Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an alleged business partnership between Elaine Clemens and the late Arthur Emme. Clemens and Emme were intimate partners who never married. Clemens began working at Emme's business, O'Neill Body and Frame, in 1990. They moved in together in 1992 and worked together on several ventures. After Emme's death in 2017, Clemens filed a lawsuit against Curtis Emme, the personal representative of Arthur Emme's estate, claiming that she and Arthur Emme had created a business partnership in 1992. She sought a declaration that a business partnership existed between her and Arthur Emme, with each owning equal interests in the partnership.The district court for Holt County, Nebraska, rejected Clemens' argument that Curtis Emme was judicially estopped from denying the existence of a business partnership between her and Arthur Emme. The court found that Arthur Emme never unequivocally stated in a prior action that Clemens was his business partner and that the courts in that action did not adopt the position that Clemens and Arthur Emme were business partners.The case then proceeded to a jury trial on the existence of a business partnership. The jury found that Clemens failed to meet her burden of proof establishing that a partnership existed. The district court entered judgment in favor of Curtis Emme and against Clemens. Clemens appealed, but the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error in its rulings. View "Clemens v. Emme" on Justia Law

Joe Tubwell had been living in a house in DeSoto County, Mississippi, since 2005. In 2016, the mortgage loan on the house went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were initiated. Tubwell filed a complaint against the mortgage companies in an attempt to stop the foreclosure. The case was moved to a federal court where the mortgage companies were granted summary judgment. Tubwell, Morgan Stanley, and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) entered settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. Tubwell agreed to vacate the property by April 30, 2020, in exchange for a confidential sum of money. The property was sold to FV-1, Inc., in trust for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC. However, Tubwell refused to vacate the property by the agreed deadline and did not return the settlement funds.The mortgage companies filed a complaint against Tubwell in the DeSoto County Circuit Court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment ordering Tubwell to relinquish possession to the plaintiffs and dismissed Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. Tubwell appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Tubwell’s petition for certiorari to address the issue of whether it was error to dismiss his counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain Tubwell’s counterclaims and erred when it declined to do so based on a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals with regard to the dismissal of Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals on the remainder of the issues raised. View "Tubwell v. FV-1, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a civil dispute arising from an automobile collision. The plaintiff, David Audish, and the defendant, David Macias, were both found negligent in the operation of their vehicles, which resulted in a collision. The jury found that each party's negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Audish. Audish suffered damages amounting to $65,699.50, including past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and future medical expenses. The jury assigned each party 50 percent of the responsibility for these losses.The case was initially filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County. The jury returned a special verdict finding both Audish and Macias negligent in the operation of their vehicles. The jury found that Audish had incurred past medical expenses, past non-economic losses, and would have future medical expenses, but did not award any damages for future non-economic losses. Audish moved for a partial new trial on the issue of damages, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's findings that he had no past or future lost earnings. The trial court denied the motion for a partial new trial and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict.The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California. Audish argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he would have Medicare medical insurance at the age of 65. He also contended that the jury returned an impermissible compromise verdict and erred by failing to award him damages for future non-economic losses. The appellate court rejected these claims and affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The court found no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings and concluded that the award of zero future non-economic damages was proper. The court also found that Audish had not established an impermissible compromise verdict. View "Audish v. Macias" on Justia Law

The case involves two petitioners, Daniel Dilly, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center (RJC), and Nancy Oldaker, Health Services Administrator at RJC, who were held in contempt of court by Judge Kurt Hall of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, West Virginia. The contempt charges arose from an incident involving a resident of RJC, identified as D.P., who suffered a broken jaw during a fight with other residents. The court had ordered that D.P. be taken off RJC grounds for an X-ray and that his mother be notified of his medical appointments. The court found that these orders were not adequately followed by the petitioners.The Circuit Court of Lewis County held a hearing to review D.P.'s placement and medical care, resulting in a "Medical Care Order" that directed RJC to schedule an appointment for D.P. with his oral surgeon and to allow D.P.'s mother to attend the appointment. The court also ordered RJC to provide a report concerning the incident that led to D.P.'s injury. When these orders were not fully complied with, the court held a "show cause" hearing and found both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker in contempt of court, fining each of them $250.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that procedural errors in the lower court's contempt proceedings deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose such sanctions. The court noted that the lower court failed to provide the petitioners with adequate notice that they were facing indirect criminal contempt proceedings and did not afford them jury trials before imposing the fines. The court concluded that the contempt orders were void and granted the petitioners' requested writs of prohibition, thereby preventing the lower court from enforcing the contempt orders. View "State ex rel. Dilly v. Hall" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Blackrock Enterprises, LLC and BB Land, LLC and JB Exploration 1, LLC over a Lease Acquisition Agreement (LAA). Both parties claimed the other had breached the agreement and sought declaratory relief regarding their respective rights and obligations. The trial was bifurcated into two phases. In the first phase, a jury found that both parties had materially breached the LAA, but that Blackrock had committed the first material breach. As a result, the business court concluded that Blackrock could not recover for any subsequent breach committed by Jay-Bee. In the second phase, the business court determined that the parties were engaged in a de facto mining partnership and ordered Blackrock dissociated from the partnership. The court also valued Blackrock’s partnership interest at zero and ordered it to quit-claim its interests in certain leases to Jay-Bee. Blackrock appealed, arguing that the business court committed multiple errors in both phases of the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the business court erred in its construction of the first material breach doctrine and by granting judgment for Jay-Bee on the basis of clearly erroneous findings “deemed” made by operation of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). The court reversed the final judgment and remanded for a new trial and further proceedings. The court also vacated that portion of the final judgment order finding the parties engaged in a mining partnership. View "Blackrock Enterprises, LLC v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ward family, who own extensive acreage in Bismarck, North Dakota, initiated a quiet title action against 152 adjacent landowners, including Dan and Lindsey Herbel, to determine adverse claims to their property. The Wards did not make any claims against the defendants personally but sought a decree that the defendants had no estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance upon their property. The Herbels moved to dismiss the action, arguing they were not proper defendants under chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., as neither the Wards nor the Herbels claimed an adverse interest against the other’s property. The Herbels also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. The district court denied the motion despite finding the Wards were not aware if any of the named defendants were claiming title to any of the property. Following a bench trial, the court granted the judicial remedy of quiet title and a judgment dismissing the Herbels’ action was entered.The Herbels appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that because neither party made an adverse claim against the other’s property, the Wards lacked standing to sue under section 32-17-01, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 requires the existence of an adverse claim. The court found that the parties’ properties did not share a fence line or a common boundary without any intervening land, and a well-traveled roadway separated the properties. The Herbels never claimed an interest in the Wards’ real property, and the Wards never asserted there was an adverse interest between the parties. The court concluded that a direct suit against the Herbels was not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01.The Herbels also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the district court has discretion to determine whether a claim is frivolous and to determine the reasonable amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The court remanded the case to determine if the claim was frivolous and, if it was, to determine attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims against the Herbels. View "Ward v. Herbel" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a merger between Parametric Sound Corporation and VITB Holdings, Inc. (VITBH). A group of shareholders, who later formed PAMTP, LLC, opted out of a class action settlement related to the merger and filed a separate lawsuit. They alleged that the merger diluted their equity interests and that Kenneth Potashner, a member of Parametric's board, had breached his fiduciary duties by misleading shareholders about the financial outlook of the merger. The district court granted judgment to the defendants, finding that PAMTP had failed to plead a direct claim.The district court's decision was based on the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in a previous related case, Parametric I, which held that the shareholders' claims should be dismissed for failure to plead a direct claim. However, the court granted the shareholders leave to replead certain claims that may have been direct under a Delaware case, Gentile v. Rossette. PAMTP's complaint in the present case was based on this guidance.The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that PAMTP had indeed failed to plead a direct claim. The court noted that the Delaware Supreme Court had since overruled Gentile, holding that most equity expropriation claims are exclusively derivative. The court also found that PAMTP had not satisfied the "direct harm test" adopted in Parametric I.The court also addressed the district court's award of costs and attorney fees to the defendants. It affirmed the award of costs but reversed the award of pre-complaint costs, finding that the district court had abused its discretion. The court also reversed the district court's denial of attorney fees to the defendants, finding that they were entitled to fees under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of fees to which the defendants were entitled. View "In re Parametric Sound Corp." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an adoption dispute involving a minor child, G.P. The child's step-great-grandparents, Katherine and Michael, had agreed to temporary guardianship of G.P. after being contacted by the child's birth mother during her pregnancy. After G.P.'s birth, Katherine and Michael filed for temporary guardianship in the Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County. Concurrently, G.P.'s grandparents, Angela and Randall, filed a competing petition for guardianship. The birth parents of G.P. later consented to terminate their parental rights and agreed to G.P.'s adoption by Katherine and Michael. With these consents, Katherine and Michael filed a petition for adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County.The Second Judicial District Court had scheduled a hearing for the competing guardianship petitions. However, it was unaware of the pending adoption petition in the Eighth Judicial District Court. The court denied Angela and Randall's petition for temporary guardianship but set a trial date for the competing guardianship requests. A few days later, the Eighth Judicial District Court granted Katherine and Michael's adoption petition. Upon learning of the adoption, Angela and Randall moved to set aside the adoption in the Eighth Judicial District Court, alleging misrepresentation and misconduct. The court granted their motion, setting aside the adoption.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the lower court's decision. The court clarified that a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b) could be brought by a party to the proceeding, an entity in privity with one of the parties, or a nonparty with interests directly affected by the judgment. However, Angela and Randall, as nonparties, lacked standing to move to set aside the adoption. They were not parties in the adoption proceedings, did not have rights directly affected by the proceedings, and lacked any other statutory or constitutional basis for standing. The court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in setting aside G.P.'s adoption. View "In re Petition of Perry" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a long-term relationship but never married. They cohabitated and ran a cattle operation together on a property that had a complex ownership history involving various members of Meyer's family. The couple's relationship ended, and Roth sued Meyer, alleging that he had converted some of her cattle and failed to repay loans she had given him.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, found in favor of Roth. It ruled that Meyer had gained title to the disputed property through adverse possession and had transferred it to Roth in 2010. The court also found that Meyer had converted 13 of Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, ordering him to pay her $52,500.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. It found that the lower court had erred in its findings on adverse possession, the admissibility of certain evidence, the timing of the alleged conversion of cattle, the valuation of the converted cattle, and the enforceability of the loan contracts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, instructing it to make new findings based on the existing record. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action initiated by Torrey Kath against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms. After the parties filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice," the district court dismissed the case. Kath then filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Agraria Insurance Company, doing business as Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), seeking an order that FUMIC had a duty to indemnify Prochnow under an insurance policy. While FUMIC's motion in the declaratory judgment action was pending, Kath and Prochnow filed a "Joint Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice" in the original case, seeking an amended judgment.The district court had previously dismissed the case with prejudice. However, Kath and Prochnow filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which the court granted. FUMIC then filed a motion to intervene, arguing that Kath and Prochnow were seeking to impair its rights. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on FUMIC's intervention motion because the case had been dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with the district court's decision. The court noted that Kath and Prochnow's motion to vacate the dismissal re-invoked the district court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, FUMIC's intervention motion initiated a special proceeding, which also invoked the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider FUMIC's motion to intervene. The case was remanded for the district court to decide on FUMIC's motion to intervene and, if necessary, to conduct additional proceedings consistent with its disposition of the motion. View "Kath v. Prochnow" on Justia Law