Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves a property dispute in Lincoln County, Montana. Tiffany House sought to sell a property initially conveyed to her former husband, Conrad Coggeshall, by an LLC owned by David E. Orr. After their divorce, House was granted permission by the Superior Court of Arizona to transfer the property into her name. However, Coggeshall, while incarcerated, executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the property to Orr, who recorded it in Lincoln County. House then filed a quiet title action, alleging the transfer was fraudulent.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court reviewed the case. House served Orr with discovery requests, including admissions that Orr failed to respond to. Consequently, House filed a motion for summary judgment, which Orr did not contest. The District Court granted House’s motion, quieting title in her name and ordering Orr to execute a quitclaim deed. Orr filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay execution, which the District Court denied. Orr’s first appeal was dismissed, and he filed a second notice of appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. Orr argued that the requests for admission were improperly served, that he did deny them, and that the summary judgment violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court noted that these arguments were not raised in the lower court and thus were not preserved for appeal. The court emphasized the importance of procedural rules and fair notice of legal issues. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of House. View "House v Orr" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Susan Keller, co-trustees of the MIKA Trust, challenged the reassignment of a parking space by defendants Clement and Martha Dwyer from one condominium unit they owned to another unit they also owned. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief, alleging violations of the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B. The dispute arose after the Dwyers transferred Parking Space 2 from Unit 11 to Unit 20, which they owned, and subsequently sold Unit 11 without an assigned parking space to the plaintiffs.The Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Harbour Hill Condominium Association and the Dwyers. The court found that the assignment and reassignment of the parking spaces were authorized and properly effected. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that although Harbour Hill’s declaration of condominium was deficient under RSA 356-B:16, I(e) for not designating the unit to which Parking Space 2 was assigned, this deficiency was cured by the condominium instruments, including the floor plan and form warranty deed. These documents, when read together, satisfied the requirements of the Condominium Act.The court also determined that the reassignment of Parking Space 2 complied with RSA 356-B:19, which governs the reassignment of limited common areas. The reassignment was authorized by the condominium declaration and had the consent of all affected unit owners, as required by the Act. The amendment to the declaration, reflecting the reassignment, was approved by a two-thirds majority of unit owners and recorded accordingly. Therefore, the court concluded that the reassignment was valid and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Keller v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

Debbie O'Gorman, facing foreclosure by creditor Grant Reynolds, transferred her property to the Lovering Tubbs Trust for no consideration. This transfer was intended to hinder Reynolds' foreclosure efforts. The Lovering Tubbs Trust and other entities involved in the transfer argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee lacked Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548 because O'Gorman's creditors were not harmed by the transfer.The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the Trustee, finding that O'Gorman's transfer was fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed this decision, noting that the Trustee had established a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer and that the appellants failed to present any admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. The court held that the Trustee had Article III standing because the transfer depleted the estate's assets, causing an injury-in-fact that was redressable by the avoidance sought. The court also clarified that actual harm to creditors is not an element of a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548. The court found that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment, as the Trustee provided direct and circumstantial evidence of O'Gorman's fraudulent intent, and the appellants failed to present any evidence to dispute this.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the bankruptcy court's denial of the appellants' request for a continuance to conduct discovery, noting that the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d) by failing to submit an affidavit or declaration specifying the facts they hoped to elicit through further discovery. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. View "IN RE: THE LOVERING TUBBS TRUST V. HOFFMAN" on Justia Law

A man sued his neighbors, claiming that an access road on their property caused flooding on his property. After settling with the neighbors and dismissing his claims with prejudice, he sued them again over continued flooding, alleging nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the tort claims, citing res judicata, but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. After a bench trial, the court found the neighbors had breached the settlement agreement and awarded specific performance, consequential damages, and attorney’s fees, but denied punitive damages. The neighbors appealed the breach of contract ruling, and the man cross-appealed the dismissal of his tort claims and the denial of punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim, finding it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the man was on inquiry notice of the breach when the driveway reconstruction was completed, as he observed defects at that time. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that the tort claims were barred by res judicata, as they stemmed from the same transaction as the prior lawsuit. The court also upheld the denial of punitive damages, finding no evidence of egregious conduct by the neighbors.In summary, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the breach of contract ruling and associated awards, affirmed the dismissal of the tort claims under res judicata, and upheld the denial of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Strong" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two lakefront property owners, the McCavits and the Lachers, over a dock extension built by the McCavits. The Lachers claimed that the extension interfered with their riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The superior court agreed and ordered the removal of the dock extension. The McCavits appealed, leading to the articulation of a new rule of reasonableness to determine whether the dock unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' rights. The case was remanded for the superior court to apply this new rule, and the court again ruled in favor of the Lachers.Initially, the superior court found that the dock extension unreasonably interfered with the Lachers' riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The court ordered the removal of the dock extension and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lachers. The McCavits appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to apply a newly articulated rule of reasonableness. On remand, the superior court reaffirmed its earlier findings and again ruled in favor of the Lachers, ordering the removal of the dock extension and awarding attorney’s fees.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the new rule of reasonableness or in finding that the dock constituted a private nuisance. However, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further consideration, noting that fees related to the litigation against the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) should not be charged to the McCavits. The main holding is that the superior court's application of the reasonableness rule and its finding of a private nuisance were upheld, but the attorney’s fees award was vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "McCavit v. Lacher" on Justia Law

The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

American Pride Properties, LLC ("APP") filed a lawsuit in the Jefferson Circuit Court against James R. Davis and William M. Pickard, seeking ejectment and damages for the loss of use of real property owned by APP. Pickard had initially shown interest in purchasing the property and was allowed to take possession for renovations before closing. However, the sale did not close as planned, and Pickard attempted to assign his rights to Davis, which led to confusion. Despite multiple extensions and addendums to the purchase agreement, the sale never closed, and APP considered the agreement canceled.The Jefferson Circuit Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of APP on its ejectment claim, awarding possession of the property to APP and dismissing the counterclaims filed by Davis and Pickard. However, the court retained jurisdiction over APP's demand for damages related to the use and detention of the property. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, leading Davis and Pickard to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper because the trial court had not resolved the issue of damages, which was part of the same claim for ejectment. The court emphasized that a claim is not fully adjudicated for Rule 54(b) purposes until all elements, including damages, are resolved. Consequently, the judgment was not final, and the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeals as premature due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Davis v. American Pride Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Retailers House of CB USA, LLC, and Chinese Laundry Lifestyle, LLC, leased commercial space at the Miracle Mile Shops, operated by PHWLV, LLC, which also runs the Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino. On July 8, 2017, a fire-suppression pipe burst, causing significant water damage to the retailers' stores and inventory. The retailers sued PHWLV for negligence in maintaining the fire-suppression system.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the retailers on the elements of duty and breach, concluding that PHWLV had a duty to prevent items on its property from damaging others' property and had breached this duty. The case proceeded to a jury trial on causation and damages, resulting in a verdict awarding House of CB $3,133,755.56 and Chinese Laundry $411,581.41. The district court denied PHWLV's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the jury verdict, also awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest to House of CB.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its formulation of PHWLV's duty. The appropriate standard of care was the duty to use reasonable care in servicing and inspecting the fire-suppression system and responding to issues arising from failures within the system. The court reversed the district court's judgment on the jury verdict, vacated the post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also denied PHWLV's request to reassign the case to a different judicial department. View "PHWLV, LLC VS. HOUSE OF CB USA, LLC" on Justia Law