Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lidia Gomez-Gabriel, a Guatemalan native and citizen, along with her son, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Gomez-Gabriel testified that Guatemalan gang members harassed her for money on multiple occasions and threatened her with a weapon once. After this incident, she avoided the area and had no further interactions with the gang. Fearing for their safety, she and her son fled to the United States in November 2015. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and after being detained for twelve days, they were informed about the one-year deadline to file an asylum application. They filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in August 2017.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, determining that the asylum application was time-barred and that the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT applications were without merit. The Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government that the Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their asylum and CAT claims, as they did not raise these issues before the BIA. However, the court found that the Petitioners adequately challenged their withholding of removal claim.On the merits, the court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that Gomez-Gabriel's membership in a protected group was not a central reason for her persecution. The court found that the gang's motivation was financial gain rather than animus towards her group membership. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "A. G.-G. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) sued two landowners, the Schoubroek and Sexton families, alleging that their farms were pumping groundwater originating from the Gila River, infringing on GRIC’s water rights. GRIC sought to stop the pumping and have the wells sealed. The San Carlos Apache Tribe intervened in support of GRIC.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and § 1331, rejecting the defendants' argument that the Arizona state court's Gila River Adjudication had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment for GRIC, concluding that the defendants' wells were pumping subflow from the Gila River and ordered the wells to be shut down. The court also denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, despite a 2007 dismissal with prejudice of a similar complaint by GRIC.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction. It held that the Decree did not provide the district court with prior exclusive jurisdiction over non-parties to the Decree. The court also found that the Arizona state court did not have prior exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion, recognizing that the 2007 dismissal did not preclude GRIC’s current claims due to the specific context of the settlement agreement. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for GRIC, finding that GRIC had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the wells were pumping subflow or were within the subflow zone. The court vacated the district court's remedy of shutting down the wells and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gila River Indian Community v. Schoubroek" on Justia Law

Kevin Rowe filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Dione Rowe, alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. Dione, with the help of her daughters, sent a letter to the Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) making disparaging allegations against Kevin, who leased Tribal-owned land from the TLE. The letter requested the TLE to cancel Kevin’s leases and lease the land to her daughters instead. The TLE rescinded Kevin’s leases at their next board meeting, leading Kevin to file the lawsuit.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Tripp County, South Dakota, denied Dione’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that her letter was an absolutely privileged communication under SDCL 20-11-5(2). The court concluded that the TLE meeting was a quasi-judicial proceeding but held that the privilege did not apply because the TLE did not follow its own procedures, including providing notice to Kevin.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(2) applies to claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. The court found that the TLE board meeting was an official proceeding authorized by law and that Dione’s letter had a logical relation to the TLE’s proceedings. The court also determined that the lack of notice to Kevin did not negate the privilege. Additionally, the court concluded that Dione did not waive the privilege by failing to plead it in her answer, as the issue was tried by implied consent during the summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of Dione. View "Rowe v. Rowe" on Justia Law

The Nelson Estate claimed an interest in a coin shop and alleged conversion of its property. Dr. Earl Nelson had provided funds for the business, resulting in a 50% ownership interest, which was confirmed by William Tinkcom. After Dr. Nelson's death in 2013, Tinkcom continued to operate the business and assured Nelson's heirs of their 50% interest. Tinkcom died in 2022, and the business was sold to Eddie Welch without including the Nelson Estate in the final agreement. The Nelson Estate sued the Tinkcom Estate, Welch, and Mere Coin Company, LLC, for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, including conversion of valuable coins and collectibles.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the statute of limitations barred all claims. The Nelson Estate argued that the statute of limitations had not expired and that equitable estoppel or fraudulent concealment should prevent the statute of limitations defense.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's determination that the first six business interest claims accrued upon Dr. Nelson's death in 2013. However, the court reversed the dismissal of these claims because the circuit court did not address the Nelson Estate's defenses of equitable estoppel and fraudulent concealment. The court also reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims, as these claims arose from the 2022 sale of the business. Lastly, the court reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim, noting that the record did not establish when the conversion occurred or when the Nelson Estate became aware of it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Tinkcom" on Justia Law

Golden View Ready-Mix, LLC (Golden View) supplied concrete to Grangaard Construction, Inc. (Grangaard) for a bridge project. Golden View alleged that Grangaard failed to pay for the concrete, breached the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and committed fraud. A jury found in favor of Golden View on the breach of contract and good faith claims, awarding damages and punitive damages, but found no liability for fraud. Grangaard appealed the punitive damages award and the decision to submit the fraud issue to the jury.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, McCook County, South Dakota, presided over the case. Grangaard moved for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim, arguing there was no independent tort duty outside the contract. The court denied this motion, allowing the fraud claim to proceed. During the trial, the court permitted the jury to consider punitive damages based on the breach of the implied obligation of good faith, despite Grangaard's objections.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court determined that punitive damages are only recoverable for breaches of obligations not arising from a contract, as per SDCL 21-3-2. The court found that the implied obligation of good faith arises from the contract itself and does not constitute an independent tort that could support punitive damages. Consequently, the court vacated the punitive damages award. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects, concluding that the error regarding punitive damages did not affect the jury's decision on the breach of contract and good faith claims. View "Goldenview Ready-Mix, LLC v. Grangaard Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Carol Cutting filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A., based on treatment she received in 2013. Cutting alleged that a doctor at Down East treated her shoulder improperly and failed to obtain informed consent, particularly regarding how her Tourette’s syndrome might affect the surgery. She also claimed the doctor falsified her medical records. A prelitigation screening panel found unanimously against Cutting, determining that the doctor’s conduct did not deviate from the standard of care.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) admitted the panel’s finding into evidence at trial. The jury found that Down East was not negligent. Cutting challenged the admission of the panel’s finding, arguing it was biased and violated her due process rights. She also contested the court’s judgment as a matter of law on her claim for punitive damages, arguing that the court erred in its decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the panel’s finding. The court noted that the panel’s offer to decide the case based on written records, if both parties agreed, did not demonstrate bias, especially since the offer was declined and a full hearing was held. The court also found that the trial court provided the jury with the necessary instructions to contextualize the panel’s finding, preserving Cutting’s right to a jury trial.Regarding punitive damages, the court held that any error in granting Down East’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was harmless. Since the jury found no negligence, they could not award any damages, including punitive damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirty survivors of childhood sexual abuse, sought damages for negligence from the Holy See under a vicarious liability theory. They alleged that the Holy See promulgated a mandatory policy of secrecy that governed how its dioceses and bishops handled reports of sexual abuse by clerics. Plaintiffs claimed that bishops in New York failed to warn children and parents of the dangers posed by the accused clerics and failed to report suspected abuse to law enforcement, thus emboldening abusers and exposing children to harm.The District Court granted the Holy See’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court concluded that the discretionary function exclusion from the FSIA’s tortious activity exception barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The court found that the bishops’ conduct was discretionary and susceptible to policy analysis, thus falling within the discretionary function exclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the discretionary function exclusion applied, precluding federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over the claims against the Holy See. The court held that the bishops’ challenged conduct involved discretionary acts and that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the bishops’ conduct violated a mandatory policy. Additionally, the court found that the bishops’ conduct was susceptible to policy analysis, satisfying the second prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test. Therefore, the discretionary function exclusion barred the exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against the Holy See. View "Blecher v. Holy See" on Justia Law

N.G.B., on behalf of her child J.B., filed a due process complaint against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) alleging that DOE failed to provide J.B. with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2019-2020 school year. An impartial hearing officer ruled in favor of N.G.B. Subsequently, N.G.B. sought attorneys' fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The district court found the claimed hourly rates and hours expended by N.G.B.'s counsel to be unreasonable and adjusted them. However, it also found that N.G.B. was substantially justified in rejecting a settlement offer from DOE, allowing her to recover fees and costs incurred post-rejection.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part N.G.B.'s motion for summary judgment. The court reduced the claimed hourly rates and hours but found that DOE's settlement offer did not account for significant work performed by N.G.B.'s counsel. The court concluded that N.G.B. was substantially justified in rejecting the offer, as it was based on outdated billing records and did not reflect the actual work done.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court applied the correct standard in determining substantial justification. The appellate court agreed that a prevailing parent under the IDEA can be substantially justified in rejecting a settlement offer if they have a good-faith, reasonable belief that the offer does not adequately compensate for the work performed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's findings and reasoning, concluding that the rejection of DOE's offer was substantially justified. View "N.G.B. v. New York City Department of Education" on Justia Law

Lezah Roberts entered into a fixed-price contract with Advanced Building Design, a Maryland-based firm, to build a handicap-accessible addition to her home in the District of Columbia. The project, which began in 2017 and was expected to take six months, remained unfinished nearly two years later. The project went over budget due to price increases and change orders, and Advanced sought to recoup these overages from Roberts. After initially agreeing to cover some additional costs, Roberts eventually refused to pay further increases, leading Advanced to cease work on the project. Roberts then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) for unfair trade practices.The Superior Court granted Advanced’s motion to dismiss Roberts’s suit, citing a mandatory forum selection clause in the contract that designated Maryland as the exclusive forum for litigation. Roberts appealed, arguing that the forum selection clause was unenforceable because it conflicted with the CPPA and was unconscionable.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with Roberts on both counts. The court held that the CPPA does not preclude parties from selecting their preferred forum and that the forum selection clause did not contravene public policy or demonstrate procedural or substantive unconscionability. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Roberts’s complaint. View "Roberts v. Advanced Building Design" on Justia Law

The case involves several states and individual plaintiffs challenging an executive order issued by President Trump, which denies citizenship to children born in the United States to parents who are temporarily or unlawfully present. The district court issued a universal preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the executive order. The defendants appealed, arguing that the states lack standing, the preliminary injunction was improperly issued, and its scope was too broad.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction, concluding that the states had standing and that the executive order likely violated both the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the states would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs. The district court issued a universal injunction, determining that a geographically limited injunction would not provide complete relief to the states.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the executive order was unconstitutional as it contradicted the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants citizenship to all persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. The court found that the states had standing due to the economic harm they would suffer from the loss of federal reimbursements and the administrative burden of complying with the executive order. The court also concluded that the universal preliminary injunction was necessary to provide complete relief to the states, as a geographically limited injunction would not address the administrative and financial burdens imposed by the executive order. View "Washington v. Trump" on Justia Law