Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dr. Laura Dean Head, a college professor, passed away in 2013, leaving behind her sisters, Della Hamlin and Helaine Head. Shortly before her death, Dr. Head executed a trust naming her former student and friend, Zakiya Jendayi, as the trustee and sole beneficiary. In 2020, Hamlin and Head petitioned the probate court to invalidate the trust, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, and forgery. After a 17-day bench trial, the court found that Jendayi had exerted undue influence over Dr. Head and invalidated the trust.The probate court determined that Hamlin and Head, as intestate heirs disinherited by the trust, had standing to contest the trust. The court applied the common law presumption of undue influence, finding that Jendayi had a confidential relationship with Dr. Head, actively participated in procuring the trust, and would unduly benefit from it. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the presumption of undue influence and rejected Jendayi’s claims of judicial bias. The court concluded that any deficiencies in its statement of decision were harmless and affirmed the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the probate court’s judgment, holding that Hamlin and Head had standing to contest the trust. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the probate court’s application of the presumption of undue influence and its finding of undue influence. The court also concluded that the probate court did not demonstrate judicial bias and that any deficiencies in the statement of decision were harmless. The judgment was affirmed. View "Hamlin v. Jendayi" on Justia Law

Lena Johnson and her daughter, Katherine Grundhauser, died in a car accident in 2006. They co-owned a property in Butte, Montana, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Lena's estate was informally probated, and her son, Kenneth Johnson, was appointed personal representative. The estate's assets were distributed among Johnson's children and three of Katherine's children, with the remainder going to Johnson and Katherine's husband, Steven Grundhauser. The property in question was not resolved, and Johnson's children lived there rent-free.In 2020, Lena's will was discovered, which stated that all property should be divided equally between Katherine and Johnson or held in trust for their children if they predeceased Lena. This will contradicted the earlier distribution and indicated that the joint ownership of the property was for convenience only. Katherine's children and Steven Grundhauser petitioned for informal probate of Lena's estate, which was denied. Formal probate was opened in 2021 with Johnson as the personal representative. A mediation in 2022 led to a settlement agreement to buy out the interests of Katherine's children in the property.The Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, denied Katherine's estate's motion to intervene and for relief from judgment, finding that the estate was bound by the settlement agreement and that the doctrine of laches barred the motions. The court concluded that Grundhauser, as a petitioner, was aware of the settlement terms and had agreed to them.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed and remanded the case. It held that Katherine's estate should have been allowed to intervene as it had a valid legal interest in the property. The court found that the settlement agreement was based on a mutual mistake of law and that the district court's order was void for lack of jurisdiction and due process. The court also held that the doctrine of laches did not apply, as the delay in asserting the estate's rights was reasonable under the circumstances. View "In re Estate of Johnson" on Justia Law

Kiefer Production Company (KPC), a non-party, appealed adverse discovery orders related to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Keetons, co-trustees and co-personal representatives of Noma Rongey's estate. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) dismissed the appeal, stating the orders were not appealable. KPC then petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The district court had previously denied the Owners' motion to quash the subpoena and ordered KPC to produce financial documents to determine the value of Rongey's interest in KPC. The district court also placed Rongey's interest in pay status. COCA partially affirmed the district court's order but remanded the case to address the implications of Rongey's death and the scope of the documents requested. On remand, the district court denied KPC's renewed motion to quash and granted the Keetons' motion to compel the production of documents.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the discovery orders were appealable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering KPC to produce the documents. The court found that KPC, as a non-party, had a substantial right affected by the orders and that the orders conclusively determined the issue of document production. The court also held that KPC's financial documents, including tax returns, were relevant to determining the value of Rongey's interest in KPC and were therefore discoverable.The Supreme Court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, requiring KPC to comply with the subpoena. The court also held that KPC did not have standing to appeal the order placing Rongey's interest in pay status, as this issue was not final and was subject to further proceedings. View "ROYAL HOT SHOT INVESTMENTS v. KIEFER PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s, Bradford Jeffcoat and Sandra Perkins began a long-term relationship and lived together in a house Jeffcoat purchased in Charleston, South Carolina. In 2000, Jeffcoat deeded the property to himself and Perkins as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Perkins developed dementia in 2009, and in 2015, her daughter Vanessa Williams took her to Alabama without Jeffcoat's knowledge. Williams was later appointed as Perkins' guardian and conservator by an Alabama probate court and deeded Perkins' interest in the property to herself. Perkins died in November 2015.Williams filed a petition in Charleston County court to partition the property by sale. Jeffcoat counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and slander of title, and argued that the conveyance was invalid. The Charleston County Master-in-Equity granted summary judgment to Williams, finding that a joint tenant could unilaterally sever the joint tenancy under South Carolina law. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Jeffcoat's unclean hands defense, which precluded summary judgment. The court also held that the Alabama probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. However, the court determined that South Carolina Code section 27-7-40, which allows unilateral severance of joint tenancies, did not apply retroactively to the joint tenancy created before the statute's enactment. Under common law, the joint tenancy could be severed by unilateral conveyance.The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in part, affirmed the decision as modified in part, and remanded the case to the Master-in-Equity to resolve the unclean hands defense and determine whether it would defeat Williams' demand for partition. View "Williams v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

Linda Ager Coyle, the personal representative of Fred Ager's estate, filed a motion for confirmation of a specific devise related to the proceeds from the sale of storage units Fred had owned. Fred's will directed that the units be given in equal shares to his children, Linda and Jeff, with a life estate interest in half of the net rental income to his wife, Arlene Ager. Arlene filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate, which the circuit court granted. Subsequently, the court denied Linda's motion for confirmation of the specific devise.Linda appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion, and Arlene filed a notice of review seeking to challenge the court's earlier decision denying her motion to remove Linda as the personal representative. The Supreme Court of South Dakota issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to address whether the order denying the motion to confirm a specific devise was appealable. Linda argued that the order was appealable based on the precedent set in In re Estate of Geier, which held that each proceeding in an unsupervised administration is a final order. Arlene contended that the order was not final and not subject to review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a decision made prior to a final order terminating a supervised probate action is not governed by the Geier final order rule. The court emphasized that supervised administration is a single in rem proceeding under SDCL 29A-3-501, which contrasts with the multiple, independent proceedings allowed under SDCL 29A-3-107 for unsupervised administration. Since the order for supervised administration was signed before the denial of Linda's motion, the action had become a supervised administration, and the individual-proceeding rule of finality did not apply. Consequently, the court also dismissed Arlene's notice of review. View "Estate Of Ager" on Justia Law

Beneficiaries of a family trust sued the co-trustees, alleging mismanagement and the creation of a secret trust to withhold funds. They sought a declaratory judgment, accountings, and damages. The district court excluded all evidence of damages due to the beneficiaries' failure to provide a damages calculation as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the co-trustees, as the beneficiaries could not prove damages and were not entitled to a declaratory judgment or accountings.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana initially handled the case. The court granted the co-trustees' motion in limine to exclude damages evidence and subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. The court found that the beneficiaries failed to provide a timely damages calculation and that their claims were time-barred under Louisiana law. The beneficiaries appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the damages evidence. The appellate court applied the "CQ factors" to determine that the exclusion was justified due to the importance of the evidence, the prejudice to the co-trustees, the availability of a continuance, and the beneficiaries' lack of a valid explanation for their delay. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment on all claims, as the beneficiaries could not prove an essential element of their case without the excluded damages evidence. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the beneficiaries' request for a declaratory judgment, as it was remedial in nature and dependent on the underlying claims for recovery. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

Thomas Labs, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, sued Amber Marie Dukes and her veterinary supply company for money owed on products delivered. During the litigation, Dukes died, and her counsel filed a notice of death but did not serve any nonparty successors or representatives. Thomas Labs moved to substitute Dukes' trust and trustee, Jason Hilliard, as parties, which the district court granted. Later, Dukes' will was filed in probate court, appointing her brother, Lynn Hill, as personal representative. Dukes' counsel then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither Hilliard nor the trust were proper representatives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against Dukes, concluding that the 180-day deadline for substitution under NRCP 25(a) had passed. The court found that service of the notice of death on the parties alone triggered the deadline, even though no court-appointed executor or administrator existed when the notice was filed. The district court also denied Thomas Labs' motion to substitute a special administrator, Shara Berry, as untimely.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that under NRCP 25(a), when a decedent's attorney files a notice of death, they must serve the notice on nonparty successors or representatives to start the 180-day deadline for substitution. The court also noted that NRS 7.075 requires the decedent's attorney to file a motion to substitute a proper party within 90 days of the client's death. The Supreme Court found that the 180-day deadline never started because Dukes' counsel failed to serve the nonparty successors or representatives. Consequently, the district court's dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the substitution of a special administrator for Dukes. View "THOMAS LABS, LLC VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

Duane Durr, diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment, appointed his step-daughter, Dawn Volden, as his attorney-in-fact in 2017, granting her broad discretion over his assets. Volden used Durr’s credit cards and checking account for various expenditures, some of which Durr later claimed were unauthorized. Durr filed a lawsuit against Volden in 2021, alleging she breached her fiduciary duties and seeking an accounting of her spending.The District Court of Cass County held a three-day bench trial in May 2023. The court found that while Volden owed Durr a fiduciary duty, the evidence was insufficient to prove she breached that duty. The court noted that some transactions seemed suspect but concluded that most were permitted under the power of attorney. The court dismissed Durr’s claims, finding he failed to prove Volden’s actions constituted willful misconduct or gross negligence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not applying the presumption of undue influence, which should be applied to transactions between parties in a confidential relationship, such as an attorney-in-fact and their principal. The Supreme Court held that Durr had met his burden by showing suspicious transactions and unaccounted-for withdrawals, shifting the burden to Volden to disprove the presumption of undue influence. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision, requiring the lower court to apply the correct legal standard and burden shift. View "Durr v. Volden" on Justia Law

Chadwick R. Traylor challenged the testamentary trust of his father, Donald R. Traylor, alleging undue influence by the defendants, who were beneficiaries under the trust. Traylor claimed that the defendants manipulated his father into amending the trust to their benefit. The district court, after a bench trial, denied Traylor’s claims and enforced the trust’s no-contest clause against him.The District Court of Natrona County initially set the case for a jury trial but later struck Traylor’s jury demand as untimely. Traylor argued that the demand was timely because not all defendants had answered, but the court disagreed, ruling that the time for serving the demand began when Traylor answered the defendants’ counterclaims. The court also denied Traylor’s subsequent motion for reconsideration and his request for a jury trial under W.R.C.P. 39(b), finding no extraordinary circumstances to justify such relief.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that Traylor waived his right to a jury trial by failing to timely serve his demand. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Traylor’s Rule 39(b) request for a jury trial. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that the district court applied the correct burden of proof, requiring Traylor to prove undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that Traylor failed to meet this burden.The Supreme Court also upheld the district court’s enforcement of the no-contest clause against Traylor, interpreting the trust’s language to include him as a beneficiary subject to the clause. Finally, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of costs to the defendants, noting that Traylor did not provide an adequate record for review. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Traylor v. Green" on Justia Law