Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changing its air-quality standard for ozone under the Clean Air Act, which required states to amend their state plans. The EPA issued guidance memoranda to assist states, suggesting specific modeling and a minimum threshold for interstate emissions. Kentucky proposed a plan based on this guidance, but the EPA delayed action on the plan for two years and then disapproved it using different modeling and a lower threshold than initially recommended. Kentucky petitioned the court to vacate the EPA's disapproval.The EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The EPA sought to transfer the case to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the disapproval was a nationally applicable final action. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion, stating that the EPA's disapproval was not nationally applicable and was based on Kentucky's unique facts. The court also found that the EPA's action violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and inconsistently with its prior guidance.The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA failed to adequately explain its departure from prior guidance and did not consider Kentucky's reliance on the initial recommendations. The court vacated the EPA's disapproval of Kentucky's plan and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized the importance of consistency and the need for the EPA to justify its actions when changing its approach. View "Kentucky v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Noah Gabriel, owns an undeveloped parcel of real estate in Narragansett, Rhode Island. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) received a notification of potential wetland violations on the property and investigated, finding that the property had been altered by clearing vegetation, applying fill soil, installing a culvert, and expanding a driveway. CRMC issued a cease-and-desist order and later an order to restore the property. Gabriel disputed CRMC's jurisdiction and filed a complaint in Washington County Superior Court, asserting that CRMC lacked jurisdiction and had committed various illegal actions.The Superior Court granted CRMC's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ordering Gabriel to cease all activities on the property. Gabriel appealed, arguing that CRMC did not have the authority to enforce wetland regulations on his property and cited the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The Court found that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Court determined that CRMC had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, as there was evidence of wetland violations. The Court also found that CRMC would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, as continued alterations to the property would harm the environment. The balance of equities favored CRMC, and the issuance of the injunction would preserve the status quo by protecting the wetland. View "Gabriel v. Willis" on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) challenging the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested multiple extensions and accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, citing his disability. The trial court granted six such requests over eight months but denied a seventh request for further extensions and relief from procedural obligations.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request deprived them of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that granting another extension would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which would not deny them access to judicial services. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Sisters Nikki Mazzocchio and Angela Kraus filed a federal "public liability action" under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) against several defendants, alleging that exposure to radioactive waste caused them to develop cancer. The waste had been handled by various entities over the years, including Mallinckrodt, Cotter Corporation, and Commonwealth Edison Company. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and civil conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law preempted the state-law claims because federal nuclear dosage regulations provide the exclusive standard of care in a public liability action. The district court denied the motions to dismiss, and the defendants appealed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were not preempted by federal law. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their case under state tort law standards. The defendants then sought and were granted permission to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that state tort law standards of care are not preempted by federal nuclear dosage regulations in a public liability action under the PAA. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., which established that state tort law applies in cases involving nuclear incidents, despite the federal government's exclusive control over nuclear safety regulation. The court also noted that Congress, through the PAA's 1988 amendments, did not repudiate the role of state tort law in such cases. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs' state-law claims to proceed. View "Mazzocchio v. Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

A lawyer representing an environmental group sought disability accommodations under California Rule of Court 1.100 due to his bipolar disorder. The accommodations requested included extensions of time for briefing deadlines and relief from procedural obligations in a case challenging the approval of a timber harvest plan by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE). The trial court had previously granted six similar requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had partially granted the environmental group's petition for a writ of mandate, finding deficiencies in CalFIRE's approval of the timber harvest plan regarding geologic, biologic, and cultural resources. However, the court rejected the group's claim that CalFIRE's delayed and incomplete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. Dissatisfied with this partial victory, the group appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the seventh request for accommodation. The court noted that the trial court had already granted multiple extensions and that further delays would create an undue burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding. The appellate court emphasized that the environmental group had the option to retain additional counsel to avoid further delays, which it failed to do. The judgment was affirmed, and the respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

In April 2020, the City of Upland approved the development of a 201,096 square-foot warehouse/parcel delivery service building. The City adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND) for the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Upland Community First (UCF) filed a petition for a writ of mandate, claiming the project violated CEQA due to potential significant impacts on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, traffic, and air quality. UCF argued that an environmental impact report (EIR) should have been prepared.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted UCF’s petition, finding insufficient evidence to support the City’s use of two quantitative thresholds for measuring the project’s cumulative impacts on GHG emissions. The court ordered the City to set aside its resolutions approving the MND and other project approvals to address the sufficiency of evidence supporting the City’s threshold of significance for GHG emissions. Both UCF and Bridge Development Partners, LLC, the project developer, appealed the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the City’s use of the 3,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year (MTCO2 e/yr.) threshold for measuring the significance of the project’s GHG emissions. The court concluded that the project’s GHG emissions would be below this threshold, thus not significantly impacting the environment. The court also found no merit in UCF’s claims regarding the project’s impacts on traffic, air quality, and GHG emissions. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and directed the lower court to enter judgment in favor of the City and Bridge. View "Upland Community First v. City of Upland" on Justia Law

The case involves the environmental review of commercial aquarium fishing permits in Hawai‘i. In 2017, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled that the permitting process for commercial aquarium collection must undergo environmental review under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). Following this ruling, the Environmental Court voided all existing permits and enjoined the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) from issuing new permits without completing HEPA review. The Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (PIJAC) then prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to continue commercial aquarium fishing in the West Hawai‘i Reef Fishery Management Area (WHRFMA).The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) initially rejected the EIS, citing fourteen reasons. PIJAC revised the EIS and, after a public comment period, submitted it again. BLNR's vote on the revised EIS resulted in a 3-3 tie, leading to the EIS being "deemed accepted" by operation of law. Plaintiffs sued BLNR in the Environmental Court for the First Circuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the EIS adequately disclosed facts for the agency to make an informed decision. Plaintiffs appealed, and the State cross-appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss.The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held that the State is a proper defendant in the case and should defend the EIS. The court also determined that the "rule of reason" should be used in conjunction with HEPA’s content requirements to evaluate an EIS. The court found that the EIS was legally sufficient as it met HEPA’s content requirements and provided enough information for BLNR to make an informed decision. Consequently, the court affirmed the Environmental Court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment for PIJAC. View "Kaupiko v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Beverly Dale Jolly worked as an inspector at nuclear plants from 1980 to 1984, where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC. In 2016, Dale was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife Brenda sued multiple defendants, settling with all except Fisher and Crosby for $2,270,000. The jury awarded Dale $200,000 and Brenda $100,000. The Jollys filed a motion for a new trial nisi additur, claiming the verdicts were inadequate. The trial court granted the motion, increasing Dale's award to $1,580,000 and Brenda's to $290,000, while allowing Fisher and Crosby the option to reject the additur for a new trial.The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Fisher and Crosby appealed, questioning the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur and the partial denial of their motion for setoff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court applied the correct standard and procedure for a new trial nisi additur and whether it properly allocated the pretrial settlement proceeds for setoff purposes.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decisions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial nisi additur, finding the jury's verdicts inadequate but not grossly so. The court also upheld the trial court's allocation of the pretrial settlement proceeds, agreeing that the allocation was reasonable and that the setoff was correctly applied only to the same injury claims. The case was remanded for Fisher and Crosby to either accept the additur or opt for a new trial. View "Jolly v. Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC" on Justia Law

A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law