Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Yu filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order against Lorain Pozniak-Rice on October 27, 2023, alleging harassment by Pozniak-Rice and her daughter following the end of his relationship with the daughter. Yu claimed that the harassment included phone calls, trespassing, threats, and false statements to authorities. The court issued a temporary restraining order and set a hearing date, requiring Yu to personally serve Pozniak-Rice with the petition and other documents.At the initial hearing on November 21, 2023, Yu reported unsuccessful attempts to serve Pozniak-Rice, leading the court to continue the hearing to December 19, 2023, and extend the temporary restraining order. Yu again failed to serve Pozniak-Rice personally and requested authorization for alternative service methods. The court granted this request based on a declaration from a service provider, allowing service by email and mail. Yu filed proofs of service indicating partial compliance with the court's order.Pozniak-Rice did not appear at the January 8, 2024, hearing, and the court granted Yu a five-year restraining order, finding clear and convincing evidence of harassment. Pozniak-Rice later filed a motion to set aside the restraining order, claiming she was never served, but the court denied the motion as procedurally defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and found that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that Yu made a diligent effort to personally serve Pozniak-Rice. The appellate court reversed the restraining order, reinstated the temporary restraining order, and directed the trial court to give Yu another opportunity to serve Pozniak-Rice and conduct further proceedings on the petition. The appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside the restraining order was dismissed as moot. View "Yu v. Pozniak-Rice" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, David Boniface, Nissandère Martyr, and Juders Ysemé, brought claims against Jean Morose Viliena under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) for events that occurred in Haiti in 2007-08. The claims included the extrajudicial killing of Boniface's brother, Eclesiaste Boniface, the attempted extrajudicial killings of Martyr and Ysemé, and the torture of Martyr and Ysemé. The jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Viliena liable and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.Viliena appealed, challenging the findings of liability and the damages awards. He argued that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that Congress did not have the power to authorize causes of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring abroad between foreign nationals. He also contended that the TVPA does not provide for attempted extrajudicial killing and raised various specific challenges to the trial and damages awards.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the TVPA claims. However, it vacated the denial of the motion for reconsideration and remanded for the district court to address whether Congress had the power to provide any cause of action under the TVPA for conduct occurring outside the United States between foreign citizens. The court also agreed with Viliena that the TVPA does not provide a cause of action for attempted extrajudicial killing.The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of liability for the extrajudicial killing and torture claims. However, it determined that a new trial on damages was necessary due to the erroneous inclusion of the attempted extrajudicial killing claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Boniface v. Viliena" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the former owner-operator of a professional baseball franchise in Puerto Rico and the league, its president, and other franchise owners. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to force the former owner to relinquish control of the franchise, violating the Sherman Act, a federal civil rights statute, and various Puerto Rico laws. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants' actions were in retaliation for the former owner's public criticism of the conditions at the team's stadium and his proposal to move the team to another municipality.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims, citing the "business of baseball" exemption. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs' claims under Puerto Rico's antitrust and fair competition laws were preempted by federal law. Additionally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal civil rights claim on res judicata grounds, based on a prior judgment from the Superior Court of San Juan. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Puerto Rico law claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sherman Act claims, agreeing that the "business of baseball" exemption applied to the Puerto Rico professional baseball league. However, the court vacated the District Court's dismissal of the Puerto Rico antitrust and fair competition claims, finding that the District Court had incorrectly applied the Supremacy Clause. The court also reversed the dismissal of the federal civil rights claim, concluding that the District Court had misapplied the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, the court reversed the dismissal of the remaining Puerto Rico law claim, as a federal claim remained in the case. View "Cangrejeros de Santurce Baseball Club, LLC v. Liga de Beisbol Profesional de Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC and NorthPoint Development, LLC (the East Gate parties) are involved in a dispute with CenterPoint Properties Trust and its affiliates (the CenterPoint parties) over development projects in the Joliet Intermodal Zone in Illinois. CenterPoint entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with local authorities to build a toll bridge, while East Gate later secured an agreement allowing heavy trucks to bypass this toll bridge, which CenterPoint claims violates the MOU.The CenterPoint parties sued in Will County Court to enjoin the East Gate agreement, initially losing but later securing a preliminary injunction on remand from the Illinois Appellate Court. The state court has yet to rule on the merits. Subsequently, the East Gate parties filed a federal antitrust lawsuit, claiming the MOU unlawfully restricted competition. The CenterPoint parties argued the federal court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, should abstain under the Colorado River doctrine, and that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shielded them from antitrust liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, dismissed the Noerr-Pennington motion without addressing the merits, but stayed the federal proceedings under Colorado River. The East Gate parties appealed the stay, while the CenterPoint parties cross-appealed the rejection of their motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that the stay did not effectively end the federal case and was merely a case management decision. The court also found no basis for immediate appeal of the interlocutory orders denying the motions to dismiss, as these could be reviewed after a final decision. View "East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC v. CenterPoint Properties Trust" on Justia Law

A property insurance dispute arose between a church in Albany, Georgia, and its insurer following storm damage in 2014. The church's property, which included asbestos tile roofs, was insured under an all-risks policy. After the storm, the insurer's adjuster estimated repair costs at $2,300, but the church's contractor estimated over $1.3 million for full roof replacement. The church sued for breach of contract and bad faith. In 2018, Hurricane Michael caused further damage, and the church filed a claim with a different insurer, obtaining a lower repair estimate. The original insurer argued that the church's failure to disclose this second claim constituted a material misrepresentation.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia excluded evidence of the alleged misrepresentation, finding it irrelevant. The jury awarded the church $1.75 million in damages, and the insurer's motion for a new trial was denied. The insurer appealed, arguing that the exclusion of misrepresentation evidence was erroneous and that the damages award was speculative and contrary to the policy terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It found that the insurer had waived its misrepresentation defense by not objecting during trial and by explicitly withdrawing the defense. The court also held that the jury's award, which included increased construction costs due to delays, was supported by sufficient evidence and did not constitute double recovery when combined with prejudgment interest. The court affirmed the district court's rulings and the jury's verdict. View "Central Baptist Church of Albany Georgia Inc v. Church Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Bethany Scheer was employed by Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Inc. (SCL) from 2014 to 2019. During her employment, Scheer faced performance issues and was placed on a performance improvement plan (PIP) that included mandatory counseling through SCL’s employee assistance program (EAP). Scheer initially agreed to the PIP but later refused to sign a form authorizing the disclosure of her counseling attendance and compliance, leading to her termination. Scheer sued SCL under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination based on a perceived disability.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of SCL. The court concluded that the mandatory referral to counseling did not constitute an adverse employment action because it did not cause a significant change in Scheer’s employment status, as required by precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis rejected the significance test previously used and established a new standard requiring plaintiffs to show they suffered "some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the new standard set forth in Muldrow. The district court must now determine if Scheer suffered "some harm" as a result of SCL’s actions. View "Scheer v. Sisters of Charity" on Justia Law

In June 2021, a deputy of the Maricopa County Sheriff rear-ended the plaintiffs while driving a vehicle owned by Maricopa County. The plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the clerk of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and subsequently sued the County, arguing it was vicariously liable for the deputy’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The County moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it lacked the requisite control over the deputy to be held vicariously liable. The Superior Court in Maricopa County agreed and granted the County’s motion to dismiss.The plaintiffs appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, arguing that the deputy is an employee of the County and thus the County should be liable for his negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the County was not vicariously liable because it lacked the necessary control over deputy county sheriffs. The court also noted that county sheriffs qualify as public entities for notice of claim purposes under Arizona law.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether a county can be held vicariously liable for a deputy county sheriff’s negligence and whether the county is the proper public entity for notice of claim purposes. The Court held that a county does not control a deputy county sheriff when carrying out law enforcement duties and therefore cannot be vicariously liable for a deputy’s negligence. The Court further held that a sheriff in his official capacity is vicariously liable for any negligence or misconduct committed by a deputy engaged in law enforcement duties. Additionally, the Court clarified that a claimant may satisfy the notice of claim requirements by filing with the county sheriff’s office, which is responsible for the sheriff’s administrative functions. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the case and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanchez v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

Dr. Joseph Jimenez, a former medical officer for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleged race and national origin discrimination, retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Dr. Jimenez, who identifies as Hispanic, claimed that his employer required him to work as a correctional officer while non-Hispanic doctors were exempt. He also alleged that the BOP denied him a reasonable accommodation for his mental health conditions.The district court dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Title VII claims related to certain adverse employment actions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted summary judgment to the BOP on the remaining Title VII claims, finding no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motives. The court later dismissed Dr. Jimenez’s Rehabilitation Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rejecting his attempt to correct a citation error in his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Dr. Jimenez failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his claims related to the denial of bonuses and failure to promote. The court also found that Dr. Jimenez did not present sufficient evidence to show that his race, national origin, or protected activity influenced the BOP’s actions. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim, agreeing that the citation error was not a mere scrivener’s error and that Dr. Jimenez did not demonstrate good cause to amend his complaint after the scheduling order deadline. View "Jimenez v. Acting United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

David Jenny, an employee of L3Harris Technologies, Inc., suffered from recurring cellulitis, which was aggravated by frequent international travel required by his job. He requested and was granted an accommodation to book seats with extra legroom on long flights. However, within three months of this accommodation, Jenny was denied permission to travel for routine business, removed from his leadership role, and ultimately discharged. Jenny sued L3Harris for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that Jenny established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation and produced sufficient evidence that L3Harris’s explanation for his discharge was pretextual. Despite this, the district court granted summary judgment to L3Harris, citing the exception set out in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., concluding that Jenny’s evidence did not sufficiently link his discharge to any discriminatory or retaliatory motive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court improperly applied the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit held that Jenny had indeed met the requirements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Jenny, did not meet the requirements for invoking the Reeves exception. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to L3Harris and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jenny v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consisting of several Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Funds and their fiduciary, sued Defendants Manny P. Concrete Co., Inc. and Manny P. Con Industries, Inc. for failing to make fringe benefit contributions as required by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA mandated contributions to the Funds for work performed by employees within its jurisdiction. An audit revealed that Defendants owed significant amounts in unpaid contributions and dues checkoffs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. The court deemed the matters within Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions admitted due to Defendants' failure to respond timely. Consequently, the court found no genuine disputes of material fact and ruled that Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming the matters admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. The court found that the requests sought admissions of fact or the application of law to fact, which are permissible under Rule 36. The appellate court also agreed that Defendants' failure to respond timely constituted implied admissions, and the district court was correct in not allowing Defendants to withdraw or amend these admissions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that there were no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the contributions owed by Defendants. The court noted that Defendants' arguments and evidence did not sufficiently counter the admissions and findings from the audit. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Cement and Concrete Workers District Council Welfare Fund v. Manny" on Justia Law