Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC, filed a claim under a homeowners’ insurance policy for wind damage to a property in Greenville, Rhode Island. The insurance company, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, provided an estimate for the loss, which the plaintiff disputed. The plaintiff invoked the appraisal process outlined in the insurance agreement. Each party appointed an appraiser, but they could not agree on an umpire, so the Superior Court appointed one. The appraisal concluded with an award signed by the plaintiff’s appraiser and the umpire, but not the defendant’s appraiser.The plaintiff filed a petition in the Superior Court to confirm the appraisal award under Rhode Island’s Arbitration Act. The defendant filed a cross-petition to vacate the award, arguing that the plaintiff’s appraiser was ineligible due to a financial interest in the award. The Superior Court granted the defendant’s cross-petition to vacate the award and denied the plaintiff’s petition to confirm it. The plaintiff did not appeal this order but instead filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the appraisal process was not arbitration because the insurance contract did not require appraisers to be disinterested. The Superior Court denied this motion.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the appraisal process was akin to arbitration, despite the absence of the word “disinterested” in the insurance contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff had initially sought to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act and only challenged the nature of the proceedings after the award was vacated. The Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that the appraisal clause in the insurance policy constituted arbitration under the Arbitration Act. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Thomas Ghelf, Tricia Hansen, Constance and Thomas Klein, Maureen Sommerfeld, and Mississippi Sports and Recreation, Inc. (MSR), own abutting properties in the Town of Wheatland, Vernon County, Wisconsin. They alleged that the Town, its officials, Vernon County, the County Treasurer, and unknown agents and employees engaged in a harassment campaign against them. This included coordinated complaints about their businesses, unlawful arrests, failures to respond to emergency services, excessive property tax assessments, a foreclosure action, and the designation of a private driveway as a public road.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the plaintiffs' tax assessment and road claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the foreclosure claims, and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity barred the tax assessment and foreclosure claims. It also found that the plaintiffs' claims related to events before September 15, 2016, were time-barred by the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tax assessment and foreclosure claims, agreeing that the Tax Injunction Act and comity principles deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The appellate court also upheld the dismissal of claims related to events before September 15, 2016, as time-barred. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' road claims, finding that these claims were not barred by claim or issue preclusion. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the road claims, and the court held that Town Chairman Jayne Ballwahn should not be dismissed from the suit at this stage. View "Ghelf v Town of Wheatland" on Justia Law

Sisvel S.p.A. owns U.S. Patent No. 7,869,396, which relates to a data transmission and retransmission method in a wireless communication system. The patent describes a method where data is packaged into protocol data units (PDUs) and assigned sequence numbers. The method includes a variation of the automatic repeat request (ARQ) method, where a receiver activates a timer when a PDU is detected as missing. If the missing PDU is not received before the timer expires, a reception failure is reported to the transmitter. If the missing PDU is received before the timer expires, the timer is stopped.The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) held claims 1, 2, and 6–8 of the '396 patent to be unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious in view of International Patent Application Publication No. WO 02/091659 (Sachs). However, the Board held that claims 3–5, 9, and 10 were not shown to be unpatentable. Appellants Sierra Wireless, ULC; Honeywell International Inc.; and Telit Cinterion Deutschland GmbH appealed the Board’s decision regarding claims 3–5, 9, and 10. Sisvel cross-appealed the Board’s decision regarding claims 1, 2, and 6–8.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Board erred in its construction of the claim limitations and that its finding that Sachs disclosed certain limitations was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also determined that the Board abused its discretion by relying on testimony from Sisvel’s expert, Mr. Bates, without finding that he was qualified as an ordinarily skilled artisan.The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s holdings that claims 1, 2, and 6–8 were unpatentable and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not reach the arguments regarding the patentability of claims 3–5, 9, and 10 due to the vacatur of the independent claims. View "SIERRA WIRELESS, ULC v. SISVEL S.P.A. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Glickman filed a motion to apportion discovery referee fees to the defendants, Charles S. Krolikowski and Newmeyer & Dillion LLP, due to their incomplete and insufficient discovery responses. The discovery referee recommended that the defendants pay all of the $22,750 in referee fees incurred on recent discovery motions, plus $1,750 for the apportionment motion itself. The trial court overruled the defendants' objections to this recommendation.The defendants appealed the trial court's order, arguing that the unequal allocation of fees was tantamount to monetary sanctions and should be appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12). They contended that the referee's allocation of fees based on their conduct in causing the fees to be incurred should be treated as a monetary sanction.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the appeal. The court held that an order allocating discovery referee fees is not a sanctions order, even if the fees are allocated based on the referee's perception of the parties' conduct. The court noted that the referee's recommendation did not use the word "sanctions" or cite any legal authority for imposing sanctions. Instead, the recommendation relied on the discretion provided in the court's reference order, which was stipulated to by the parties.The court concluded that the order could not be classified as a "monetary sanction" for purposes of establishing appealability. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that parties must either wait for entry of judgment to appeal this kind of order or file a timely writ petition. The court also rejected the notion that the order could be appealed under the collateral order doctrine, as the payment of discovery referee costs may be reallocated at the end of the lawsuit. View "Glickman v. Krolikowski" on Justia Law

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tiffaney Whitt, on behalf of her minor children, and Jeremiah Parker, Whitt’s adult son, filed a lawsuit against Kearney School District and Durham School Services, L.P., due to racial harassment experienced by Parker and his siblings on a school bus operated by Durham. Plaintiffs alleged a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim against Durham, asserting they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Kearney and Durham, which required safe, harassment-free transportation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Durham’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, which challenged the validity of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim. Durham then filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in its contract with Kearney. The district court denied this motion, concluding that Durham waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause by not raising it earlier in the litigation. Durham appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Durham knew of its right to arbitrate, as it possessed the contract containing the arbitration clause, and acted inconsistently with that right by engaging in extensive litigation and discovery before filing the motion to compel arbitration. The court also noted that the district court’s consideration of prejudice to Plaintiffs, although erroneous, did not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The appellate court rejected Durham’s argument that it could not have known to seek arbitration until the district court’s summary judgment ruling and found that Durham’s actions were inconsistent with preserving its right to arbitrate. The court also denied Plaintiffs’ request to adopt a process for certifying interlocutory appeals as frivolous and their request for costs under Fed. R. App. P. 38. View "Parker v. Durham School Services, L.P." on Justia Law

Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A law firm, Sherrets Bruno & Vogt LLC (SBV), sued Timothy E. Montoya, an Arizona resident, in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, to collect unpaid attorney fees. These fees were part of a divorce settlement agreement from an Arizona court, where Montoya agreed to pay his ex-wife's attorney fees to SBV. Montoya failed to make the payments and did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court.The District Court for Douglas County overruled SBV's motion for default judgment and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Montoya's only contact with Nebraska was through phone calls to SBV's Nebraska office, which did not establish sufficient minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. The court gave SBV an opportunity to present facts establishing jurisdiction but found the evidence insufficient.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that an objection to personal jurisdiction is not waived by default when a nonresident fails to respond to process served out of state and does not appear. It also held that a trial court may raise personal jurisdiction on its own motion when deciding whether to enter a default judgment because the defendant has failed to appear. The court concluded that SBV failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Montoya, as the limited communications and agreement to pay fees to a Nebraska office did not establish the necessary minimum contacts. Therefore, the dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Sherrets Bruno & Vogt v. Montoya" on Justia Law

Marlene Banwart and her husband Richard filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in 2020 against Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., Dr. David Beck, and Dr. Thomas Getta. Marlene had undergone a lumbar laminectomy performed by Dr. Beck in July 2018, followed by severe postoperative pain and complications, including an epidural hematoma that required emergency surgery. The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the surgery and postoperative care by Dr. Beck and Dr. Getta.The Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action as time-barred, concluding that the Iowa Supreme Court's emergency supervisory orders tolling the statute of limitations during the COVID-19 pandemic were invalid. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had substantially complied with Iowa's certificate of merit affidavit statute, despite the certificates not being signed under oath or penalty of perjury. Both parties appealed these rulings.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and bypassed the statute of limitations issue, focusing on the cross-appeal regarding the certificate of merit. The court held that the plaintiffs' certificates did not substantially comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because they were not signed under oath or penalty of perjury. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the statute was void for vagueness and that the defendants had waived their rights by delaying their challenge. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's ruling on the certificates of merit and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C." on Justia Law

Joyce Pates filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI), Affinity Hospital, LLC, d/b/a Grandview Medical Center, Dr. John Kirchner, and Southlake Orthopaedics Sports Medicine and Spine Center, P.C. Pates alleged that after injuring her ankle and undergoing surgery performed by Dr. Kirchner at Grandview Medical Center, she experienced complications leading to an infection and ultimately the amputation of her right leg.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which argued that Pates's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The court reasoned that Pates's injury began when she was informed of the need for amputation, thus starting the statute of limitations from that point.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that Pates's claims were indeed barred by the AMLA's statute of limitations. The court found that Pates's injuries, including signs of infection and the need for hardware removal, were evident by November 2020. Therefore, the statute of limitations began at that time, and Pates's complaint filed in February 2023 was outside the two-year limit. The court granted the petitions for writs of mandamus, directing the trial court to dismiss Pates's claims against the defendants. View "Ex parte Affinity Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law