Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Jacob Hollingsworth filed for divorce from Katie Hollingsworth after nearly five years of marriage. They had one child and stipulated to a parenting plan, leaving the division of marital property, spousal support, and attorney’s fees as the issues for trial. Katie entered the marriage with significant debt and a house, while Jacob had a house, personal assets, and business interests. They kept separate finances except for a joint account for shared expenses. Jacob paid off much of Katie’s debt during the marriage.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, heard testimony from both parties, two valuation experts, and Jacob’s father. The court awarded Jacob 92% and Katie 8% of the marital assets, denied Katie’s requests for spousal support and attorney’s fees, and allowed Jacob’s valuation expert to testify despite a late report disclosure. Katie appealed the decisions.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It upheld the district court’s decision to allow the expert testimony, noting that the court offered a continuance, which Katie declined. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the late disclosure.The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court’s valuation and division of the marital estate, finding the valuations were within the range of evidence presented and the unequal distribution was justified by the parties’ financial contributions and spending habits. The court upheld the use of the agreed valuation date for assets and found no error in including interim order funds in the marital estate.The court found no clear error in denying spousal support, as both parties were capable of self-support. It also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, noting Katie’s sufficient income and excessive spending habits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. Shahriyar argued that the writ should be quashed because it was sought more than ten years after the entry of judgment, violating Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020, and was subject to the renewal requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. He contended that judgments for attorney fees under the Family Code are not exempt from these requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ of execution. The court found that the judgment for attorney fees, entered under the Family Code, was enforceable until satisfied in full and did not require renewal under Family Code section 291, subdivision (b). Shahriyar appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment for attorney fees is entered under the Family Code, it is enforceable until paid in full, and failure to renew the judgment does not affect its enforceability. The court found that the plain language of Family Code section 291, its legislative history, and common sense supported this interpretation. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that Family Code section 291's reference to money judgments includes those for attorney fees, exempting them from the ten-year limitation and renewal requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. Child support was to continue until their child, Shari, turned 19 and was a full-time high school student. Shari turned 18 in January 2001 and graduated high school in June 2001, but wage garnishments for child support continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously modified the spousal support order but failed to do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands. The court also disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007, noting that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of child support. The court emphasized that it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage and earnings assignment order. Given the 13-year delay and the prejudice to Lois, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny David's request for reimbursement. View "Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of J.M. (Father) appealing an order from the Circuit Court denying his motion to dismiss a neglect petition due to defective service of process. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed the petition after J.M.'s mother passed away, leaving J.M. without a caretaker. Father, who was living in Florida and had not seen J.M. for over a year, was served with the petition by a process server. He argued that service was defective because it was not performed by a law enforcement officer as required by RSA 169-C:8, I.The Circuit Court denied Father's motion to dismiss, and the adjudicatory hearing proceeded, resulting in a finding of neglect and an order for J.M.'s out-of-home placement. Father did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss and participated in the hearing, leading to the waiver of his service of process challenge under Mosier v. Kinley.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with DCYF that Father waived his challenge by not appealing immediately. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's neglect finding, noting that Father had not seen J.M. for 18 months and had not provided any support for two years despite being financially able.The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the neglect finding was supported by evidence and that the trial court did not err in continuing J.M.'s out-of-home placement instead of placing J.M. in Father's custody under DCYF supervision. The Supreme Court clarified that appeals from a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are discretionary and must be filed within 30 days. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law