Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Amazon.com Services LLC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB alleged that Amazon committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. While the charge was pending before the Board, the Board sought temporary injunctive relief, including the employee’s reinstatement. The district court found "reasonable cause" to believe Amazon committed an unfair labor practice in terminating the employee. However, it concluded that ordering Amazon to cease and desist from committing certain violations of the Act was "just and proper," but that ordering Amazon to reinstate the employee was not.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court did not adequately explain why the cease-and-desist order was just and proper, particularly in light of its conclusion that the employee’s reinstatement was not. Therefore, the injunction was vacated in part. The court noted that the district court's lack of explanation for granting the cease-and-desist order, coupled with its explicit, undisputed findings in rejecting the request to order the employee's reinstatement, cast serious doubt on the propriety of the cease-and-desist order. View "Poor v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an incident where an employee, Leonard Bernstein, shot his co-worker, Christopher Bayouth, at their workplace, Morgan Stanley's Oklahoma City branch. Bernstein, who was suffering from mental deficiencies, believed he was acting in self-defense due to his delusional state. After the shooting, Bayouth filed a lawsuit against Bernstein for willful and intentional acts, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bernstein passed away, and his estate was substituted as the defendant. The estate argued that Bayouth's exclusive remedy was through the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), as he had received workers' compensation benefits.The District Court of Oklahoma County granted summary judgment in favor of Bernstein's estate, ruling that the exclusive remedy provision of the AWCA protected Bernstein regardless of whether he was acting within his course and scope of employment when the shooting occurred. The court reasoned that the focus was on whether the injured employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident, not the employee who caused the injury.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. The court held that for the exclusive remedy provision under the AWCA to apply, the employee who injures another employee must be acting within the course and scope of their employment when the incident occurs. The court found that the parties disputed whether Bernstein was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he shot Bayouth. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bayouth v. Dewberry" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The petitioners, Judith and Gary Shears, filed a lawsuit against Ethicon, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson, alleging injuries caused by Ethicon’s Tension-Free Vaginal Tape (TVT), a mesh sling used to treat stress urinary incontinence. The Shearses claimed that the TVT device was defectively designed. The case was part of a multidistrict litigation proceeding against Ethicon.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, where Ethicon argued that the plaintiffs must prove that an alternative, feasible design would have materially reduced the plaintiff’s injuries. The district court rejected this argument. However, after the publication of the West Virginia Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases (PJI) § 411, which stated that a plaintiff must prove that there was an alternative, feasible design that eliminated the risk that injured the plaintiff, the district court reconsidered its decision and agreed with Ethicon's argument. The case was then transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia was asked to clarify certain elements of proof required to establish a prima facie case in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court held that PJI § 411 does not correctly specify a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a strict liability claim based on a design defect. The court further held that a plaintiff asserting a strict liability claim for a design defect must prove that an alternative, feasible design was available to the manufacturer at the time the product in question was manufactured. Lastly, the court held that a plaintiff is required to prove that an alternative, feasible design existing at the time the subject product was made would have substantially reduced the risk of the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff. View "Shears v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a 52-year-old native of the Dominican Republic, G.P., who unlawfully entered the United States twice and was convicted for drug trafficking both times. After serving his sentence for the second conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intended to remove him again. However, G.P. expressed fear of retaliation in the Dominican Republic due to his cooperation with the government in prosecuting the leader of the drug trafficking organization. An asylum officer found his fear credible and placed him into withholding-only proceedings. G.P. applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but his application was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). G.P. appealed the decision, and the case was remanded for further consideration of his CAT claim.While his CAT claim was pending, G.P. was held in immigration detention. He brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," and that he should therefore be released subject to supervision. The district court disagreed, and G.P. appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that G.P.'s situation was distinguishable from the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, which G.P. cited as precedent. The court noted that G.P.'s detention was not indefinite or potentially permanent, as his CAT proceedings were still pending and there was no indication of bad faith or undue delay by the agency. Furthermore, G.P. did not dispute that if he was ultimately denied relief, the government would be able to remove him to the Dominican Republic. Therefore, the court concluded that G.P. had failed to show that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." View "G.P. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case involves attorney Larry Klayman, who has been subject to multiple disciplinary investigations and proceedings by the District of Columbia Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In response, Klayman filed a series of lawsuits against the District of Columbia Bar, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and individual D.C. Bar officials, alleging torts and constitutional claims. In June 2020, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered a ninety-day suspension of Klayman’s license to practice law. Employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel mailed notice of that suspension to other jurisdictions where Klayman is admitted to practice law. Klayman then brought three lawsuits against the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees and the Chair of the D.C. Board on Professional Responsibility, alleging that the notification letters amounted to tortious interference and abuse of process. The district court dismissed Klayman’s suits in full and entered a pre-filing injunction restricting Klayman’s ability to file any related actions or claims for relief in any forum, state or federal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the pre-filing injunction. The court affirmed on immunity grounds the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for damages, but it affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court held that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel employees were entitled to absolute immunity from Klayman’s damages claims. However, the court found that there was no relevant pending state proceeding to support Younger abstention at the time of the dismissal, and thus reversed the district court’s dismissal of Klayman’s claims for injunctive relief. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on those injunctive-relief claims. View "Klayman v. Porter" on Justia Law

In October 2022, Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Gwinnett County, challenging a 2015 county ordinance regulating "Adult Establishments." Starship, which owns two stores in Gwinnett County, had previously filed a similar lawsuit in 2017, which it voluntarily dismissed. The county, however, maintained its counterclaim, and the trial court granted the county a permanent injunction restraining Starship from "regularly making more than 100 sexual devices available for sale" at each of its locations. Starship appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction against Starship.In the second lawsuit, Starship invoked a constitutional amendment that waives sovereign immunity for certain lawsuits, including lawsuits against a county for declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed Starship’s lawsuit, holding that it was barred by sovereign immunity and by res judicata. Starship appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the novel constitutional question involved.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that although the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Starship’s lawsuit, the suit was barred by res judicata. The court found that Starship's lawsuit sought relief from the county's prospective acts of enforcement, which will occur after January 1, 2021, and therefore the county’s sovereign immunity was waived under the constitutional amendment. However, the court also found that the lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the constitutional matters Starship now sought to raise could have been raised in the previous lawsuit. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the lawsuit. View "STARSHIP ENTERPRISES OF ATLANTA, INC. v. GWINNETT COUNTY" on Justia Law

In 2020, Albert Omstead contracted BPG Inspection, LLC to inspect a property he and his wife, Jessique Omstead, intended to purchase. The contract included a one-year limitation clause preventing Mr. Omstead from suing BPG Inspection or its employees more than one year after the inspection. After the inspection, the Omsteads purchased the property. Over a year later, Mr. Omstead died when a retaining wall on the property collapsed. Mrs. Omstead filed a wrongful death suit against BPG Inspection and one of its inspectors.The trial court found the one-year limitation unenforceable, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in approving the one-year limitation and whether the limitation is void as against public policy.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court found that the one-year limitation was enforceable and not void as against public policy. The court rejected Mrs. Omstead's arguments that the limitation only applied to contract claims and not claims involving bodily injury or wrongful death, that the limitation functioned as a “contractually-effectuated statute of repose,” and that the limitation impermissibly voided “professional standards of conduct.” The court concluded that the one-year limitation did not violate OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and was not void as against public policy. View "OMSTEAD v. BPG INSPECTION, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward A. Cianci and Raymond Frechette, who purchased a foreclosed property and initiated a summary process action in the Housing Court against the occupants, including Elizabeth D'Andrea. The Housing Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs for possession. D'Andrea appealed and sought to waive the appeal bond due to her indigency. The Housing Court found D'Andrea to be indigent and waived her appeal bond, but required her to make monthly use and occupancy payments of $1,275 to the plaintiffs to maintain her appeal. D'Andrea appealed this order to the Appeals Court, which reported questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that use and occupancy payments required of an indigent party under G. L. c. 239, § 5 (e), may not be waived, substituted, or paid by the Commonwealth under the indigency statute because use and occupancy payments are not an "extra fee or cost" as defined in the indigency statute. The court further concluded that the order setting use and occupancy payments in this case did not violate D'Andrea's constitutional rights, even if the order requires her to make payments that potentially exceed her ability to pay. The court reasoned that the summary process statute reasonably imposes a fair balancing of interests between the owner of the property and the party in possession, and the Housing Court performed the fair balancing required. View "Frechette v. D'Andrea" on Justia Law

A graphic designer, Cynthia Foss, filed a lawsuit against Marvic, Inc., Brady-Built, Inc., and Charter Communications, alleging copyright infringement. Foss claimed that Marvic and Brady-Built used a marketing brochure she created without her permission. She also sought a declaratory judgment that Charter Communications was not eligible for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe-harbor defense.Previously, Foss had filed a similar lawsuit against Marvic alone, which was dismissed because she had not registered her copyright before filing the suit. This dismissal was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. In the current case, the District Court dismissed Foss's copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built on the grounds of claim preclusion, citing the dismissal of her earlier lawsuit. The court also dismissed her claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a plausible claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the dismissal of the copyright infringement claim against Marvic and Brady-Built. The court found that the dismissal of Foss's earlier lawsuit was not a "final judgment on the merits" for claim preclusion purposes. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Foss's claim against Charter Communications for lack of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the District Court's alternative merits-based dismissal of Foss's claim against Charter Communications. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Foss v. Marvic" on Justia Law