Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A company acquired a tax title to certain immovable property in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, after the original owners failed to pay property taxes. Following the expiration of the redemptive period, the company mailed post-tax sale notice to the executrix of the former owner’s succession at the address listed in the succession proceedings. The company then filed a petition to quiet title, and the executrix was personally served. In response, she filed a reconventional demand seeking to annul the tax sale, alleging she had not received adequate pre-tax and post-tax sale notice. The City, which had previously held a small interest in the property, was also named as a third-party defendant.The 16th Judicial District Court sustained exceptions of prescription raised by the company and the City, dismissing the executrix’s claims as untimely. On appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, finding the reconventional demand was timely because it was filed within six months of service of the petition to quiet title, as required by La. R.S. 47:2266. The appellate court also held that the failure to provide pre-tax sale notice could render the tax sale absolutely null, and that the company and the City bore the burden of proving the reconventional demand was prescribed.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that, following the 2008 revision to Louisiana’s tax sale statutes, failure to provide pre-tax sale notice for tax sales occurring after January 1, 2009, no longer results in an absolute nullity. Instead, such defects are relative nullities, subject to specific prescriptive periods under La. R.S. 47:2287. The Court further held that a nullity action brought as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action must also comply with the six-month limitation in La. R.S. 47:2266. The Court affirmed the appellate ruling regarding prescription but reversed on the issue of absolute nullity, remanding for further proceedings. View "BELAIRE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, LLC VS. SUCCESSION OF SHELTON" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a civil action against two business entities, seeking relief in the Parish of Orleans. When initiating the lawsuit, the plaintiff requested service of citation on the defendants and paid all fees required by the clerk of court at the time of filing. Subsequently, the sheriff’s office sent an additional invoice for service fees, which the plaintiff paid after the ninety-day period prescribed by law for requesting service. The defendants argued that the plaintiff failed to properly request service within the statutory period because not all service-related fees were paid within ninety days.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ exception of insufficiency of service of process and their motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that the plaintiff’s timely request for service, accompanied by payment of the initial fees, satisfied the statutory requirement. The defendants appealed, and the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1201(C) does not require payment of all service fees within the ninety-day period, only that service be requested.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari to resolve conflicting appellate decisions on this issue. The court held that Article 1201(C) requires only that a plaintiff “request” service of citation within ninety days of filing the petition, and does not mandate that all service-related fees be paid within that period. The court reasoned that the statutory language is unambiguous and that payment requirements are addressed elsewhere in Louisiana law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in favor of the plaintiff. View "DAROUSE VS. P.J.'S COFFEE OF NEW ORLEANS, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner obtained a building permit from a city and was required, under the city’s standard procedures, to submit a form containing financial information about subcontractors before the city would conduct necessary inspections and issue a certificate of occupancy. The property owner refused to provide the requested information, leading the city to withhold inspections. As a result, the property owner filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the city lacked authority to require such information and requesting an order compelling the city to perform the inspections. The owner also sought damages for delays allegedly caused by the city’s refusal to inspect.After the property owner settled with the city’s building inspector, the case proceeded in the Baldwin Circuit Court. The jury was asked to decide both the declaratory judgment and damages claims, ultimately finding in favor of the property owner and awarding over $3.5 million in damages. The city appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a prior decision, held that the damages claim was barred by substantive immunity and reversed the damages award, but did not address the declaratory judgment claim, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered judgment for the property owner on the declaratory judgment claim but did not award damages. The city appealed again. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that, because the inspections had already been completed and all requested relief had been granted or resolved, no justiciable controversy remained. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for dismissal. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles" on Justia Law

A Georgia limited-liability company owned and operated a hotel in Birmingham, Alabama, which was subject to a $10,710,000 loan secured by a mortgage, an assignment of leases and rents, and other collateral. The loan was eventually assigned to a bank acting as trustee for a mortgage trust. After the hotel owner allegedly defaulted on its loan obligations and mismanaged the property, the bank filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking the appointment of a receiver to manage the hotel and ensure payment of operating expenses. The court appointed a receiver and issued orders outlining the receiver’s duties, including managing the hotel and paying its expenses.Following the appointment, disputes arose between the hotel owner, the receiver, and the bank regarding whether the receiver was required to pay expenses incurred before the receivership began (“pre-receivership claims”). The hotel owner sought to compel the receiver to pay these claims, while the receiver and the bank objected, arguing that such payments could harm the receivership estate and improperly prioritize unsecured creditors over the secured lender. The circuit court ultimately issued an order in July 2024 clarifying that the receiver was required to pay pre-receivership expenses, prompting the receiver to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the July 2024 order was an appealable interlocutory injunction and whether the circuit court erred in requiring the receiver to pay pre-receivership claims without regard to creditor priority. The court held that the order was injunctive in nature and appealable. It further held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by requiring the receiver to pay all pre-receivership claims unconditionally, as this could harm the receivership estate and the interests of priority creditors. The Supreme Court reversed the July 2024 order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kolessar v. SJP Investment Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

A law firm sought to recover over $1.7 million in fees and costs for representing the Los Angeles County Sheriff, Alex Villanueva, and the Sheriff’s Department in litigation initiated by the County of Los Angeles. Due to a conflict of interest, the County’s Board of Supervisors offered Villanueva independent counsel, allowing him to select his attorney but reserving discretion over compensation. Villanueva chose the law firm, which entered into an engagement agreement with him. The County, however, sent its own retainer agreement to the firm, which the firm refused to sign. The firm continued its representation but was never paid. After the firm demanded arbitration under its engagement agreement, the County and related plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed and an injunction against the arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, then summary judgment for the County plaintiffs, finding the Sheriff lacked authority to enter into the engagement agreement. The court denied the law firm’s post-judgment motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, citing both untimeliness and bad faith. The firm then filed a separate lawsuit against the County and related defendants, asserting breach of contract and related claims. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer, dismissing the complaint with prejudice on grounds that the claims were compulsory cross-claims in the earlier action and for failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the dismissal of the law firm’s separate lawsuit. The court held that the Sheriff did not have authority to retain counsel on his own; only the Board of Supervisors could contract for legal services. The law firm’s claims were barred as compulsory cross-claims and for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. View "County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP" on Justia Law

A company based in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), which provides computer and networking services, entered into a contract with a California-based distributor of Microsoft products. The CNMI company sought to purchase Microsoft software to fulfill a government contract. After a series of communications and assurances that the software would meet the CNMI government’s specifications, the CNMI company paid over $800,000 to the distributor, which then delivered the software directly to the CNMI government. The software did not conform to the required specifications, leading the government to cancel its contract with the CNMI company and request a refund. The CNMI company, in turn, sought a refund from the distributor, which offered a partial refund minus a cancellation fee. The CNMI company objected and filed suit alleging fraud, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The district court relied on a then-binding Ninth Circuit panel decision, which was later vacated and replaced by an en banc decision. The district court did not address whether the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI or whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the CNMI company alleged sufficient facts to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The court found that the distributor purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the CNMI and purposefully directed its actions toward the CNMI. The court also concluded that the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI and that exercising jurisdiction would not be unfair or unjust. View "SUPERTECH, INC. V. MY CHOICE SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted a law making it a state crime for certain noncitizens who had previously been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed from the United States to enter or be found in Iowa. The law also required state judges to order such individuals to return to the country from which they entered and prohibited state courts from pausing prosecutions based on pending or possible federal immigration status determinations. Two noncitizens residing in Iowa, both of whom had previously been subject to federal removal orders but later lawfully reentered the United States, along with a membership-based immigrant advocacy organization, challenged the law, arguing it was preempted by federal immigration law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found that the plaintiffs had standing and granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Iowa law was preempted by federal law under both conflict and field preemption doctrines. The district court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the law went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits because every application of the Iowa law would conflict with federal immigration law by interfering with the discretion Congress grants to federal officials. The court also found that the other factors for a preliminary injunction were met. The Eighth Circuit remanded for the district court to determine the appropriate scope of the injunction in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "IA Migrant Movement for Justice v. Bird" on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a roofing subcontractor was severely injured after falling through an uncovered hole while working on a library roof replacement project. The general contractor had contracted with the property owner to perform the roof work and then subcontracted the roofing portion to the injured worker’s employer. The injured worker received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer and subsequently filed a negligence lawsuit against the general contractor, seeking damages for his injuries.In the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the general contractor asserted statutory employer immunity under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing it was immune from tort liability as a statutory employer. The trial court struck the general contractor’s answer and new matter as untimely and granted the injured worker’s motion to preclude the statutory employer defense at trial. The case proceeded to a jury, which found the general contractor negligent and awarded $5 million to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the general contractor’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the general contractor. The Superior Court held that the general contractor was the injured worker’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort liability, finding all elements of the statutory employer test satisfied and that the defense was not waivable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether to overrule prior precedent (Fonner and LeFlar) regarding statutory employer immunity and waiver, and whether the Superior Court properly applied the statutory employer test. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that a general contractor’s statutory employer immunity does not depend on actual payment of workers’ compensation benefits and that the defense is jurisdictional and not waivable. However, it found the Superior Court erred by exceeding its scope of review and remanded the case to the trial court to determine, after appropriate proceedings, whether the general contractor satisfied the disputed elements of the statutory employer test. View "Yoder v. McCarthy Const." on Justia Law

A homebuyer entered into an agreement to purchase a property in Titusville, Pennsylvania, and, before completing the purchase, orally contracted with a home inspector to perform an inspection. The inspector delivered a report that did not disclose any structural or foundational issues. Relying on this report, the buyer purchased the property. The following winter, a burst pipe led to the discovery of significant defects, including the absence of a proper foundation and improper ductwork, which had not been disclosed in the inspection report. The buyer filed suit against the inspector more than two years after the report was delivered, alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law, breach of contract, and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.The Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County overruled most of the inspector’s preliminary objections and denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding ambiguity in the statute governing the time to bring actions arising from home inspection reports. The trial court reasoned that the statute could be interpreted as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose and declined to grant judgment for the inspector. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the statute in question was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and that all of the buyer’s claims were time-barred because they were filed more than one year after the inspection report was delivered.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the relevant statutory provision, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512, is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations. The Court held that the statute is a statute of repose, barring any action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report if not commenced within one year of the report’s delivery, regardless of when the claim accrues. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Gidor v. Mangus" on Justia Law