Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of prohibition to defendant Denita D. Berg, preventing the Circuit Court of Grant County from enforcing orders to sell personal property before determining its ownership. The orders were part of a case brought by Denita Berg's stepchildren, who alleged that Berg had not properly inventoried their father's estate after his death and had committed fraud.The Supreme Court's decision was based on the fact that the orders to sell the property were issued despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact about who owned it. The Court explained that the circuit court's order was erroneous as a matter of law because it went beyond the requirements of Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment should only be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law.The Court concluded that the circuit court had exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering the sale of the property when ownership was still in dispute. Therefore, it granted a writ of prohibition, as moulded, to preclude the circuit court from ordering the sale of the disputed property. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. Berg v. Ryan" on Justia Law

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In the case before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Christopher O’Donnell, as the personal representative of the estate of Erica J. O’Donnell, appealed a judgment from the York County Probate Court. The court had approved a referee's report regarding the distribution of the estate. O’Donnell contested several aspects of the report, including the application of the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A of the Maine Revised Statutes to Erica J. O’Donnell's estate and the court’s decision to adopt the referee's report without holding a hearing on O’Donnell's amended objection.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court concluded that the intestacy succession provisions of Title 18-A, not Title 18-C, applied because Erica J. O’Donnell died before the effective date of Title 18-C. The court also rejected O’Donnell's argument that he was deprived of a hearing on the referee’s report, finding that a hearing was held after the referee's report and O’Donnell's objections were received. The court ruled that O’Donnell's amended objection lacked the required level of specificity to preserve his objection to the plan of distribution. View "Estate of Erica J. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of the State of Montana was presiding over a dispute regarding the reimbursement claim of Angela Mastrovito from the Estate of Rebekah Barsotti. Mastrovito, the mother of the deceased Rebekah Barsotti, had served as her court-appointed guardian after Rebekah went missing and was presumed dead following a reported drowning accident. Mastrovito filed a claim for $140,688.45 in expenses she allegedly incurred during her guardianship, including costs for rent, legal fees, meals, travel, and others. The claim was opposed by Rebekah's husband, David Barsotti, who was appointed as the personal representative of Rebekah's estate.The District Court denied Mastrovito's claim for three reasons: her appointment as a guardian was retroactively improper due to Rebekah's death, the claimed expenditures were unreasonable, and the claim lacked sufficient substantiation. Mastrovito appealed this decision, arguing that her appointment was not improper and that she was denied a fair hearing to present evidence in support of her claim.Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's denial of the claim. The court reasoned that even if Mastrovito's appointment was proper, she still failed to provide sufficient support for her claim. The court concluded that a hearing could not change the fact that Mastrovito's claim was facially insufficient. The court underscored the need for providing supporting evidence to determine the validity and reasonableness of claimed costs. View "In re Estate of Barsotti" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision to reform an irrevocable trust to reflect the original intent of the settlor. The settlor, Elton G. Beebe Sr., created a trust in 1992 with the aim of providing lifetime benefits to 16 named individuals. However, he claimed that a scrivener’s error in the trust document led to a misunderstanding about the distribution of the trust's assets upon the death of the last named beneficiary. The trust document stated that the assets would be distributed to the descendants of all 16 beneficiaries, but Beebe claimed that his intention was for the assets to be distributed to his own lineal descendants.The trial court found that the settlor provided clear and convincing evidence of his original intent and the mistake in the trust document. It reformed the termination provision of the trust to reflect the settlor's intent. The decision was appealed by several parties who were not in agreement with the reformation.The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the termination provision in the trust was a mistake of expression that did not reflect Beebe's intent at the time the trust was created. The court did not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding. View "In the Matter of the Elton G. Beebe, Sr. Irrevocable Family Mortgage Trust v. Family Management, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this case, GayLe Schleve, the personal representative of the estates of Viola J. Heath and Caleb C. Heath, appealed orders from the District Court of Dunn County, North Dakota, that granted Wells Fargo Bank's motions to vacate previous orders establishing the authority of domiciliary foreign personal representatives and letters testamentary related to the estate of Viola J. Heath, and determining heirs and successors in the estate of Caleb C. Heath.Viola and Caleb Heath were residents of Montana who owned mineral rights in Dunn County, North Dakota. After their deaths, litigation ensued over the distribution of these mineral rights. The orders being challenged in this appeal had resulted in the mineral rights being transferred to the heirs of Viola Heath.Wells Fargo, as successor to Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co., the trustee appointed in Caleb Heath's will, claimed an ownership interest in the mineral rights and challenged the transfer of those rights to the heirs of Viola Heath. Wells Fargo argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the orders, and that the orders should be vacated because they were manifestly unjust and based on incorrect applications of the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Wells Fargo had standing to challenge the orders. The court also held that the district court had erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order in the Estate of Viola J. Heath. However, the Supreme Court remanded for further determination of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties in the Estate of Viola J. Heath, and whether relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).Finally, the Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting Wells Fargo's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the order in the Estate of Caleb C. Heath without sufficient findings related to timeliness. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Heath" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Mrs. Tokowitz the right to a spousal election against her late husband's will. The late Mr. Tokowitz had left his estate to a revocable trust and made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz in his will. The court held that Mrs. Tokowitz was not deprived of her spousal election right simply because her husband's property was transferred to his trust through a pour-over will. The court reasoned that property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the decedent's probate estate until the will is probated. Only after probate does it pass in accordance with section 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust terms. The court also found that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming at the time of his death, as evidenced by his will, making Mrs. Tokowitz eligible for the spousal election under Wyoming law. The court declined to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz's rights as a beneficiary under the trust, stating that issues relating to the trust were outside of its jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Tokowitz v. Tokowi" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard an appeal by Kelly Maltais contesting the dismissal of her probate appeal by the Superior Court. Kelly challenged the last will and testament of her father, Laurent E. Maltais, alleging fraud, duress, and undue influence, and asserting that her father lacked testamentary capacity. Kelly's probate appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court on the grounds that it was filed 32 days after the probate court order, two days beyond the statutory 30-day limit for appeal. Kelly argued that the 30th day fell on a Saturday, and under Rule 6 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, she had until the following Monday to file her appeal.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Superior Court, ruling that the computation of time for the 30-day deadline is tolled when the last day for filing falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in order to give appellants the full benefit of all the time allowed, even if it necessitates giving an additional day. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Maltais v. Maltais" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

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In this case, UMB Bank, N.A. (UMB) filed a complaint against Jessie Benton and her children, alleging that they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by committing acts of mail, wire, and bank fraud. The dispute arose from the management of a family trust, which included works of art, real estate, and personal effects. The beneficiaries of the trust accused UMB of mismanagement and sued UMB in a separate Missouri state court case. UMB then filed this federal case, arguing that the beneficiaries and their attorney engaged in fraudulent activities to force UMB to increase trust distributions or resign as trustee.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss UMB's complaint for failure to state a civil RICO claim. The court agreed that UMB failed to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. Although UMB might be able to prove that three communications to media outlets qualify as predicate acts of mail, wire, or bank fraud, these acts did not show a pattern of racketeering activity because they occurred within a few days and targeted a single victim (UMB). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of UMB's post-judgment motions for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was both untimely and futile. View "UMB Bank v. Guerin" on Justia Law

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The case concerns a dispute between Dominic and Eric Jr., the grandchildren of the settlor of the Lena Grace Hamilton Trust, and their aunt, LaDonna Green, the initial trustee of the trust. After the death of Lena Grace Hamilton, the trust's settlor, LaDonna informed Dominic and Eric Jr. that she was the sole beneficiary of the trust. However, Dominic and Eric Jr. believed the trust amendment that made LaDonna the sole beneficiary was forged. They filed a lawsuit alleging forgery and other claims more than a year after they received notice from LaDonna about the trust and its terms. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Four, held that Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was an action to contest the trust under Probate Code section 16061.8. This section imposes a 120-day statute of limitations for bringing such an action, which starts running from the day the notification by the trustee is served. Since Dominic and Eric Jr.'s lawsuit was filed more than a year after they received the notification, the court ruled that their action was time-barred under section 16061.8. The court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which had sustained LaDonna's demurrer (a motion to dismiss) without leave to amend, effectively dismissing the lawsuit. View "Hamilton v. Green" on Justia Law