Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2018, a juvenile court removed seven children from their biological parents' custody due to abuse and neglect. The children were returned in early 2019 but removed again a few months later after continued issues. The five oldest children were eventually placed with their grandparents in New Mexico, while the two youngest, Alice and Liam, were placed with a foster family in Utah. In October 2020, the juvenile court held a termination trial to determine the best permanent placement for Alice and Liam. The court decided it was in their best interest to terminate the biological parents' rights and allow the foster family to adopt them.The biological parents appealed the decision. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the termination order, concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The appellate court also held that termination must be "materially better" than any other option. Because it reversed on the merits, the court of appeals did not address other issues raised by the parents, such as ineffective counsel.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found several errors in the court of appeals' reasoning. First, it rejected the "materially better" standard, stating that the correct standard is whether termination is "strictly necessary" to promote the child's best interest. Second, the court of appeals exceeded its scope by reweighing evidence and considering evidence outside the record. Third, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the juvenile court's decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining issues in the biological parents' initial appeal. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

Harrison Sanders and Trinity Turner, divorced parents of two children, were involved in a legal dispute over compliance with a Family Court Order of Protection From Abuse (PFA Order) against Turner. The PFA Order required Turner to undergo evaluations by a certified treatment program and obtain a psychological evaluation. Turner failed to comply, leading to a contempt finding and a daily fine of $200 until compliance.The Family Court Commissioner found Turner in contempt twice. The first contempt order imposed a daily fine for noncompliance, and the second contempt order calculated the total fine at $51,200 for continued noncompliance. Initially, the Commissioner directed that the fine be paid to Sanders. Turner sought review by a Family Court Judge, who upheld the contempt finding and fine amount but ruled that the fine should be paid to the court, not Sanders. Sanders filed a motion for reargument, which the court denied, maintaining that the fine was to be paid to the court as it was intended to coerce compliance with the court's order.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The court held that coercive contempt fines, unless compensatory in nature, should be paid to the court. The court reasoned that it is the court's authority being vindicated through such fines, not the rights of a private litigant. The court also addressed procedural arguments, concluding that the Family Court Judge had the authority to review and modify the Commissioner’s orders and that Sanders suffered no prejudice from the court’s decision to consider the payment recipient issue. The Supreme Court denied Sanders' request for attorneys' fees, affirming the Family Court's judgment. View "Sanders v. Turner" on Justia Law

Keith and Latasha Warner were married in 2018 and have one child. In May 2022, Keith filed for divorce and requested primary residential responsibility. The parties initially agreed to an interim order granting equal residential responsibility. After mediation in August 2022, a summary agreement was prepared but not signed by either party. Keith served multiple documents to Latasha at an incorrect address, causing her to miss a scheduling conference and not receive a notice of trial. Despite this, the court mailed a scheduling order to her correct address, setting a trial date for June 5, 2023.At trial, Latasha requested a continuance to retain counsel, which the court denied. The court awarded primary residential responsibility to Keith. Latasha did not appeal the judgment but later moved for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60, arguing that Keith's misrepresentation about the mediation agreement prevented her from fairly preparing her case. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied her motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s denial of Latasha’s motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. The court found that the mediation agreement was not binding as it was not signed or approved by the court. The court also found that Keith’s counsel’s statement during trial was inaccurate but did not prevent Latasha from fairly preparing her case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Latasha’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and affirmed the decision. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

Jill and Grant Wiese were married for nearly 30 years before their marriage was dissolved in 2016. They had a premarital agreement (PMA) that kept their assets and earnings separate, with Grant responsible for reasonable support. Jill worked as an independent agent for Grant’s real estate brokerage, receiving 100% of her commissions after deductions for business expenses and estimated taxes. Grant deducted amounts for taxes and personal expenses he believed exceeded his support obligations, but the tax deductions did not match the actual taxes paid, and he did not refund the excess to Jill.The Superior Court of Orange County found the PMA valid and enforceable. Jill then brought claims against Grant for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that his deductions from her commissions were excessive and impaired her separate property. Grant countered that Jill’s claims were time-barred and meritless. The trial court ruled in Jill’s favor on the tax-withholding claims, awarding her over $1.3 million, but rejected her other claims. Both parties appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that Jill’s fiduciary duty claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations and that most were time-barred. For the surviving claims, the court found Grant breached his fiduciary duty by withholding excessive amounts for taxes but erred in awarding Jill the entire amount withheld rather than the excess. The court also found that Grant’s deductions for personal expenses required reconsideration. It affirmed that Grant was solely liable for the mortgage debt on their jointly owned property but reversed the order requiring Jill to reimburse Grant for housing during their separation. The court remanded for further proceedings, including recalculating damages and reconsidering attorney fees. View "Marriage of Wiese" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Amber Elizabeth McCay and David William McCay, who were married in 2016 and divorced in 2018. They have one minor child, for whom David was initially awarded primary residential responsibility. In 2019, Amber filed a motion for an ex parte interim order, alleging that David had a history of alcohol abuse and had been charged with child neglect. The court denied her motion, stating that David was "innocent until proven guilty." Later, David entered an Alford plea to a charge of reckless endangerment. In 2023, Amber moved to modify primary residential responsibility and requested to relocate the child from North Dakota to Nevada. The district court granted her motion, awarding her primary residential responsibility and permission to relocate the child to Nevada.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, found that Amber had established a prima facie case justifying modification and ordered an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court granted Amber's motion, awarding her primary residential responsibility and permission to relocate the child to Nevada. The court entered an amended judgment and parenting plan.David appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, challenging the court's findings on a material change in circumstances, best interest factors, the findings supporting relocation, and the findings related to the new parenting schedule. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the findings supporting the material change in circumstances, best interest factors, relocation, and the modified parenting schedule were not clearly erroneous. The court found that David's conduct constituted a significant change of circumstances that required a change in custody. The court also found that the changes in circumstances adversely affected the child, requiring a change in custody to foster the child's best interests. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings regarding the best interest factors and that the court's findings on the Stout-Hawkinson factors, which consider the potential negative impact of relocation on the child, were not clearly erroneous. The court denied Amber's request for attorney’s fees for defending against the appeal, concluding that David's appeal was neither flagrantly groundless nor devoid of merit. View "McCay v. McCay" on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Joseph R. and his wife, sought to adopt the wife's two minor children and terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father. The mother had been granted sole parental rights and responsibilities in a 2016 divorce judgment, and the biological father, who resides in Scotland, had not had contact with the children or the mother since the divorce. The couple married in 2017 and filed their petitions for adoption, change of name, and termination of parental rights in the York County Probate Court in April 2023.The York County Probate Court dismissed the couple's petitions, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to recent legislative changes. Specifically, the court cited the enactment of 19-A M.R.S. § 1658(1-A) in 2021, which it interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving one parent's attempt to terminate another parent's parental rights to a minor child. The couple appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the statute. The court noted that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for adoption and termination of parental rights proceedings brought pursuant to section 9-204. The court found that the language in section 1658(1-A) does not divest the Probate Court of subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. The court further examined the legislative history of section 1658 and concluded that section 1658(1-A) applies only to termination petitions brought pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1658 and does not divest the Probate Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over termination petitions filed in conjunction with adoption proceedings under 18-C M.R.S. § 9-103. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adoption by Joseph R." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over visitation rights between a mother and her three children, Anna, Chris, and Margaret. The Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had investigated the mother and the father of Anna for maintaining an injurious environment and neglecting the children through improper discipline. The parents admitted to forcing Margaret to stand in a corner for many hours, whipping her with a belt, and making her sleep on a bare floor. The trial court adjudicated Margaret as abused and neglected, and Anna and Chris as neglected. The mother had not entered a case plan with DHHS for reunification with any of her children by the time of the November 2019 disposition order.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, stating that the trial court improperly admitted some hearsay evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's reasoning was so heavily reliant on the hearsay evidence that the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court's order and remand for a new hearing with respect to Margaret. The Court of Appeals also ordered the trial court to dismiss the petitions directed at Margaret's younger siblings.The Supreme Court of North Carolina disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had made numerous errors, including misstating the standard of review, requiring the trial court to make specific findings for each parent regarding unfitness or conduct inconsistent with their parental rights, and addressing the constitutional rights of respondents without any briefing or argument from the parties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case directly to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re A.J.L.H., C.A.L.W., M.J.L.H." on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, Leah B., who appealed from the order of the county court for Dodge County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, denying her challenge to the validity of her relinquishment of parental rights to her child, Jordon B. Jordon was removed from Leah's care shortly after his birth in 2020 and placed into the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon in November 2022. The State then filed a motion to terminate Leah's parental rights based on the relinquishment, which the court granted. Leah subsequently filed a pro se motion to rescind the termination order, alleging that she signed the relinquishment involuntarily and under duress and that she was developmentally disabled and should have been appointed a guardian ad litem.The juvenile court denied Leah's motion, finding that she lacked standing to file her motion because she was no longer a party to the action after she relinquished her parental rights. The court also found that Leah's relinquishment was validly executed and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that Leah was under any duress when she signed the relinquishment.Leah appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in determining that she lacked standing to file her motion, in denying her motion on the merits, and in not affording her due process by ruling on the motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court's decision, finding that Leah's motion was a substantive challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and not a challenge to the court's order terminating her parental rights. The court held that Leah had standing to file her motion and that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The court also held that Leah was not provided a meaningful hearing on her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights, and therefore, her due process rights were violated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Jordon B." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Michael Powell and Melanie Knoepfler-Powell over the modification of their child custody arrangement. The couple divorced in 2017 and agreed to joint legal custody of their child, with primary physical custody granted to Melanie. In 2021, Melanie intended to move to Alabama and sought to modify the custody arrangement. Michael objected and sought an injunction to prevent the relocation. He also sought primary physical custody if Melanie relocated or more time with the child if she stayed in Virginia. Both parties also requested "tie-breaking authority" regarding the child's legal custody.The Fairfax County Circuit Court denied Michael's motion to modify the custody arrangement. The court allowed their child, who was nine years old, to testify and used her notes as a guide for questioning. The court admitted the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, meaning they had no independent probative value and were meant to explain or clarify other substantive evidence. The court used uncorroborated portions of the notes in its decision not to modify the custody arrangement. Michael appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by reviewing the child's notes while she testified, admitting the notes as a demonstrative exhibit, and relying on them in reaching its decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision. It ruled that Michael failed to sufficiently preserve for appeal any challenges to the trial court's review of the child's notes or the admission of the notes as a demonstrative exhibit. The Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court's ruling was not actually based on the child's notes, but on testimony contained in the record.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the uncorroborated portions of the child's notes in determining whether it was in the child's best interests to modify the custody arrangement. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Powell v. Knoepfler-Powell" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on non-parties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions.The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings. They argued about the timeliness of Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer, the sufficiency of her attempts to meet and confer with Acendi, and the reasonableness of the monetary sanctions award, among other matters.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three agreed with only one of their contentions. It held that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions because they were not incurred as part of the necessary costs of bringing the motions. Therefore, the court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. In all other respects, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law