Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ricky Hughes, a railroad employee, was injured twice at work during his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. He did not disclose these potential personal injury lawsuits to the bankruptcy court. About 19 months after his bankruptcy closed, Hughes filed a personal injury lawsuit against his employer and other defendants. The district court granted summary judgment against Hughes based on standing and judicial estoppel, as he had not disclosed the potential lawsuit in his bankruptcy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that Hughes had standing to bring the lawsuit. The court reasoned that the claims vested with Hughes, as per Section 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that estate assets vest with the debtor. The court rejected the defendants' argument that Section 554(d), which provides that undisclosed estate assets that have not been expressly abandoned remain property of the estate, should control.The court also applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a party from asserting a position in a case that is clearly inconsistent with a position it took in a previous case. The court found that judicial estoppel applied to claims arising from the first incident but not the second. The court reasoned that when Hughes was injured for the second time, he had already made all of the payments required under his five-year plan, and there was no permissible statutory basis to modify the plan. Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not rely on the second nondisclosure, and there was no risk of inconsistent court determinations or threats to judicial integrity. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hughes v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves the Office of the United States Trustee and a group of Chapter 11 debtors, John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al. The issue at hand is the remedy for a constitutional violation identified in a previous case, Siegel v. Fitzgerald, where a statute was found to violate the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement as it allowed different fees for Chapter 11 debtors depending on the district where their case was filed. The government argued for prospective parity as the appropriate remedy, while the debtors argued for a refund.The Bankruptcy Court found no constitutional violation and did not address the remedial question. The Tenth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the fee statute permitting nonuniform fees violated the Bankruptcy Clause and ordered a refund of the debtors’ quarterly fees. The U.S. Trustee sought certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision. The Court agreed with the government that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation is prospective parity. The Court held that requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward aligns with congressional intent, corrects the constitutional wrong, and complies with due process. The Court rejected the debtors' argument for a refund, stating that such a remedy would require undercutting congressional intent and transforming a program that Congress designed to be self-funding into a significant bill for taxpayers. The Court concluded that neither remedial principles nor due process requires such an outcome. View "United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC" on Justia Law

Edward Johnson filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 and made payments to the bankruptcy trustee, Marilyn O. Marshall, under his proposed repayment plan. However, the bankruptcy court never confirmed his plan due to his inability to address an outstanding loan and his domestic support obligations, and ultimately dismissed his case for unreasonable delay. Before returning Johnson's undisbursed payments, the trustee deducted a percentage fee as compensation. Johnson filed a motion requesting that the trustee disgorge her fee, which the bankruptcy court granted, reasoning that the trustee did not have statutory authority to deduct her fee because Johnson's plan was not confirmed. The trustee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court analyzed the statutory text and agreed with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that the United States Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter 13 trustee to return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed. The court found that neither of the two exceptions in § 1326(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code applied to the trustee's fee. The court also rejected the trustee's argument that § 1326(b) authorized her to keep her fee when making pre-confirmation adequate protection payments to creditors, as this provision only addresses payments made after a plan has been confirmed. The court further found that the trustee had no right to keep her fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2), which only addresses the source of funds that may be accessed to pay standing trustee fees.The court concluded that the Chapter 13 trustee must return her fee when the debtor's plan is not confirmed, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court. View "Marshall v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A group of retirement and pension funds filed a consolidated putative securities class action against PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (collectively, PG&E) and some of its current and former officers, directors, and bond underwriters (collectively, Individual Defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that all the defendants made false or misleading statements related to PG&E’s wildfire-safety policies and regulatory compliance. Shortly after the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint, PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, automatically staying this action as against PG&E but not the Individual Defendants. The district court then sua sponte stayed these proceedings as against the Individual Defendants, pending completion of PG&E’s bankruptcy case.The district court for the Northern District of California issued a stay of the securities fraud action against the Individual Defendants, pending the completion of PG&E's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The court reasoned that the stay would promote judicial efficiency and economy, as well as avoid the potential for inconsistent judgments. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by entering the stay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the Moses H. Cone doctrine because the stay was both indefinite and likely to be lengthy. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the stay as to the Individual Defendants. The court held that when deciding to issue a docket management stay, the district court must weigh three non-exclusive factors: the possible damage that may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity that a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and judicial efficiency. The appellate court vacated the stay and remanded for the district court to weigh all the relevant interests in determining whether a stay was appropriate. View "PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASS'N OF NEW MEXICO V. EARLEY" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from the financial fallout of Winter Storm Uri, which severely impacted Texas's electrical grid in 2021. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), responsible for managing the grid, took measures including manipulating energy prices to incentivize production. This resulted in Entrust Energy, Inc., receiving an electricity bill from ERCOT of nearly $300 million, leading to Entrust's insolvency and subsequent bankruptcy filing. ERCOT filed a claim seeking payment of the invoice, which was challenged by Anna Phillips, the trustee of the Entrust Liquidating Trust. The trustee argued that ERCOT's price manipulation violated Texas law, that ERCOT was grossly negligent in its handling of the grid during the storm, and that ERCOT's transitioning of Entrust’s customers to another utility was an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The bankruptcy court declined to abstain from the case and denied ERCOT’s motion to dismiss all claims except for the takings claim. ERCOT appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the bankruptcy court should have abstained under the Burford doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from complex state law issues to avoid disrupting state policies.The Fifth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court erred in refusing to abstain under the Burford doctrine. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of ERCOT’s motion to abstain and its denial of ERCOT’s motion to dismiss the trustee’s complaint. The court also vacated the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing the takings claim with prejudice. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss certain counts and stay others pending the resolution of related state proceedings. View "Electric Reliability Council of Texas v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The case involves Bestwall, LLC, a company that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2017. The company sought to establish a trust to pay current and future asbestos-related claims against it. As part of this process, Bestwall requested all persons with pending mesothelioma claims against it to complete a personal injury questionnaire. Several individual claimants and the Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants objected to this request. The bankruptcy court granted Bestwall's motion and ordered all current mesothelioma claimants to complete the questionnaire. Some claimants, represented by the law firm of Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French & Mudd, LLC, filed a lawsuit in Illinois seeking an injunction to prevent Bestwall from enforcing the questionnaire order. In response, Bestwall moved in the bankruptcy court to enforce the order.The bankruptcy court held the claimants and their law firm in contempt for violating the questionnaire order. The court later sanctioned them jointly and severally in the amount of $402,817.70 for fees and expenses Bestwall incurred in defending the Illinois lawsuit and enforcing the questionnaire order. The claimants and their law firm appealed both the contempt order and the sanctions order to the district court, which dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the contempt and sanctions orders were not final appealable orders because they did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case. The court noted that in normal civil litigation, a party may not immediately appeal a civil contempt order or attendant sanctions but must wait until final judgment to appeal. The same rule applies in bankruptcy, except the relevant final judgment may be a decree ending the entire case or a decree ending a discrete proceeding within the bankruptcy case. The court concluded that the contempt and sanctions orders did not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy case, and therefore, they were not final appealable orders. View "Blair v. Bestwall, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Euna McGruder, who was terminated from her position as the Executive Officer of Priority Schools for the Nashville public school system, operated by Metro Nashville, after she investigated allegations of racial discrimination at a Nashville middle school. McGruder sued Metro Nashville in 2017, alleging that her termination constituted illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII. In 2021, a jury awarded McGruder $260,000 for her claim, and the district court ordered Metro Nashville to reinstate her to her previous position.After the trial, Metro Nashville discovered that McGruder had failed to disclose the existence of her Title VII claim to the bankruptcy court when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2018. Metro Nashville argued that McGruder's claims should be barred by judicial estoppel due to her failure to disclose her cause of action against Metro Nashville in her bankruptcy filing. The district court concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction over Metro Nashville’s judicial estoppel claim, given that Metro Nashville’s earlier notice of appeal had divested the court of jurisdiction over the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's reinstatement order and dismissed Metro Nashville's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that judicial estoppel does not bar McGruder's reinstatement. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering McGruder's reinstatement. The court did not have jurisdiction to apply judicial estoppel to the non-final and therefore non-appealable jury award, forthcoming back pay trial, or award of attorneys’ fees. View "McGruder v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville" on Justia Law

Highland Capital Management, L.P., a firm co-founded by James Dondero, filed for bankruptcy in 2019 due to litigation claims. As part of a settlement agreement, Dondero relinquished control of Highland to three independent directors, one of whom, James P. Seery, was appointed as Highland’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative by the bankruptcy court. To protect Seery from vexatious litigation, the bankruptcy court issued an order that no entity could commence or pursue a claim against Seery relating to his role without the bankruptcy court's prior approval. Despite this, two entities founded by Dondero, the Charitable DAF Foundation and its affiliate CLO Holdco, filed a lawsuit against Highland in district court, alleging that Highland, through Seery, had withheld material information and engaged in self-dealing related to a settlement with one of its largest creditors, HarbourVest.The bankruptcy court held the appellants in civil contempt for violating its order and ordered them to pay $239,655 in compensatory damages. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the award was compensatory and therefore civil. The appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the sanction was punitive and thus exceeded the scope of the bankruptcy court’s civil contempt powers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case. The appellate court found that the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion by imposing a punitive sanction that exceeded its civil contempt powers. The court held that the sanction was not compensatory because it was not based on the damages Highland suffered due to the appellants' decision to file the motion in the wrong court. The court instructed the bankruptcy court to limit any sanction award to the damages Highland suffered because of this error. View "Charitable DAF Fund v. Highland Captl Mgmt" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Montana reversed and remanded a decision of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The case involved Saddlebrook Investments (Saddlebrook), assignee of Stuart Simonsen, and Krohne Fund, L.P. (Krohne Fund). Saddlebrook appealed against the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Krohne Fund on Saddlebrook’s claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Saddlebrook from pursuing its claims. The court noted that a party is not judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements. However, this does not apply when the bankruptcy trustee is pursuing the action for the benefit of creditors. Once substituted, a bankruptcy trustee is free to pursue the debtor’s nondisclosed claim.In this case, the Trustee had knowledge of Simonsen’s claims and authorized the state court suit. The Supreme Court concluded that because the Trustee had control of Simonsen’s abuse of process claim through the bankruptcy estate, the District Court erred when it estopped Saddlebrook from pursuing that claim. Therefore, Saddlebrook is not judicially estopped from pursuing its malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims against Krohne Fund. View "Saddlebrook Investments v. Krohne Fund" on Justia Law

The case under review centers around certain Chapter 7 debtors and their creditor. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, but provided an incorrect mailing address for their creditor's attorney in their schedule of creditors. As a result, the creditor didn't file a claim in the bankruptcy case. The creditor later sought a determination that its default judgment in an unlawful detainer case wasn't discharged due to lack of notice of the bankruptcy.The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the creditor, stating that no portion of the unlawful detainer judgment was dischargeable. This decision was affirmed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. The debtors argued that all but a certain amount of the judgment, which they calculated to be what the creditor would have received had it filed a timely claim, was discharged. They also contended that the creditor seeking to recover the full amount would constitute a windfall.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It concluded that a debtor’s failure to properly schedule a debt renders that debt nondischargeable in its entirety, rejecting the debtors' arguments. The court clarified that the issue of whether the debt could be enforced against the debtors is a matter of state law and interpretation of the prior state court judgment, and should be resolved by the state court. View "In re Licup v. Jefferson Avenue Temecula LLC" on Justia Law