Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves T & C Construction Services and Theodore Miller (collectively, T & C), who operate a rental building in St. Albans, West Virginia. The City of St. Albans inspected the premises after a tenant reported a fire, revealing numerous fire hazards and building code violations. The City issued two citations for these violations, and the St. Albans Municipal Court fined T & C $81,250.00 for the fire code violations and $116,900.00 for the building code violations. After T & C failed to appeal these orders, the City sought enforcement in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County issued a cease-and-desist order that enjoined T & C from operating its rental business on the premises, granted the City a money judgment for the criminal fines, and appointed a special commissioner to sell the property to satisfy the judgment. T & C appealed this enforcement order to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to grant injunctive relief, rejecting T & C’s challenges to the injunctive relief. The court found that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. However, the court reversed the lower court's appointment of a special commissioner to sell the property. The court held that the issuance and return of a writ of fieri facias showing “no property found” is a precondition to a circuit court’s jurisdiction to order the sale of a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment for a criminal fine. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T & C Construction Services, LLC v. City of St. Albans" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Pamela Antosh and Ned Lashley, who challenged the Village of Mount Pleasant's use of its eminent-domain power to acquire their property for road improvements associated with the private Foxconn development. In state court, the plaintiffs contested only the amount of compensation they were owed, not the propriety of the taking. However, when the state court ruled against them on an evidentiary issue two years into litigation, they decided to try their luck in federal court. In their federal complaint, they alleged for the first time that the taking was improper because it served a private purpose, not a public one.The state court proceedings were stayed pending the resolution of the federal suit. The Village filed a motion to dismiss the federal complaint, arguing that the federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction over the proceeding. The district court agreed, dismissing the federal claims without prejudice, citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The plaintiffs appealed this judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court was correct to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the federal claims. The court concluded that the federal and state actions were parallel and that exceptional circumstances justified the district court's decision to abstain. The court noted that the plaintiffs' litigation strategy signaled a lack of respect for the state's ability to resolve the issues properly before its courts. The court also found that the plaintiffs' federal suit was a strategic attempt to bypass an unfavorable state-court ruling two years into that litigation. View "Antosh v. Village of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

A group of developers, collectively referred to as "The Preserve," entered into an agreement in 2011 to purchase land in Richmond, Rhode Island, with the intention of operating an outdoor shooting range and gun club. The town council and planning board initially supported the project, but a subsequent zoning ordinance amendment prohibited such uses. The Preserve was not notified of these changes. In 2016, a new zoning district was created, once again permitting indoor and outdoor shooting ranges. The Preserve claimed that the two-year delay caused substantial revenue loss. They also alleged that the town imposed arbitrary fees, delayed the approval process, and engaged in other discriminatory practices that increased their costs and hindered their development efforts.The Superior Court dismissed The Preserve's claims for violations of substantive due process, tortious interference with contract and prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses, and a violation of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The court found that the claims were either barred by the statute of limitations or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the claims for civil liability for crimes and offenses and civil RICO were barred by a three-year statute of limitations because they were considered torts. The court also found that the statute of limitations was not tolled for the tortious interference claims, as the harm allegedly present was merely the consequence of separate and distinct acts that had occurred prior to the final approval of the land development for the resort. Therefore, all of The Preserve's claims were time-barred. View "The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over unpaid rent for a department store in an Illinois mall. The store was operated by CPS Partnership, which leased the retail space from WEC 98C-3 LLC. Saks Inc. guaranteed that it would pay the rent if CPS could not. However, when CPS stopped paying rent, Saks did not make any payments to WEC. This led to WEC defaulting on its mortgage, and the property was purchased by 4 Stratford Square Mall Holdings, LLC (“Stratford”) at a foreclosure auction. Initially, WEC sued Saks for damages. Later, Stratford intervened with its own claim for damages. The district court ruled only on Stratford’s claim for unpaid rent, finding that it was entitled to payment from Saks.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Saks argued that Stratford lacked standing to sue, that the district court erred in certifying its judgment for immediate appeal, and that the district court erred in rejecting Saks’s affirmative defenses. The appellate court found that Stratford did have standing to sue Saks, and the district court properly certified its judgment for appeal. On the merits, the appellate court concluded that Saks could not mount any of its desired defenses as it had waived its right to present affirmative defenses to liability in the guaranty that it signed. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "WEC 98C-3 LLC v. SFA Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Anthony Sam and Renee Kwan, who formed a limited liability company (LLC) and purchased a parking lot. Sam alleged that Kwan, without his knowledge, sold the lot for a significant profit, fabricated documents, and pocketed the money without giving him anything. Sam sued Kwan, her entities, the company providing title and escrow services for the sale, and the parking lot buyer. The trial court ruled against Sam, denying him any remedy.The trial court's decisions were largely unfavorable for Sam. It denied First American's motion for summary judgment but granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. The court also granted judgment on the pleadings to various defendants, including Fidelity, First American, Kwan, Vibrant, Asset, 600 LLC, and Holdings. The court sustained Fidelity's demurrer in part with leave to amend and in part without leave to amend. Sam appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed some of the trial court's rulings but reversed others. The appellate court reversed the denial of Sam's leave to amend his claims on behalf of 2013 LLC and remanded to permit Sam to bring these claims on behalf of the member entities. The court also reversed the remainder of the grants of judgment on the pleadings, except as to the breach of contract claims based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings. The court affirmed the ruling that the breach of contract claims based on the operating agreements of 600 LLC and Holdings against 600 LLC and Holdings cannot be amended to state viable claims. The court reversed the sustaining of Fidelity's demurrer as to the civil conspiracy cause of action. Finally, the court reversed the grant of the Board's summary judgment motion. View "Sam v. Kwan" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land within the Rio Grande National Forest in Colorado, owned by Leavell-McCombs Joint Venture (LMJV). The land, obtained through a land exchange with the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) in 1987, was intended for development into a ski resort village. However, access to the parcel was hindered due to a gravel road managed by the USFS that was unusable by vehicles in the winter.In 2007, LMJV invoked the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), claiming it required the USFS to grant access to inholdings within USFS land. The USFS initially proposed a second land exchange with LMJV to secure access to Highway 160. However, this proposal was challenged by several conservation groups under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2017, the district court vacated the USFS decision and remanded to the agency.The USFS then considered a new alternative in the form of a right-of-way easement to LMJV across USFS land between the Parcel and Highway 160. The USFS consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to secure a new biological opinion (BiOp) and incidental take statement (ITS) for the proposed action in 2018. The USFS then issued a final Record of Decision (ROD) in 2019, approving the easement.The conservation groups challenged this latest ROD under NEPA, the ESA, and ANILCA. The district court vacated and remanded under the law of the case doctrine, concluding that it was bound by the reasoning of the district court’s 2017 order. The Agencies appealed the district court’s decision vacating the 2018 BiOp and 2019 ROD.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and affirmed the Agencies’ decisions. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter under the practical finality rule, and that the Conservation Groups had standing. The court held that the district court incorrectly applied the law of the case doctrine because the Agencies considered a different alternative when issuing the 2019 ROD. The court also concluded that ANILCA requires the USFS to grant access to the LMJV Parcel. The court determined that even if the Conservation Groups could show error under NEPA, they had not shown that any alleged error was harmful. Finally, the court held that the Conservation Groups failed to successfully challenge the 2018 BiOp under the ESA, and that the Agencies correctly allowed the ITS to cover not only the proposed easement, but also LMJV’s proposed development. View "Rocky Mountain Wild v. Dallas" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land. The parcel was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel, but in an amended complaint, treated the two sections as distinct parcels acquired at different times and on different grounds. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. A different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The trial court's decision was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland which affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The homeowner then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court also held that the Appellate Court erred in conditionally reinstating the Association’s counterclaim for a prescriptive easement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Sharon Ann Koch, a member of the Buffalo Trail Ranch subdivision, and Melissa R. Gray, who was purchasing a tract in the subdivision. Koch, along with other members and the developer of the subdivision, Rocky Mountain Timberlands, Inc. (RMT), sued Gray for allegedly violating the subdivision's restrictive covenants by placing garbage, junk, and other prohibited items on her property. The covenants, filed by RMT in 2008, also required the formation of a road maintenance association, which was never established.The District Court of Albany County dismissed all claims against Gray, applying the contractual "first to breach" doctrine. The court reasoned that RMT, by failing to form the road maintenance association, was the first to breach the covenants. Therefore, it was impossible to hold Gray to the covenants. Koch appealed this decision, arguing that she had no contractual relationship with Gray, and thus the "first to breach" doctrine should not apply to her claim.The Supreme Court of Wyoming agreed with Koch. It found that the "first to breach" doctrine, which is based on a contractual relationship, could not be applied as there was no contract between Koch and Gray. The court also rejected the lower court's conclusion that RMT's breach of the covenants rendered them inapplicable to Gray. The court found no legal basis for applying the "first to breach" doctrine to a third party's enforcement of covenants. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Koch v. Gray" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a property dispute between two neighboring parties, Bo and Dan Jones (appellants), and Hamed Ghadiri (respondent). A block wall, erected before either party owned their respective properties, did not follow the property line, resulting in Ghadiri being denied use of a portion of his property. When Ghadiri sought to remove the wall and build a new one on the property line, the Joneses filed a complaint in the district court for a prescriptive easement or adverse possession.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. It found that the Joneses could not claim adverse possession as they had not paid property taxes on the disputed property. It also ruled that a prescriptive easement was unavailable as it would result in Ghadiri's complete exclusion from the subject property. The Joneses appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified the distinction between adverse possession and prescriptive easements, noting that the former results in the acquisition of title and the right to exclusively control the subject property, while the latter results in the right to a limited use of the subject property. The court acknowledged that comprehensive prescriptive easements, which result in the owner of the servient estate being completely excluded from the subject property, may be warranted in exceptional circumstances. However, it found that the Joneses had not demonstrated such exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ghadiri. View "Jones v. Ghadiri" on Justia Law

The case involves the United States government's action to reduce federal tax liens to judgment and foreclose on real property. The government sought to foreclose on tax liens against a property owned by Komron Allahyari. Shaun Allahyari, Komron's father, was named as an additional defendant due to his interest in the property through two deeds of trust. The district court found that the government was entitled to foreclose on the tax liens and sell the property. However, the court did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale and ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status Report. Shaun Allahyari filed an appeal before the parties submitted the Joint Status Report and stipulated to the value of the property to be sold.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the district court's order was not final because it did not have sufficient information to enter an order for judicial sale. The court also clarified that for a decree of sale in a foreclosure suit to be considered a final decree for purposes of an appeal, it must settle all of the rights of the parties and leave nothing to be done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds. Because that standard was not met in this case, there still was no final judgment. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "USA V. ALLAHYARI" on Justia Law