Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

James Jurgensen sustained a work injury on July 29, 2021, while employed by Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc. He hired attorney Joshua E. Borken, who agreed to a contingent fee of 20% of the first $130,000 of compensation and 20% of any excess amount, subject to approval. Minnesota Statutes § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), caps attorney fees in workers’ compensation cases at $26,000. The parties settled for $150,000, and Borken sought $30,000 in fees, including $4,000 in excess fees. The compensation judge approved $26,000 but denied the excess fees after applying the Irwin factors.The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the compensation judge’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the excess fees. The WCCA also concluded that automatic approval of unobjected-to excess fees is inconsistent with section 176.081, which provides a presumptive cap on attorney fees. The WCCA did not address the constitutional issue due to a lack of jurisdiction.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the 2024 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 176.081, which increases the cap on attorney fees, does not apply retroactively. The court also held that the WCCA did not err by declining to automatically approve the requested excess fee. Additionally, the court found that Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2022), does not violate the Contracts Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Finally, the court concluded that the WCCA did not err by affirming the compensation judge’s denial of excess attorney fees under the Irwin factors.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the WCCA, upholding the denial of the $4,000 in excess attorney fees. View "Jurgensen vs. Dave Perkins Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Brenda Zaragoza fell in the parking lot of a Johnson County public library, resulting in serious injuries. She sued the Johnson County Board of Commissioners, alleging negligence for failing to mitigate the presence of a storm drain and warn of the change in elevation between the curb and the parking surface. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, citing recreational use immunity under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), which bars negligence claims arising from the use of public property intended for recreational purposes unless gross and wanton negligence is involved. The court also denied Zaragoza's motion to amend her petition to add a claim of gross and wanton negligence.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the library's recreational use immunity applied and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaragoza's untimely motion to amend her petition. Zaragoza then petitioned for review, raising both issues. After the petition was granted, she filed a supplemental brief raising a new constitutional argument, which was not considered because it was not presented in her petition for review or before the lower courts.The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court declined to consider Zaragoza's unpreserved constitutional challenge. It affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, agreeing that the library's parking lot fell under the recreational use immunity provision of the KTCA. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Zaragoza's motion to amend her petition, finding no evidence of gross and wanton negligence by the County. The court concluded that the library is public property intended for recreational purposes and that the parking lot is integral to its function, thus qualifying for immunity under the KTCA. View "Zaragoza v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs " on Justia Law

In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

American Oversight, a nonprofit group, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in district court against the Governor and the Attorney General of Texas, alleging violations of the Public Information Act (PIA). They sought official communications and other documents, which the Governor's and Attorney General's offices partially withheld, citing various exemptions. Dissatisfied with the responses, American Oversight pursued legal action to compel the release of the information.The Travis County district court denied the State's pleas to the jurisdiction, leading to an interlocutory appeal. The State argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against constitutional executive officers, as only the Texas Supreme Court has such authority under section 22.002(c) of the Texas Government Code. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that section 552.321(b) of the PIA authorized district courts to issue mandamus relief against any governmental body, including those headed by constitutional executive officers.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that section 552.321(b) did not expand the jurisdiction of district courts to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive officers. The Court held that only the Texas Supreme Court has the authority to issue such writs against these officers, as per section 22.002(c) of the Texas Government Code. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and directed the district court to dismiss the mandamus petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "PAXTON v. AMERICAN OVERSIGHT" on Justia Law

Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

Nathan Nash was involved in an automobile collision in Tuscaloosa County with a truck driven by Joshua Hunter Jones and owned by Davis Ice Cream Alabama, LLC. Nash filed a complaint in Jefferson County against Jones for negligence and wantonness, and against Davis Ice Cream for negligent training and hiring. Nash and Jones reside in counties adjacent to Jefferson County, and Davis Ice Cream's principal place of business is in Jefferson County. Nash received medical treatment and had an employer in Jefferson County.The Jefferson Circuit Court transferred the case to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on a motion by Davis Ice Cream, citing Alabama's forum non conveniens statute. Nash objected, highlighting his medical treatment and employer connections in Jefferson County. After the transfer order, Nash filed a motion for reconsideration and then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in transferring the case. The Court noted that Davis Ice Cream's principal place of business and Nash's medical providers and employer were in Jefferson County, establishing a strong connection to the action. In contrast, Tuscaloosa County's only connection was the location of the collision. The Court concluded that Davis Ice Cream failed to demonstrate that Tuscaloosa County had a strong connection to the action and that Jefferson County had a weak connection. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Nash's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Nash" on Justia Law

Michael Straus wired $60,000 to an account at GBC International Bank (GBC) owned by Apex Oil and Gas Trading, LLC (Apex). Apex allegedly failed to provide the services Straus paid for, withdrew the funds, and disappeared. Straus sued GBC in May 2024, claiming negligence and wantonness, alleging GBC closed Apex's account knowing Apex was engaged in fraud. Straus argued GBC's website acknowledged its obligations under the Patriot Act to prevent such fraud.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied GBC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. GBC then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. GBC argued it had no general or specific personal jurisdiction in Alabama, supported by an affidavit from its executive vice president and chief financial officer, Richard Holmes. Holmes stated GBC had no business operations, property, or targeted advertising in Alabama. Straus's response included an unsworn declaration, which the court found insufficient to establish jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that Straus's unilateral action of wiring money to GBC did not establish specific personal jurisdiction. GBC's general statements on its website about compliance with federal law did not constitute purposeful availment of conducting activities in Alabama. The court concluded that GBC did not have the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Therefore, the court granted GBC's petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss Straus's complaint. View "Ex parte GBC International Bank" on Justia Law

A minor child, through his mother, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against an obstetrician, the clinic where the obstetrician was employed, and the hospital where he was born. The child suffered an obstetric brachial plexus injury during birth. The district court excluded the package insert for Pitocin used during the birth, ruling it was hearsay and lacked foundation. The child also argued that the court erred in not giving his requested jury instructions and giving other erroneous instructions, which he did not object to at trial.The District Court for Douglas County ruled in favor of the defendants. The jury found that the child had not met his burden of proof and rendered a general verdict for the defendants. The child appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could not determine the standard of care from the testimony of expert witnesses. This erroneous instruction was on a vital issue and misled the jury, prejudicially affecting a substantial right of the child. The court held that the error was of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, without addressing the remaining assignments of error, as they were unnecessary to adjudicate the case and might be tried differently on remand. View "J.R.M.B. v. Alegent Creighton Health" on Justia Law

Nickolas Trabucco parked at a gas station in Hernando, Mississippi, where Officer Andres Rivera was filling up his patrol car. Rivera approached Trabucco’s car, and after a brief interaction, Trabucco exited his vehicle. The subsequent events, partially obscured by the car, are disputed. Trabucco claimed Rivera grabbed and tackled him without provocation, while Rivera testified that Trabucco resisted and attempted to flee, prompting Rivera to tackle him. Surveillance footage showed Rivera restraining Trabucco, who continued to struggle. Rivera then used a taser on Trabucco, who fell and was subsequently arrested.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Trabucco sued Rivera under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force. The jury found that Rivera used excessive force but was entitled to qualified immunity. Trabucco’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Trabucco waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by not properly moving for judgment as a matter of law. The court found that Trabucco’s actions sufficiently alerted the court and Rivera to the sufficiency issue, allowing the court to consider the evidence. The court then held that Rivera’s use of force was not unreasonable in light of clearly established law, distinguishing this case from precedents like Trammell v. Fruge and Hanks v. Rogers due to factual differences. The court also found no error in the jury instructions and upheld the district court’s denial of Trabucco’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trabucco v. Rivera" on Justia Law