Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
by
Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

by
R.W. and J.R. are the biological parents of twins Rachel and Joshua, born prematurely on May 9, 2022. Both R.W. and the twins tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Jackson County Youth Court placed the children in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) and later adjudicated them as neglected children. The court also ruled that CPS could bypass reasonable efforts to reunify the twins with their parents. R.W. and J.R. appealed this decision.The Jackson County Youth Court initially held an emergency custody hearing, followed by an adjudication hearing where the twins were declared neglected. The court found that R.W. had a history of substance abuse and had previously lost custody of her other children. J.R. was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. The court ruled that CPS could bypass efforts to reunify the children with their parents due to the parents' history and current circumstances. R.W. and J.R. raised issues on appeal regarding jurisdiction, venue, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the neglect adjudication and the bypass of reunification efforts.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's judgment. The court held that the youth court had both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and that Jackson County was the proper venue. The evidence presented, including the positive drug tests and the parents' histories, was sufficient to support the adjudication of neglect. The court also found that bypassing reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents was justified based on the parents' past terminations of parental rights and J.R.'s criminal history. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the youth court's decision. View "R.W. v. Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

by
A mother sought to regain custody of her children, who had been living with their uncle and aunt in Canada for two years. The uncle and aunt opposed the return, arguing it was in the children's best interests to stay with them. Concurrent custody proceedings took place in Alaska and Canada, with Alaska ultimately asserting jurisdiction. After a custody trial, the uncle and aunt were awarded physical and legal custody of the children. The mother appealed, claiming the court made several legal and factual errors.The Alaska Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and consolidated the cases. During the trial, the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the mother, the uncle, the aunt, and experts. The court found that the children were thriving in Canada and that returning them to their mother would be detrimental due to her erratic behavior and substance use. The court also conducted in camera interviews with the children, who expressed a preference to stay with their uncle and aunt.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the uncle and aunt, finding that the children's welfare required it. The court also found that the Superior Court correctly applied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements, determining that the placement constituted a "foster care placement" and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court concluded that the expert witnesses were properly qualified and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to their mother would likely cause serious emotional damage. The custody and visitation orders were upheld as not being an abuse of discretion. View "O'Brien v. Delaplain" on Justia Law

by
Miriam Penado sought a temporary order of protection for herself and her two minor children in Butte-Silver Bow County Justice Court against Daniel Hunter, the children's father. The Justice Court issued a temporary ex parte order of protection and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, Hunter filed a parenting plan petition in Gallatin County District Court and moved to remove the protection order case to that court, citing a state statute. The Justice Court transferred the case and vacated the hearing. The Gallatin County District Court then referred the case to a standing master, who set a hearing and maintained the temporary order of protection.Penado filed a motion in the Justice Court to vacate the transfer orders, which was denied. She appealed to the Gallatin County District Court, which also denied her appeal, stating that any appeal should have been made to the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The District Court found that Hunter had properly removed the case under the relevant statute. At the subsequent hearing, the District Court granted a one-year order of protection for Penado and allowed Hunter visitation rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the removal of the temporary order of protection case to the Gallatin County District Court was proper under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, which allows either party to remove the matter to district court before or after the hearing. The court found that the statute's language and intent were to consolidate related family law matters in the district court handling the parenting plan. The court also determined that Penado's due process rights were not violated, as she had notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's final order of protection. View "Penado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

by
Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law

by
Fawna and Terry Goff were married in 2015 and had one child, M.G. In late 2021, Terry left for work in Texas and did not return, pursuing a new relationship. Fawna allowed M.G. to visit Terry in Texas, but he refused to return the child. Fawna filed for divorce, and the circuit court granted her a divorce on grounds of adultery, awarded her primary custody of M.G., set child support, divided property, and awarded partial attorney fees to Fawna. Terry appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Terry did not respond to the divorce complaint in time, leading Fawna to seek a default judgment. At the hearing, Terry requested to proceed with the divorce trial, which the court allowed. The court granted Fawna a divorce, primary custody of M.G., and ordered Terry to pay child support and arrearages. Terry was also ordered to pay half the mortgage on the marital home and awarded his camper. Terry filed for divorce in Texas, but the South Dakota court retained jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Terry waived his claim against the trial on the merits by not objecting at the hearing. However, the court found that the circuit court abused its discretion in calculating arrearages without considering the months Terry cared for M.G. and other support provided. The court also found insufficient findings regarding the best interests of M.G. for visitation limitations and the award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recalculating arrearages and further findings on visitation and attorney fees. View "Goff v. Goff" on Justia Law

by
Evan D., an Indian child, was born with significant health complications. Shortly after his birth, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed an emergency petition to adjudicate him a child in need of aid due to his parents' history of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Evan was placed with foster parents Rosalind and Max M., who lived near a medical facility capable of addressing his health needs. The Native Village of Togiak, Evan’s tribe, was informed of the proceedings and later petitioned to transfer jurisdiction over Evan’s case to the tribal court.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, adjudicated Evan a child in need of aid and granted temporary custody to OCS. OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Evan’s parents, and the Tribe petitioned to transfer jurisdiction. Rosalind and Max moved to intervene, arguing that the Tribe might place Evan with his grandmother, who they believed could not meet his health needs. The Superior Court denied their motion, stating that federal law prohibits considering potential placement changes when deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the foster parents' arguments against transferring jurisdiction were contrary to federal law, which prohibits considering whether transfer could affect the child's placement. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that the foster parents did not present valid grounds to deny the transfer of jurisdiction and therefore did not share any issue of law or fact in common with the underlying proceedings that would justify their intervention. The court also addressed the procedure for staying transfer orders pending appeal, emphasizing the need to balance competing interests. View "Rosalind M. v. State" on Justia Law

by
A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

by
The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

by
Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law