Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Louis Paolino and Marie E. Issa, own property in Cumberland, Rhode Island, adjacent to a site operated as an automobile recycling business. The neighboring property, owned by J.F. Realty, LLC and operated by LKQ Route 16 Used Auto Parts, Inc., was found to be contaminated. The Department of Environmental Management (DEM) required remediation, leading the defendants, Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc., to design a stormwater remediation system. Plaintiffs alleged that this system discharged contaminated water onto their property and encroached on it.In prior litigation, the plaintiffs sued the Ferreira defendants in state court for trespass due to contamination. The case was removed to federal court, where federal claims were dismissed, and state claims were remanded. A jury found encroachment but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, which was partially granted. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the encroachment, deeming it de minimis, but ordered a new trial on other issues. In a subsequent trial, the jury found no continuing trespass. Plaintiffs also pursued a Clean Water Act claim in federal court, which was dismissed after a bench trial.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the issues in the current case were precluded by collateral estoppel. The court found that the issue of contamination had been litigated and decided in prior state and federal actions, and the encroachment was previously determined to be de minimis. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred from relitigating these issues. View "Paolino v. Commonwealth Engineers & Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

Brett Del Valle was sued by Alum Rock Riverside, LLC in California for breach of contract, resulting in a judgment against him for over $4 million. Alum Rock domesticated this judgment in Utah and recorded it with the Weber County Recorder’s Office. At the time of recording, the property in question was held by a revocable trust established by Brett and his wife, but the trust sold the property to the Mulligans before Alum Rock applied for a writ of execution to seize and sell the property.The Third District Court upheld the writ of execution despite the Mulligans' objections. They argued that Alum Rock failed to create a valid judgment lien because it did not record the judgment in the registry of judgments, that the writ was not available since the trust held the title when the judgment was domesticated, and that the court lacked jurisdiction as the property was in a different judicial district. The district court rejected these arguments, holding that recording the judgment with the county recorder was sufficient to create a lien, the writ was valid because Brett retained ownership indicia over the property, and the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that since July 1, 2002, a judgment lien is created by recording the judgment with the county recorder, not by filing it in the registry of judgments. The court also determined that Brett owned the property for purposes of the lien because he retained control over the trust. Finally, the court found no relevant limitation on the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ, even though the property was located in a different judicial district. View "Mulligan v. Alum Rock Riverside" on Justia Law

Citizens of a town submitted a document to the town's Board of Commissioners, seeking a referendum on a zoning ordinance that reclassified certain properties. The document contained 1,051 signatures and requested the reversal of the zoning changes. However, it did not reference the specific ordinance or request a referendum vote. The Commissioners determined that the document did not meet the requirements of the town's charter for a valid petition for referendum.The Circuit Court for Harford County reviewed the case and ruled that the Commissioners' determination was invalid. The court found that the Commissioners should have submitted the document to the Board of Election Judges for verification of signatures before making any determination on its validity. The court also ruled that the Commissioners' action by verbal motion was insufficient and that they should have acted by ordinance or resolution.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Commissioners correctly determined that the document did not meet the charter's requirements for a valid petition for referendum. The court found that the charter did not require the Commissioners to submit the document to the Board of Election Judges for signature verification before making a threshold determination of its validity. The court also held that the Commissioners were authorized to make their determination by verbal motion, as memorialized in the meeting minutes.The Supreme Court of Maryland vacated the Circuit Court's judgment and remanded the case for entry of a declaratory judgment consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the citizens were not entitled to a writ of mandamus or permanent injunctive relief. View "Town of Bel Air v. Bodt" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) acquired the high bid at a foreclosure sale of Anthony Michael Branch's property. Fannie Mae then initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court to gain possession. The court ruled in favor of Fannie Mae, and Branch appealed. During the appeal, Fannie Mae sold the property to Roberto Pina Cardoso. Cardoso intervened in the case and was awarded use and occupancy payments from Branch. The Appeals Court later vacated the Housing Court's judgment for possession, declaring it moot since Fannie Mae no longer had a possessory interest, and required Cardoso to establish his right to possession in a new case.The Housing Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and dismissed Branch's counterclaims. Branch appealed, and during the appeal, Cardoso was allowed to intervene and was joined as a party with Fannie Mae. The Appeals Court vacated the judgment for possession as moot but affirmed the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and disagreed with the Appeals Court's mootness determination. The court held that Cardoso, having acquired Fannie Mae's interest, maintained a live stake in the adjudication of the judgment for possession. The court affirmed the Housing Court's order allowing Cardoso to intervene and be joined as a party. It also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae for possession and the dismissal of Branch's counterclaims. The court concluded that the foreclosure was valid and that Pentagon Federal Credit Union, as the authorized agent of the note holder, had the authority to foreclose. View "Fannie Mae v. Branch" on Justia Law

The case involves a boundary dispute between two siblings, Susan Dzingle and Thomas Krcilek, over their adjoining tracts of real property in Valley County, Nebraska. Dzingle owns the northwest quarter, and Krcilek owns the northeast quarter of Section 17. The dispute arose when Krcilek discovered a government survey marker indicating that the true boundary line was approximately 20 feet west of an existing fence that had been in place since at least 1946. Dzingle believed the fence was the true boundary and filed a complaint to establish it as such.The district court for Valley County dismissed Dzingle’s claims based on mutual recognition and acquiescence and the common grantor rule, finding that the parties had not owned their properties for the requisite 10-year period and that the common grantor rule did not apply to quarter sections. The court also rejected Dzingle’s request to reform the deeds based on mutual or unilateral mistake, as there was no evidence of inequitable or fraudulent conduct by Krcilek. The court accepted the survey marker as the true boundary and granted Krcilek’s counterclaims to eject Dzingle from his property and order her to construct a new fence along the survey’s boundary line.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the common grantor rule applies only to conveyances described by lot numbers, not by quarter sections. The court also agreed that the doctrine of mutual recognition and acquiescence was inapplicable because the parties had not owned their properties for 10 years and their mother, the previous owner, could not have acquiesced to the boundary. The court found no error in the district court’s acceptance of the survey marker as the true boundary and rejected Dzingle’s claim for reformation of the deeds. View "Dzingle v. Krcilek" on Justia Law

Donald and Mary Fuger own forty acres of land in Wyoming. Larry Wagoner began using a five-acre section of this land for his oilfield business around 2008. The Fugers and Wagoner agreed to construct two buildings on the site, with Wagoner handling construction and the Fugers securing financing. They did not formalize this agreement in writing. A lease agreement was signed, giving Wagoner exclusive use of the buildings for five years. Wagoner claimed there was an oral agreement to transfer ownership of one building and the land to him in exchange for his construction work and loan payments, which the Fugers denied.The District Court of Sweetwater County initially found in favor of Wagoner, awarding him damages for breach of the oral contract. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed this decision in Fuger v. Wagoner, 2020 WY 154, ruling the oral contract void because Mrs. Fuger did not join the agreement. The case was remanded to consider Wagoner’s equitable claims. On remand, the district court found the Fugers were unjustly enriched by Wagoner’s construction work and awarded him damages, offsetting some of these due to his use of the buildings. The court also awarded prejudgment interest on a portion of the damages.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the district court did not err in offsetting Wagoner’s damages by the actual rent he received rather than the fair rental value of the second building. The court also upheld the award of prejudgment interest, finding that a portion of Wagoner’s damages were liquidated and thus subject to such interest. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in its equitable determinations regarding offset and prejudgment interest. View "Fuger v. Wagoner" on Justia Law

In October 2014, while guiding a hunting party on their property, the Olsens' son observed a crop duster spraying herbicide, which allegedly damaged the Olsens' ponderosa pine trees. The Olsens claimed the herbicide caused significant damage and death to the trees. They filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who argued that expert testimony was required to prove causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, leading to the Olsens' appeal.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Spink County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that without expert testimony, a jury would be left to speculate about the cause of the damage to the trees. The court noted that the fields of chemistry, botany, and agronomy were beyond the understanding of a typical layperson. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the Olsens' complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the need for expert testimony to establish causation for the damage to the trees. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the claims of trespass, statutory nuisance, and common law nuisance, noting that these claims do not require proof of damages to survive summary judgment. The court remanded these claims for further proceedings, allowing the Olsens to potentially recover nominal damages. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel and civil conspiracy due to the lack of evidence on causation for damages. View "Estate of Olsen v. Agtegra Cooperative" on Justia Law

Lippa and Manmohan Grewal sold a gas station to Theodore Hansen, who later sold it to Junction Market Fairview, L.C. (JMF). The sale contract required Hansen to make regular installment payments, with the final balance due after three years. Hansen missed many payments and failed to pay the full balance when due. The Grewals initiated foreclosure proceedings over six years after Hansen's first missed payment. The applicable statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years, raising the question of when the statute begins to run for installment contracts.The Sixth District Court in Sanpete County granted partial summary judgment in favor of JMF, concluding that the statute of limitations began when Hansen missed the first payment, making the Grewals' foreclosure action too late. The court awarded sole control of the gas station to JMF and ordered the Grewals to release the title. When the Grewals failed to comply, JMF seized the station and sold it to a third party. The district court also awarded JMF attorney fees under the Public Waters Access Act and the reciprocal attorney fees statute.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the sale of the gas station to a third-party bona fide purchaser rendered the Grewals' appeal on the title issue moot, as no court action could affect the litigants' rights to the property. However, the issue of attorney fees was not moot. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to JMF under the reciprocal attorney fees statute. The court affirmed the award of attorney fees and remanded to the district court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees JMF incurred in defending against the appeal. View "Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview" on Justia Law

The case involves Pure Oasis LLC, which applied for a conditional use permit to operate a recreational cannabis dispensary in Boston. The building commissioner denied the permit, and Pure Oasis appealed to the Board of Appeal of Boston. After multiple hearings, the board approved the permit. William Shoucair, an abutter to the property, opposed the permit, arguing it would negatively impact the neighborhood and filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Suffolk County, appealing the board's decision.The Superior Court judge ordered each plaintiff to post a $3,500 bond, despite not finding the appeal to be in bad faith. The judge applied the standard from Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of Boston, which allows for a bond to discourage frivolous appeals while not obstructing meritorious ones. The plaintiffs sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Appeals Court stayed the bond order and allowed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that under Section 11 of the Boston zoning enabling act, a preliminary finding of bad faith or malice is not required before imposing a bond for damages. The court reaffirmed the standard from Damaskos, which balances discouraging frivolous appeals with not obstructing meritorious ones. The court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court judge in setting the bond amount and affirmed the order. View "Shoucair v. Board of Appeal of Boston" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud related to property rights. The defendants, through their business, REO Holdings, LLC, bought properties at tax sales and used redemption rights to obtain titles, some of which were later found to be fraudulent. The case involved four specific properties where the defendants allegedly used misrepresentation and forged documents to redeem and sell the properties at a profit.The Chancery Court for Davidson County initially dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of redemption rights, finding that unjust enrichment required a voluntary conferral of a benefit and that Tennessee law did not recognize conversion of intangible property rights. The court also denied class certification. After a jury trial, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence preponderated against the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. The court also held that a claim for unjust enrichment does not require a voluntary conferral of a benefit, overruling previous case law to the extent it held otherwise. Finally, the court affirmed that Tennessee law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Family Trust Services LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC" on Justia Law