Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Zabrocki began receiving Teachers Retirement System (TRS) retirement benefits in 2007. In 2012 TRS notified Zabrocki that he did not qualify for those benefits and was liable to reimburse TRS for the amounts it paid. Zabrocki requested administrative review. The TRS Board affirmed. Zabrocki requested a contested case hearing. TRS appointed a hearing examiner who issued a proposed order granting TRS's motion for summary judgment. Zabrocki filed exceptions. The Board heard argument on February 21, 2014; the chair stated that a final decision would be adopted at a subsequent meeting. On May 16, the Board issued its order, finding disputes as to material facts precluding summary judgment, and remanded to the hearing examiner. Zabrocki sought judicial review, contending that TRS violated MCA 2-4-623(1)(a), which requires that a final decision in a contested case be issued within “90 days after a contested case is considered to be submitted for a final decision.” The district court agreed that the May 16 order was not a final order, noted that a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision for purposes of appeal, and determined that on May 16 the Board decided “the issues raised on summary judgment” and not the entire dispute, so that “there is more to be done at the agency level.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, in favor of TRS. The Board did not violate the final agency decision requirement of MCA 2-4-623(1)(a). View "Zabrocki v. Teachers Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell (Brent), pled violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Tyrrell's case, the court denied BNSF's motion to dismiss. In Nelson's case, the court granted BNSF's motion. The issues on appeal centered on personal jurisdiction over BNSF: whether Montana courts had jurisdiction under FELA or Montana law. After review, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana courts had general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the FELA and Montana law. Both cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "Tyrrell v. BNSF" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell (Tyrrell), as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell, pled violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs’ claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion in Nelson's case was granted; the motion in Tyrrell's case was denied. The issue on appeal was whether Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana law. After review, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that Montana courts had personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and Montana Law. The order denying BNSF's motion to dismiss Tyrrell's case was affirmed, and the motion in Nelson's case was reversed. View "Tyrrell v. BNSF" on Justia Law

The Denturist Association of Montana (Association), on behalf of denturist Carl Brisendine, filed suit against the Board of Dentistry, challenging the validity of A.R.M. 24.138.2302(1)(j) (Rule J), the latest in a long line of legal disputes between the two. "Wiser v. Montana," (129 P.3d 133 (Wiser I)) and "Wiser v. Board of Dentistry," (Wiser II)) either implicitly or explicitly claimed that the Board's promulgation of Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with statute. The Wiser I plaintiffs (comprised of every denturist in Montana) made their claims "on behalf of the profession of denturitry." Wiser I plaintiffs lost their challenge to the Board's authority. The Wiser II plaintiffs, comprised of a smaller group of denturists, attempted to distinguish themselves from the Wiser I plaintiffs, but the Court saw no distinction in their capacity to challenge the Board’s promulgation of Rule J as individuals rather than as representatives of a group. The Court barred the Wiser II plaintiffs’ claims on res judicata grounds. In this case, Brisendine’s complaint contains three counts: Count 1 Rule J was discriminatory and restrained trade, and that the Board violated Montana law by discriminatorily applying its disciplinary rules: being unduly harsh on denturists while giving leniency to dentists. Counts II and III alleged Rule J was invalid because it conflicted with various statutes. Brisendine moved for summary judgment on Count II, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. The District Court, citing Wiser I and II, held Brisendine’s claims were barred by res judicata as a matter of law. Brisendine appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that privity existed between the litigants in the Wiser cases and Brisendine. Because privity exists and the other elements of claim preclusion were not contested with respect to Counts II and III, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board on those claims on res judicata grounds. Brisendine's claim in Count I was an entirely different claim than those made in the Wiser cases, and the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Board on this claim. View "Denturist Assoc. v Montana DOL" on Justia Law

In 2012, Montana voters passed Legislative Referendum 121 (LR 121). The referendum denied certain state services to “illegal aliens.” Before the law went into effect, Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA) filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from LR 121, arguing that the referendum violated certain constitutional rights and was preempted by federal law. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction as to the majority of LR 121 but enjoined the use of the definition of “illegal alien” so as to preclude the State from using an individual’s unlawful entry into the United States as a factor in determining that individual’s entitlement to state benefits. The district court subsequently concluded that LR 121 was preempted by federal law. The court then awarded MIJA attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that MIJA has associational standing to challenge LR 121; (2) did not err in concluding that LR 121 is preempted by federal law; and (3) erred in awarding “supplemental relief” to MIJA in the form of attorney fees. View "Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock" on Justia Law

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

The case at issue in this proceeding was originally assigned to the Twentieth Judicial District Court Judge James Manley. Judge Deborah Christopher assumed jurisdiction after a defendant moved for substitution. At the request of Judge Christopher, Chief Justice Mike McGrath called in retired District Judge Douglas Harkin to preside over the case. The plaintiff subsequently requested substitution. In response, Judges Christopher and Manley entered an order returning jurisdiction to Judge Manley. Petitioner asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control over the District Court by directing Christopher and Manley to vacate their order returning jurisdiction of the case to Judge Manley. Petitioner also asked that Chief Justice McGrath deny the motion to substitute judge filed by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of supervisory control and ordered that Judge Manley assign a new judge to preside over the case, holding that specific assignments of retired judges under Mont. Code Ann. 19-5-103 are within the intended scope of the right to substitution under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 and that the right of substitution applies. View "Cushman v. Twentieth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

When E.G. was fifteen years old, the Youth Court found him to be delinquent and ordered that he be committed to the Department of Corrections until age eighteen. After remand, the Youth Court stated that it would retain jurisdiction until E.G. was twenty-one and consider transfer of the case to the district court. When E.G. turned eighteen, the Youth Court, after a hearing, transferred supervision of E.G. to the district court. E.G. subsequently violated his probation, and the district court sentenced him to the Department of Corrections until age twenty-five. E.G. appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation and sentence because his parents did not receive notice of the hearing on the State’s motion to transfer supervision of his probation from the Youth Court to the District Court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory parental notice requirement did not withdraw, circumscribe, limit or affect the Youth Court’s jurisdiction over the issue of transferring supervision of E.G. to the District Court. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a constructive discharge claim naming the Musselshell County Sheriff’s Office as the sole defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was not an independent legal entity subject to suit. Plaintiff subsequently moved for leave to amend the complaint to add Musselshell County as a defendant. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court’s order was appealable; and (2) under the circumstances, the district court’s refusal to allow Defendant to add the correct party constituted an abuse of discretion and resulted in substantial prejudice to Defendant. Remanded. View "Seamster v. Mussellshell County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law