Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen residing in Beirut, Lebanon, filed a defamation lawsuit against three media companies based in Dubai. The companies broadcast a news story on their Arabic language channels, which was rebroadcast in the U.S. via DISH Network and republished on their website and YouTube channel. The plaintiff alleged that the story falsely accused him of helping a Hezbollah leader launder money. The defendants moved to quash the lawsuit, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them due to insufficient contacts with the state.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to quash, finding that the defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to justify jurisdiction. The court noted that the defendants' primary audience was in the Middle East and North Africa, and their U.S. viewership, including California, was minimal. The court also found that the plaintiff's connections to California were not strong enough to establish jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the California forum. The court emphasized that the defendants' broadcast was not specifically targeted at California but was part of a broader international distribution. The court also noted that the plaintiff's primary professional and personal connections were in Lebanon, not California, and thus the brunt of any harm from the alleged defamation would be felt in Lebanon. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was expressly aimed at California, as required under the "effects test" from Calder v. Jones. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that further discovery was unlikely to produce evidence establishing jurisdiction. View "Safieddine v. MBC FZ" on Justia Law

Jill and Grant Wiese were married for nearly 30 years before their marriage was dissolved in 2016. They had a premarital agreement (PMA) that kept their assets and earnings separate, with Grant responsible for reasonable support. Jill worked as an independent agent for Grant’s real estate brokerage, receiving 100% of her commissions after deductions for business expenses and estimated taxes. Grant deducted amounts for taxes and personal expenses he believed exceeded his support obligations, but the tax deductions did not match the actual taxes paid, and he did not refund the excess to Jill.The Superior Court of Orange County found the PMA valid and enforceable. Jill then brought claims against Grant for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that his deductions from her commissions were excessive and impaired her separate property. Grant countered that Jill’s claims were time-barred and meritless. The trial court ruled in Jill’s favor on the tax-withholding claims, awarding her over $1.3 million, but rejected her other claims. Both parties appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that Jill’s fiduciary duty claims were subject to a four-year statute of limitations and that most were time-barred. For the surviving claims, the court found Grant breached his fiduciary duty by withholding excessive amounts for taxes but erred in awarding Jill the entire amount withheld rather than the excess. The court also found that Grant’s deductions for personal expenses required reconsideration. It affirmed that Grant was solely liable for the mortgage debt on their jointly owned property but reversed the order requiring Jill to reimburse Grant for housing during their separation. The court remanded for further proceedings, including recalculating damages and reconsidering attorney fees. View "Marriage of Wiese" on Justia Law

WasteXperts, Inc. (WasteXperts) filed a complaint against Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. dba Athens Services (Athens) and the City of Los Angeles (City) in June 2022. WasteXperts alleged that Athens, which holds a waste collection franchise from the City, sent a cease and desist letter to WasteXperts, arguing that WasteXperts was not legally permitted to handle Athens’s bins. WasteXperts sought judicial declarations regarding the City’s authority and Athens’s franchise rights, and also asserted tort claims against Athens for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and trade libel.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Athens’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire complaint, finding that the claims were based on Athens’s communications, which anticipated litigation and were therefore protected activity. The court also held that the commercial speech exemption did not apply and that WasteXperts had no probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. WasteXperts’s request for limited discovery was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court concluded that the declaratory relief claim did not arise from protected activity, as it was based on an existing dispute over the right to move waste collection bins, not on the prelitigation communications. The court also found that the commercial speech exemption applied to Athens’s communications with WasteXperts’s clients, removing those communications from the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, the tort claims did not arise from protected activity. The appellate court did not address the probability of WasteXperts prevailing on the merits or the request for limited discovery. View "Wastexperts, Inc. v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Kathleen and Bruce Smith filed a petition to confirm the validity of a 2016 amendment to a trust established by Ernest Myers. The amendment would grant the Smiths Ernest’s 54.2 percent interest in a property, adding to their existing 45.8 percent interest. Without the amendment, the trust would give Ernest’s interest to Emma Myers, his widow. Emma argued that the Smiths’ petition was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3, which requires claims arising from a promise or agreement with a decedent to be filed within one year of the decedent’s death.The Superior Court of Glenn County denied Emma’s motion for summary adjudication, concluding that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition, as it concerned the internal affairs of a trust rather than a promise relating to a distribution. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Smiths, validating the amendment and ordering Emma to transfer the property interest to them. Emma’s cross-petition to invalidate the amendment was denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, agreeing that section 366.3 did not apply to the Smiths’ petition. The court held that the statute of limitations in section 366.3 pertains to claims based on promises or agreements to create testamentary documents, not to claims based on the documents themselves. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Smiths was upheld, and Emma’s appeal was dismissed. View "Smith v. Myers" on Justia Law

Carlton Loeber, the trustor of an irrevocable trust owning two undeveloped properties within the Lakeside Joint School District, sought to place an initiative on the ballot to exempt taxpayers over 65 from any district parcel tax on undeveloped parcels. The district declined to call the election, citing cost concerns and legal objections. Loeber filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the district to place the initiative on the ballot. The trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that Loeber lacked standing.The trial court found that Loeber did not have a direct and substantial interest in the initiative because he did not personally own property in the district and failed to show that the trust could qualify for the exemption. The court also rejected Loeber’s public interest standing argument, noting the lack of public engagement and the significant cost to the district. The court concluded that the public need was not weighty enough to warrant the application of the public interest exception.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that Loeber had standing under the public interest exception, given the significant public right at issue concerning the initiative power. However, the court concluded that the proposed initiative did not fall within the scope of Article XIII C, Section 3 of the California Constitution, which allows initiatives to reduce or repeal local taxes. The court held that the initiative, which sought to create a new exemption for certain taxpayers, did not constitute "reducing" a tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Consequently, the district was not obligated to call an election on the initiative. The judgment was modified to deny the writ petition and affirmed as modified. View "Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Susan George, a teacher who had worked for the Susanville Elementary School District for several years before resigning to teach at another school district. She later returned to the District. Upon her return, the District did not credit her for the years of experience she gained at the other school district following her resignation. George filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing the District violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code section 45028 and the restoration requirement of section 44931 when placing her on the salary schedule without accounting for the years of experience she gained while outside the District after her resignation.The trial court found that the District complied with the Education Code. It ruled that the collective bargaining agreement prevented George from acquiring credit for the two years she worked for another school district. The trial court further found the uniformity requirement did not afford George relief and the District complied with the restoration requirement by restoring George to her prior position. Consequently, the trial court denied George’s petition for writ of mandate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the District violated the uniformity requirement by failing to place George at step 15 of the District’s salary schedule. The court disagreed with the District's argument that the uniformity requirement is inapplicable to George’s placement on the salary schedule because the restoration requirement controls the placement of teachers rehired within 39 months. The court found that the District must credit George with up to 12 years of out-of-district experience. The court remanded the case with directions to issue a writ compelling the District to place George on its salary schedule in compliance with Education Code section 45028 as construed herein, with appropriate back pay and benefits. The District was ordered to pay costs on appeal. View "George v. Susanville Elementary School District" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on non-parties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions.The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings. They argued about the timeliness of Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer, the sufficiency of her attempts to meet and confer with Acendi, and the reasonableness of the monetary sanctions award, among other matters.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three agreed with only one of their contentions. It held that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions because they were not incurred as part of the necessary costs of bringing the motions. Therefore, the court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. In all other respects, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

The case involves Xingfei Luo, who twice sought a restraining order against Professor Eugene Volokh under the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Luo wanted to prevent Volokh from identifying her in his writings. After the trial court dismissed the first petition, Luo moved to "strike" exhibits she filed in support of that failed petition. The trial court denied that motion and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude her from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. Luo appealed these orders. The second case involves Luo’s second petition for a restraining order where the trial court granted Volokh’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion and dismissed Luo’s second petition. Luo also appealed from a subsequent order granting Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in her second petition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Luo's first petition for a restraining order, concluding that the alleged harmful conduct was "likely protected free speech." The court also found that the alleged facts did not comprise acts of violence, threats of violence, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed the petitioner and caused substantial emotional distress. Luo did not appeal from the order discharging that petition. However, Luo filed an "ex parte application for an order to strike and withdraw improperly filed exhibits." The trial court denied Luo’s ex parte motion to “strike” her exhibits because Luo had not completed the proper forms for submitting an ex parte motion. Luo filed a new motion and Volokh again opposed it, and also filed a separate motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. The trial court denied Luo’s motion to strike her exhibits and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the order granting Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Luo’s second petition. The court dismissed Luo’s appeals as to the trial court’s ruling on her motion to strike exhibits in her first petition and the court’s granting of Volokh’s motions in both cases to use her actual name. The court concluded that these rulings are based on nonappealable orders. View "Luo v. Volokh" on Justia Law

In 2020 and 2021, two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Doe WHBE 3 and Jane Doe LSA 35, filed separate lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Raiser, LLC, alleging they were sexually assaulted by their Uber drivers in Hawaii and Texas, respectively. These cases, along with hundreds of others, were coordinated before a single judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. Uber moved to stay the cases on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that the cases should be heard in the jurisdictions where the alleged incidents occurred. The trial court granted Uber's motions, staying the cases and providing for tolling of the statute of limitations.The trial court's decision was based on a comprehensive 21-page order that considered whether the alternate forums (Hawaii and Texas) were suitable for trial, the private interests of the litigants, and the public interest in retaining the action for trial in California. The court concluded that the alternate forums were suitable, and that the public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of transfer. The court also found that the cases should be viewed as individual sexual assault/misconduct cases in which the plaintiffs claimed Uber was vicariously liable due to its deficient safety practices, rather than as corporate misconduct cases.The plaintiffs appealed both the trial court’s forum non conveniens order and the agreed-upon order applying it to the non-California cases. They argued that the trial court erred in failing to ensure that a suitable alternative forum existed for all the affected cases, failing to require Uber to demonstrate that California was a “seriously inconvenient” forum, and failing to “accord the coordination order proper deference.” The Court of Appeal rejected all of these arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves TRC Operating Co., Inc. and TRC Cypress Group, LLC (collectively TRC) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), oil producers operating adjacent well fields in Kern County, California. Both companies pump from a shared underground oil reservoir and engage in a process known as “cyclic steaming” to make oil extraction more efficient. In 1999, a “surface expression” formed near a Chevron well, which occurs when the steaming process causes a lateral fracture from the wellbore, allowing oil and other effluent to escape to the surface. Despite Chevron’s attempts at remediation, in 2011, an eruption occurred in the area of the well, causing a sinkhole to form, which killed a Chevron employee. The state oil and gas regulator issued various orders preventing steaming in the area, which lasted four years. TRC sued Chevron, claiming Chevron’s negligent maintenance and operation of its property led to dangerous conditions which made it unsafe to perform cyclic steaming operations. These conditions led to the regulator's shut-down orders, and to TRC’s harm and damages. Chevron countersued, claiming TRC’s failure to adequately maintain its own wells was the cause of the surface expression, the eruptions, and damages suffered by Chevron. The jury found in favor of TRC, awarding approximately $120 million in damages against Chevron. Nothing was awarded to Chevron. Chevron filed motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial court denied the JNOV, but granted a new trial based on misconduct by a juror. TRC appealed the granting of this motion. The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a new trial, finding that the juror was not ineligible and no prejudice resulted from the juror’s failure to disclose his prior criminal conviction or the previous civil lawsuit. Chevron also filed a protective cross-appeal, in the event the Court of Appeal found against it on TRC’s appeal. Chevron appealed the denial of its JNOV, arguing that the regulator's orders to stop steaming were the superseding cause of any harm suffered by TRC and precludes it from bearing any liability. The Court of Appeal concluded sufficient evidence was introduced to sustain the verdict, demonstrating TRC did not stop any of its steaming operations solely because of the regulator's orders, which were therefore not a superseding cause. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment against Chevron. View "TRC Operating Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law