Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES V. STEMILT AG SERVICES, LLC
In this case, Columbia Legal Services represented farmworkers in a class action against Stemilt AG Services, LLC, alleging forced labor and trafficking. During the litigation, the district court issued a protective order limiting Columbia's use of discovered information outside the case. The order required Columbia to seek court approval before using any discovery materials in other advocacy efforts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over the initial case. The court issued two protective orders during the discovery process. The first order protected sensitive employment data from the Washington State Employment Security Division. The second order, which is the subject of this appeal, restricted Columbia from using Stemilt's financial and employment records in other advocacy without prior court approval. The district court adopted this order to prevent Columbia from using discovered information outside the litigation, citing concerns about Columbia's intentions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Columbia had standing to appeal the protective order because it directly affected Columbia's ability to use discovered information in its advocacy work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a broad and undifferentiated protective order without finding "good cause" or identifying specific harm that would result from public disclosure. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's protective order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that discovery is presumptively public and that protective orders require a showing of specific prejudice or harm. View "COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES V. STEMILT AG SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law
Pilot v. Duffy
Jacqueline Pilot applied for a promotion with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Kansas City, Missouri. After another candidate was selected, Pilot sued the Secretary of Transportation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging race, sex, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for a previous employment discrimination complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. The court found that Pilot did not provide sufficient evidence to support her claims of discrimination and retaliation. Pilot then appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which is used for claims lacking direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation. The court found that while Pilot made a prima facie case for her claims, the Secretary provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision: the FAA hired the highest-ranked candidate based on a standardized hiring process. The court concluded that Pilot failed to show that the Secretary's reason was pretextual. The court noted that the hiring process used a mix of objective and subjective criteria, and the top-ranked candidate was selected based on a standardized rubric. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Secretary, finding no evidence of pretext or discrimination. View "Pilot v. Duffy" on Justia Law
Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth
In several Minnesota cities, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. Multiple contractors, a carpenter, and a union objected to this requirement, alleging it violated the First Amendment. The contractors, Kaski, Inc.; Nordic Group, Inc.; and Roen Salvage Co., claimed they missed out on lucrative work due to these project-labor agreements. Luke Krhin, a carpenter, and the Christian Labor Association, which has a local chapter in Minnesota, also joined the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court found that the contractors, Krhin, and the Christian Labor Association could not succeed on their First Amendment claim. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on the issue of standing, a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that the contractors did not have standing because the relevant constitutional claims belonged to their employees, not to them. The court also found that Krhin, who opposed joining a pre-approved union, was exempt from the requirement as a supervisor, thus lacking standing. The Christian Labor Association also lacked standing because it failed to identify any members who would have standing to sue in their own right.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss based on a lack of standing. View "Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC
Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson, former Amazon warehouse employees, alleged that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by not compensating them for time spent in mandatory pre-shift COVID-19 screenings. These screenings, which included temperature checks and symptom questions, took 10-15 minutes on average and were required before employees could clock in for their shifts. Johnson and Miller Anderson argued that this time should be compensable as it was necessary for their work and primarily benefited Amazon by ensuring a safe workplace during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). The court found that the FLSA claims were barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), which excludes certain pre-shift activities from compensable time. The district court also concluded that the IMWL claims failed because it assumed the IMWL incorporated the PPA’s exclusions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the IMWL incorporates the PPA’s exclusions for compensable time. The court noted the lack of Illinois state court decisions directly addressing this issue and found the arguments from both parties plausible. To resolve this important and unsettled question of state law, the Seventh Circuit decided to certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking a definitive answer on whether the IMWL includes the PPA’s limitations on pre-shift compensation. The court stayed further proceedings pending the Illinois Supreme Court's decision. View "Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law
Reilly v Will County Sheriff’s Office
James Reilly, a deputy in the Will County Sheriff's Office, alleged that his employer and Sheriff Michael Kelley retaliated against him for criticizing Kelley during a 2018 election campaign by not promoting him to sergeant. Reilly filed his complaint over two years after his eligibility for promotion expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was untimely. The district court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Reilly then requested the district court to set aside its judgment and allow him to amend his complaint, but the court denied this request, applying a heightened standard and requiring extraordinary circumstances for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had mistakenly applied a heightened standard to Reilly's Rule 59(e) motion instead of the liberal standard for amending pleadings. The appellate court concluded that Reilly's proposed amended complaint stated a plausible claim for relief and that he had not pled himself out of court based on the statute of limitations. The court noted that Reilly's claim could not be conclusively determined as time-barred at this stage and that the defendants could raise the statute of limitations defense later in the case on a more complete factual record.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Reilly to proceed with his amended complaint. View "Reilly v Will County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law
Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles
D’Andre Lampkin, a deputy at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), filed a complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation after he reported an interaction with Michael Reddy, a retired deputy sheriff. Lampkin claimed that Reddy’s friends at LASD retaliated against him, leading to his suspension, a search of his residence, and termination of medical benefits. Lampkin sought monetary damages and other relief. The case went to trial, and the jury found that while Lampkin engaged in protected whistleblowing activity and this was a factor in LASD’s actions against him, LASD would have made the same decisions for legitimate, independent reasons. Consequently, the jury awarded no damages.Lampkin moved to amend his complaint to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, but the trial court denied the motion. He then filed a motion to be declared the prevailing party and sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the same-decision defense should not preclude a fee award, as held in Harris v. City of Santa Monica for FEHA cases. The trial court agreed, declared Lampkin the prevailing party, and awarded him costs and attorney’s fees.The County of Los Angeles appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. The appellate court held that Lampkin did not bring a “successful action” under Labor Code section 1102.5 because he obtained no relief due to the County’s successful same-decision defense. Therefore, he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The court also found that the County was the prevailing party under section 1032, as neither party obtained any relief, and thus Lampkin was not entitled to costs. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and order awarding fees and costs to Lampkin and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the County. View "Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
Stark v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
Nancy Stark, as the legal guardian and mother of Jill Finley, an incapacitated person, filed a lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Finley, who suffered a hypoxic brain injury in 2007, was initially approved for long-term disability benefits by Reliance. However, in 2022, Reliance terminated her benefits, claiming recent testing did not support her total disability. Stark appealed, and Reliance reinstated the benefits in 2023. Stark then sued, seeking a surcharge for financial harm caused by the wrongful termination, claiming breach of fiduciary duty for not providing internal records, and contesting the deduction of social security payments from Finley's disability payments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted Reliance's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Stark did not plausibly allege a claim for equitable relief under ERISA, nor did she demonstrate that Reliance's actions violated the terms of the insurance policy or breached fiduciary duties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Stark was not entitled to attorney’s fees incurred during the administrative appeal under ERISA’s § 1132(a)(3) or § 1132(g). The court also found that Stark's claims regarding the SSD offset were time-barred and waived due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Additionally, the court concluded that Stark did not allege any concrete harm resulting from Reliance's alleged failure to provide requested records during the administrative appeal. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss all of Stark's claims. View "Stark v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Andersen v. Department of Health and Human Services
Sharon Andersen filed a complaint against the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging hostile-work-environment disability discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). Andersen, who worked for DHHS from 2005 to 2019, claimed that from July 2018 to August 2019, she experienced increased stress and anxiety due to her workload and interactions with her supervisor. She reported panic attacks and was eventually diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Andersen requested reasonable accommodations, including reassignment, which were denied. She went on medical leave in January 2019 and resigned in August 2019, claiming constructive discharge.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) granted summary judgment in favor of DHHS, concluding that Andersen’s claim was time-barred. The court found that the only actions within the statutory limitations period were DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen and her resignation, neither of which were discriminatory in themselves or indicative of a continuing violation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that Andersen did not make a prima facie showing of a continuing violation. The Court determined that Andersen’s resignation, occurring more than seven months after she went on medical leave, was too disconnected from the alleged hostile work environment to qualify as a constructive discharge. Additionally, the Court noted that DHHS’s refusal to reassign Andersen was not a required reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the MHRA. Therefore, Andersen’s claim was deemed untimely, and the summary judgment in favor of DHHS was affirmed. View "Andersen v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law
Wood v. Florida Department of Education
Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law
HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC.
A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law