Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Michael Kosor, Jr., a homeowner in Southern Highlands, a Las Vegas residential common-interest community, sued the Southern Highlands Community Association (HOA) and its developer, Southern Highlands Development Corporation (SHDC), for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the homeowners' right to elect the HOA's board of directors. Kosor claimed that the community had surpassed the 75% home-sale threshold, ending the declarant control period, yet SHDC continued to appoint three of the five board members, violating homeowners' voting rights. The HOA and SHDC disputed Kosor's interpretation and calculations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied Kosor's motion for a temporary restraining order, largely denied the HOA's and SHDC's motion to dismiss, and denied Kosor's motion for summary judgment. Kosor then sought to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice, but the court dismissed it with prejudice and awarded fees and costs to the HOA and SHDC. Kosor appealed but later withdrew his appeal, acknowledging that he could not reinstate it or raise the same issues again. Subsequently, the HOA and SHDC sought additional fees and costs incurred on appeal, prompting Kosor to file a motion under NRCP 60(b)(4), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to noncompliance with NRS 38.310's pre-suit ADR requirement.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 38.310, which mandates pre-suit mediation or arbitration for certain HOA-related claims, is a procedural claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction despite the parties' noncompliance with NRS 38.310 and properly denied Kosor's motion to vacate its judgment and fee-award orders as jurisdictionally void. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. View "KOSOR VS. S. HIGHLANDS CMTY. ASS'N" on Justia Law

A group of current and former pretrial detainees filed a putative class action against Prince George’s County, Maryland, and 11 state court judges, alleging that their detentions and the policies leading to them were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and the Maryland Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the judges and the county had absolute immunity from the plaintiffs’ claims for damages and an injunction, and that a declaratory judgment could not provide meaningful relief. The district court dismissed the judicial defendants based on absolute judicial immunity and dismissed the claims against the county based on quasi-judicial immunity. Additionally, the district court dismissed seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention, reasoning that they would not benefit from any available remedy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the judicial defendants but concluded that the dismissal should have been for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the absence of an Article III case or controversy. The court held that the judicial defendants were acting in an adjudicative capacity, not as adversaries, and thus there was no justiciable controversy. The court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the county, holding that municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, including the reinstatement of the claims of the seven plaintiffs who had been released from pretrial detention. View "Frazier v. Prince Georges County" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2020, a woman with a history of severe mental illness was detained at the Bucks County Correctional Facility after an altercation with a neighbor. While in custody, she was allegedly subjected to repeated uses of force by corrections officers, including being pepper sprayed, handcuffed, and placed in a restraint chair on multiple occasions. The complaint asserts that these actions were taken as punishment for her inability to comply with directives due to her mental illness, and that she did not pose a threat to staff or other inmates. Her condition deteriorated significantly during her detention, leading to her eventual transfer to a mental hospital, by which time she was reportedly catatonic and unresponsive.Her parents, acting on her behalf, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Bucks County and various corrections officers, alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The court reasoned that the complaint was not detailed enough to determine whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct, and that further factual development was necessary.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit held that when a complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation but lacks sufficient detail to assess whether the right was clearly established, qualified immunity cannot be granted at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court concluded that the defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity was not apparent from the face of the complaint and remanded the case for limited discovery to develop the facts necessary for a proper qualified immunity analysis. View "Stringer v. County of Bucks" on Justia Law

In this case, inmate Kyle Richards alleged that Thomas Perttu, a prison employee, sexually harassed him and other inmates. Richards also claimed that Perttu destroyed his grievance documents and retaliated against him for attempting to file them. Richards sued Perttu under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment right to file grievances. Perttu moved for summary judgment, arguing that Richards had failed to exhaust available grievance procedures as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The Magistrate Judge found a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Richards was excused from exhausting his claims due to Perttu's interference and held an evidentiary hearing. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Richards's witnesses lacked credibility and recommended dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The District Court adopted this recommendation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial when the resolution of the exhaustion issue under the PLRA would also resolve a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the merits of the plaintiff's substantive case.The Supreme Court of the United States held that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that requires a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Court reasoned that the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that factual disputes regarding legal claims go to the jury. The PLRA is silent on whether judges or juries should resolve exhaustion disputes, and this silence indicates that the usual practice should be followed. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. View "Perttu v. Richards" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of state emissions-control plans submitted by Oklahoma and Utah. The EPA disapproved these plans, asserting that they did not comply with the Clean Air Act's (CAA) "Good Neighbor" provision, which requires states to prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to air quality problems in other states. The EPA aggregated its disapprovals into a single rule and claimed that the rule was nationally applicable, or alternatively, that it was based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.The states and energy-industry petitioners challenged the EPA's disapprovals in regional Circuits. The EPA moved to dismiss these challenges or transfer them to the D.C. Circuit. Four out of five Circuits found that regional Circuit review was proper. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and transferred the challenges to the D.C. Circuit, reasoning that the EPA's omnibus rule constituted a single, nationally applicable action.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the Tenth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the EPA's disapprovals of the Oklahoma and Utah SIPs are locally or regionally applicable actions, not nationally applicable. The Court further held that the "nationwide scope or effect" exception did not apply because the EPA's disapprovals were based on state-specific, fact-intensive analyses rather than on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

G.W. was taken into custody in the District of Columbia on a delinquency matter. Although released in that matter, the trial court ordered his detention under the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) to be picked up by Virginia authorities on a different juvenile matter. When Virginia authorities did not take custody, the trial court dismissed the ICJ matter, but the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) continued to detain G.W., interpreting the ICJ to require detention until all of G.W.'s juvenile matters in the District were resolved or until Virginia took custody or consented to his release.G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that DYRS had no authority under the ICJ to detain him once Virginia failed to take custody. DYRS opposed the petition, citing ICJ rules and an advisory opinion by the Interstate Commission for Juveniles. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the petition, relying on the advisory opinion that interpreted the ICJ rules to require detention until charges in the holding state were resolved or there was consent from the demanding state.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Since the trial court's ruling, the Commission withdrew the advisory opinion, and both the Commission and the District of Columbia conceded that the ICJ rules did not require G.W.'s detention. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ICJ Rule 7-103 did not address detention and that ICJ Rule 6-102.2 required detention only until the demanding state returned the juvenile or the time period for doing so expired. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Eric Coomer, Ph.D., the former Director of Product Strategy and Safety at Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., filed a defamation lawsuit against several defendants, including Make Your Life Epic, LLC, Reopen America, LLC, and Clayton Thomas Clark. Joseph Oltmann, a nonparty to the lawsuit, was subpoenaed to testify and produce documents. Oltmann initially appeared for his deposition but left without authorization and later boasted about his actions on his podcast, disparaging the magistrate judge and suggesting violence.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held Oltmann in civil contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena and court orders. The court imposed a $1,000 per day fine until Oltmann complied and ordered him to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Oltmann appealed the Contempt Order, arguing that he properly invoked the newsperson’s privilege and that his due process rights were violated because the district court did not hold a hearing before issuing the Contempt Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s Contempt Order. The appellate court held that Oltmann waived his arguments by not raising them specifically in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the Contempt Order without a second hearing, as the material facts were undisputed. The appellate court further imposed sanctions on Oltmann, ordering him to pay Coomer’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs associated with the appeal, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the amount. View "Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic" on Justia Law

Future Link Systems, LLC entered into a license agreement with MediaTek, Inc. in 2019, which stipulated that MediaTek would pay Future Link a lump sum if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek Semiconductor Corporation. Future Link subsequently filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) accusing Realtek of patent infringement. During the litigation, Future Link settled with a third party and informed Realtek, leading Realtek to file a motion for sanctions against Future Link before the administrative law judge (ALJ).The ALJ expressed concerns about the legality of the agreement between Future Link and MediaTek but ultimately denied Realtek's motion for sanctions, concluding that the agreement did not influence Future Link's decision to file the complaint. Future Link then withdrew its complaint and moved to terminate the investigation, which the ALJ granted. The ITC terminated the investigation when no petition for review was filed. Realtek petitioned the ITC to review the ALJ's order denying sanctions, but the ITC declined and terminated the sanctions proceeding.Realtek appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking an order for Future Link to pay a fine to the Commission. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Realtek's appeal, as the Commission's decision on sanctions was not a "final determination" under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) that would affect the exclusion or non-exclusion of articles from entry. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that jurisdiction over such matters likely lies with the district courts, not the Federal Circuit. View "Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff SeanPaul Reyes, who frequently posts videos of his interactions with police on YouTube, challenged a New York City Police Department (NYPD) policy that prohibits video recording inside police facilities. Reyes, who had been arrested twice for recording inside police stationhouses, argued that the policy violated his rights under the First Amendment and the New York State and New York City Right to Record Acts (RTRAs). He sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the City from enforcing the policy and to remove signs stating the policy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Reyes a preliminary injunction based on his state and local law claims, despite finding that he was unlikely to succeed on his First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Reyes demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his RTRAs claims, irreparable harm, and that the public interest favored an injunction.The City of New York appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state and local claims and in finding that Reyes met the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or its determination of irreparable harm. However, the court noted that the resolution of whether Reyes is likely to succeed on the merits and whether the public interest favors an injunction depends on the interpretation of the RTRAs.Given the lack of clear guidance from New York courts on whether the RTRAs afford a right to record inside police stationhouses, the Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: Does either N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-p or N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 14-189 afford individuals the right to video record law enforcement activities inside public facilities, specifically inside the publicly accessible lobbies of police stationhouses, notwithstanding the NYPD policy forbidding such recording? The decision on the appeal is reserved pending the response from the New York Court of Appeals. View "Reyes v. City of New York" on Justia Law