Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator at the Texas Civil Commitment Center, brought a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family Protective Services and the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He alleged that these agencies failed to investigate his reports of misconduct and abuse at the facility, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, as well as rights under the Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients. The plaintiff asserted that he should be able to file complaints with these agencies rather than being required to use the internal grievance procedure of the Texas Civil Commitment Office.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief and that amendment would be futile, so it dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that he had adequately stated equal protection and due process claims, that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint, and that the district court was biased.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to state an equal protection claim because he was not similarly situated to other Texas citizens and the different grievance procedures had a rational basis. The court also found no protected liberty or property interest to support a due process claim and concluded that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. The court further held that amendment would have been futile and found no evidence of judicial bias. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel was denied. View "Dunsmore v. Muth" on Justia Law

A family from Colombia, consisting of two adults and their minor children, sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States. They had been active members of the Colombian Liberal Party and participated in political campaigning. After receiving threatening phone calls related to their political activities, the family continued their involvement. Subsequently, the father, who was a provisional lawyer and intern at the National Prosecutor’s office, became involved in a property dispute with a man known as Don Rafa, a leader of a narco-trafficking group. Following this, the family received further threats, including armed confrontations and threats against their children, which they attributed to Don Rafa and his associates. The family relocated within Colombia briefly before departing for the United States.After arriving in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security charged the family as removable. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the family credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ concluded that the harm suffered did not amount to past persecution, lacked a nexus to a statutorily protected ground, and that internal relocation within Colombia was reasonably available. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal, also rejecting the family’s due process claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision under a substantial-evidence standard. The court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate past persecution, a nexus to a protected ground, or that the Colombian government was unable or unwilling to protect them. The court also found that the record did not show the family could not safely relocate within Colombia. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Jimenez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Christopher Toland was sentenced in 1993 to a lengthy prison term for rape, kidnapping, and related offenses, making him eligible for parole in 2004. Between 2004 and 2020, the Pennsylvania Parole Board denied him parole fourteen times, often contrary to recommendations from the Department of Corrections. Toland filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, seeking mandamus relief and alleging constitutional violations in the Board’s parole denials from 2017, 2018, and 2019. He claimed the Board relied on false information, acted arbitrarily, and applied parole standards retroactively in violation of ex post facto prohibitions.The Commonwealth Court overruled the Parole Board’s preliminary objections to Toland’s claims, allowing discovery to proceed. When Toland requested documents related to his parole eligibility, the Parole Board objected, citing its own regulation (37 Pa. Code § 61.2) that designates its records as “private, confidential and privileged.” The Commonwealth Court rejected the Board’s objections, finding that Toland, as the beneficiary of the privilege, could waive it. The Board then filed an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order, but on a different basis. The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board does not have the authority to create an evidentiary privilege through its own regulation. Therefore, Section 61.2 does not establish a privilege that can be invoked to prevent disclosure of documents in discovery. The Court clarified that only privileges created by the legislature, the constitution, or the common law are recognized in Pennsylvania courts, and no such privilege exists under Section 61.2. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm the lower court’s order. View "Toland v. PBPP" on Justia Law

A fuel distribution company sought to acquire a competitor in Western Alaska, prompting the State to sue for anticompetitive conduct under Alaska’s consumer protection laws. To resolve the dispute, the State and the company negotiated a consent decree requiring the company to divest a portion of its fuel storage capacity in Bethel to another distributor, Delta Western, before completing the acquisition. The consent decree specified that it would expire in 30 years or could be dissolved by court order for good cause. Delta Western was not a party to the consent decree, but entered into a separate fuel storage contract with the acquiring company as required by the decree. The contract’s term extended beyond the initial five years at Delta Western’s option.Years later, the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, dissolved the consent decree at the acquiring company’s request. The company then notified Delta Western that it considered the fuel storage contract terminated as a result. Delta Western filed a breach of contract action in Anchorage Superior Court, seeking to enforce the contract and arguing that its terms were independent of the consent decree. The contract case was transferred to Nome Superior Court, which issued a preliminary ruling that the contract remained valid despite the dissolution of the consent decree. The court also vacated its initial order dissolving the consent decree to allow Delta Western to intervene and present its position.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether dissolution of the consent decree automatically terminated the fuel storage contract and whether the superior court abused its discretion by permitting Delta Western to intervene. The court held that dissolution of the consent decree did not automatically void the contract between the parties, and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Delta Western to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions and lifted the stay on the contract case. View "Crowley Marine Services, Inc. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

The City of New York brought suit in New York state court against several major oil companies and the American Petroleum Institute, alleging violations of New York’s consumer protection laws through deceptive advertising about the environmental impact of fossil fuels. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting multiple grounds for federal jurisdiction. The City moved to remand the case to state court, but the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of a similar case, Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.After the Second Circuit affirmed the remand in the Connecticut case, the district court in New York lifted the stay and allowed the parties to re-brief the remand motion in light of the new precedent. The City renewed its motion to remand and requested attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The oil companies continued to oppose remand, pressing several arguments that had already been rejected by numerous federal courts, including the Second Circuit in the Connecticut case. The district court granted the motion to remand and awarded the City attorneys’ fees and costs, but only for work related to five of the six grounds for removal, and only for work performed after the Connecticut decision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed only the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs for the objectively unreasonable grounds for removal pressed after the legal landscape had shifted. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the award was justified under the “unusual circumstances” exception recognized in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp. View "The City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Noah Gilbert purchased a motor vehicle insurance policy from Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, initially declining underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage but later adding a UIM endorsement with $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident limits. The policy included an offset provision, reducing any UIM payout by amounts received from another party’s insurance. Gilbert paid premiums for this coverage but never filed a UIM claim or experienced an accident triggering such coverage. He later filed a putative class action, alleging that Progressive’s UIM coverage was illusory under Idaho law and asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud, and constructive fraud.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court raised the issue of standing and ultimately held that Gilbert lacked standing because he had not filed a claim or been denied coverage, and thus had not suffered an injury-in-fact. Alternatively, the court found that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits: there was no breach of contract or bad faith without a denied claim, no damages to support fraud or constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment was unavailable due to the existence of a valid contract. The court granted summary judgment for Progressive and denied Gilbert’s motion for class certification as moot.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that Gilbert did have standing, as payment of premiums for allegedly illusory coverage constituted a concrete injury. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits because he never filed a claim, was never denied coverage, and did not incur damages. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, as an enforceable contract provided an adequate legal remedy. The judgment in favor of Progressive was affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A group of borrowers in California brought a class action against Flagstar Bank, alleging that the bank failed to pay interest on their mortgage escrow accounts as required by California Civil Code § 2954.8(a). Flagstar did not pay interest on these accounts, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted the California law, and therefore, it was not obligated to comply. The plaintiffs sought restitution for the unpaid interest.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court ordered Flagstar to pay restitution and prejudgment interest to the class. Flagstar appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Lusnak foreclosed Flagstar’s preemption argument. However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to correct the class definition date and the judgment amount due to errors in the statute of limitations tolling and calculation of damages.On remand from the United States Supreme Court, following its decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it could overrule Lusnak in light of Cantero. The court held that Cantero did not render Lusnak “clearly irreconcilable” with Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, the panel lacked authority to overrule Lusnak. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the NBA does not preempt California’s interest-on-escrow law, but vacated and remanded the judgment and class certification order for modification of the class definition date and judgment amount. View "KIVETT V. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB" on Justia Law

Mark Howerton was convicted in 2010 of computer child pornography and three counts of internet stalking of a child, based on offenses committed in 2009. He received a total prison sentence of 24 years, with some sentences suspended. Howerton was paroled in 2017 but returned to prison in 2020 for a parole violation. He was denied parole in 2022 for two years and again in 2024 for another two years. Howerton filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, alleging that the chairperson of the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board, Lona McCastlain, acted without legal authority in denying his parole, arguing that the denial was based on statutes applied ex post facto and an unauthorized “detriment to the community” rationale.The Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Division, granted McCastlain’s motion to dismiss Howerton’s petition. The court found that Howerton failed to state sufficient facts to support his claims, noting that Arkansas parole statutes and regulations do not create a protectable liberty interest in discretionary parole decisions, and that parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. The court also found that Howerton did not demonstrate that the incorrect statute was applied or that the Board’s regulations were violated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the dismissal for abuse of discretion and for the existence of a justiciable controversy. The court held that Howerton failed to present sufficient facts to establish that McCastlain acted outside her authority or violated applicable statutes or regulations. The court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, concluding that Howerton’s allegations were insufficient to warrant declaratory or mandamus relief. View "HOWERTON v. MCCASTLAIN" on Justia Law

A group of New Mexico residents filed lawsuits against several out-of-state law firms, alleging that these firms conspired with tobacco companies and industry organizations to mislead the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking, resulting in personal injuries. The law firms, based in Missouri, the District of Columbia, and North Carolina, had no significant business or physical presence in New Mexico. The plaintiffs argued that the law firms’ participation in a nationwide civil conspiracy, which included acts affecting New Mexico, established grounds for the state’s courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over them.The First Judicial District Court denied the law firms’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, relying on a New Mexico Court of Appeals decision that recognized “conspiracy jurisdiction” as a valid basis for specific personal jurisdiction. The district court found that the plaintiffs had shown the law firms participated in a conspiracy that “reached into New Mexico,” but did not make detailed factual findings. The law firms then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico for writs of prohibition to prevent the district court from exercising jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that conspiracy jurisdiction is constitutional if it is limited to situations where a defendant knowingly and actively participates in a civil conspiracy targeting the forum state, with knowledge that co-conspirators would commit acts in or aimed at that state. However, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing that the law firms either participated in such a conspiracy or knew of acts in furtherance of the conspiracy that created minimum contacts with New Mexico. As a result, the Court directed that the law firms be dismissed from the lawsuits. View "Shook v. Wilson" on Justia Law