Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendants dismissed Plaintiff from two graduate nursing studies programs. She sued, claiming that her dismissal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause. The district court refused to dismiss some of her claims. The Defendants appealed part of that order, contending that they have sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims and that she failed to state Fourteenth Amendment claims.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendants' appeal in part finding that the court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court affirmed the order in part and reversed the order in part, concluding that Plaintiff stated some Title II claims but not all of the claims that the district court refused to dismiss. Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity at this stage of the litigation because Plaintiff’s allegations did not permit the court to assume that Defendants did not violate her due-process rights. The court explained that it has appellate jurisdiction over only the denial of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims. The court wrote it must assume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. The state may or may not be correct that its rebuttal evidence vitiates any inference that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability. But the pleading stage was not the right time to raise those contentions. Although the court has done so in the past, Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit the court to assume that the Due Process Clause was not violated. View "Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ" on Justia Law

The State of California gave the San Bernardino City Unified School District (District) hardship funding to build a school. The State demanded that the District return funds the District did not use for the project (the project savings). Education Code section 17070.63(c) allowed a district to retain project savings for other proper purposes when the savings included funds received from the state. The District challenged the demand for return of the funding in an appeal to the State Allocation Board (Board). The Board upheld the state’s demand, relying on a regulation requiring the return of hardship funding. The District then filed an administrative mandamus action in the trial court, challenging the Board’s decision and the pertinent regulation. The trial court found the regulation conflicted with the statutory scheme and entered judgment in favor of the District. The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred by determining that section 17070.63(c) allowed a district to retain hardship funding, even though the regulation required return of unused hardship funding to the state. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the regulation relied on by the Board improperly conflicted with the statutory scheme, and that the District was entitled to retain the hardship funding. View "San Bernardino City Unif. School Dist. v. State Allocation Bd." on Justia Law

Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. Michigan Head Start grantees challenged the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services. The district court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit denied an injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs have not shown that they will likely prevail on the merits. HHS likely did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it promulgated the vaccine requirement through an interim final rule instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). That rule contains ample discussion of the evidence in support of a vaccine requirement and the justifications for the requirement, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,055-059. HHS likely has the statutory authority to issue a vaccine requirement for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers under 42 U.S.C. 9836a(a)(1)(A), (E). The risk that unvaccinated staff members could transmit a deadly disease to Head Start children—who are ineligible for the COVID-19 vaccine due to their young age—is “a threat to the health” of the children. The court noted HHS’s history of regulating the health of Head Start children and staff. View "Livingston Educational Service Agency v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Daniel Schafer, a teacher at a high school in the Anderson Union High School District (District), had a sexual relationship on school premises with one of his students, plaintiff Jane Doe. Doe sued the District, principal Carol Germano, and superintendent Tim Azevedo for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the District, finding that there was no evidence the District knew or should have known that Schafer posed a risk of harm to students. On appeal, Doe contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the District had a duty to supervise and monitor Schafer and Doe, and whether the District breached its duty to Doe was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, the District did not have a duty to review alarm data and video recordings in order to constantly monitor all teachers, students, and campus visitors, nor did it have such a duty specifically with regard to Schafer and Doe. View "Doe v. Anderson Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christopher Teacher filed a complaint seeking a writ of administrative mandate against California Western School of Law (CWSL) challenging the procedures CWSL followed in expelling him from the law school. The trial court denied Teacher’s request for a writ and entered a judgment in favor of CWSL. On appeal, Teacher claimed, among other things, that CWSL failed to provide him with a fair administrative process in expelling him. The Court of Appeal concurred, finding CWSL’s disciplinary procedures expressly provided, “The student or the student’s spokesperson shall have the right to cross[-]examine witnesses.” Notwithstanding this, CWSL did not afford Teacher the opportunity to cross-examine any of the witnesses on whose statements CWSL relied in reaching its decision to expel Teacher. In light of the fact that CWSL deprived Teacher of this important right guaranteed by its own procedures, the Court reversed judgment, emphasizing that it did not reach any conclusion as to Teacher’s commission of the misconduct that CWSL alleged. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Teacher v. Cal. Western School of Law" on Justia Law

In October 2017, plaintiffs Sadie Boyd (a student at Twin Valley Middle High School in Whitingham, Vermont) Madeleine Klein (a resident and property owner in Whitingham), and the Town of Whitingham filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State of Vermont, arguing that the education funding and property taxation system set forth in 16 V.S.A. ch. 133 and 32 V.S.A. ch. 135 violated the Education Clause, the Proportional Contribution Clause, and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They claimed that the system was unconstitutional because it deprived plaintiff Boyd of an equal educational opportunity, required plaintiff Klein to contribute disproportionately to education funding, and compelled the Town to collect an unconstitutional tax. The civil division granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the alleged inequities were caused by the statutes in question or that the education property taxation system lacked a rational basis. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd, et al. v. Vermont" on Justia Law

The parents of M.W., a minor eligible for services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), filed a Petition for Due Process against the Board of Education. Before a scheduled hearing, the ALJ met with counsel, M.W.’s parent, and a Board representative. The terms of a purported settlement were read into the record. In a “Decision Approving Settlement,” the ALJ made specific findings and ordered, “that the parties comply with the settlement terms.” The parents later contacted the Board, repudiating the agreement, and moved the ALJ to “set aside the settlement.” They filed suit, seeking relief under the IDEA.The district court questioned whether the ALJ’s bare findings that the settlement was entered into voluntarily and resolved all disputes satisfied the IDEA's jurisdictional requirements, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, citing IDEA provisions for the enforceability of settlement agreements (20 U.S.C. 1415(e), 1415(f)(1)(B)), and held that the ALJ’s decision was not based on “substantive grounds,” under 1415(f). The Third Circuit reversed. The entry of a “Decision Approving Settlement” in an IDEA dispute satisfies section 1415(I)'s jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal of an administrative IDEA determination. If a prevailing party may enforce a settlement agreement embodied in an administrative consent order as an “aggrieved party” under 1415(i)(2), then a party seeking to challenge such an order as improperly entered must likewise be able to bring a challenge in federal court. View "G W v. Ringwood Board of Education" on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

The "borrower defense" cancellation of federal student loans is allowed in certain cases of school misconduct, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). After DeVos became the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Department used a new methodology to decide borrower defense claims. The Department was preliminarily enjoined from using that methodology. From June 2018-December 2019, the Department issued no borrower defense decisions. Individuals with pending applications sued. The parties negotiated a proposed settlement that included an 18-month deadline to resolve outstanding claims. Before the class fairness hearing, the Department sent out form letters denying borrower defense applications at a rate of 89.8%. The district court denied final approval of the settlement and ordered updated written discovery. Plaintiffs took four depositions of Department officials and received about 2,500 documents. In 2021, after DeVos resigned as secretary, the district court authorized class counsel to take her deposition. Plaintiffs then served a subpoena for a nonparty deposition on DeVos under FRCP 45.The Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoena. Compelling the testimony of a cabinet secretary about the actions she took as a leader in the executive branch is allowable only in extraordinary circumstances. The party seeking the deposition must demonstrate agency bad faith and that the information sought from the secretary is essential to the case and cannot be obtained in any other way. There was no indication that DeVos held information that was essential to the case or that it was otherwise unobtainable. View "In re: United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

In 2017 and 2018, the California Legislature enacted two statutes, Government Code sections 17581.96 and 17581.97, in part to fulfill the state’s obligation to reimburse school districts under article XIII B, section 6 of the state constitution. Both statutes provided one-time funding to school districts in a certain year, either in fiscal year 2017-2018 or 2018-2019, and both stated that the provided funds “shall first satisfy any outstanding” amounts owed to the school districts under article XIII B, section 6. Appellants were nine school districts that objected to these two statutes in a suit against the State and the State Controller. In their view, article XIII B, section 6 prohibited the state from reimbursing school districts in the manner that sections 17581.96 and 17581.97 allowed. The trial court, however, disagreed, finding no merit to Appellants’ claim. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diego Unified School Dist. v. State of Cal." on Justia Law