Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Cynthia Miles, a sixty-four-year-old woman suffering from acute psychosis and a history of suicidal ideation, experienced several psychiatric crises in 2021. After multiple hospitalizations and escapes from care facilities, she was admitted to Harbor Point, an unlocked mental health facility, where she again escaped on November 11, 2021. Despite a search, Miles was never found. Her family, having previously experienced her disappearances followed by safe returns, could not determine her fate. After extensive efforts to locate her failed, her family petitioned the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County for a judicial determination of death. Following a jury trial, the court issued a certificate of presumed death on August 29, 2022.Subsequently, Miles’s daughter, as administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against several healthcare providers. The defendants asserted that the action was time-barred under Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims, arguing that the limitations period began either at Miles’s disappearance or when the family first sought a declaration of death. The Iowa District Court for Cass County rejected this argument, ruling that the statute of limitations began only upon the judicial declaration of death, not the earlier disappearance.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal to determine when the limitations period commenced. The court held that, in a case where there is no known physical injury and it is unclear whether the missing person is alive or dead, the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim does not begin to run until there is a judicial determination of death. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, allowing the wrongful death action to proceed as timely filed. View "Schneide v. Holliday" on Justia Law

A company was the beneficiary of life insurance policies held in a trust formed by Daniel Carpenter. After the insurer paid proceeds to the trust, the beneficiary sought to recover the full amount and alleged that Carpenter hid assets through hundreds of shell companies. Carpenter was convicted of fraud, and the beneficiary obtained a judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, later registering the judgment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court entered judgment against several Carpenter entities, including a limited liability company that owned another company incorporated in Oklahoma. A receiver was authorized to preserve the assets of the debtor company.An entity called Phoenix Charitable Trust, apparently linked to Carpenter, entered the Oklahoma proceedings as an “interested party” through its counsel, who had represented Carpenter and related entities in other courts. Phoenix objected to several orders issued by the district court: an award of attorney fees and costs against Carpenter, an order authorizing the sale of the Oklahoma company’s insurance portfolio, and an order denying Phoenix’s motion to vacate a prior injunction against Carpenter and his entities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether Phoenix had standing to challenge these orders. The court found that Phoenix failed to demonstrate it was injured by the attorney fees order or the sale-of-assets order, as required for Article III standing. Regarding the injunction, the court concluded that Phoenix lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the rights of others rather than its own. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Phoenix’s challenges. View "Universitas Education v. Phoenix Charitable Trust" on Justia Law

Two brothers became parties to a dispute over the inheritance of their father’s estate after the father died intestate. One brother, Christopher, asserted that his sibling, Daniel, was not the biological child of their father, Ernest, and therefore not entitled to inherit. Christopher petitioned for letters of administration in the probate court, claiming to be Ernest's sole heir. The probate court granted him letters of administration. Christopher then sought to remove the estate administration to the circuit court, filing a petition that was not verified under oath as required by Alabama law. The circuit court entered an order removing the administration and later, based on DNA evidence, an affidavit from the mother, and Daniel’s marriage certificate, declared that Daniel was not Ernest’s biological child or heir.After the circuit court’s order, Daniel filed a postjudgment motion arguing that the removal of the estate administration was invalid because Christopher’s initial removal petition was not sworn, as required by Ala. Code § 12-11-41. Around the same time as the hearing on this motion, Christopher submitted an amended, sworn petition for removal, and the circuit court then entered a new order granting removal. However, this action occurred after the circuit court had already issued its prior order resolving the inheritance dispute.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the estate administration was not properly invoked until a sworn petition was filed, as mandated by statute. Thus, the July 2025 order declaring Daniel not an heir was void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at the time it was entered. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the July 2025 order. View "Thomas v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Barbara Tanzer, an elderly woman, and her husband moved through several states, ultimately leasing an apartment in Alabama to allow her husband to receive medical treatment. Shortly after their arrival, the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) petitioned for protective services, alleging Barbara was unable to care for herself and at risk of exploitation. DHR cited Barbara’s physical and cognitive limitations and alleged suspicious financial activity by a third party using a power of attorney. Barbara was evaluated twice by medical professionals, who found she did not suffer from significant cognitive impairment and retained capacity for medical decision-making, though she required physical assistance. Barbara asserted that her presence in Alabama was temporary and that she remained domiciled elsewhere.After DHR’s petition, the Jefferson Probate Court issued emergency protective orders, froze Barbara’s assets, and ultimately appointed a permanent conservator for her estate. Throughout the proceedings, Barbara maintained that the court lacked personal jurisdiction, as she did not reside in Alabama, had no family or assets there, and was only temporarily present for her husband’s medical care. She sold her Georgia property, purchased a condominium in Massachusetts, and notified the probate court of her permanent move out of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the probate court lacked personal jurisdiction under the Alabama Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act. The Court found that Alabama was neither Barbara’s home state nor a significant-connection state at the time the petition was filed, and none of the statutory bases for jurisdiction applied. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the probate court’s order appointing a conservator and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tanzer v. Alabama Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Robert Crawford was admitted to a hospital in August 2018 in critical condition. The next day, his daughter Carol obtained a general power of attorney (POA) allegedly signed by Robert and notarized by Lindsay, though Robert’s condition raised questions about the validity of the POA. Carol attempted to use the POA to access Robert’s bank accounts; one bank and a hospital refused to honor it, but First Security Bank (FSB) allowed significant withdrawals, despite having prior instructions from Robert to prohibit such transactions unless he appeared in person. Robert died intestate in September 2018, and Dasie Mae Richmond was appointed administratrix of his estate.Dasie filed suit in the Quitman County Chancery Court in August 2021 against FSB, Carol, and Lindsay, alleging improper procurement of the POA, conversion, conspiracy, negligence, and breach of contract. After initial discovery, proceedings were stayed due to Carol’s indictment and plea related to exploitation of a vulnerable person. Lindsay filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. Later, Lindsay moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), with FSB and Carol joining. The chancery court granted dismissal as to Lindsay only, citing ongoing restitution by Carol and unresolved issues with FSB, but denied the motion as to FSB and Carol.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed only FSB’s appeal of the denial of dismissal. The Court held that the facts justifying dismissal for Lindsay applied equally to FSB and found no sound basis in the record for treating FSB differently. The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that the chancery court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 41(b) dismissal as to FSB. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against FSB. View "First Security Bank v. Richmond" on Justia Law

A woman sought to challenge the probate of a will and asserted claims seeking recognition as an heir, either as a biological child or by equitable adoption, following the death of a decedent who resided in Tallapoosa County. After letters of administration had initially been issued to her by the Montgomery Probate Court, subsequent proceedings transferred jurisdiction to the Tallapoosa Probate Court, which admitted a document as the decedent’s will and appointed other individuals as personal representatives. The woman then filed a pro se complaint in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, contesting the will and requesting various relief, including a DNA test to establish her relationship to the decedent.The Tallapoosa Circuit Court held a hearing, denied her request to compel DNA testing of the proponents, allowed her to submit her own certified DNA evidence, and later dismissed the action on the ground that she had failed to provide proof of relationship as required. She appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to jurisdictional reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama determined that, due to statutory changes enacted by Act No. 2022-427, original jurisdiction for will contests relating to wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, lies with the probate court, not the circuit court, except in cases where a proceeding has been properly removed to the circuit court. Finding that no removal had occurred, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. The Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court made no determination as to the woman’s ability to bring a will contest in the probate court. View "Glenn v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when one attorney, after obtaining a $5 million default judgment against another attorney in California, sought to collect on that judgment by levying two Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) belonging to the judgment debtor. The debtor argued that because he had moved to Florida, Florida’s statutory exemptions should apply, shielding his IRAs from collection. He also claimed the IRAs were funded from a surrendered life insurance policy held in a private retirement plan, asserting exemptions under California law for both the policy and the retirement plan.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the claim of exemption. Initially, the court tentatively applied Florida law but later decided the law of the forum state—California—should govern exemption claims. Ultimately, the court found the debtor failed to prove that the IRAs qualified for any exemption under California law, including the private retirement plan exemption or that the funds were necessary for his support. The court denied the claim of exemption, permitting the creditor to levy the IRAs.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that California law applies to collection actions in California courts regardless of the judgment debtor’s domicile. It further concluded that a surrendered life insurance policy is not necessarily exempt from collection and, once surrendered, is treated as matured, requiring proof that the proceeds are necessary for support. The court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings, applied a de novo review to legal questions, and affirmed the order denying the exemption. Thus, the IRAs were subject to collection, and the trial court’s order was affirmed. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law

A woman, Susan, was one of three beneficiaries of her father Warren’s trust. She believed the trust’s terms were unfair to her compared to her brothers, David and Michael, as her share was subject to restrictive terms and higher taxes. Warren allegedly wanted to amend the trust to make distributions equal among his children, and had consulted an attorney about this. Susan claimed that David and Michael undertook several actions in 2021 to prevent Warren from making this amendment, including interfering with his lawyer, making accusations against Susan, and isolating Warren.Previously, Susan filed a probate petition in Alameda County Superior Court, seeking to remove David as trustee and as Warren’s agent, and alleging elder isolation and similar misconduct by her brothers. The probate petition raised many of the same factual allegations later made in this civil case. After Warren’s death, Susan dismissed her probate petition without prejudice. She then filed a civil complaint, asserting claims for intentional interference with expected inheritance (IIEI) and elder financial abuse. The elder abuse claim was later dismissed, and the IIEI claim proceeded. David filed a demurrer, arguing Susan had an adequate remedy in probate, among other defenses.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Susan’s complaint. The appellate court held that Susan’s IIEI claim could not proceed because she had an adequate remedy in probate. The court reasoned that the tort of IIEI is only available when probate does not provide a remedy, and Susan, as a beneficiary, had standing and the ability to seek relief in probate but chose to dismiss her petition. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. View "Halperin v. Halperin" on Justia Law

Tony petitioned for formal probate of his mother Judith’s will and codicil, which left her entire estate to him and specifically disinherited her other children, Rick, Sandy, and Beth. The siblings objected, alleging that the will was the product of undue influence, among other claims. The dispute centered on family dynamics and prior business conflicts between Tony and Rick, including previous litigation over property and asset division. In the prior case, the court made adverse findings about Tony’s credibility and honesty regarding his dealings with Rick.The siblings, as respondents, successfully moved in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Todd County, for the admission of the prior court’s findings and conclusions under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, arguing these were relevant to the undue influence claim. The circuit court admitted almost all of the findings from the prior case as conclusively established, including negative credibility determinations about Tony. The jury in the undue influence trial was instructed to accept these findings as true, and ultimately found that Tony had unduly influenced Judith, invalidating the will.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court properly applied collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred by admitting the prior findings wholesale, as the issues in the prior litigation were not identical to those in the undue influence case and the credibility determinations were not essential to the prior judgment. The Supreme Court found this error was prejudicial, as it likely impacted the jury’s assessment of Tony’s credibility, a central issue in the undue influence claim. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Estate Of O'Neill" on Justia Law