Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves James and Wilma Self, who filed a lawsuit as representatives of a class of plaintiffs who own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana within compulsory drilling units operated by BPX Operating Company. The plaintiffs alleged that BPX's practice of withholding post-production costs from their pro rata share of production was improper. BPX sought dismissal of the claim, arguing that the Louisiana doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for unit operators to be reimbursed for post-production costs not otherwise covered by specific statutes. The federal district court granted BPX's motion to dismiss.On appeal, the United States Fifth Circuit found the law unsettled on this issue and certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The question was whether the doctrine of negotiorum gestio applies to unit operators selling product in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3).The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the doctrine of negotiorum gestio does not apply and cannot be a basis for liability as a unit operator is always acting "with authority." The court reasoned that the oil and gas conservation law provides a unique quasi-contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit operators, which cannot be applied consistently with the doctrine of negotiorum gestio. The court further explained that a party is only a gestor if his action is taken "without authority," but a unit operator is statutorily authorized by La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) to sell an unleased owner's share of production when the unleased owner has not arranged to dispose of his share. Therefore, a unit operator who sells an owner's production under the statutory authority of La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) cannot be a gestor under La. C.C. art. 2292. The court answered the certified question and sent its judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties. View "SELF VS. BPX OPERATING COMPANY" on Justia Law

This case involves a vehicular collision that occurred in a construction zone on Interstate 10 in LaPlace, Louisiana. The plaintiff, Frank Cushenberry, was driving a commercial vehicle when he collided with a truck owned by Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC. The truck was partially in the right lane of the highway while backing up to move traffic cones. The collision resulted in significant injuries to Mr. Cushenberry, including a traumatic brain injury.The case was initially heard in a lower court, where the jury found Barber Brothers 100% at fault for the accident and awarded substantial damages to Mr. Cushenberry, his wife, and their two minor children. Barber Brothers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the trial court did err in its jury instructions, but that this error was not reversible. The court also found that the jury erred in finding Barber Brothers solely at fault for the accident. The court determined that Barber Brothers was 80% at fault and Mr. Cushenberry was 20% at fault.The court also found that the jury abused its discretion in awarding general damages of $10,750,000.00 to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $2,500,000.00 to his spouse, Robin Cushenberry, and $1,500,000.00 to each of their minor children. The court reduced these awards to $5,000,000.00 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, and loss of consortium damages of $400,000.00 to Mrs. Cushenberry and $100,000.00 to each child.As amended, the trial court judgment was affirmed. View "BARBER BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, LLC VS. CAPITOL CITY PRODUCE COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of residents and a church, collectively referred to as the "Neighbors," sued Ghassan Korban, the Executive Director of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (SWB), for damages caused to their properties during a drainage project. The Neighbors won a judgment for inverse condemnation, but the SWB did not pay. The Neighbors then filed a federal lawsuit, which was dismissed. They subsequently filed a state lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment. The district court dismissed the case, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the payment of a judgment for inverse condemnation is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court found that the federal lawsuit did not bar the state lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata because the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state mandamus claim. The court also found that the Neighbors had stated a valid cause of action for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the payment of a judgment based on inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus. The court remanded the case to the district court to devise a plan for satisfying the judgment within a reasonable period of time. View "WATSON MEMORIAL SPIRITUAL TEMPLE OF CHRIST V. KORBAN" on Justia Law

The case involves two sets of plaintiffs, Douglas Bienvenu et al. and John Doe et al., who filed lawsuits against two defendants for alleged sexual abuse of minors. The plaintiffs argued that the revival provisions of Section 2 of 2021 La. Acts 322 and Section 2 of 2022 La. Acts 386, which were designed to revive previously prescribed claims related to sexual abuse of minors, were constitutional and should apply retroactively. The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the retroactive application of the amended statute would unconstitutionally deprive them of a vested property right to claim the accrued defense of liberative prescription.The case was initially heard in the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, overruling the exception of prescription and finding that Act 322, as interpreted by Act 386, was constitutional and applied retroactively to revive all causes of action related to sexual abuse of a minor that previously prescribed under any Louisiana prescriptive period.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted a rehearing to address the plaintiffs' contention that the original opinion erred in its due process analysis. The court vacated its original opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the legislature's intent to apply the amended provisions of La. R.S. 9:2800.9 retroactively by reviving previously prescribed claims was clearly and explicitly stated in Act 386. The court also held that when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of liberative prescription, that right becomes a vested property right protected by the constitution’s due process guarantees. However, the court found that the revival provision in Act 386 was rationally related to a legitimate government interest and therefore did not violate the due process clause. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Bienvenu v. Defendant 1" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an accident where the plaintiff, Daniel Bennett, was injured when his vehicle abruptly stopped after driving over a downed telecommunications line owned by Cox Communications of Louisiana (“Cox”). Bennett filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including Cox and Cable Man, Inc., a company contracted by Cox to maintain the line. Bennett alleged that both Cox and Cable Man were negligent in their handling of the line and their failure to properly train their employees.Cox, in response, invoked an indemnification agreement under their contract with Cable Man, requiring Cable Man to indemnify and defend Cox against any claims related to Cable Man's work. Cable Man refused the tender and filed an Exception of Prematurity, arguing that without a finding of liability or a judgment, the claim for indemnity was premature. The trial court denied the exception, but the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, reversed the trial court's ruling, finding Cox’s claim for indemnity to be premature.The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. The court held that a claim for indemnity raised during the pendency of the litigation and before a finding of liability is not premature. The court reasoned that this finding aligns with principles of judicial economy and efficiency, and the relevant Code of Civil Procedure articles pertaining to third party practice. The court clarified that while the right to collect on an indemnity agreement is determined upon judgment or finding of liability or loss, there is no prohibition on asserting a claim for indemnity in the same proceeding. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Demco Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a wrongful death suit filed by Catherine Evans, the mother of Tommy Wiley's children, against Abubaker, Inc., the owner of a convenience store where Wiley was shot and killed. The incident occurred in the store's parking lot during a verbal altercation between Wiley and Cedric Daniels. Wiley struck Daniels in the face, and Daniels retaliated by shooting and killing Wiley. Evans alleged that the store owner had a duty to provide heightened security measures due to the store's location in a high crime area and its history of criminal activity. She claimed that Abubaker's failure to implement such measures made it liable for Wiley's death.The district court denied Abubaker's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the shooting was not foreseeable and that Wiley was not an innocent bystander but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the shooting. The court found that there were questions of fact regarding the foreseeability of the crime and whether Abubaker had a duty to provide additional security. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Wiley was not acting as a store patron but was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the incident. Therefore, Abubaker had no duty to protect Wiley from the consequences of his own actions. The court held that Abubaker should have been granted summary judgment as it had no duty to protect Wiley under the circumstances of the case. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "EVANS VS. ABUBAKER, INC." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on whether the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupts prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit. This query arose from the case of Randall Kling who initially filed suit in state court alleging his dismissal from the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control was in retaliation for submitting written complaints about workplace and ethics violations. He later filed a complaint in federal district court citing substantially similar facts and seeking relief for violations of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana answered the certified question by stating that prescription or the period within which a lawsuit may be filed is interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully inform the defendant of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant. The Court explained that the essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved. The court emphasized that notice is sufficient when it fully informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and what is demanded of the defendant. Thus, the court took a balanced approach between a broad interpretation of interruption and a narrow one, placing emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-case basis. View "KLING VS. HEBERT" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal properly found no abuse of discretion in a jury’s award of approximately $10 million in general damages to plaintiff Henry Pete who developed mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Intertwined with this issue was the fundamental question of the manner by which appellate courts were to review damage awards for excessiveness; necessarily, the same rules would apply in determining whether an award was too low. Louisiana jurisprudence had a long-standing general principle that, in reviewing a general damage award, the “initial inquiry . . . is whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages.” Thereafter, and only when a determination has been made that the “trier of fact has abused its ‘much discretion,’” will a court “resort to prior awards . . . and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Such determinations are not subject to mathematical exactitude or scientific precision. The Court held that an appellate court must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact’s award is an abuse of discretion. Applying this principle to this case, the Court found the jury abused its discretion in awarding $9,800,00.00 in general damages. "The evidence presented at trial does not support an award that far exceeds the highest reasonable awards in cases involving similar injuries. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced at trial, we find $5,000,000.00 to be the highest amount that could reasonably be awarded." View "Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this medical malpractice matter in order to consider whether the gross negligence standard of La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) was to be considered by a medical review panel when the medical treatment occurred during a declared state of public health emergency pursuant to La.R.S. 29:766(A). To this, the Court found the trial court did not err in declaring that La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) should not be considered or applied in medical review panel proceedings and, therefore, did not err in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the court of appeal did not err in its affirmation. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sebble v. St. Luke's #2, LLC d/b/a St. Luke's Living Center, et al." on Justia Law