Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Duane Durr, diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment, appointed his step-daughter, Dawn Volden, as his attorney-in-fact in 2017, granting her broad discretion over his assets. Volden used Durr’s credit cards and checking account for various expenditures, some of which Durr later claimed were unauthorized. Durr filed a lawsuit against Volden in 2021, alleging she breached her fiduciary duties and seeking an accounting of her spending.The District Court of Cass County held a three-day bench trial in May 2023. The court found that while Volden owed Durr a fiduciary duty, the evidence was insufficient to prove she breached that duty. The court noted that some transactions seemed suspect but concluded that most were permitted under the power of attorney. The court dismissed Durr’s claims, finding he failed to prove Volden’s actions constituted willful misconduct or gross negligence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not applying the presumption of undue influence, which should be applied to transactions between parties in a confidential relationship, such as an attorney-in-fact and their principal. The Supreme Court held that Durr had met his burden by showing suspicious transactions and unaccounted-for withdrawals, shifting the burden to Volden to disprove the presumption of undue influence. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision, requiring the lower court to apply the correct legal standard and burden shift. View "Durr v. Volden" on Justia Law

Chadwick R. Traylor challenged the testamentary trust of his father, Donald R. Traylor, alleging undue influence by the defendants, who were beneficiaries under the trust. Traylor claimed that the defendants manipulated his father into amending the trust to their benefit. The district court, after a bench trial, denied Traylor’s claims and enforced the trust’s no-contest clause against him.The District Court of Natrona County initially set the case for a jury trial but later struck Traylor’s jury demand as untimely. Traylor argued that the demand was timely because not all defendants had answered, but the court disagreed, ruling that the time for serving the demand began when Traylor answered the defendants’ counterclaims. The court also denied Traylor’s subsequent motion for reconsideration and his request for a jury trial under W.R.C.P. 39(b), finding no extraordinary circumstances to justify such relief.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that Traylor waived his right to a jury trial by failing to timely serve his demand. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Traylor’s Rule 39(b) request for a jury trial. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that the district court applied the correct burden of proof, requiring Traylor to prove undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that Traylor failed to meet this burden.The Supreme Court also upheld the district court’s enforcement of the no-contest clause against Traylor, interpreting the trust’s language to include him as a beneficiary subject to the clause. Finally, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of costs to the defendants, noting that Traylor did not provide an adequate record for review. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Traylor v. Green" on Justia Law

Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the will of the late Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, is the testator’s former wife. She appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul Doucette, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The Superior Court affirmed an order of the Newport Probate Court denying the plaintiff’s petition for leave to file a claim out of time against the estate. The denied claim would have alleged a breach of contract, based on the plaintiff’s contention that a key provision of the testator’s will violated the terms of the couple’s property-settlement agreement.The plaintiff and the testator were married in 1986, had three children, and were divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement (PSA), the testator was to execute a will that would not only treat his obligations under the PSA as “a claim against any assets in [his] [e]state” but also “specifically bequest to [plaintiff] an amount equal to said obligations.” A dispute soon unfolded over what the PSA required of the testator’s will.In 2017, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Superior Court judgment on multiple grounds. Relevant to the present appeal, the court determined “that the disputed provision in the will is ambiguous” because it “does not clearly specify under what circumstances plaintiff is to receive the sum of $2,000,000 or the circumstances under which she is to receive such other amount necessary to satisfy all of [the testator’s] remaining obligations.” Because “a proper resolution of this matter require[d] factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to [the] testator’s intent,” the court remanded the case to the Superior Court.Back in Superior Court, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint with a claim for breach of contract. The Superior Court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, in part because she did not first submit the claim to the probate court, and also because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition in the Newport Probate Court for leave to file a claim out of time and, after the court denied her petition, she appealed that denial to the Superior Court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to timely present her claim for breach of contract was not due to excusable neglect and, therefore, her claim must be denied. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

The case involves Leatrice Tanner-Brown, a descendant of people enslaved by the Cherokee Tribe and emancipated at the end of the Civil War. Her grandfather, George Curls, received land allotments as a minor. Tanner-Brown and the Harvest Institute Freedman Federation, LLC (HIFF) brought suit seeking various remedies related to the allotments, including an accounting from the Secretary of the Interior arising from the alleged creation of a trust relationship between the federal government and Indian beneficiaries.The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that Tanner-Brown failed to establish that she was injured by not receiving an accounting on the ground that there was no trust relationship between Curls and the federal government and that HIFF failed to satisfy the requirements for associational standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that although HIFF cannot sustain standing, Tanner-Brown has alleged a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court also found that the case raises factual questions that cannot be resolved at this juncture and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Tanner-Brown’s allegations and the relevant record documents in the first instance. View "Tanner-Brown v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the "Traveler Photo," taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA's alleged use of Dr. Sumrall's right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership. View "Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a conservatorship dispute over Susan Davis Malone. Two attorneys involved in the case filed two motions requesting the trial judge to recuse himself. The first recusal motion was denied and affirmed on appeal. The second recusal motion was also denied. The attorneys then filed a second petition for recusal appeal, arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Court of Appeals agreed with the attorneys and held that the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators then filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court of Tennessee.The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted the application and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court also held that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "In Re Conservatorship of Malone" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law