Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Little Scholars of Arkansas, AP Consolidated Theatres II L.P., CSRC Charter LISA, LLC, and KLS Leasing LLC (collectively, appellants) who appealed against Pulaski County, Arkansas, and its officials (collectively, appellees). The appellants operate charter schools and lease properties for their schools. The appellees assessed real-property taxes against the schools, which the appellants contested, arguing that the properties used for school purposes are exempt from taxes under the Arkansas Constitution. The appellants also sought a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118, which they claimed the appellees relied on for the tax assessment, is void under the constitution.The case was initially brought before the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The appellees moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over county tax matters. The circuit court agreed with the appellees, dismissing the case on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellants argued that the circuit court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their illegal-exaction claims. They also argued that their request for a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118 is void does not fall within the county court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants, affirming the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim was not an illegal-exaction claim but an assessment dispute, which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' request for declaratory judgment. View "LITTLE SCHOLARS OF ARKANSAS FOUNDATION v. PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Helena-West Helena and its Mayor, Christopher Franklin, and a resident, Greg Williams. The dispute arose when the Helena-West Helena City Council passed two ordinances, one increasing the conflict-of-interest limit for contracts signed with the City and the other raising the mayor's base pay. The then-mayor, Kevin Smith, vetoed both ordinances, citing the timing of the meeting as an attempt to circumvent the new city council. When Mayor Franklin took office, he attempted to rescind Smith's veto, stating that the ordinances should become law.The Phillips County Circuit Court had previously granted Williams's request for declaratory relief, ruling that the previous mayor's veto of the two city ordinances was proper. The court found that Smith had timely and properly executed a veto regarding the ordinances and that his veto was not overridden by a two-thirds vote of the City Council. As a result, the court declared all actions taken by the Council on December 30, including the passage of the two ordinances, null and void.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court disagreed with the appellants' argument that Smith's veto was ineffective due to his failure to comply with the statutory requirements. The court found that Smith had complied with the statute by timely vetoing the Council's actions and filing a written statement of his reasons for the veto prior to the next regular Council meeting. The court also disagreed with the appellants' interpretation of the statute, stating that the statute does not affirmatively require that the mayor's reasons for the veto be presented to the Council in order to effectuate the veto. View "CITY OF HELENA-WEST HELENA v. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the fatal shooting of Jabari Asante-Chioke by police officers in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The officers, including Nicholas Dowdle, allegedly shot Asante-Chioke after he raised a gun in their direction. An autopsy revealed that thirty-six rounds were fired by the officers, with twenty-four hitting Asante-Chioke. The plaintiff, Asante-Chioke's daughter, filed a lawsuit against the officers and Colonel Lamar Davis, superintendent of the Louisiana State Police, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging unlawful seizure and excessive force.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, stating that the plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. The court also denied the defendants' request to limit discovery. The defendants appealed the denial of limited discovery, and the district court stayed discovery only as to claims against Dowdle and issues regarding his qualified immunity on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's order. The court found that it had jurisdiction to review the order under the collateral order doctrine, as the district court's failure to limit discovery was tantamount to the denial of qualified immunity. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case, directing the lower court to limit discovery to uncover only the facts necessary to rule on qualified immunity. View "Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle" on Justia Law

The case involves SKAV, L.L.C., the owner of a Best Western hotel in Abbeville, Louisiana, and Independent Specialty Insurance Company. The hotel was damaged by Hurricane Laura in August 2020, and SKAV filed a claim on a surplus lines insurance policy it had purchased from Independent Specialty. The policy contained an arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be settled by arbitration. However, SKAV sued Independent Specialty in the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that the insurance company had failed to adequately cover the hotel's hurricane damage under the policy's terms. Independent Specialty moved to compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion, citing a prior decision that concluded that § 22:868 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes voids an arbitration provision in a contract for surplus lines insurance.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The main dispute was the effect of § 22:868 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes on the insurance policy's arbitration clause. The statute bars insurance policies from depriving Louisiana courts of jurisdiction and permits, in limited circumstances, forum- and venue-selection provisions. The court noted that there were conflicting decisions on this issue from district courts in Louisiana and New York.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the arbitration clause in the surplus lines insurance policy was void under § 22:868. The court reasoned that the Louisiana Legislature's 2020 amendments to the statute did not reverse the state's longstanding anti-arbitration policy. The court also rejected Independent Specialty's argument that the issue of the arbitration clause's validity must itself go to arbitration, stating that when a statute prevents the valid formation of an arbitration agreement, the court cannot compel arbitration, even on threshold questions of arbitrability. View "S. K. A. V. v. Independent Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a woman who sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former intimate partner, alleging he sexually assaulted her after their relationship had ended. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) which barred the partner from possessing firearms and from attending the same church as the woman. At a later DVRO hearing, the trial court issued a DVRO, finding the man had sexually assaulted the petitioner and had committed subsequent acts of abuse by attending the same church as the petitioner and possessing a firearm, both in violation of the TRO.The man appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights by conducting a direct examination of the petitioner, allowing her to testify about an incident of sexual assault not contained in the petition, admonishing his counsel about his method of questioning his client, and by depriving him of the opportunity to respond to a law enforcement firearms report that showed he owned a firearm.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court's procedures were adequate and did not violate the man's procedural due process rights. The court noted that the trial court had given the man several opportunities to respond to the report that he was the registered owner of a firearm, and he refused to respond fully. The court also found that the trial court acted appropriately in conducting questioning, restricting itself to eliciting material facts with general questions and clarifying confusing and incomplete testimony. The court affirmed the protective order. View "Bailey v. Murray" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, violated certain provisions of the LAMC by maintaining landscaping and hedges on their property that exceeded height limits and were non-compliant with the Residential Parkway Landscaping Guidelines. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations under Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a), which provides that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action.The trial court sustained the Cohens' demurrer to the Schwartzes' first and fourth causes of action, but overruled the demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on alleged violations of the LAMC. The trial court relied on a previous decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which held that anyone can sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances under section 36900. The Cohens petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order overruling their demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, granted the Cohens' petition. The court disagreed with the interpretation of section 36900 in Riley, finding that the statute only grants city authorities, not private parties, the right to redress violations of municipal ordinances via either criminal prosecution or civil action. The court overruled Riley and held that section 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. The court clarified that its holding does not disturb caselaw recognizing that a defendant's violation of a local ordinance may be relevant to, or provide an element of, some other cause of action by a private party, such as nuisance or public nuisance. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend. View "Cohen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Center, Inc. (Potomac), a residential behavioral health center in West Virginia, and two former residents, L.K. and D.S., who were represented by their guardian and conservator, Kelly Young. The plaintiffs alleged that they were abused and neglected by Potomac staff members while residing at the facility for approximately five months spanning the years 2013 and 2014. They asserted claims for negligence and unlawful discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act.The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of Hardy County, where the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. Potomac appealed the decision, arguing that the lower court erred in several ways, including denying its pre-trial motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether Potomac is a “place of public accommodations” under the Human Rights Act, and admitting evidence at trial pertaining to the abuse of other children who resided at Potomac and the results of a 2014 investigation of that abuse.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that Potomac is not a “place of public accommodations” under the Human Rights Act and that the lower court erred by not granting summary judgment to Potomac on this issue prior to trial. The court also found that the lower court committed reversible error by admitting the 2014 investigative reports in their entirety into evidence at trial. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court’s final order and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Center, Inc.v. L.K., By Her Guardian and Conservator, Young" on Justia Law

The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Marvel Jones, a civilly committed individual at Norfolk Regional Center in Nebraska, filed a pro se civil rights complaint against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS), several correctional facilities, and unnamed individuals. Jones alleged that the institutions' policies and the individuals' actions obstructed his right to legal assistance and unlawfully limited his access to the courts while he was incarcerated. He claimed that the NDCS's law library policies, which prohibit prison librarians and legal aides from assisting inmates in conducting legal research and other legal activities, violated his federal rights.The defendants moved to dismiss the case, citing sovereign immunity and the applicable statutes of limitations. The district court granted the motion, finding that Jones's claims against the correctional facilities and the individual defendants in their official capacities were indeed barred by sovereign immunity and the statutes of limitations. However, the court did not dismiss the claims against the unnamed individual defendants in their individual capacities. Instead, it conditionally dismissed the case against NDCS, requiring it to provide Jones with the requested names and addresses of the unnamed defendants. NDCS appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the district court's order violated NDCS's sovereign immunity. The court noted that once the district court concluded that NDCS was entitled to sovereign immunity, it lacked the authority to hold NDCS in as a litigant, even on a relatively minor disclosure condition. The court reversed and vacated the portion of the district court’s order that conditioned NDCS’s dismissal on its disclosure of the identities and addresses of the unnamed defendant employees and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Jones v. Dept. of Correctional Services" on Justia Law

Sylvan Plowright filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County, its police chief, and two of its police officers after one of the officers, Sergio Cordova, fatally shot Plowright’s dog, Niles, during an investigation. The district court dismissed Plowright’s complaint, concluding that Cordova was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right when he shot Niles.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the use of deadly force against a domestic animal constitutes a seizure of its owner’s property subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. The court found that under the facts alleged in the complaint, no reasonable officer in Cordova’s position could have believed that Niles posed an imminent danger, and therefore, his decision to shoot Niles falls short of that requirement. The court reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s § 1983 claim against Cordova and remanded for further proceedings. The court also reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cordova. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plowright’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a second officer, as well as his claims against the county and its police chief. View "Plowright v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law