Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A stockholder of Amazon.com, Inc. sent a letter to the company demanding to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The stockholder aimed to investigate potential wrongdoing and mismanagement by Amazon, believing the company engaged in anticompetitive activities in the U.S. and Europe. When the stockholder and Amazon could not agree on certain conditions for producing the records, the stockholder filed an action in the Court of Chancery.A Magistrate in Chancery conducted a one-day trial and concluded that the stockholder did not meet its burden to prove a "credible basis" for inferring possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The stockholder took exceptions to the final report. A Vice Chancellor adopted the final report's conclusion but did not reach its credible basis analysis, instead finding the scope of the stockholder's stated purpose to be "facially improper" and not "lucid."On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that the Vice Chancellor erred in interpreting the scope of the stockholder's purpose and was required to engage with the evidence presented. The court determined that the evidence, including a complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission against Amazon for alleged antitrust violations that largely survived a motion to dismiss, established a credible basis from which a court could infer possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Chancery and remanded for further proceedings to determine the scope and conditions of production consistent with its decision. View "Roberta Ann K.W. Wong Leung Revocable Trust v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Pable, a software engineer with the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), discovered a cybersecurity vulnerability in the BusTime system, which was developed by Clever Devices, Ltd. Pable reported the vulnerability to his supervisor, Mike Haynes, who tested it on another city's transit system. Clever Devices, which had a significant contract with the CTA, alerted the CTA about the incident, leading to the termination of Pable and Haynes. Pable then sued the CTA and Clever Devices under the National Transit Systems Security Act, alleging retaliation for whistleblowing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Pable's complaint during the discovery phase, citing the deletion of evidence and misconduct by Pable's attorney, Timothy Duffy. The court also imposed monetary sanctions on both Pable and Duffy. The court found that Pable and Duffy had failed to preserve relevant electronically stored information (ESI) and had made misrepresentations during the discovery process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Pable's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) due to the intentional spoliation of evidence. The court also upheld the monetary sanctions imposed under Rule 37(e), Rule 37(a)(5), and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, finding that Duffy's conduct unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. The appellate court declined to impose additional sanctions on appeal, concluding that the appeal was substantially justified. View "Christopher Pable v CTA" on Justia Law

Jefferson County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), including Express Scripts and OptumRX, alleging that their distribution practices facilitated prescription opioid abuse, resulting in numerous deaths and emergency room visits. The County sought relief under Missouri public nuisance law. The case was initially filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri and later amended multiple times. On December 1, 2023, the PBMs filed a notice of removal to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and other federal statutes.The case was previously part of the federal Opioid Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) but was severed and remanded to Missouri state court in July 2019. During discovery, the County provided a "Red Flag Analysis" identifying prescription claims, including federal claims. The PBMs argued that this analysis indicated the case was removable to federal court. However, the County later disclaimed reliance on federal claims in a joint stipulation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the County's motion to remand the case to state court. The district court found that the PBMs' removal was untimely, as they were required to file a notice of removal within 30 days of the February 14, 2022, Red Flag Analysis. The court also determined that removal was not substantively proper under the federal officer removal statute because the County had disclaimed any reliance on federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the PBMs had unambiguously ascertained that the February 14, 2022, Red Flag Analysis allowed for removal but failed to act within the required 30-day period. Consequently, the district court's order to remand the case to state court was upheld. View "Jefferson County v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Arkansas enacted a law limiting the number of voters one person could assist to six, with violations classified as misdemeanors. Arkansas United, a non-profit organization, and its founder, L. Mireya Reith, challenged this law, arguing it conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which allows voters needing assistance to choose anyone to help them, except their employer or union representative.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order but later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining the enforcement of the six-voter limit. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The State sought and obtained a stay of the injunction from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, allowing the six-voter limit to remain in effect for the 2022 General Election.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Section 208 of the VRA does not create a private right of action. The court found that enforcement of Section 208 is intended to be carried out by the Attorney General, not private parties. The court also rejected the argument that the Supremacy Clause provided a basis for a private right of action. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, vacated the permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Arkansas United v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Super Lighting sued CH Lighting for infringing three patents related to LED tube lamps. CH Lighting conceded infringement of two patents before trial. The district court excluded CH Lighting's evidence on the validity of these two patents and granted Super Lighting's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that the patents were not invalid. A jury found the third patent infringed and not invalid, awarding damages for all three patents. CH Lighting appealed.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court excluded evidence from CH Lighting regarding the validity of the two patents and granted JMOL in favor of Super Lighting. The jury found the third patent infringed and awarded damages. CH Lighting's motions for JMOL on invalidity and for a new trial were denied, and the court doubled the damages award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in granting JMOL on the validity of the two patents because it improperly excluded CH Lighting's evidence. The court held that a new trial was required to determine the validity of these patents. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdicts of infringement and no invalidity for the third patent. Additionally, the court instructed the district court to reassess the reliability of Super Lighting's damages expert's testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC APPLIANCE, CO. v. CH LIGHTING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. " on Justia Law

An assistant prosecuting attorney, Jennifer Janetsky, filed a lawsuit against Saginaw County, the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office, John McColgan, and Christopher Boyd. Janetsky alleged violations of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), public policy violations, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. The case stemmed from Janetsky’s handling of a criminal sexual conduct prosecution and subsequent alleged retaliatory actions by her supervisors, McColgan and Boyd, after she reported concerns about a plea agreement.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the Saginaw County Prosecutor’s Office on all claims, to all defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and to McColgan on the intentional-tort claims, but denied the motion for the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment in part, ordering summary disposition in favor of all defendants on the remaining claims. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider unresolved issues. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed in part, ordering summary disposition on the intentional-tort and public-policy claims in favor of all defendants and on the WPA claim in favor of Saginaw County.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of summary disposition. The Supreme Court determined that Saginaw County was an employer under the WPA, allowing Janetsky to sue under the Act. The Court also established a test for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, remanding the case to the trial court to apply this test. Additionally, the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Janetsky’s intentional-tort claims, including false imprisonment and assault and battery, sufficient to defeat summary disposition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Janetsky v. County Of Saginaw" on Justia Law

Davariol Marquavis Taylor, an incarcerated individual, sued several members of the correctional staff at Marquette Branch Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations. Taylor claimed that a nurse administered incorrect medication, resulting in another inmate's overdose and death. He also alleged that a doctor sexually assaulted him and punched him when he resisted. Taylor sought to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows a litigant to avoid paying filing fees upfront due to financial constraints.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Taylor's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) “three-strikes” rule, which prevents incarcerated individuals from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three or more prior cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The district court identified four previous cases as strikes against Taylor and dismissed his suit when he did not pay the filing fee. Taylor appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Taylor had only two valid PLRA strikes, not three. The court determined that the district court's original order incorrectly counted two cases, Adler and Stump, as strikes. The court clarified that dismissals based on Eleventh Amendment immunity or improper filing under § 1983 do not count as strikes unless all claims in the complaint are dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Taylor v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Jeanne Weinstein, a former server at The Ridge Great Steaks & Seafood, filed a collective action complaint alleging that the restaurant and its operator, Stephen Campbell, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not meeting the federal minimum wage requirement. The Ridge paid servers and bartenders $2.15 per hour, supplementing their income with tips to meet the $7.25 minimum wage. The Ridge also required servers and bartenders to contribute 3% of their gross food sales to a tip pool, which was used to pay support staff. Any excess tips were supposed to be distributed to bartenders, but there were inconsistencies in the record-keeping and distribution process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted unopposed motions to voluntarily dismiss five opt-in plaintiffs. The court also ruled partially in favor of the defendants on summary judgment, finding that the tip pool funds were not distributed to non-tipped employees. The remaining issue for trial was whether the defendants retained any portion of the tip pool funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Rule 41(a) permits the dismissal of a single plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff case if all claims brought by that plaintiff are dismissed. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that the defendants did not retain any of the extra tips and operated a lawful tip pool within the parameters of the FLSA. Consequently, the defendants successfully asserted the tip credit defense, and the plaintiffs could not prevail on their minimum wage claim. View "Weinstein v. 440 Corp." on Justia Law

Timothy Upchurch, a Black man, has worked at the Indiana Department of Correction’s Correctional Industrial Facility (CIF) for over thirty years. He filed discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII against the State of Indiana, challenging his demotion from Correctional Lieutenant to Officer, subsequent written reprimands, a suspension, and non-promotions. The district court substituted the Indiana Department of Correction for the State of Indiana as the defendant and granted summary judgment to the Department.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found insufficient evidence of race discrimination or retaliation to support Upchurch's claims. Upchurch appealed, challenging the substitution of the Department for the State as the defendant and the summary judgment decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the Indiana Department of Correction was the proper defendant under Title VII, as it had actual hiring and firing responsibility. The court also reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, finding that the Department provided nondiscriminatory explanations for its actions, and Upchurch failed to show these explanations were pretextual. The court noted that Upchurch did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of race discrimination or retaliation, including failing to show that comparators were similarly situated or that the Department's actions were motivated by his race or complaints about discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that race discrimination or retaliation motivated the adverse employment actions against Upchurch. View "Upchurch v. Indiana" on Justia Law

A mother and father had their parental rights terminated in two consolidated child in need of aid (CINA) cases. They appealed the termination, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for further proceedings. While the appeal was pending, the children's foster parents petitioned to adopt them, and the superior court granted the adoption petitions. On remand, the superior court did not require the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to make further efforts to reunify the family and instead reevaluated the same information, terminating the parental rights again. The parents appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order a second time.The parents then sought to vacate the adoption and reopen the CINA case. The adoptive parents opposed, arguing that the parents' attempt to vacate the adoption was barred by the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree. The superior court agreed with the adoptive parents, concluding that the parents' failure to appeal the adoption decree itself within one year barred their challenge. The court also concluded that the motion to reopen the CINA case was moot because the adoption remained valid, and the children were no longer in need of aid.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree under AS 25.23.140(b) applies strictly to appeals of the adoption decree itself, not to appeals of related termination orders in CINA cases. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality and stability for adopted children, noting that allowing collateral attacks on adoption decrees beyond the one-year period would unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of adopted children. Consequently, the adoption remained valid, and the CINA case was moot. View "In re Adoption of C.R. and E.R. v. State" on Justia Law