Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Pamela McKenzie was shopping at a Walgreens in Houston in 2019 when she was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. A Walgreens employee called the police, suspecting McKenzie was the same person who had stolen from the store earlier that day. After reviewing surveillance footage, the police determined McKenzie was not the thief and released her. McKenzie claimed that other Walgreens employees had agreed she was not the thief, but the employee called the police anyway. She sued Walgreens for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior liability for employee negligence, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision (NHTS).The trial court denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which allows for early dismissal of legal actions based on the exercise of free speech. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the trial court erred by not dismissing McKenzie’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability for employee negligence. However, it held that the NHTS claim was not subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it was not entirely based on the employee’s exercise of free speech rights.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply to McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The court concluded that McKenzie failed to meet her evidentiary burden to avoid dismissal, as she did not provide clear and specific evidence for each essential element of her NHTS claim. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, specifically for the dismissal of McKenzie’s NHTS claim. The remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment was left undisturbed. View "WALGREENS v. MCKENZIE" on Justia Law

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Dyamond Davis, an employee at the Shapiro Development Center, informed her supervisor on May 12, 2017, that she needed to leave work due to pregnancy-related morning sickness. Her supervisor allowed her to leave, reminding her to complete the necessary paperwork. Davis was later granted FMLA leave retroactive to May, but DHS determined that part of her May 12 absence was unauthorized because it believed FMLA did not cover morning sickness and that Davis violated policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. Consequently, DHS terminated her employment. Davis appealed her termination unsuccessfully to the Illinois Civil Service Commission and then filed a lawsuit alleging FMLA interference. Another employee, Antionette Burns, joined the lawsuit with a similar claim.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. The court found that Burns failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact and that DHS was entitled to rely on the medical certification provided by Davis’s doctor, which did not indicate a need for intermittent leave for morning sickness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Burns’s claim without prejudice, agreeing that she failed to establish a concrete injury-in-fact. However, the court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding Davis’s FMLA claim. The court noted that morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under FMLA and that DHS was aware of Davis’s need for intermittent leave due to morning sickness. The court also found that DHS may have improperly applied its paid leave substitution policy, which could have led to Davis’s termination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DHS on Davis’s claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

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The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

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Charlene Carter, a flight attendant for Southwest Airlines, was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion messages to the president of the flight attendants' union, Audrey Stone. Carter, a pro-life Christian, opposed the union's leadership and its participation in the Women's March, which she viewed as supporting abortion. After an arbitrator found that Southwest had cause to terminate Carter under its corporate policies, Carter sued Southwest and the union, claiming her termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Railway Labor Act (RLA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of Carter, finding that Southwest and the union had discriminated against her based on her religious beliefs and practices. The court permanently enjoined Southwest and the union from interfering with the religious expression of any Southwest flight attendant and held Southwest in contempt for failing to comply with its judgment. Both Southwest and the union appealed, and Carter cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of Southwest's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Carter's belief-based Title VII claim and RLA retaliation claim, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for Southwest. The court affirmed the judgment against Southwest on Carter's practice-based Title VII claims and the dismissal of Carter's RLA interference claim. The court also affirmed the judgment against the union on all claims but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for additional proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the contempt order against Southwest. View "Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Ray Jr. died from asphyxiation due to an industrial accident involving nitrogen gas. His widow, Sharmel Culver, was awarded death benefits and subsequently applied for an additional award, alleging that Ray’s employer, TimkenSteel Corporation, violated specific safety requirements (VSSR). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied the application, finding that the specific safety requirements did not apply because nitrogen gas is not considered "toxic" or a "poison."Culver sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth District Court of Appeals, which determined that the commission abused its discretion. The court issued a limited writ, directing the commission to reconsider the VSSR analysis, concluding that nitrogen gas, in the concentration present in the elevator-control room, was toxic and thus fell under the applicable safety regulations.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth District’s judgment. The court held that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the additional award. The court found that the commission’s decision was supported by some evidence, including expert testimony and industry literature indicating that nitrogen gas is not inherently toxic. The court emphasized that the regulations in effect at the time of Ray’s death defined "air contaminants" as including only "toxic" gases, and the evidence did not support a finding that nitrogen gas met this definition. The court concluded that the commission’s interpretation of the regulations was reasonable and that the Tenth District erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the commission. View "State ex rel. Culver v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

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Amazon.com Services LLC appealed the "constructive denial" of its motion for injunctive relief from two administrative proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The case involves Amazon's fulfillment center in Staten Island, New York, where the Amazon Labor Union (ALU) won an election to represent over 8,000 employees. Amazon filed objections alleging interference by ALU and the NLRB's Regional Office, leading to two NLRB cases: one concerning the election and another regarding Amazon's refusal to bargain with ALU.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas reviewed Amazon's request for temporary, preliminary, and permanent declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid harm from the alleged unconstitutional proceedings. Amazon argued that the structure of the NLRB proceedings violated the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied Amazon's request for a temporary restraining order, finding that Amazon had not established a substantial threat of irreparable harm. The court also granted but stayed the NLRB's motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of New York.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court found that Amazon did not act diligently in seeking expedited relief and failed to establish a legitimate basis for urgency. The court noted that Amazon did not repeatedly request swift review or a ruling by a specific date until the day before its deadline to respond to the NLRB's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that the district court did not effectively deny Amazon's motion for injunctive relief by failing to rule by September 27, 2024. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Amazon.com v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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Loretta Mauldin, an employee at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) since 1991, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the United States Department of the Army. Mauldin, who was born in 1958, claimed retaliation and discrimination based on age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The case arose after Mauldin was not selected for a promotion to a Grade 9 Explosives Operator Supervisor position in 2018. She alleged that her non-selection was due to her age, sex, and prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity, including supporting a co-worker's age discrimination complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the Army, dismissing Mauldin's claims. The court found that Mauldin failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and discrimination. It concluded that the Army provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting another candidate, Scott Harkey, who performed better in the interview process. The court also determined that Mauldin did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the Army's reasons were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court correctly considered the Army's evidence, including testimony from the interview panelists and Mauldin's supervisor, Buckner. The court found that Mauldin did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. The court emphasized that the interview process was neutral and that Mauldin's lower interview scores were a legitimate reason for her non-selection. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit upheld the summary judgment in favor of the Army, concluding that Mauldin's claims of retaliation and discrimination were not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Mauldin v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

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James Eckardt, an aircraft mechanic, sustained multiple work-related injuries over his 40-year career, including injuries to his knees, shoulders, wrists, and cervical spine. His final injury occurred in October 2015, leading to a spinal fusion surgery. Eckardt retired in February 2017 due to his inability to perform his job duties and sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund.An administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Division of Workers’ Compensation assigned permanent partial disability (PPD) amounts to Eckardt’s preexisting injuries and determined he was permanently and totally disabled, awarding PTD benefits. The Fund appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, arguing that the ALJ improperly considered non-qualifying injuries, including carpal tunnel syndrome and a right shoulder injury, in the PTD determination. The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision, finding that the doctor’s reliance on the non-qualifying right shoulder injury meant there was no credible evidence that Eckardt was permanently and totally disabled due to the primary injury in combination with only qualifying preexisting injuries.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s denial of PTD benefits. The Court held that Eckardt’s right shoulder injury did not qualify as a preexisting disability because it did not meet the statutory threshold of 50 weeks PPD, and a load factor could not be applied to enhance the PPD amount. The Court also found that Eckardt failed to show he was permanently and totally disabled due to the combination of his primary injury and only his qualifying preexisting disabilities, as the doctor’s opinion improperly included the non-qualifying right shoulder injury. Therefore, Eckardt did not meet his burden of proof for Fund liability, and his claim for PTD benefits was denied. View "Eckardt v. Treasurer" on Justia Law

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Matthew Moriarty, the defendant, appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his amended counterclaim against Evoqua Water Technologies LLC and Neptune-Benson, LLC. Moriarty's counterclaim sought declaratory relief and tort damages, alleging violations of a non-compete agreement he signed in 2010 while employed by Neptune-Benson, Inc. (NBI). Evoqua acquired Neptune-Benson in 2016 and hired Moriarty in 2017. The plaintiffs sued Moriarty in 2018 for breaching the 2010 agreement, among other claims, and obtained a preliminary injunction in 2019 to enforce the agreement.The Superior Court dismissed Moriarty's counterclaim, citing the litigation privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings. Moriarty's counterclaim included claims for emotional distress, declaratory judgments, constructive discharge, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations, based on alleged false testimony by an Evoqua executive during the preliminary injunction hearing.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal. The Court held that the litigation privilege protected the executive's testimony, barring Moriarty's claims for emotional distress, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations. The Court also found Moriarty's declaratory judgment claim moot, as the non-compete agreement had expired in 2020, and his constructive discharge claim failed to state a valid cause of action. The Court concluded that Moriarty did not demonstrate that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Thus, the dismissal of Moriarty's amended counterclaim was upheld. View "Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty" on Justia Law

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Kenya Watkins, a Black woman, was employed by Genesh, Inc., d/b/a Burger King, from August 2014 to August 2015. She alleged that her manager verbally, physically, and sexually harassed her, including forcing her into a freezer, groping her, simulating sex with her, and stating she would not be promoted unless she had sex with him. Watkins filed an employment discrimination charge with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the EEOC in early 2016. In December 2018, she alleged that Genesh admonished her then-employer, Church’s Chicken, for hiring her, leading to a second EEOC charge in 2019.In August 2019, Watkins sued Genesh in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding her allegations did not plausibly support racial harassment. The court noted that Watkins had pending EEOC charges and could file her Title VII claims once the EEOC proceedings concluded. In July 2021, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2019 charge, which Watkins did not pursue. In April 2022, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2016 charge, leading Watkins to file a second lawsuit in July 2022, raising claims under Title VII and other statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Watkins’s 2022 complaint as untimely. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. The court held that Watkins’s Title VII claims were precluded by the final judgment in her 2019 lawsuit, as both suits arose from the same employment relationship. The court reaffirmed that the absence of a right-to-sue letter did not deprive Watkins of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Title VII claims in the initial suit. View "Watkins v. Genesh" on Justia Law