Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
by
Thomas Zundel attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied due to a 1990 simple assault charge in Jamestown Municipal Court, which was flagged in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The charge was noted as continued for a year pending counseling, with no conviction confirmed. Zundel's voluntary appeal to the FBI was denied because the final disposition of the case was missing. Zundel sought records from various agencies, but none had documentation beyond the initial arrest. He then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to close the case and restore his constitutional rights.The Jamestown Municipal Court and other respondents argued that Zundel had an adequate remedy in federal court, referencing Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a federal suit would not adequately address the state court records issue. The court emphasized the municipal court's duty to maintain accurate records and noted that the missing record should have been retained permanently according to administrative rules.The North Dakota Supreme Court granted the petition in part, ordering the Jamestown Municipal Court to conduct a diligent inquiry to locate or reconstruct the missing record and document the results. The court denied Zundel's requests for declaratory relief regarding the nature of the 1990 charge and his right to possess a firearm, citing a lack of evidence in the record to make such determinations. The court's decision underscores the importance of accurate court records for due process and public accountability. View "Zundel v. City of Jamestown" on Justia Law

by
A group of plaintiffs, including William Clardy, Michelle Tucker, two state representatives, and a nonprofit corporation, filed a lawsuit against Maine's Senate President, Speaker of the House, and Governor. They sought to invalidate a special legislative session called by the Governor, arguing it was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed the session was based on a "contrived" extraordinary occasion and that the legislative leaders ceded power to the executive branch. They sought declarations that the session and the legislation passed during it were void.The Kennebec County Superior Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not decide on the plaintiffs' standing but ruled that the Governor's determination of an extraordinary occasion to convene the Legislature was not subject to judicial review. Additionally, the court found that the legislative leaders were immune from suit for their actions. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal, but on different grounds. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The court found that the individual plaintiffs, as citizens and taxpayers, did not demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from the general public. The state representatives failed to show a concrete injury arising from the Governor's proclamation or the convening of the special session. Lastly, the nonprofit corporation lacked standing because its members did not have standing to sue individually. The court concluded that no plaintiff had suffered an injury sufficient to confer standing, thus affirming the lower court's dismissal of the case. View "Clardy v. Jackson" on Justia Law

by
The case involves a challenge to the Re-Enfranchisement Act, which allows individuals convicted of felony-level offenses to vote once they are no longer incarcerated. The plaintiffs, individual taxpayers and the Minnesota Voters Alliance, argued that the Act violates the Minnesota Constitution by restoring only the right to vote rather than all civil rights. They also claimed that using public funds to educate and notify people about the new voting provision is unlawful if the Act itself is unconstitutional.The district court denied the petition, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court determined that taxpayer standing requires a challenge to an illegal expenditure or waste of tax money, which the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate. The court also found that the Minnesota Voters Alliance lacked associational standing because its members did not have standing.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that taxpayer standing exists only when the central dispute involves alleged unlawful disbursements of public funds. The court held that the plaintiffs could not manufacture standing by pointing to incidental expenditures related to implementing the law. Since the plaintiffs' challenge was primarily against the substantive law itself and not the expenditures, they lacked the necessary standing. Consequently, the Minnesota Voters Alliance also lacked associational standing. The court did not address the merits of the case due to the lack of standing. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance vs. Hunt" on Justia Law

by
The plaintiffs, who regularly engage in cryptocurrency transactions, challenged amendments to 26 U.S.C. § 6050I, which now require reporting certain cryptocurrency transactions to the federal government. They argued that the law violates their constitutional rights under the Fourth, First, and Fifth Amendments, and exceeds Congress's enumerated powers. The plaintiffs claimed that the law's requirements would force them to disclose private information, incur compliance costs, and potentially expose them to criminal penalties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the case, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. The court ruled that the claims were either not ripe for adjudication or that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Specifically, the court found that the Fourth Amendment claim was not ripe because the law was not yet effective and the Department of Treasury was still developing rules. The First Amendment claim was dismissed for lack of standing, as the court deemed the plaintiffs' injuries too speculative. The court also found the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim unripe due to pending regulatory action, and the enumerated-powers claim unripe for similar reasons. The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim was dismissed as not ripe because the plaintiffs had not yet asserted the privilege.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing the enumerated-powers, Fourth Amendment, and First Amendment claims. The appellate court held that these claims were ripe for review and that the plaintiffs had standing. The court noted that the plaintiffs, as direct objects of the law, would indeed be subject to the reporting requirements and incur compliance costs, thus suffering an injury in fact. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment vagueness and self-incrimination claims as not ripe. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Carman v. Yellen" on Justia Law

by
In 2017, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III began investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, during which Giorgi Rtskhiladze testified before a grand jury. When the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a redacted version of Mueller’s report, it included information that Rtskhiladze claimed was inaccurate and damaging to his reputation. Rtskhiladze sued for both equitable and monetary relief and sought a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Rtskhiladze lacked standing for his equitable claims, failed to state a claim for damages, and was not entitled to obtain a copy of the transcript. The court found that Rtskhiladze had abandoned his separate damages claim against DOJ and Mueller personally and forfeited arguments about this claim on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rtskhiladze has standing to bring all his claims and remanded the equitable claims for further consideration. The court agreed with the district court that Rtskhiladze failed to state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, as he did not allege "intentional or willful" conduct by DOJ. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Rtskhiladze’s request to obtain a copy of his grand jury testimony transcript, emphasizing the government’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy and preventing witness intimidation.In summary, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Rtskhiladze’s equitable claims for lack of standing, affirmed the dismissal of his damages claim for failure to state a claim, and upheld the denial of his request to obtain a copy of his grand jury transcript. View "Rtskhiladze v. Mueller" on Justia Law

by
In May 2023, Iowa's Governor signed Senate File 496 (SF496) into law, which introduced new regulations for public school libraries, classrooms, and curriculum, and required parental notification for certain gender identity accommodations. Two groups of plaintiffs, including students, authors, and educators, filed lawsuits to enjoin SF496, arguing it violated the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Access Act. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the law's enforcement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining the enforcement of SF496's provisions related to the removal of books from school libraries and the prohibition of instruction on gender identity and sexual orientation for students in kindergarten through grade six. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing and that the law's enforcement would likely cause irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's analysis was flawed. The appellate court held that the district court did not properly apply the legal standards for facial challenges and failed to consider the law's legitimate applications. The Eighth Circuit also noted that the district court did not adequately address the as-applied challenges raised by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The plaintiffs were allowed to pursue injunctive relief under the correct legal framework and address the unconsidered as-applied challenges. View "GLBT Youth in Iowa Schools Task Force v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

by
An Arkansas inmate, Steven Pinder, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various defendants, including Wellpath, LLC, and its employees, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Pinder sought declaratory and injunctive relief and substantial damages for several medical issues, including severe glaucoma, peptic ulcers, acid reflux, diabetes, and an orthopedic condition in his right shoulder. The district court granted summary judgment to two defendants on the shoulder claim and dismissed other claims for failure to establish in forma pauperis (IFP) status.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas initially denied Pinder's IFP status due to his "three strikes" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which bars prisoners with three prior dismissals for frivolous or malicious claims from proceeding IFP unless they are in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Pinder filed a declaration asserting imminent danger, which the magistrate judge partially accepted, allowing some claims to proceed. The district court adopted these recommendations but later revoked IFP status for most claims based on new evidence, ultimately granting summary judgment on the remaining shoulder claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court remanded the motion to revoke Pinder's IFP status to the district court for further consideration, particularly in light of new medical evidence. The appellate court also remanded the issue of whether the interlocutory dismissals were proper, given a recent Eighth Circuit opinion. The court did not rule on the summary judgment at this time, vacating the district court's judgment and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pinder v. WellPath" on Justia Law

by
Antonio Webb, a former state inmate in Missouri, filed a lawsuit against several prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Webb claimed he was subjected to sexual harassment and abuse, that officials failed to protect him from this abuse, and that he faced retaliation for reporting the misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, leading to Webb's appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri initially handled the case. The officials asserted qualified immunity as a defense in their answer to Webb's complaint but did not file a motion to address it. The case moved forward through discovery, and at a pretrial conference, the officials indicated they had not moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity due to a lack of grounds. However, four days before the trial, the court ordered the officials to file a motion discussing qualified immunity, extended the deadline for dispositive motions, and continued the trial. The officials complied, and the court granted summary judgment, concluding Webb failed to present sufficient evidence of any constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's decision to address qualified immunity before trial was a reasonable exercise of case management, aimed at conserving judicial resources and ensuring fairness. Webb had adequate notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion. On the retaliation claim, the court determined Webb did not provide competent evidence to support his allegations. His declaration was inadmissible as it was not signed under penalty of perjury, and his grievance records did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Webb v. Lakey" on Justia Law

by
Anthony Cordero, a student at Montana State University (MSU) during the Spring 2020 semester, sued MSU for prorated reimbursement of his tuition and fees after the university transitioned to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cordero claimed that MSU breached an express contract to provide in-person education and services. He also asserted claims for breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, due process violation, violation of the takings clause, and inverse condemnation.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County dismissed four of Cordero’s six claims, including the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU on the remaining claims, including the express contract claim, and denied Cordero’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The court found that Cordero did not identify a specific, bargained-for promise by MSU to provide in-person education and that he had no compensable property interest in the tuition and fees paid.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that there was an express contract between Cordero and MSU, but it did not include a specific promise to provide in-person education. The court found that MSU had the right to change its regulations and policies, including transitioning to online learning during emergencies. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, noting that an implied contract cannot exist when an express contract is present. The court concluded that MSU did not breach its contractual duties regarding tuition and fees, as it maintained campus facilities and services to the extent possible during the pandemic. View "Cordero v. Montana State University" on Justia Law

by
The case involves The Satanic Temple, Inc. (TST), an atheistic organization that venerates Satan, which sued the City of Boston. TST alleged that Boston's failure to invite it to give an invocation before City Council meetings violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. TST also argued that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a protective order preventing the deposition of Michelle Wu, a former City Councilor and current Mayor of Boston.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Boston and denied TST's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court found that TST had not shown that Boston's legislative prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause or the Massachusetts Free Exercise Clause. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a protective order preventing TST from deposing Mayor Wu.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that TST had not demonstrated that Boston's legislative prayer practice, either on its face or as applied, violated the Establishment Clause or the Massachusetts Free Exercise Clause. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order preventing the deposition of Mayor Wu. The appellate court emphasized that Boston's practice of selecting invocation speakers based on their contributions to the community was constitutional and did not show evidence of religious discrimination. View "Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston" on Justia Law