Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Indiana enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach within 25 feet of a law enforcement officer who is lawfully engaged in official duties, after being ordered by the officer to stop approaching. Several media organizations and news outlets challenged this law, arguing that it is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment because it allows police officers too much discretion in deciding when to issue a do-not-approach order, potentially leading to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The plaintiffs asserted that the law chills their newsgathering activities, as journalists often need to approach police officers in public spaces to report on events.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the State’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury in fact. The district court then granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claim, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored an injunction. The court did not address the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. The State appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the law was not unconstitutionally vague and that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case was not moot, even though a second, narrower buffer law had been enacted. The court found that the original buffer law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to decide when to issue a do-not-approach order, thus encouraging arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The court remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of the injunction in light of recent Supreme Court precedent limiting universal injunctions. View "Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita" on Justia Law

Monica Richards, a long-time employee in her early fifties, applied for a promotion at Eli Lilly & Company after serving as an interim District Sales Manager. The promotion was instead awarded to a younger, less experienced candidate. Richards filed suit in federal court, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Massachusetts law. She sought to proceed collectively on behalf of all Eli Lilly employees aged 40 or older who were denied promotions since February 2022, claiming a companywide bias favoring “Early Career Professionals” over older employees.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Richards moved for conditional certification of a collective action and requested that notice be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The parties disputed the appropriate standard for issuing such notice. The district court applied the Lusardi “modest factual showing” standard, declined to consider the employer’s opposing evidence, and granted conditional certification, agreeing to send notice. Recognizing uncertainty in the law, the district court certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case to clarify the standard for issuing notice in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and ADEA collective actions. The court held that, before notice may issue, plaintiffs must present evidence raising a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated. Both parties’ evidence must be considered, and the district court retains discretion to manage the process, including authorizing limited discovery or narrowing the scope of notice. The court rejected both the lenient Lusardi standard and heightened standards requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence or a strong likelihood of similarity. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings under the clarified standard. View "Richards v. Eli Lilly & Company" on Justia Law

John Snyder, after working for Guardian Life Insurance Company and obtaining a national customer list (the Guardian Broker List), was employed by Beam Technologies, Inc. Snyder claims that Beam induced him to join and disclose the list, promising compensation. While at Beam, Snyder created state-specific broker lists derived from the Guardian Broker List and inadvertently included the full list in emails to several Beam employees. He did not mark the lists as confidential, restrict access, or inform Beam of their confidential nature. After his employment ended, Snyder did not attempt to recover the list or notify Beam of its confidential status, and he later confirmed to Beam’s CEO that the disclosure was intentional.Snyder sued Beam in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and state law, as well as several state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Beam on the trade secret claims, finding Snyder failed to show he “owned” the Guardian Broker List. The court also granted Beam’s motion to exclude Snyder’s damages expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and, in doing so, barred Snyder from presenting any evidence or witnesses on lost wages for his remaining claims. Snyder’s motion to reconsider this order was denied, and the parties settled or dismissed the remaining claims, leading to a final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the trade secret claims, holding that Snyder failed to take reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the Guardian Broker List, a requirement under both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 702 order to the extent it excluded all evidence and witnesses on lost wages, finding that such a dispositive ruling required notice and the procedural protections of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Snyder v. Beam Technologies" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Slovenian-born U.S. permanent resident, claimed to have discovered billions of dollars dispersed across Africa after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He sought to repatriate these funds to the United States and enlisted the help of a Washington, D.C. lawyer. The appellant alleged that, during his efforts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, he was unable to complete the repatriation due to issues with verifying the legitimacy of Treasury Department letters. He further claimed that, while detained in Côte d'Ivoire, the funds were stolen and replaced with counterfeit cash, and that he was later arrested for alleged money laundering and misrepresentation of U.S. documents. Upon returning to the United States, the lawyer withdrew representation due to the criminal allegations against the appellant.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the appellant’s fraud claims in two parts. First, it found that the complaint failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation by the lawyer, noting that the lawyer had provided legal services as agreed. Second, for the claims against three federal employees, the court allowed the United States to substitute itself as defendant under the Westfall Act, as the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. The court then dismissed the claim against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the appellant’s complaint did not allege with particularity any fraudulent misrepresentation by the lawyer at the time of contract formation. Regarding the federal employees, the court found that the appellant failed to rebut the government’s certification that the employees acted within the scope of their employment, and thus sovereign immunity barred the claim. The court also denied the appellant’s request for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery. View "Plevnik v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Burke McCarthy died in October 2018 after receiving medical treatment from Dr. Wesley Hiser at Wyoming Medical Center. Dianna Ellis, McCarthy’s daughter and wrongful death representative, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Hiser and the hospital in February 2021, within the two-year statute of limitations. However, Dr. Hiser was never served with the original complaint. Nearly two years later, Ellis voluntarily dismissed her suit against Dr. Hiser. In December 2023, she refiled her complaint, relying on Wyoming’s savings statute to argue she had an additional year to commence a new action. Dr. Hiser was served for the first time in February 2024, more than five years after McCarthy’s death.The District Court of Natrona County granted Dr. Hiser’s motion to dismiss the refiled complaint. The court found that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Dr. Hiser in the original action because he was not served, and therefore the savings statute could not apply to extend the time for refiling. Ellis appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Wyoming’s savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. The court overruled its prior decision in Hugus v. Reeder, 2022 WY 13, which had held that a voluntary dismissal qualified as a “failure otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute. The court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is not a “failure” within the meaning of the statute, as it is a matter of choice rather than an unsuccessful attempt to proceed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ellis’s refiled complaint. View "Ellis v. Hiser" on Justia Law

Dorothy Seabrook, a black woman, was the Family Programs Manager for the U.S. Army Reserve Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2013, she was involved in disciplinary actions against an employee, Scott Hamilton. Subsequently, the Army investigated Seabrook for creating a toxic work environment and making inappropriate comments and physical contact. In 2014, she was suspended for two weeks and reassigned to another division. Seabrook filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in January 2015, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and sex. She received a poor performance evaluation in February 2015, which she believed was retaliatory, leading her to file a second EEO complaint.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated and found no discrimination. Seabrook then filed a pro se complaint in federal court, which was construed as alleging disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Seabrook failed to plausibly allege that the Army's actions were motivated by discriminatory bias. The court found that Seabrook's allegations did not support claims of disparate treatment, as her comparators were not similarly situated. Her hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged actions were not objectively abusive or severe. Lastly, her retaliation claim was dismissed due to a lack of causal connection between her EEO activity and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that Seabrook's complaint did not meet the pleading standards required to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Seabrook v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Latonia Lister, the first African-American female firefighter in Las Vegas, sued the City of Las Vegas for employment discrimination under Title VII, alleging sex- and race-based discrimination and retaliation. The case stemmed from an incident on April 7, 2019, where her supervisor, Captain Michael Benneman, made offensive comments while feeding a dog. Lister reported the incident and later experienced additional incidents she considered discriminatory and retaliatory. She eventually requested a transfer out of her station.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada presided over the case. At trial, the jury found that the April 7 incident was severe or pervasive and objectively and subjectively offensive but was not motivated by race or gender. The jury concluded that the City did not discriminate against Lister or retaliate against her in violation of Title VII. Despite finding no liability, the jury awarded Lister $150,000 in damages. The district court reconciled the verdict by setting aside the damages award and entered judgment for the City. Lister's motion for a new trial was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the jury instructions were not erroneous and did not contain prejudicial errors. The court found no conflict between the instructions and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not resubmitting the verdict to the jury. The court determined that the district court acted within its discretion by polling the jury to clarify the verdict and reconciling the verdict on its own. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the City and the denial of Lister's motion for a new trial. View "LISTER V. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

Three registered Texas voters alleged that three local officials—a justice of the peace, a sheriff, and a constable—conspired to punish them for political reasons. The plaintiffs were arrested after reporting for jury duty, accused of falsely claiming residency in Loving County. The officials argued they were enforcing voter-eligibility rules, while the plaintiffs claimed it was retaliation to silence dissent. The plaintiffs sued under § 1983, alleging constitutional violations.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to the officials for some claims but denied judicial immunity for actions related to the jury proceeding. The officials appealed the denial of judicial immunity, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the grant of immunity on other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that presiding over the jury proceeding was a judicial act protected by absolute judicial immunity. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of judicial immunity for the jury proceeding. Regarding the plaintiffs' cross-appeal, the court found it lacked jurisdiction to review those claims at this interlocutory stage and dismissed the cross-appeal.The court's main holding was that the actions of the justice of the peace in presiding over the jury proceeding were judicial in nature and thus protected by absolute judicial immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision in part and dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jones v. King" on Justia Law

In a suburban shopping center parking lot on July 1, 2016, Michael Cokes, Isaiah Stevenson, and Ronald Arrington waited in a car while Jimmie Malone robbed a restaurant manager. After the robbery, the men drove away with Malone, who later took over as the driver. When Illinois state troopers stopped the car, the men refused to exit, and Malone sped off, leading to a high-speed chase. During the chase, Chicago Police Officer Dean Ewing, driving an unmarked car, collided with the Pontiac, resulting in serious injuries to Cokes, Stevenson, and the officers in Ewing’s car, and the deaths of Malone and Arrington.The plaintiffs, including Arrington’s estate, sued the City of Chicago and Officer Ewing, alleging various torts related to the collision. After a nine-day trial, a jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, challenging the district court’s decisions on affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and the admissibility of evidence. The district court denied these motions, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no legal error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the affirmative defenses, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings. Specifically, the court upheld the district court’s decisions to allow the defendants to plead a joint enterprise theory of contributory negligence, to admit testimony about Arrington’s conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 601 rather than the Illinois Dead Man’s Act, and to exclude the COPA report under Rule 403. The appellate court concluded that any potential errors did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. View "Arrington v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River), LLC ("ADA") filed a lawsuit against Atlas Carbon, LLC ("Atlas") in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Wyoming law. ADA claimed that Atlas breached their contract for the sale of activated carbon by improperly invoking the "Force Majeure" clause and failing to supply the agreed-upon quantity of carbon. ADA filed an amended complaint asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).The district court accepted jurisdiction and, after a bench trial, awarded ADA $76,000 in damages. ADA appealed the district court's judgment, dissatisfied with the method for calculating damages. During the appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified potential jurisdictional defects, specifically regarding the complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. The court ordered supplemental briefing to clarify the citizenship of Atlas's members, including trusts and limited partnerships involved.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that it lacked sufficient information to determine whether complete diversity of citizenship existed at the time of filing. The court noted that Atlas's identification of its members, including trusts and limited partnerships, was incomplete and did not provide adequate information about their citizenship. Consequently, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to make the necessary factual findings to determine whether it had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court was instructed to analyze the citizenship of all members of ADA and Atlas, tracing through all layers of ownership to ensure complete diversity. View "ADA Carbon Solutions (Red River) v. Atlas Carbon" on Justia Law