Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Kristina Croy, a daycare operator, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter following a six-day jury trial. The charges stemmed from an incident in which an eight-month-old infant, MG, in her care died due to positional asphyxia resulting from being improperly swaddled. Croy appealed, arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Court affirmed the conviction, stating there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that swaddling MG posed a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and that Croy had consciously disregarded that risk. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror who had discussed the case with another juror prior to deliberations, violating the court's instructions not to prejudge the case. Furthermore, the Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive Croy of a fair trial when it declined her request to impose restrictions on how the State split its time between closing summation and rebuttal argument. The Court's decision was based on the particular facts of the case, noting that Croy could not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability the verdict might have been more favorable to her if the prosecutor had not been allowed to make a lengthy rebuttal argument. View "Croy v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the appellant, Mr. James Baker, contested the decree entered by a successor district judge after the original district judge who presided over the trial retired. Mr. Baker argued that the successor judge violated his right to due process by making findings of fact and conclusions of law without a formal certification under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 63.The Supreme Court of Wyoming concluded that Mr. Baker had waived his right to object to the successor judge's procedure. During a status conference, in which the successor judge proposed to proceed with determining the case based on the trial transcripts, Mr. Baker's counsel affirmed this approach and requested the court to make a ruling based on the existing record. Therefore, the court ruled that Mr. Baker intentionally relinquished his right to object to the successor judge's procedure, constituting a waiver.The court also clarified that the language in W.R.C.P. 63 does not necessitate the successor judge to advise the parties of their rights under the rule. The court found no authority supporting an affirmative duty for the successor judge to do so. Hence, the court affirmed the decree of divorce entered by the successor district court judge. View "Baker v. Baker" on Justia Law

In the child protection case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Dominique Desiree Sciacca (Mother), contested the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, JDD. The Department of Family Services had filed a petition for termination based on Mother's neglect of the child and her failure to comply with a reunification plan. The District Court of Goshen County granted the Department's petition. On appeal, Mother did not dispute the grounds for termination but argued that her due process rights were violated because she was not physically present in court for the termination hearing, although she was allowed to participate by phone. She also contended that the court violated procedural rules by allowing her to testify by phone from the same location as the child's father, without adequate safeguards to protect her from his influence. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no violation of due process or procedural rules. The court ruled that Mother was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the lower court had implemented sufficient safeguards during her phone testimony. View "In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: JJD v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Petitioners' petition for a writ of review seeking interlocutory review of the orders of the district court denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss and motion to set aside default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.At issue was subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on service by publication. Petitioners argued that the failure to serve Defendants with a summons stripped the district court of both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit held (1) absent a statute or rule to the contrary, no summons is required when service is accomplished by publication; (2) the district court correctly determined that a summons is not required as to those defendants who are properly subject to service by publication; but (3) the court erred in finding the service by publication conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendants with a known address. View "Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies) and seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice the complaint, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.The complaint alleged that S&T Bank's lending policies in the wake of the 2008 economic recession caused severe financial loss to the seventeen limited partnerships (the Limited Partnerships) managed by Black Diamond Energy and Black Diamond Energy of Delaware (together, the BDE Companies). Daniel Groskop, the trustee of a trust formed by the Limited Partnership, was later substituted for the Limited Partnerships as the true party in interest on the condition that the BDE Companies' claims against the Bank be dismissed with prejudice. Due to Groskop's noncompliance with discovery orders and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Groskop's violation of two court orders compelling discovery, two orders awarding attorneys' fees, and the failure to fulfill the representative duties associated with Wyo. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) required dismissal with prejudice. View "S&T Bank v. Groskop" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment to Appellee, holding that because the district court's order granting summary judgment did not resolve all outstanding issues before it, it was not an appealable order under Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.).Michael G. McDill, as trustee of the Phyllis V. McDill Revocable Trust, filed a petition for instructions seeking confirmation that the Trust's no contest clause prohibited Thomas P. McDill, Jr. from taking under the Trust. The district court granted Michael's motion for summary judgment and his petition for instructions. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the district court's order granting Michael's summary judgment motion was not an appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) Michael was entitled to attorney fees and costs under W.R.A.P. 1.03 and 10.05. View "McDill v. McDill" on Justia Law

In this contract dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing H&P Advisory Limited's complaint against Randgold Resources, Limited and Barrick Gold Corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in H&P's favor did not support personal jurisdiction over Defendants in Wyoming.Randgold, a Jersey (Channel Islands) corporation, and Barrick, a Canada corporation, were two of the world's largest gold mining companies. H&P, a United Kingdom private limited company, served as a neutral broker between the two companies in a merger deal. Those involved in the merger met in Jackson, Wyoming to participate in a series of negotiations. Randgold and Barrick subsequently announced the merger but did not list H&P as an advisor and offered to pay H&P a "small fee" for its role in the merger. H&P sued Randgold and Barrick in the Ninth Judicial District in and for Teton County, Wyoming alleging breach of contract. The district court dismissed the complaint on personal jurisdiction grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants. View "H&P Advisory Ltd. v. Randgold Resources Ltd." on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from the district court's partial summary judgment order, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it certified its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54(b).After his long-term romantic partner died, Defendant provided notice that he was the surviving joint tenant with survivorship rights as to a home in Teton County. Plaintiff, the executor of the decedent's estate, filed a declaratory judgment that Appellant and the decedent were tenants in common and asserted claims for breach of contract or partition. The district court concluded that Defendant owned the property as the surviving joint tenant. Over Defendant's objection, the district court certified the partial summary judgment order as a final judgment and stayed the remaining claim for slander of title. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declined to convert the appeal to a writ of review, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding "no just reason for delay" and certifying its partial summary judgment order as a final judgment. View "CIBC National Trust Co. v. Dominick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action claiming that Defendant failed to perform under a website development agreement, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case for improper venue.The district court determined that Teton County, Wyoming was not the proper venue for Plaintiff's suit because a forum selection clause in the parties' Master Services Agreement (MSA) required any claim or suit arising under the agreement to be litigated in Orange County, California. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact in determining that the MSA was a valid contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not decide any material issues of fact; (2) the MSA governed the parties' relationship; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue. View "Ecocards v. Tekstir, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue, holding that venue was not proper in Sheridan County.Plaintiffs brought this action in Sheridan County for legal malpractice against two attorneys and their firm. Defendants resided and had their personal place of business in Albany County. Defendants were served with the complaint at their place of business in Albany County. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that venue was improper in Sheridan County. The district court denied the motion, finding that Defendants could reasonably have expected to be summoned in Sheridan County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Defendants' motion to dismiss based on an erroneous interpretation of the venue provision in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-5-108. View "Aron v. Willey" on Justia Law