Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on a property owner that purchased a vacant and dilapidated parcel in Nashville’s East Bank district, intending to redevelop it into a multi-family residential project in accordance with local zoning rules. The owner submitted a building permit application that, according to its allegations, fully complied with all applicable zoning requirements. However, in mid-2022, the local government placed an indefinite “development hold” on the property, effectively barring any consideration or approval of the permit. The stated reason was that authorities were assessing possible routes for a planned major roadway that might require acquisition of part of the property. As a result, the owner claims the property has become undevelopable and unsellable, resulting in millions of dollars in carrying costs.After unsuccessful efforts to have the hold lifted, the owner filed suit in state court, alleging violations of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, where the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including untimeliness and qualified immunity. The district court, on its own initiative, dismissed the complaint for lack of “jurisdictional” ripeness, reasoning that there had been no final decision on the permit application.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered only the ripeness issue. The court held that the owner’s claims were both constitutionally and prudentially ripe because the local government’s development hold constituted a definitive, final decision barring any development of the property. The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. View "SW Nashville EB Owner, LLC v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty." on Justia Law

A company was ordered by a local Board of Zoning Appeals to remove LED displays from a billboard it was constructing. Disagreeing with this directive, the company sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Fulton County and brought additional claims. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision regarding the displays but left the company’s other claims unresolved.After this partial ruling, the company submitted a discretionary application for review to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application in an unpublished order, determining that the superior court’s decision was not final and thus not subject to discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which governs appeals from superior court reviews of certain administrative actions. The appellate court also considered, but did not resolve, whether the superior court’s order functioned as an interlocutory injunction under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(4), which could have permitted an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Court of Appeals erred by not considering whether the superior court’s order should be treated as an interlocutory injunction, which would allow immediate appeal by discretionary application. The Supreme Court clarified that OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a) and 5-6-35 are not conflicting but may overlap, and that certain immediately appealable orders may still require a discretionary application. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s dismissal and remanded the case for the appellate court to determine if the superior court’s order qualifies as an interlocutory injunction and whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC v. NORTH FULTON OUTDOOR, LLC" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted legislation establishing a Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) Overlay Zone, enabling data centers and related infrastructure to be built on a limited portion of county land. The boundaries and zoning designations of the Overlay Zone were later set by Ordinance 26-01-001 (the CDI Ordinance), which included color maps as exhibits to indicate the precise locations and zoning designations. A group of residents, the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, sought to challenge this ordinance by referendum and gathered sufficient signatures for a petition. However, the petition included only black-and-white reproductions of the ordinance’s maps, which did not clearly show the Overlay Zone boundaries or zoning distinctions.The sufficiency of the petition was initially upheld by the Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections, who found it met requirements as to form, though she did not decide whether the ordinance was a proper subject for referendum. Several parties opposed the referendum, arguing in the Circuit Court for Frederick County that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County Charter and that the petition was deficient because it did not include a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance. The circuit court agreed, finding both that the CDI Ordinance was not a “law” subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition’s reproduction of the ordinance was insufficient due to the lack of accurate color maps.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that under the Frederick County Charter, zoning ordinances, such as the CDI Ordinance, are not subject to referendum because the Charter intended to maintain pre-Charter limitations on referenda for such ordinances. Additionally, the Court held that the petition was insufficient because it did not contain a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance, as the black-and-white maps omitted essential information. View "In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum" on Justia Law

A group of homeowners and their associations opposed amendments to a planned unit development in Baltimore City, actively communicating their disapproval to the Planning Commission. After the Commission approved the amendments, the developer filed suit against the homeowners and associations, seeking damages and alleging breach of contract and tortious interference. The homeowners and associations, believing the suit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), moved to dismiss under Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City found the lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the dismissal, citing evidence that the suit was intended to deter the homeowners from exercising their rights.Two years after the Appellate Court affirmed the SLAPP dismissal, the homeowners and associations filed a class action for malicious use of process against the developer, its law firm, and its attorney. They alleged unique injuries, including emotional distress, intimidation, diminished property values, and burdensome discovery demands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the suit, concluding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded the “special injury” required for malicious use of process. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that the alleged injuries were typical of litigation and not “special” as required by Maryland law.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for malicious use of process because they did not plead a special injury. The Court clarified that litigation expenses, temporary property value diminution, emotional distress, and chilling of constitutional rights are not special injuries under Maryland law. The Court also declined to adopt a rule that victims of a SLAPP inherently satisfy the special-injury requirement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "Millrace Condo. v. Shapiro Sher etc., PA" on Justia Law

Larry Danduran attended public meetings held by the Eddy County Zoning Board and the Eddy County Commissioners to consider amendments to Eddy County’s wind-energy zoning regulations. He raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest among members of both bodies and alleged that public comment was improperly restricted during the decision-making process. Despite his objections, the Zoning Board recommended, and the County Commission adopted, the proposed amendments. After a grievance hearing failed to change the outcome, Danduran filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the zoning amendments, require recusals for conflicted officials, and obtain costs and other relief.The District Court of Eddy County, Southeast Judicial District, reviewed the case. The County moved to dismiss Danduran’s amended complaint, arguing that any challenge to a zoning decision must be brought through the exclusive statutory appeal procedures outlined in North Dakota law. Danduran had initially filed a timely statutory appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01 but voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice. The district court concluded that his claims, though framed as statutory and constitutional violations, substantively challenged the validity of the rezoning proceedings and decision. The court ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Danduran had failed to properly pursue the exclusive statutory remedy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that when a statutory appeal process is available to challenge a local governing body’s zoning decision, that process is the exclusive remedy. Collateral attacks through separate actions for declaratory or injunctive relief are not permitted. The Supreme Court found that Danduran’s claims, despite their characterization, fell within the scope of the exclusive statutory review process, and because he did not pursue that remedy, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. View "Danduran v. Eddy Cty. Zoning Bd." on Justia Law

A developer sought approval to build a solar farm in Spencer County, Indiana, parts of which would be located both within the Town of Grandview and within its two-mile extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”) fringe. The Town of Grandview granted a special exception approval for the project, despite its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance only covering land within the town’s corporate limits and not properly providing for ETJ authority. Years later, landowners adjacent to the proposed solar farm challenged the Town’s approval, arguing it was void because the Town lacked authority over the ETJ at the time the approval was granted.Initially, Grandview Solar obtained approvals from both the Town and County, and invested millions into the project. When the Town later refused to issue an improvement location permit due to public opposition, Grandview Solar sued, leading to a preliminary injunction directing the Town to issue the permit. After settlement and dismissal of that suit, the landowners filed a new declaratory judgment complaint. The Spencer Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the Town and Grandview Solar. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the special exception approval was “ultra vires and void,” subject to collateral attack at any time.The Indiana Supreme Court, on transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court. The Court held that the Town’s failure to properly provide for ETJ authority before granting the special exception rendered the approval voidable, not void. Because Indiana’s enabling statutes authorized the Town to provide for ETJ and grant special exceptions, any objections had to be raised within the statutory 30-day review window. The landowners’ late challenge constituted an impermissible collateral attack. The Court clarified that only actions truly outside statutory and ordinance authority are void and subject to collateral attack; errors within general authority are merely voidable. View "Wike v. Grandview Solar Project LLC" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute involving the planned construction of a new cottage by a hotel operator on Martha’s Vineyard. The hotel, situated in a residential area, is considered a preexisting nonconforming commercial use. In 2008, the hotel’s predecessor sought permission for expansion and entered into an agreement with a neighboring property owner, who agreed not to oppose the project or appeal permit decisions, in exchange for promises including the installation and maintenance of vegetative screening. After subsequent changes to the project—including the removal and replacement of screening and the relocation and resizing of the cottage—the neighbor, acting as trustee, objected to the most recent modifications in 2023, claiming inadequate screening and diminished privacy.Following the 2023 decision by the Edgartown zoning board of appeals approving the hotel’s modifications, the trustee filed suit challenging that decision and asserting additional claims against the hotel. The hotel counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the suit was frivolous and vexatious. The Superior Court denied the trustee’s special motion to dismiss the counterclaim under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the underlying lawsuit was a sham. The trustee appealed. The Appeals Court reversed, finding that it could not determine at that stage whether the trustee’s claims were meritless because the underlying suit was unresolved.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the anti-SLAPP statute requires the party opposing dismissal to prove that the petitioning activity (the lawsuit) was devoid of reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. The court determined that the hotel failed to meet this burden because the trustee’s challenge to the 2023 decision was not frivolous on its face. The order denying the special motion to dismiss was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings, including an award of attorney’s fees to the trustee. View "Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased undeveloped property in Westerly, Rhode Island, in 1999. In 2007, they applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for permission to install an onsite wastewater treatment system (OWTS), a prerequisite for building a residence on their land. DEM denied their application because the groundwater table on the property was only five inches below the surface, while regulations required a minimum of twelve inches. The plaintiffs did not pursue an administrative appeal at that time.In 2020, more than a decade after the denial, the plaintiffs filed suit in Washington County Superior Court, seeking declaratory relief and compensation for an alleged regulatory taking under state and federal law. They also asserted that the regulation violated their rights to equal protection and due process. The state moved to dismiss the action, contending it was time-barred, the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and they lacked standing. The Superior Court agreed, holding that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed whether the lower court’s dismissal was proper. The Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to all claims, and the continuing violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period because DEM’s denial of the permit was a discrete act, not a continuing violation. The Court further found the plaintiffs lacked standing for prospective relief because they did not allege an actual or imminent injury, as any future application might not necessarily be denied. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Majeika v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law