Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Alabama
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Lamerle Miles ("Miles"), as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased mother Tameca Miles ("Tameca"), sued Coosa Valley Medical Center ("CVMC") and other named and fictitiously named parties, alleging that they had engaged in negligent, wanton, and outrageous conduct that caused Tameca's death. Miles specifically alleged that multiple CVMC employees had breached the applicable standards of care, resulting in the Sylacauga Police Department removing Tameca from the CVMC emergency room before she was treated for what was ultimately determined to be bacterial meningitis. Miles did not identify any specific CVMC employees in her original complaint, but she later filed a series of amendments substituting Kristen Blanchard, Teshia Gulas, Carla Pruitt, and Kathy Russell for fictitiously named defendants. After being substituted as defendants, the CVMC petitioners moved the trial court to enter summary judgments in their favor, arguing that they had not been named defendants within the two-year period allowed by the statute of limitations governing wrongful-death actions. The Talladega Circuit Court denied those motions, and the CVMC petitioners sought mandamus relief from the Alabama Supreme Court. After review, the Court denied petitions filed by Blanchard, Gulas, and Pruitt. The Court granted Russell's petition because Miles' complaint did not state a cause of action against her. View "Ex parte Kathy Russell, R.N." on Justia Law

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Mark Stiff's property was sold at a tax sale that took place inside the Bessemer courthouse instead of "in front of the door of the courthouse" as required by section 40-10-15, Ala. Code 1975. He argued that the sale was void because of that irregularity. To that, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and therefore reversed the circuit court's judgment refusing to set aside the tax sale. "The tax-sale statutes include a clear list of procedures designed to protect the rights of property owners and the public. The requirement that a tax sale be held in a uniform public location encourages fairness and transparency, and it supports the legitimacy of the tax-sale system as a whole. If the 'in front of the door of the courthouse' requirement is no longer important to Alabamians, it is up to the legislature (not the courts) to remove it." View "Stiff v. Equivest Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

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Kevin Crook appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate Indemnity"), Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate Insurance"), and The Barker Agency (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants"). Crook owns lake-front property in Tuscaloosa County. The property consists of a house, a bathhouse, a garage, a deck, and a boat dock. In 2006, Crook, through The Barker Agency, obtained property insurance on the house and other structures from Allstate Indemnity. Allstate Indemnity issued a policy to Crook ("the policy") and provided uninterrupted insurance coverage of Crook's house from 2006 through 2015. On February 12, 2015, Allstate Indemnity conducted an inspection of the property for underwriting purposes. After the inspection, on February 23, 2015, The Barker Agency sent Crook a letter with the results, finding no "issues that impact [Crook's] current coverage, and you do not need to do anything further. ...our inspection... focused only on identifying certain types of hazards or conditions that might impact your future insurance coverage. It may not have identified some other hazards of conditions on your property." In April 2015, a storm damaged the deck and the boat dock. Ultimately, Crook sued defendants for breach of contract, bad-faith failure to pay a claim, negligent/wanton procurement of insurance, and estoppel, all relating to the policy's coverage of the storm damage. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and affirmed. View "Crook v. Allstate Indemnity Company, et al." on Justia Law

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Doris Sanders petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its March 13, 2020, order transferring the underlying action to the Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, Alabama's forum non conveniens statute. In 2019, Sanders, a resident of Barbour County, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident on Interstate 85 in Macon County. Sanders sued the drivers of the other two vehicles, Sae Him Chung and Shawn Reaves, at the Macon Circuit Court, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for her accident-related injuries. Sanders also included a claim against her insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Defendants requested the change of venue to Montgomery County, arguing: (1) that the accident occurred in Macon County and was investigated there; (2) that Sanders was employed by the State of Alabama Tourism Department, which is located in Montgomery County; (3) that Chung lived and worked in Montgomery County; and (4) that Kellie McElvaine, a witness to the accident, lived and worked in Montgomery County. Sanders opposed the motion, arguing defendants failed to carry their burden of showing a transfer to Montgomery County was required under the statute. Sanders stated that she did not work in Montgomery County; rather, she said, she worked in Macon County at the Macon County Rest Area. And she received medical treatment for her injuries in Lee County and Barbour County, both of which were closer to Macon County than to Montgomery County. Thus, she asserted that her health-care providers in Lee County and Barbour County would have to travel farther if the case were transferred to Montgomery County. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Macon Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in transferring this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. The Court therefore granted the petition for mandamus relief, and directed the Macon Court to vacated its March 2020 transfer order. View "Ex parte Doris Sanders." on Justia Law

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In December 2016, Geraldine Daniels was residing at the Hawthorne at Lily-Flagg apartment complex, which was owned by Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC ("Hawthorne-Midway"), and managed by Hawthorne Residential Partners, LLC, and its community manager, Tracy Wiley. Daniels sued Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley for damages resulting from injuries she suffered when she fell while stepping off a sidewalk at the complex. Daniels appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed: Daniels did not demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact that prevented Hawthorne-Midway and Wiley from being entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Daniels v. Hawthorne-Midway Lily Flagg, LLC" on Justia Law

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Angela Williams, as mother and next friend of Li'Jonas Earl Williams, a deceased minor, appealed a judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of the remaining defendants, Dr. Wesley H. Barry, Jr., and Advanced Surgical Associates, P.C. Li'Jonas Williams was a 17-year-old with sickle-cell disease. In June 2014, Li'Jonas went to the emergency room at Southern Regional Medical Center in Georgia ("the Georgia hospital") complaining of back and chest pain. A CT scan performed at the Georgia hospital showed that Li'Jonas had cholelithiasis, which is stones in the gallbladder. Li'Jonas and Williams saw Li'Jonas's pediatrician in Montgomery, Dr. Julius Sadarian. Dr. Sadarian referred Li'Jonas to Dr. Barry for gallbladder removal. Dr. Barry testified that Li'Jonas tolerated the procedure well; that Li'Jonas did not experience any complications during the surgery; and that Li'Jonas had only about 10ccs (two teaspoons) of blood loss during the surgery. Li'Jonas did not experience any problems when he was in the post-anesthesia-care unit or when he was in the outpatient recovery room. On the evening of August 4, 2014, Li'Jonas was found unresponsive at his home. He was transported by ambulance to the emergency; ultimately efforts to revive Li'Jonas were unsuccessful and he died a half hour after admission to the ER. In her fourth amended complaint, Williams asserted a wrongful-death claim based on allegations of medical malpractice pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act against defendants. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants, and Williams appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found that when the evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Williams presented substantial evidence to create a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury as to the issue whether the surgery performed by Dr. Barry was the proximate cause of Li'Jonas's death. It therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Barry" on Justia Law

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Bernadine Odom appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of several supervisory officers in the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol Division, in a lawsuit based on the misconduct of a state trooper. In 2015, Odom was involved in an automobile accident. State Trooper Samuel Houston McHenry II responded to the scene. Odom's vehicle was inoperable, so after McHenry investigated the accident, he gave her a ride, ostensibly to a safe location. At 12:12 a.m., he radioed his post dispatcher that he was en route with Odom to an exit about 10 miles from the accident scene. He did not mention his vehicle's mileage as of the time he left the accident scene. Instead of taking Odom directly to the exit, McHenry took her to a wooded area and sexually assaulted her. At 12:21 a.m., he radioed that he was dropping Odom off at the exit, and at 12:25 he radioed that he had completed the drop-off. Within two days, McHenry's employment was terminated based on his misconduct. McHenry was charged with first-degree rape, and he pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct. Odom then filed this civil lawsuit against McHenry and law enforcement officials alleging violations of various law-enforcement policies and procedures, and well as failing to properly train and supervise McHenry. Because Odom could not demonstrate the supervisory defendants were not entitled to State-agent immunity, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment in their favor. View "Odom v. Helms et al." on Justia Law

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This matter went before the Alabama Supreme Court on consolidated appeals stemming from an action filed by Nancy Hicks for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Hicks appealed when the trial court denied her motion for a new trial. Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of its motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law on the issue of causation of Hicks's injuries. By refusing to allow the jury to consider the mortality table, the trial court hindered the jury's ability to determine the appropriate amount of damages to which Hicks was entitled in a trial in which the only issue was the amount of damages. Because the trial court erroneously determined that the mortality table could not be admitted into evidence, the trial court's denial of Hicks's motion for a new trial was reversed. Because of the Court's holding on this issue, it pretermitted discussion of Hicks's other argument in support of her request for a new trial, namely that the trial court erred by not giving the requested jury instructions on permanent injuries and on the use of mortality tables. Because Allstate did not properly preserve for appellate review its motion for a partial judgment as a matter of law of the issue of causation underlying Hicks's claim, the trial court's denial of that motion was affirmed. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Allstate Insurance Company v. Hicks" on Justia Law

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Joshua Rogers appealed a preliminary injunction preventing Rogers from soliciting any employees or clients of Burch Corporation, his former employer, as contractually agreed to under restrictive covenants in an employment agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court determined there was nothing justiciable concerning the preliminary injunction because the nonsolicitation clause in the employment agreement expired, at the latest, on December 6, 2019. Therefore, the case was moot and the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Burch Corporation" on Justia Law

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Clint Walters appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of Montgomery Police Department ("MPD") patrol officer Jessica De'Andrea and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive"). Walters was driving his motorcycle when he came to a complete stop at a red light. De'Andrea was traveling in her MPD police vehicle when she came to a stop directly behind Walters's motorcycle at the intersection of the Eastern Boulevard and Monticello Drive. De'Andrea testified in her deposition that she had completed her patrol shift and that she was on her way to the MPD South Central Headquarters on the Eastern Boulevard to end her shift. When the light turned green, De'Andrea saw that other vehicles were moving. She wasn't sure if Walters' brake light was intact; the officer assumed Walters was moving and proceeded to go, hitting Walters from behind. Walters alleged he suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident, and filed an action against De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Walters asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against De'Andrea in her individual capacity; he asserted claims for uninsured-motorist benefits against Progressive and State Farm. State Farm moved for summary judgment, attesting Walters did not have any insurance policies with State Farm in force at the time of the accident. De'Andrea moved for summary judgment, arguing she was entitled to state-agent immunity; Progressive and State Farm also moved for summary judgment, arguing that if De'Andrea was entitled to be dismissed, they too should be dismissed because Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover damages" from De'Andrea. The circuit court entered summary judgments in favor of De'Andrea, Progressive, and State Farm. The summary-judgment order did not detail the circuit court's reasons for its decision. Walters filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court alter, amend, or vacate its summary-judgment order. The postjudgment motion was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding De'Andrea failed to demonstrate that Walters's claims arose from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity. Therefore, the summary judgment in De'Andrea's favor was due to be reversed. Because Progressive's summary-judgment motion was predicated solely on the ground that Walters would not be "legally entitled to recover" uninsured-motorist benefits if De'Andrea was entitled to State-agent immunity, the summary judgment in its favor was also reversed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walters v. De'Andrea" on Justia Law