Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property, which they had borrowed to develop parcels in Utah. After several loan modifications and assignments, the lenders—Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P.—foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, where they were the only bidders. The sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt, and the lenders continued to pursue the deficiency. Later, Talisker discovered information suggesting that the lenders, in coordination with a court-appointed receiver, may have taken actions to depress the sale price, including deterring potential bidders and bundling properties in a way that made them less attractive.Talisker filed suit in the Third District Court, Summit County, seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, alleging that the lenders’ conduct during the foreclosure process violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and constituted fraud or grossly inequitable conduct. The lenders moved to dismiss, arguing that Talisker had broadly waived any rights or defenses related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but concluded that the waivers were enforceable and covered the rights Talisker sought to assert, including those under Rule 69B(d). The court found no unlawful irregularity in the sales and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s broad and explicit waivers in the loan documents encompassed all rights and defenses related to the foreclosure sales, including the right to challenge the method of sale or seek equitable relief based on alleged unfairness or irregularities. The court concluded that, regardless of the alleged conduct, Talisker had contractually relinquished any basis for relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner diagnosed with a painful uterine fibroid sought medical treatment, including surgery, while incarcerated. Despite recommendations from two outside physicians for surgical intervention, prison medical staff repeatedly denied her requests for surgery. The prisoner followed the Bureau of Prisons’ four-step administrative grievance process: she attempted informal resolution, filed a formal written request, appealed to the regional director, and then submitted a final appeal (BP-11 form) to the Bureau’s General Counsel. Although she properly completed and mailed the BP-11 form, prison officials claimed they never received or logged it, and the tracking system showed no record of its receipt.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama initially dismissed her Federal Tort Claims Act claims but allowed her to amend her complaint to pursue Eighth Amendment claims against individual medical staff. After further proceedings, the district court dismissed her amended complaint, concluding that she failed to exhaust administrative remedies because her BP-11 form was never logged as received and because she filed her lawsuit before the General Counsel’s response period had expired.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the prisoner satisfied her obligation to exhaust administrative remedies by properly completing and mailing the BP-11 form, even though prison officials failed to log or process it. The court further held that the administrative remedy process was unavailable to her due to the lack of guidance on how to proceed when officials fail to file a properly submitted grievance, making the process “prohibitively opaque.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McGuire-Mollica v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Several chambers of commerce, including regional and national organizations, brought a lawsuit on behalf of their pharmaceutical-manufacturer members challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program established by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. This federal program authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure drugs sold to Medicare and Medicaid. Among the plaintiffs’ members were AbbVie Inc. and its subsidiary Pharmacyclics LLC, manufacturers of a drug selected for the first round of negotiations. Notably, Pharmacyclics joined the Dayton and Ohio Chambers only after the litigation began, while AbbVie had longstanding membership in several chambers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the case after the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the Dayton Chamber lacked associational standing and that venue was therefore improper. The district court allowed limited discovery and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case, holding that the regional chambers’ purposes were not sufficiently related to the interests at stake in the lawsuit, and thus they lacked associational standing. The court also found that, without standing for the Dayton and Ohio Chambers, venue in the Southern District of Ohio was improper and declined to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the interests asserted in the lawsuit were not germane to the purposes of the Dayton, Ohio, or Michigan Chambers, as their regional missions were too remote from the national pharmaceutical issues at stake. The court further concluded that, with no plaintiff residing in the district, venue was improper. The judgment of dismissal for improper venue was therefore affirmed. View "Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child drowned after wandering unattended from the home where she had been placed under temporary custody by order of the Probate Court. The child’s parents had previously lost guardianship, and the court had vested temporary custody in maternal relatives. To determine whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship, the Probate Court ordered the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to investigate the home and report its findings. DCF submitted its report, recommending the placement, but before the court could hold a hearing on permanent guardianship, the child died. The child’s estate, through her father as administrator, alleged that DCF’s negligence in investigating the placement and in making recommendations to the Probate Court was a proximate cause of the child’s death, and also claimed DCF failed to fulfill independent duties to protect the child from abuse and neglect.After the estate received permission from the Claims Commissioner to sue the state, DCF moved to dismiss the action in the Superior Court, arguing that it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions integral to the judicial process, such as conducting court-ordered investigations and making recommendations. The Superior Court agreed, holding that DCF was protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when acting as an arm of the Probate Court, and that the Claims Commissioner could not waive this immunity. The court dismissed the action, finding the complaint’s allegations insufficient to overcome DCF’s immunity.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Claims Commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the relevant statute does not preclude the state from asserting absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However, the Court reversed in part, concluding that some of the estate’s allegations may fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial immunity, particularly those involving DCF’s independent statutory duties. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, are not barred by quasi-judicial immunity. View "Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Indiana enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor for a person to knowingly or intentionally approach within 25 feet of a law enforcement officer who is lawfully engaged in official duties, after being ordered by the officer to stop approaching. Several media organizations and news outlets challenged this law, arguing that it is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment because it allows police officers too much discretion in deciding when to issue a do-not-approach order, potentially leading to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The plaintiffs asserted that the law chills their newsgathering activities, as journalists often need to approach police officers in public spaces to report on events.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the State’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury in fact. The district court then granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claim, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of harms and public interest favored an injunction. The court did not address the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. The State appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the law was not unconstitutionally vague and that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case was not moot, even though a second, narrower buffer law had been enacted. The court found that the original buffer law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to decide when to issue a do-not-approach order, thus encouraging arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The court remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the appropriate scope of the injunction in light of recent Supreme Court precedent limiting universal injunctions. View "Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita" on Justia Law

Monica Richards, a long-time employee in her early fifties, applied for a promotion at Eli Lilly & Company after serving as an interim District Sales Manager. The promotion was instead awarded to a younger, less experienced candidate. Richards filed suit in federal court, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Massachusetts law. She sought to proceed collectively on behalf of all Eli Lilly employees aged 40 or older who were denied promotions since February 2022, claiming a companywide bias favoring “Early Career Professionals” over older employees.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Richards moved for conditional certification of a collective action and requested that notice be sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs. The parties disputed the appropriate standard for issuing such notice. The district court applied the Lusardi “modest factual showing” standard, declined to consider the employer’s opposing evidence, and granted conditional certification, agreeing to send notice. Recognizing uncertainty in the law, the district court certified the question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case to clarify the standard for issuing notice in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and ADEA collective actions. The court held that, before notice may issue, plaintiffs must present evidence raising a material factual dispute as to whether the proposed collective is similarly situated. Both parties’ evidence must be considered, and the district court retains discretion to manage the process, including authorizing limited discovery or narrowing the scope of notice. The court rejected both the lenient Lusardi standard and heightened standards requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence or a strong likelihood of similarity. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings under the clarified standard. View "Richards v. Eli Lilly & Company" on Justia Law

John Snyder, after working for Guardian Life Insurance Company and obtaining a national customer list (the Guardian Broker List), was employed by Beam Technologies, Inc. Snyder claims that Beam induced him to join and disclose the list, promising compensation. While at Beam, Snyder created state-specific broker lists derived from the Guardian Broker List and inadvertently included the full list in emails to several Beam employees. He did not mark the lists as confidential, restrict access, or inform Beam of their confidential nature. After his employment ended, Snyder did not attempt to recover the list or notify Beam of its confidential status, and he later confirmed to Beam’s CEO that the disclosure was intentional.Snyder sued Beam in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets under federal and state law, as well as several state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Beam on the trade secret claims, finding Snyder failed to show he “owned” the Guardian Broker List. The court also granted Beam’s motion to exclude Snyder’s damages expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and, in doing so, barred Snyder from presenting any evidence or witnesses on lost wages for his remaining claims. Snyder’s motion to reconsider this order was denied, and the parties settled or dismissed the remaining claims, leading to a final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the trade secret claims, holding that Snyder failed to take reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of the Guardian Broker List, a requirement under both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Colorado Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 702 order to the extent it excluded all evidence and witnesses on lost wages, finding that such a dispositive ruling required notice and the procedural protections of summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Snyder v. Beam Technologies" on Justia Law

The appellant, a Slovenian-born U.S. permanent resident, claimed to have discovered billions of dollars dispersed across Africa after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He sought to repatriate these funds to the United States and enlisted the help of a Washington, D.C. lawyer. The appellant alleged that, during his efforts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, he was unable to complete the repatriation due to issues with verifying the legitimacy of Treasury Department letters. He further claimed that, while detained in Côte d'Ivoire, the funds were stolen and replaced with counterfeit cash, and that he was later arrested for alleged money laundering and misrepresentation of U.S. documents. Upon returning to the United States, the lawyer withdrew representation due to the criminal allegations against the appellant.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the appellant’s fraud claims in two parts. First, it found that the complaint failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation by the lawyer, noting that the lawyer had provided legal services as agreed. Second, for the claims against three federal employees, the court allowed the United States to substitute itself as defendant under the Westfall Act, as the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. The court then dismissed the claim against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the appellant’s complaint did not allege with particularity any fraudulent misrepresentation by the lawyer at the time of contract formation. Regarding the federal employees, the court found that the appellant failed to rebut the government’s certification that the employees acted within the scope of their employment, and thus sovereign immunity barred the claim. The court also denied the appellant’s request for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery. View "Plevnik v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Burke McCarthy died in October 2018 after receiving medical treatment from Dr. Wesley Hiser at Wyoming Medical Center. Dianna Ellis, McCarthy’s daughter and wrongful death representative, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Hiser and the hospital in February 2021, within the two-year statute of limitations. However, Dr. Hiser was never served with the original complaint. Nearly two years later, Ellis voluntarily dismissed her suit against Dr. Hiser. In December 2023, she refiled her complaint, relying on Wyoming’s savings statute to argue she had an additional year to commence a new action. Dr. Hiser was served for the first time in February 2024, more than five years after McCarthy’s death.The District Court of Natrona County granted Dr. Hiser’s motion to dismiss the refiled complaint. The court found that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Dr. Hiser in the original action because he was not served, and therefore the savings statute could not apply to extend the time for refiling. Ellis appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Wyoming’s savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. The court overruled its prior decision in Hugus v. Reeder, 2022 WY 13, which had held that a voluntary dismissal qualified as a “failure otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute. The court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is not a “failure” within the meaning of the statute, as it is a matter of choice rather than an unsuccessful attempt to proceed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ellis’s refiled complaint. View "Ellis v. Hiser" on Justia Law

Dorothy Seabrook, a black woman, was the Family Programs Manager for the U.S. Army Reserve Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2013, she was involved in disciplinary actions against an employee, Scott Hamilton. Subsequently, the Army investigated Seabrook for creating a toxic work environment and making inappropriate comments and physical contact. In 2014, she was suspended for two weeks and reassigned to another division. Seabrook filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in January 2015, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and sex. She received a poor performance evaluation in February 2015, which she believed was retaliatory, leading her to file a second EEO complaint.The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated and found no discrimination. Seabrook then filed a pro se complaint in federal court, which was construed as alleging disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Seabrook failed to plausibly allege that the Army's actions were motivated by discriminatory bias. The court found that Seabrook's allegations did not support claims of disparate treatment, as her comparators were not similarly situated. Her hostile work environment claim failed because the alleged actions were not objectively abusive or severe. Lastly, her retaliation claim was dismissed due to a lack of causal connection between her EEO activity and the adverse employment actions. The court concluded that Seabrook's complaint did not meet the pleading standards required to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Seabrook v. Driscoll" on Justia Law