Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A mother sought to modify an existing child custody order to change the school district her daughter attends after moving to a new residence. The father objected, arguing that changing schools would be disruptive and limit his time with the daughter. Unable to reach an agreement through mediation, the mother petitioned the court to modify the custody decree.The Iowa District Court for Worth County denied the mother's request, determining that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. The mother appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Frazier. The Court of Appeals, interpreting Frazier, concluded that the district court lacked authority to hear the mother's petition because she was not seeking to alter the parents' status as joint legal custodians. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling without considering the merits of the mother's petition.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Frazier. The Supreme Court held that a court that entered a custody decree has the authority to modify it when requested, even if the modification does not relate to who has legal custody. The Supreme Court found that the district court had the authority to rule on the mother's petition since the decree specified the daughter's school district, and the mother sought to modify that based on a change of circumstances.On de novo review, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the district court's determination that changing school districts was not in the daughter's best interests. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the district court's order denying the modification petition. View "Venechuk v. Landherr" on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma moved to terminate a mother's parental rights due to her methamphetamine addiction and failure to provide a stable environment for her child. The child was placed in emergency custody in May 2022, and the mother entered and left multiple inpatient treatment programs without completing them. The State filed a motion to terminate her parental rights in April 2023, and a jury trial was set for August 2023. The mother failed to appear for the trial, and her attorney requested a continuance, which was denied. The trial court held a nonjury trial and terminated her parental rights.The mother appealed the decision, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The mother argued that the statute allowing the trial court to deem her failure to appear as a waiver of her right to a jury trial was unconstitutional. The Court of Civil Appeals did not substantively address this constitutional claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and found that the statute in question is constitutional. However, the court emphasized that due process requires that the record must reflect that the parent received notice of the possible consequences of failing to appear for the jury trial. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the mother had received sufficient notice. The trial court is to hold the hearing within 30 days and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Supreme Court within 15 days after the hearing. View "IN THE MATTER OF FB v STATE OF OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

An unmarried couple, K.L.T. and M.O.J., filed a petition on September 27, 2024, to adopt three children who had been in their care since early 2022. The Cass County District Court denied their petition on October 8, 2024, citing North Dakota Century Code § 14-15-03(2), which the court interpreted as not permitting unmarried couples to jointly adopt. The case was subsequently dismissed.Following the dismissal, K.L.T. and M.O.J. moved for reconsideration on October 14, 2024. Although the district court found them to be suitable adoptive parents, it denied the motion for reconsideration. The court then certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, asking whether an unmarried couple can adopt children under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(2), noting the absence of controlling precedent in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether to answer the certified question. Under Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court has the discretion to answer certified questions of law if they are determinative of the proceeding and if there is no controlling precedent. However, the court determined that answering the certified question would be purely advisory since the petition had been dismissed and the time to appeal had expired. Consequently, there was no existing case that could be resolved by answering the question.The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the proceeding. View "K.L.T. v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

Christopher Shelton, Vicky Costa, and Todd Costa appealed two orders from the First Judicial District Court dismissing their claims against the State of Montana, Susan Ridgeway, and Axilon Law Group. The case arose from the adoption of L.S., Shelton's biological child, by a Utah couple. Melissa Surbrugg, L.S.'s biological mother, arranged the adoption before L.S. was born. After L.S.'s birth, Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs, leading to a report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). Surbrugg relinquished her parental rights, and the adoptive parents took temporary custody of L.S. The Utah court later terminated Shelton's parental rights and finalized the adoption.The District Court dismissed the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, ruling that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs as they represented Surbrugg, not the plaintiffs. The court also granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Utah courts had already determined that Montana complied with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), thus precluding the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, agreeing that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of the State, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It concluded that the Utah courts had already decided the issue of ICPC compliance, and the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in Utah. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, as the alleged misrepresentation related to a future event, not a past or existing fact. View "Shelton v. State" on Justia Law

Cynthia Maldonado and Martha Amaro, who lived on both sides of the Oklahoma-Kansas border and in Mexico, appealed a trial court's order that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over a juvenile deprived proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The trial court found that Maldonado's child, L.A., had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the commencement of the proceeding, making Oklahoma the child's home state. The court also adjudicated the children deprived as to Maldonado.The Texas County District Court of Oklahoma ordered that N.A. and L.A. be taken into emergency custody by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS) after Maldonado and N.A. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Maldonado filed a motion arguing that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, claiming that Mexico and Kansas were the children's home states. The State argued that Oklahoma had jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Children's Code. The trial court found that L.A. had lived in Oklahoma for six months before the proceeding and adjudicated the children deprived.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's findings. The court held that the Oklahoma district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile deprived proceeding and that the UCCJEA applied to such proceedings. The court found that the trial court's determination that L.A. had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the proceeding was not clearly erroneous. The court also affirmed the trial court's order adjudicating the children deprived as to Maldonado, finding competent evidence to support the order. The appeal was not considered moot due to ongoing collateral consequences. View "IN RE: N.A.; STATE OF OKLAHOMA vs MALDONADO" on Justia Law

H.B., III, a minor, needed a guardian after his father's death. He temporarily lived with his mother, Lasandra K., on the streets of Las Vegas before moving in with his uncle, Marques B. Marques petitioned the district court to be appointed as H.B.'s guardian, disclosing his felony conviction for attempted murder. The district court ordered a criminal background check, which confirmed the conviction. During the hearing, H.B.'s paternal grandmother supported Marques's petition, and Marques claimed Lasandra also supported it via text messages.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, denied the petition, concluding that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from serving as a guardian. Additionally, the court found that Marques failed to serve the petition and citation on all required relatives and interested parties, and did not meet the notice requirements or allege facts to support a waiver of notice. The petition was denied with prejudice, and the matter was closed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify a potential guardian under NRS 159A.061(3). The statute requires the district court to consider various factors, including a felony conviction, but no single factor is dispositive. The district court erred by not considering all relevant factors. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition based on Marques's failure to properly effectuate service. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, and the district court was instructed to amend its order accordingly. View "IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF H.B. III" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

Charlene Monfore petitioned for guardianship and conservatorship over her mother, Gerda Flyte, who suffers from dementia. Gerda’s son, Roger Flyte, objected and requested to be appointed instead. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found it was not in Gerda’s best interests to appoint either Charlene or Roger and instead appointed Black Hills Advocate, LLC (BHA), a for-profit corporation. Charlene appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by not appointing her and lacked statutory authority to appoint a for-profit organization.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Fall River County, South Dakota, initially appointed Charlene as temporary guardian and conservator. Roger objected, raising concerns about Gerda’s care under Charlene, including medical neglect and financial mismanagement. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found both Charlene and Roger unsuitable due to various concerns, including Charlene’s failure to provide necessary medical care and financial mismanagement, and Roger’s financial irresponsibility and anger issues. The court appointed BHA as guardian and conservator.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint Charlene, given the evidence of her inadequate care and financial mismanagement. However, the Supreme Court found that SDCL 29A-5-110 does not authorize the appointment of for-profit entities as guardians or conservators, except for qualified banks or trust companies as conservators. Therefore, the appointment of BHA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also awarded Roger one-half of his requested appellate attorney fees. View "Guardianship And Conservatorship Of Flyte" on Justia Law

Pat Doe and Jarrod Burnham each filed complaints for protection from abuse against each other in December 2021. Doe's complaint was transferred to Portland for a consolidated hearing, where the court found that Burnham had abused Doe and granted her a two-year protection order effective until January 14, 2024. On January 4, 2024, Doe attempted to file a motion to extend the protection order in Bangor but was informed it needed to be filed in Portland. She mailed the motion on January 13, 2024, but it never arrived due to insufficient postage. Doe learned the order had not been extended on January 17, 2024, and filed a new protection from abuse action in Bangor.The District Court in Portland denied Doe's motion to extend the protection order, concluding it could not extend an expired order. Doe's motion for reconsideration was also denied, with the court finding that her failure to file on time was not excusable neglect and that the statute did not permit extending an expired order. Doe then filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing excusable neglect, which was also denied. The court stated that excusable neglect under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) did not apply to statutory deadlines.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decisions, holding that 19-A M.R.S. § 4111(1) unambiguously prohibits extending an expired protection order. The court also held that a motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to circumvent statutory authority, and thus the trial court did not err in denying Doe's motion for relief from judgment. View "Doe v. Burnham" on Justia Law