Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a landowner, Medardo Rivera, who sought to clear an easement from his property. The easement was granted by a previous owner of the property to Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., and later assigned to TLC Properties, Inc., an affiliate of Lamar Advertising Company. The easement allowed for the construction and operation of billboards on the property. Rivera argued that the easement was void as it was granted after he had already purchased the property.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the easement holder, ruling that Rivera's action was time-barred under Iowa Code section 614.17A. This statute prevents actions to recover or establish an interest in real estate if the action is based on a claim arising more than ten years earlier, is against the holder of the record title to the real estate in possession, and the holder and their grantors have held chain of title to the real estate for more than ten years.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court agreed with Rivera's argument that section 614.17A could not apply to an action to clear an easement. The court reasoned that by its terms, section 614.17A only applies to claims against a "holder of the record title to the real estate in possession." Because easements are nonpossessory interests, an easement holder does not possess the encumbered real estate, and so section 614.17A cannot apply to an action to clear an easement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rivera v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a legal malpractice action against a state public defender, who represented a client convicted of sexual abuse. The client, Donald Lyle Clark, was convicted and sentenced to prison. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. However, in postconviction proceedings, the court determined that Clark's defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance and ordered a new trial. The state declined to prosecute, and Clark filed a civil action for legal malpractice against the state as the lawyer’s employer. The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding that the finding of ineffective assistance in the postconviction proceedings established counsel’s negligence as a matter of law. The jury found the lawyer negligent and awarded Clark $12 million in emotional distress damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the judgment for emotional distress damages. The court clarified that to recover emotional distress damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence. The court held that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that the criminal defense attorney acted with willful and wanton disregard for the client’s rights or safety. The court concluded that the district court erred by instructing the jury that negligence was sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Clark v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the will of Richard D. Janssen, who had six children: Dean, Sheryl, Debra, Jeff, Larry, and Gary. Richard and his wife Melva owned three parcels of farmland, which they held as tenants-in-common. Over the years, they executed several "mirror image" wills, with the final one in 2014 leaving the farmland to Larry and Gary, $60,000 each to Dean, Jeff, and Debra, and nothing to Sheryl. After Melva's death in 2017, Richard, upset about the terms of his 2014 will, drafted a new will in 2018 with the help of his daughter Sheryl. This will left his one-half interest in each of the farm properties to Debra and Sheryl, and the remainder of his estate would be equally divided between Larry, Gary, Sheryl, and Debra. Richard passed away in June 2018.After Richard's 2018 will was admitted to probate, Dean, Larry, Gary, and Jeff filed a petition for will contest against Sheryl, Debra, and Security National Bank, seeking to set aside Richard’s 2018 will based on lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence exercised by their sisters. The first trial ended in a hung jury. Before the second trial, Gary and Larry sought dismissal of all claims against Debra. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Larry and Gary, concluding that Sheryl had unduly influenced Richard in drafting his 2018 will and that her tortious interference caused actual damages to Larry and Gary in the amount of $480,000.After the verdict, the district court granted Sheryl’s posttrial motion to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party (Debra), ordering a new trial instead of dismissal. Larry and Gary appealed this decision, arguing that Debra's dismissal did not entitle Sheryl to a new trial where section 633.312’s joinder requirement was satisfied.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision, holding that when a party, once joined and actively participating in a will contest, affirmatively agrees to be dismissed from the lawsuit without objection from any other party, section 633.312 has been satisfied and does not prevent their dismissal. The court remanded the case for the district court to address any unresolved issues in the pending posttrial motions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janssen v. The Security National Bank of Sioux City" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice claim filed by Darrin P. Miller against Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. and several medical professionals. The claim arose from the death of Miller's wife, Meredith, who died after a car accident when an endotracheal tube was incorrectly placed in her esophagus instead of her trachea. Miller alleged that the medical providers breached the standard of care by incorrectly performing the intubation and failing to identify and correct the error.The defendants sought dismissal of the case on two grounds: the expert's certificate of merit was not signed under oath as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, and the expert, an anesthesiologist, was not qualified to testify against the defendant surgeons or respiratory therapist. The district court denied the defendants' motions, ruling that the expert's unsworn but signed letter substantially complied with the affidavit requirement and that the expert's qualifications satisfied section 147.139.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the expert's signed but unsworn report did not substantially comply with section 147.140's affidavit requirement, and this violation was not cured by the expert's sworn declaration served over three months after the statutory deadline. The court did not reach the question of whether the expert anesthesiologist was qualified under section 147.139 to testify against these defendants. The case was remanded for dismissal of the medical malpractice claims with prejudice. View "Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves two attorneys, Jeffrey Peterzalek and Molly Weber, who sought to quash subpoenas for their depositions in a civil rights case brought by Charis Paulson against her employers, the State of Iowa and the Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS). Paulson alleged gender-motivated discrimination and retaliation. Weber had represented DPS in its response to Paulson's civil rights complaint before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), while Peterzalek had represented DPS and its leaders in various other matters over the years. The district court declined to quash the subpoenas but ordered that the depositions be sealed. The attorneys then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Iowa.The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the writ and retained the case. The attorneys argued that the court should adopt the Shelton test, which narrowly limits the circumstances in which opposing counsel may be deposed. They also argued that they should not be deposed or, alternatively, that substantial limitations should be imposed if their depositions were allowed.The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with the attorneys' argument to adopt the Shelton test. Applying the test, the court concluded that Weber's deposition should be quashed as she was opposing counsel in the ongoing dispute and the information sought could be obtained by other means and was protected by the work-product doctrine. However, the court affirmed the district court's refusal to quash the subpoena for Peterzalek's deposition, as he was not opposing counsel in the ongoing dispute. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the entry of an order quashing the subpoena for Weber's deposition. View "Peterzalek v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

An elderly woman, Janice Geerdes, and her long-time friend, Albert Gomez Cruz, had a partnership raising hogs on a piece of land. Initially, Janice deeded half of her interest in the land to Albert. Over a decade later, she deeded the rest of her interest in the land to Albert, receiving nothing in return. About six months later, Janice’s adult daughters were appointed her conservator and guardian. The conservator challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed based on undue influence and lack of capacity.The district court set aside the deed, finding that there was undue influence through a confidential relationship and that Janice lacked the necessary capacity to deed her interest in the land. The court of appeals affirmed the decision on the basis of lack of capacity.The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, disagreed with the lower courts. The Supreme Court found that the conservator did not establish by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that there was undue influence or that Janice lacked capacity at the time of the gift. The court found that the lower courts gave too much weight to the perceived improvidence of the transaction and too little weight to the testimony of the third-party accountant who witnessed the transaction. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservatorship of Janice Geerdes v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Emilio Puente, a police officer for the City of Iowa City, resigned from his position and later attempted to rescind his resignation. When the City rejected his attempt, Puente filed an action with the Civil Service Commission of Iowa City (Commission) for review of the City’s refusal to reinstate him. The Commission dismissed Puente's complaint, agreeing with the City that it was untimely. Puente then filed a petition for judicial review in the Johnson County District Court, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that Puente’s “petition for judicial review” was not a “notice of appeal” as required by Iowa Code § 400.27.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court of appeals relied on the differences between a chapter 17A proceeding and an appeal under section 400.27 to conclude that the petition for judicial review could not be deemed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals noted that the two are initiated differently, have different venue provisions and service requirements, and have different standards and scopes of review.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court found that Puente had substantially complied with the requirements for filing a notice of appeal from the Commission’s decision to the district court. The court noted that Puente's petition sought "judicial review" of the Commission’s decision, identifying the Commission as a “respondent” rather than a “defendant.” The court concluded that Puente's reference to the wrong Code provision for venue did not mean he failed to substantially comply with the correct Code provision. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment dismissing Puente’s appeal from the Commission’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Puente v. Civil Service Commission of Iowa City" on Justia Law

A juvenile, K.C., was charged with two serious misdemeanors: carrying dangerous weapons and possession of marijuana. As K.C. was 17 at the time of the incident, the juvenile court had initial jurisdiction. However, after K.C. turned 18, the State filed a petition to waive the juvenile court's jurisdiction. In preparation for the waiver hearing, K.C. hired a forensic psychologist, Dr. Tracy Thomas, to conduct an evaluation. K.C. requested the State to cover Dr. Thomas's fees, which were estimated to be $7,990. The juvenile court initially authorized the fees but later set a limit of $4,590, deeming the full amount unreasonable. K.C. filed a motion for additional expert fees, which was denied by the juvenile court. K.C. then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the juvenile court acted illegally by not properly determining whether the requested expert fees were reasonable.The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with K.C. that the juvenile court's order was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that three of the four reasons the juvenile court initially cited for deeming the full fee unreasonable were no longer relevant. The court also found that the juvenile court failed to provide any explanation for why it declined to increase the fee award or reconsider its denial. The Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the juvenile court's reasoning was based on an erroneous application of law and thereby abused its discretion.The Supreme Court of Iowa sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the juvenile court's orders denying K.C.'s requests for additional expert fees, and remanded the matter for entry of an order authorizing the full $7,791.20 in expert fees for Dr. Thomas's work. View "K.C. v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Kirkwood Institute's request for public records from the Office of the Auditor of State in Iowa. The Institute sought emails between the Auditor's office and two investigative reporters. The Auditor's office withheld ten email chains, citing Iowa Code § 11.42 and § 22.7(18), which protect certain types of information. Kirkwood sued, arguing that the Auditor's office failed to show that these exceptions applied to the withheld emails. Additionally, Kirkwood claimed that the Auditor's office failed to disclose an eleventh email chain that had been quoted in a reporter's blog.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auditor's office, holding that the ten email chains were exempt from production and that no violation occurred with the late turnover of the eleventh email chain. Kirkwood appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court found that there was a factual issue as to whether the delay in producing the eleventh email was reasonable. It also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Auditor's office's withholding of nine emails under § 11.42, as it was not immediately apparent that these emails were received in the course of an audit or examination. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the tenth email withheld under § 22.7(18), agreeing that it fell within the exception created in this statute. View "Kirkwood Institute, Inc. v. Sand" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed a case involving a dispute between the University of Iowa and Modern Piping, Inc., a mechanical contractor. The dispute arose during the construction of the University of Iowa Stead Family Children’s Hospital. Modern Piping sought to arbitrate some delay disputes, but the University obtained a temporary injunction preventing arbitration. Modern Piping successfully had the injunction dissolved and sought to recover not only the fees and costs it incurred in doing so, but also restitution for the University's wrongful injunction.The district court initially granted the University an ex parte temporary injunction against Modern Piping, preventing arbitration of specific disputes. Modern Piping intervened and successfully had the injunction dissolved. The University appealed this decision but was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the parties arbitrated the original disputes, resulting in the University paying Modern Piping over $16 million pursuant to the arbitration award.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the restitution awarded to Modern Piping was not a proper remedy for a claim for wrongful injunction and could not stand. The court affirmed the $21,784.50 award to Modern Piping for fees and costs but reversed the $12,784,177.00 award for restitution. The court found that Modern Piping's claim for restitution was not directly correlated to the injunction, and therefore, it was not entitled to recover restitution in the form of a broad-reaching unjust enrichment claim. The case was remanded for entry of an order consistent with this directive. View "The University of Iowa v. Modern Piping, Inc." on Justia Law