Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Roberts County, South Dakota, and several individuals, including County Sheriff Tyler Appel, County Deputies Zachary Angerhofer and Wesley Bowsher, his adopted son Ross Torgerson, and his ex-wife Terri Torgerson. Torgerson alleged violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil conspiracy. He also asserted a Monell claim against the County, a state-law claim for common law battery against Ross, and a state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claim against Deputy Angerhofer, Deputy Bowsher, Ross, and Terri. These claims stemmed from a domestic dispute involving Torgerson, Ross, and Terri.The defendants moved for summary judgment on Torgerson’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The court concluded that Torgerson failed to state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, as he did not plead that he possessed a constitutional interest that had been violated. The court also determined that Torgerson’s civil conspiracy claim failed due to the lack of a stated constitutional interest and insufficient facts showing a conspiracy. Consequently, Torgerson’s Monell claim against the County also failed. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, considering them to be purely state-related issues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Torgerson did not suffer a deprivation of liberty as he was not charged or prosecuted for any crime, thus failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and Monell claims, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "Torgerson v. Roberts County of South Dakota" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a bin full of phosphate rock collapsed at the Lee Creek Mine in Beaufort, North Carolina, injuring three miners. Industrial TurnAround Corporation (ITAC), the independent contractor responsible for checking the structural integrity of the bin's support columns, was cited by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for failing to take defective equipment out of service. MSHA sent a notice of proposed penalty to ITAC's outdated address of record, and ITAC did not contest the penalty, which became final 30 days later. ITAC subsequently filed a motion to reopen the penalty, claiming it had inadvertently failed to update its address of record.The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission granted ITAC's motion to reopen the penalty, citing excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commission noted that ITAC had not occupied the address since 2009 and had only discovered the MSHA notice when an employee checked for missing packages. The Secretary of Labor, representing MSHA, opposed the motion, arguing that ITAC's failure to update its address could not be excused under FRCP 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission’s order to reopen the penalty was not an appealable collateral order and dismissed the Secretary’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the order did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship, and that the interest in immediate review did not meet the high threshold required under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to reopen the penalty did not involve a substantial public interest or a particular value of a high order that justified immediate appeal. View "Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation" on Justia Law

Mary Doe, a social worker proceeding under a pseudonym, challenged New York’s Reproductive Health Act (RHA), arguing it violated constitutional rights. Doe sought to represent a class of viable fetuses, claiming the RHA’s decriminalization of abortion and elimination of fetal homicide laws harmed them. She also sought to amend her complaint post-judgment to include a specific fetus, "Baby Nicholas," alleging he faced harm due to the RHA.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Doe’s claims for lack of standing, denying her motion to be appointed as "next friend" to the fetuses, citing her lack of a significant relationship with them. The court also denied her post-judgment motion to amend the complaint, finding it futile as Baby Nicholas lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the district court erred in requiring a significant relationship for next friend appointments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). However, it affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s claims on the grounds that she failed to identify or describe any specific member of the viable fetus class, thus failing to establish a live case or controversy under Article III.Regarding the post-judgment motion, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial, concluding that Baby Nicholas lacked standing. The court found that the alleged risks to Baby Nicholas were not imminent and traceable to the RHA, as required for standing. The potential harm from a third party was not sufficiently connected to the RHA’s provisions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, maintaining the dismissal of Doe’s claims and denying the motion to amend the complaint. View "Doe v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Karen Orr tripped on a soft drink display at a Dollar General store in Ackerman, Mississippi, and subsequently fell. After Orr's death, Sandie Keister, on behalf of Orr's estate, sued Dolgencorp for premises-liability negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. During discovery, Dolgencorp failed to produce security camera footage, data from the store’s daily planner, and safety-check data. The district court found that Dolgencorp lost or could not access this evidence. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and Keister also filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment for Dolgencorp on all claims and denied Keister’s motions for summary judgment and sanctions. Keister appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Dolgencorp on her premises liability claim and in denying her motion for sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed the decision. The court held that Keister failed to provide evidence that Dolgencorp breached its duty to warn Orr of the dangerous condition. Keister's arguments, including the mode-of-operation theory and the duration of the dangerous condition, were insufficient to establish Dolgencorp's liability. The court also affirmed the denial of Keister’s motion for sanctions, finding no evidence that Dolgencorp intended to deprive her of the missing evidence and noting that the request for a jury instruction became moot after summary judgment was granted.The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Keister v. Dolgencorp" on Justia Law

Union Pacific Railroad Company, as the corporate successor to a dissolved coal mining company, periodically received mine subsidence claims from the Illinois Mine Subsidence Insurance Fund. The Fund, acting as a reinsurer for primary insurers offering mine subsidence coverage, sought to recover its reinsurance payments from Union Pacific. After years of litigation, Union Pacific sued the Fund for declaratory and injunctive relief to preclude future cases. The Fund moved to dismiss, and the district court allowed the complaint seeking injunctive relief to proceed on certain theories but not others. Union Pacific brought an interlocutory appeal.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois had previously ruled that Union Pacific could seek declaratory and injunctive relief for subsidence claims acquired by the Fund before the Gillespie case and the 2019 Opinion but not for future claims. Union Pacific amended its complaint, and the district court reiterated its earlier decision, dismissing the request for future injunctive relief while allowing the case to proceed on the earlier claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court determined that the district court's order was a narrowing of the injunctive relief rather than a definitive refusal. The court also found that the injunctive relief sought on appeal was not substantially different from the relief still pending in the district court. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Illinois Mine Subsidence Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

A high school student, Eszter Pryor, trained and competed with the Ohio State Diving Club at The Ohio State University (OSU). In the summer of 2014, when she was sixteen, her diving coach, William Bohonyi, sexually abused her. Pryor alleged that OSU was aware of the abuse by August 2014, as they fired Bohonyi following an internal investigation. Pryor filed a Title IX lawsuit against OSU in January 2022, claiming the university was deliberately indifferent to a sexually hostile culture and her abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Pryor's claim, ruling it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. OSU had argued that the applicable statute of limitations was two years, as per Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A), and the district court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of OSU based on the expiration of the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the correct statute of limitations for Title IX claims in Ohio is the two-year period for personal injury actions under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10(A). The court rejected Pryor's argument that a twelve-year limitations period for child sex-abuse claims under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.111(C) should apply. The court emphasized the importance of uniformity and predictability in applying the statute of limitations and noted that Pryor's claim accrued when she turned eighteen in July 2015, giving her until July 2017 to file her lawsuit. Since she filed in January 2022, her claim was indeed time-barred. View "Pryor v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law

Fire-Dex, a manufacturer of personal protective equipment for firefighters, faced lawsuits from firefighters and their spouses alleging exposure to carcinogens from Fire-Dex's products. These lawsuits were consolidated in multidistrict litigation in South Carolina. Fire-Dex had general commercial liability insurance policies with Admiral Insurance Company and requested Admiral to defend and indemnify it against the lawsuits. Admiral refused, leading to a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Ohio, where the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially had diversity jurisdiction over Admiral's declaratory judgment action but chose to abstain from exercising it, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Subsequently, Fire-Dex filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court seeking a declaration that Admiral must defend and indemnify it, along with compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract and bad faith. Admiral removed the case to federal court and filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment. Fire-Dex moved to remand the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to remand the declaratory claims and stay the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in abstaining from the declaratory claims under Thibodaux abstention, as the case did not involve unsettled questions of state law intimately involved with state sovereignty. The court also found that abstaining from the declaratory claims was an abuse of discretion because the declaratory and damages claims were closely intertwined, and no traditional abstention doctrine applied to the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fire-Dex, LLC v. Admiral Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law

In this case, Whitney Hodges, representing the estate of her late daughter Honestie Hodges, alleges that on December 6, 2017, Grand Rapids Police Department officers detained Honestie, an eleven-year-old African American girl, at gunpoint, handcuffed her, and placed her in a police car. The officers were searching for a stabbing suspect who did not match Honestie’s description. Honestie was not armed, did not pose a threat, and did not attempt to flee. The complaint asserts that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain Honestie and used excessive force in doing so.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan partially denied the officers' motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds. The district court found that the complaint plausibly alleged violations of Honestie’s Fourth Amendment rights, including unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and excessive force. The court declined to consider video evidence and police reports provided by the officers, determining that these materials did not blatantly contradict the complaint’s allegations and were subject to reasonable dispute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The court affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the complaint plausibly alleged that the officers violated Honestie’s clearly established rights. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers’ actions, as alleged, lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause and involved excessive force. The court dismissed the officers' appeal to the extent it sought to resolve disputed factual issues, emphasizing that such issues should be addressed after discovery. View "Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids, Mich." on Justia Law