Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Matthew Warman, a former graduate student at Mount St. Joseph University (MSJU), objected to taking the COVID-19 vaccine on religious grounds. When MSJU required all students and employees to be vaccinated, Warman applied for a religious exemption. He was allegedly detained by two MSJU Police Department officers who attempted to convince him to get vaccinated and disparaged his religious beliefs. Warman later sued MSJU, MSJPD, and several individual employees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Warman’s complaint. The court dismissed his free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims with prejudice and dismissed MSJPD from all counts with prejudice. Warman appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims. However, the court found that Warman plausibly pleaded that the two officers who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Warman’s wrongful detention claim and reinstated the claim against those defendants. The court also vacated the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over Warman’s state-law claims and remanded for reconsideration.In summary, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most of Warman’s claims but reinstated his Fourth Amendment wrongful detention claim against the two officers and remanded the state-law claims for further consideration. View "Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute established procedures for internet broadband service providers to access railroad property and lay cable across tracks. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) challenged the statute, arguing it was preempted by federal law and violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that AAR lacked standing to bring the claims because they required the participation of individual member railroads.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that AAR lacked associational standing for both its preemption and Takings Clause claims. The court found that the preemption claim required a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the statute unreasonably burdened rail transportation, necessitating individual member participation. Similarly, the Takings Clause claim required individualized proof of inadequate compensation for each crossing, which also required member participation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that AAR had standing to pursue its preemption claims, as these could be litigated without the participation of individual members. The court reasoned that the preemption claims involved general judgments about the statute's nature and operation, not specific operations of individual railroads. However, the court affirmed the district court's ruling on the Takings Clause claim, agreeing that it required individualized proof of compensation for each crossing, necessitating member participation.The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Association of American Railroads v. Hudson" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), challenged the University of Texas at Austin (UT) for its admissions policies, alleging they violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI by considering race as a factor. After the Supreme Court's decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, UT revised its admissions policy to exclude race as a factor but allowed admissions officers access to applicants' racial data. SFFA claimed this access still constituted a violation and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims as moot, reasoning that UT's policy changes addressed the issues raised by SFFA. The district court concluded that the claims related to the old policy were moot and that the new policy did not violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that claims related to UT's pre-Harvard policy were moot because the policy had been repealed and could not reasonably be expected to recur. However, the court found that claims related to UT's post-Harvard policy were not moot. The court noted that admissions officers' access to racial data could still potentially allow for racial discrimination, thus maintaining a live controversy.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that SFFA's claims regarding the revised admissions policy remained live and required further examination to determine if the policy was a subterfuge for continued race discrimination. View "Students for Fair Admissions v. University of Texas Austin" on Justia Law

Dr. Alan Braid, a Texas OB/GYN, admitted in a Washington Post editorial to performing an abortion in violation of the Texas Heartbeat Act (S.B. 8). This led to three individuals from different states filing lawsuits against him under the Act's citizen-suit enforcement provision, seeking at least $10,000 in statutory damages. Facing potential duplicative liability, Dr. Braid filed a federal interpleader action in Illinois, seeking to join the claimants in a single suit and also sought declaratory relief to declare S.B. 8 unconstitutional.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Dr. Braid’s suit, citing the Wilton-Brillhart abstention doctrine due to the existence of parallel state-court proceedings. The court reasoned that the Texas state courts were better suited to resolve the issues, particularly given the unique enforcement mechanism of S.B. 8. The district court also questioned whether Dr. Braid had a reasonable fear of double liability but ultimately found that it had jurisdiction before deciding to abstain.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction over the interpleader action but concluded that abstention was appropriate under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to defer to parallel state-court proceedings in exceptional cases. The court emphasized that the Texas courts were better positioned to resolve the complex state-law issues and that abstention would avoid piecemeal litigation and conflicting judgments. The court also noted that the Texas courts could adequately protect Dr. Braid’s rights and that the federal suit appeared to be an attempt to avoid the state-court system. View "Braid v. Stilley" on Justia Law

The Idaho Legislature established the Community Partner Grant Program in 2021, using funds from the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on school-aged children. The funds were to be used exclusively for in-person educational and enrichment activities for children aged 5 to 13. In 2023, the Idaho Attorney General received information suggesting that some grant recipients had misused the funds to serve children under the age of five. Consequently, the Attorney General issued civil investigative demands (CIDs) to 34 grant recipients, requesting documentation related to the grant program. The recipients did not comply and instead sought a preliminary injunction in district court to set aside the CIDs.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied the preliminary injunction for 15 grant recipients, requiring them to respond to the CIDs, but granted it for 19 others, concluding that the Attorney General had not shown sufficient reason to believe these recipients had misused the funds. The court also reviewed two declarations in camera and provided redacted versions to the recipients' counsel.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that both the Idaho Charitable Assets Protection Act (ICAPA) and the Idaho Charitable Solicitation Act (ICSA) applied to the grant funds, giving the Attorney General authority to issue CIDs. The court determined that the "reason to believe" standard, not probable cause, was sufficient for issuing CIDs. The court found that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction to the 19 recipients and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the CID issued to Elizabeth Oppenheimer was overly broad and violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association, requiring the district court to reconsider this CID. The court declined to award attorney fees to either party. View "Children's Home Society v. Labrador" on Justia Law

In several Minnesota cities, only members of a pre-approved union can work on municipal construction jobs. Multiple contractors, a carpenter, and a union objected to this requirement, alleging it violated the First Amendment. The contractors, Kaski, Inc.; Nordic Group, Inc.; and Roen Salvage Co., claimed they missed out on lucrative work due to these project-labor agreements. Luke Krhin, a carpenter, and the Christian Labor Association, which has a local chapter in Minnesota, also joined the lawsuit.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that none of the plaintiffs had standing to sue. The court found that the contractors, Krhin, and the Christian Labor Association could not succeed on their First Amendment claim. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on the issue of standing, a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that the contractors did not have standing because the relevant constitutional claims belonged to their employees, not to them. The court also found that Krhin, who opposed joining a pre-approved union, was exempt from the requirement as a supervisor, thus lacking standing. The Christian Labor Association also lacked standing because it failed to identify any members who would have standing to sue in their own right.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss based on a lack of standing. View "Christian Labor Association v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law

Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute within the Unification Church, also known as the Unification Movement, following a schism and succession conflict. The plaintiffs, including the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International, filed a complaint in 2011 against defendants, including Unification Church International (UCI) and its president, Hyun Jin (Preston) Moon. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in actions contrary to the church's mission, including amending UCI's articles of incorporation and transferring assets to entities like the Kingdom Investments Foundation (KIF) and the Global Peace Foundation (GPF).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants' actions were inconsistent with UCI's original purposes. However, the court's decision was reversed on appeal in Moon III, where it was held that resolving the plaintiffs' claims would require deciding disputed religious questions, making them nonjusticiable under the First Amendment's religious abstention doctrine. The case was remanded for further proceedings.On remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked special interest standing to pursue their self-dealing claims against Preston Moon after Moon III, as the claims no longer involved extraordinary measures threatening UCI's existence. The court also determined that the contract claims were nonjusticiable under the religious abstention doctrine, as resolving them would require interpreting religious terms and doctrines. The court declined to apply the potential fraud or collusion exception to the religious abstention doctrine, finding no evidence of bad faith for secular purposes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's orders, agreeing that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable and that they lacked special interest standing. The court also upheld the trial court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. The litigation, which spanned over a decade, was thereby brought to a close. View "Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International v. Moon" on Justia Law

Katie Wood, a transgender woman teaching at a public high school in Florida, challenged the enforcement of Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3), which prohibits her from using the honorific “Ms.” and the gendered pronouns “she,” “her,” and “hers” in exchanges with students during class time. Wood argued that this statute violated her First Amendment right to free speech and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted Wood a preliminary injunction, finding that she had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim. The district court reasoned that Wood’s use of her preferred honorific and pronouns constituted speech as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and that her interest in expressing her gender identity outweighed the state’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s findings. The appellate court held that Wood had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Fla. Stat. § 1000.071(3) infringed her free speech rights. The court concluded that when Wood used her preferred honorific and pronouns in the classroom, she was speaking as a government employee, not as a private citizen. Consequently, her speech was not protected under the First Amendment in this context. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wood v. Florida Department of Education" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law