissions by Paul in related cases as reasons for the denial.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Paul and Skyline followed the proper procedure for seeking a change of judge and that neither had waived their right to do so in this specific action. The court found that Judge Spears was disqualified from further proceedings upon the filing of the affidavit for change of judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated all orders entered by Judge Spears in the case and remanded for the appointment of a replacement judge. View "Estate Of O’Farrell v. Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren" on Justia Law