Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a petition filed by Jennifer McGill and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC (CNE) seeking to invalidate a proposed constitutional amendment concerning the Pope County casino license. The petitioners argued that the Arkansas Secretary of State, John Thurston, improperly certified the proposed amendment. They claimed that the number of valid signatures was insufficient and that the popular name and ballot title were misleading. Local Voters in Charge (LVC) and Jim Knight intervened in the case, supporting the proposed amendment.Previously, the Arkansas Supreme Court granted expedited consideration of the petition and allowed the intervention. The court bifurcated the proceedings into two counts: the sufficiency of the signatures and the sufficiency of the popular name and ballot title. A Special Master was appointed to resolve factual disputes regarding the signatures, which were addressed in a separate opinion. This opinion focuses on the challenges to the popular name and ballot title.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the popular name and ballot title certified by the Attorney General. The court held that the popular name and ballot title were sufficient and not misleading. The court found that the ballot title adequately informed voters that any existing casino license in Pope County would be revoked if the amendment passed. The court also rejected arguments that the popular name and ballot title failed to disclose conflicts with federal law or that they misled voters about the amendment's impact on future constitutional amendments.Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition, allowing the proposed amendment to remain on the ballot for the November 5, 2024, general election. The court issued its mandate immediately. View "MCGILL V. THURSTON" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves the Ohio Democratic Party and two voters, Norman Wernet and Eric Duffy, who filed a mandamus action against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. They sought to compel LaRose to rescind Directive 2024-21, which requires individuals delivering absentee ballots for family members or disabled voters to complete an attestation at the board of elections and prohibits returning such ballots to a drop box. The directive aims to prevent "ballot harvesting" and ensure the integrity and security of absentee ballot delivery.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose that certain Ohio laws limiting who can return absentee ballots for disabled voters were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. Following this, LaRose issued Directive 2024-21 and later Directive 2024-24 and Advisory 2024-03, which provided additional guidance but did not substantially alter the original directive.The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the relators' claims were barred by laches due to their unreasonable delay in filing the complaint. The court noted that the directive was issued on August 31, but the complaint was not filed until September 27, a 24-day delay. This delay was deemed unreasonable, especially given the time-sensitive nature of election-related matters. The court also found that the delay caused material prejudice to the Secretary of State and county boards of elections, as absentee voting had already begun, and changing the procedures at this stage would lead to voter confusion and administrative burdens.The Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus based on laches and did not address the merits of the relators' claims. The court also denied the motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Republican Party but accepted their brief as an amici curiae brief. View "State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose" on Justia Law

In this case, Georgia voters challenged the qualifications of presidential electors certified by two independent candidates for President, Dr. Cornel West and Claudia De la Cruz. The challengers argued that these electors were required to file nomination petitions signed by a number of qualified Georgia voters to have their candidates placed on the ballot. Since none of the electors filed such petitions, the challengers contended that the independent candidates should not appear on the ballot for the November 2024 General Election.The Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially agreed with the challengers, concluding that the electors had not met the qualification requirements under Georgia’s Election Code. However, the Secretary of State overruled the ALJ’s decisions, determining that the electors had qualified under Georgia law. Subsequently, two different superior court judges reversed the Secretary’s decisions, agreeing with the ALJ that the electors had not filed the necessary nomination petitions and thus had not qualified to place their candidates on the ballot.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that each presidential elector for an independent candidate is required to file a nomination petition in their own name under OCGA § 21-2-132 (e). The Court found that since no electors for West or De la Cruz had filed such petitions, they had not qualified as candidates for presidential elector. Consequently, the Court affirmed the superior courts' decisions, which concluded that neither West’s nor De la Cruz’s electors satisfied the statutory requirements for their candidates to appear on Georgia’s ballot for President.The Court also addressed procedural issues, including the dismissal of the Georgia Republican Party’s appeal due to lack of party status in the lower court and the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. The Court affirmed the superior court’s orders regarding the remedies, including the posting of notices at polling places to inform voters of the disqualification of the candidates. View "Al-Bari v. Pigg" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

The Montana Democratic Party (MDP) sought a writ of supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, after the court dissolved a temporary restraining order and denied MDP’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. MDP aimed to prevent Robert Barb from appearing on the general election ballot as the Montana Green Party’s 2024 U.S. Senate candidate, arguing that the District Court erred in its decision.The First Judicial District Court, presided over by Judge Michael McMahon, had previously denied MDP’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court found that MDP had not followed the statutory process for contesting nominations as outlined in § 13-36-102, MCA. The court concluded that MDP was unlikely to succeed on the merits and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. MDP appealed this decision and simultaneously filed a petition for a writ of supervisory control with the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that supervisory control was warranted due to the urgency of the upcoming election. However, the court ultimately concluded that the District Court did not err in its ruling, albeit for different reasons. The Supreme Court found that the terms "nomination" and "appointment" are distinct within the context of Montana election law. The court agreed with MDP that the procedure for contesting nominations did not apply to the appointment of a replacement candidate under § 13-10-327, MCA. However, the court also found that MDP failed to demonstrate that the Green Party violated its bylaws in appointing Barb, and thus, MDP was unlikely to succeed on the merits.The Montana Supreme Court denied MDP’s petition for a writ of supervisory control, affirming the lower court’s decision to allow Barb to appear on the ballot. View "Montana Democratic Party v. First Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Catoosa County Republican Party (CCRP) and its executive officers attempted to prevent certain candidates from qualifying for the May 2024 Republican primary for county commission seats, citing a statute that mandates candidates follow their party's procedural rules. The CCRP's local rules required candidates to be pre-approved by the County Committee and present a notarized affidavit at the time of qualifying. On March 4, 2024, four candidates filed petitions against the CCRP Defendants, alleging they were denied the right to qualify despite meeting statutory requirements. They sought temporary restraining orders and injunctions to prevent the CCRP from blocking their qualifications.The trial court issued temporary restraining orders on March 5, 2024, and later denied the CCRP Defendants' motions to lift the orders and dismiss the petitions. The court ruled that the CCRP's rules were not enforceable and ordered that the candidates be allowed to qualify. The CCRP Defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia, recognizing it had jurisdiction over election contests.The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that parties seeking to challenge election results must act with urgency and exhaust all avenues to resolve disputes before the election. The CCRP Defendants failed to expedite their appeal and even requested delays. The court reiterated its long-standing precedent that it will not review challenges to candidate qualifications once the election has occurred, especially when the challenging party has not acted promptly. The court's decision underscores the importance of finality in election results and the need for challengers to litigate their claims with dispatch. View "CATOOSA COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY v. HENRY" on Justia Law

Jamie Walsh and Mike Cabell competed in the April 23, 2024, primary election for the Republican nomination to represent the 117th District in Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives. Several provisional ballots were returned, and Walsh led Cabell by three votes before counting them. The Luzerne County Board of Elections held hearings to review the provisional ballots. Cabell challenged a ballot submitted by Timothy Wagner because the envelope was unsigned, and Walsh challenged a ballot submitted by Shane O’Donnell, who was registered to vote in a different county. The Board decided to count Wagner’s ballot but not O’Donnell’s.Cabell appealed to the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, which held a hearing where Wagner and O’Donnell testified. Wagner could not remember if he signed the envelope, but the court affirmed the Board’s decision to count his ballot due to no evidence of fraud and clear intent to vote. O’Donnell testified he moved to a new home less than 30 days before the election, and the court affirmed the Board’s decision not to count his vote, as he could have voted in his new district.The Commonwealth Court reversed both rulings. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted based on the Election Code’s clear language. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his old district.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted due to the clear statutory requirement for a signature. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his previous district. View "IN RE: CANVASS OF PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN THE 2024 PRIMARY ELECTION" on Justia Law

David Archie contested the results of the Hinds County Supervisor primary runoff election held on August 8, 2023, alleging election irregularities. He filed a petition for judicial review on September 8, 2023, one day past the statutory deadline. The key issue on appeal was whether the Hinds County Circuit Clerk’s office was open or closed on September 7, 2023, as the deadline would be extended if the office was closed.The Hinds County Circuit Court dismissed Archie’s petition, finding it was filed outside the allowable time period. The court based its decision on the fact that the courthouse was open on September 7, 2023, but did not make specific findings about whether the clerk’s office was open or closed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the evidence was insufficient to determine whether the clerk’s office was open or closed on September 7, 2023. The court noted that while the courthouse was open, the clerk’s office doors were locked, and there was conflicting evidence about whether the office was accessible for conducting business. The court vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for a more thorough evidentiary hearing to determine the status of the clerk’s office on the critical date.The main holding by the Supreme Court of Mississippi was that the circuit court’s judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings to establish whether the clerk’s office was open or closed on September 7, 2023, which would affect the timeliness of Archie’s petition. View "Archie v. Smith" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law