Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2006, David and Jill Landrum, along with Michael and Marna Sharpe, purchased land in Madison County to develop a mixed-use project called the Town of Livingston. The project stalled due to the 2008 financial crisis and legal issues. In 2010, Jill and Marna formed Livingston Holdings, LLC, which owned the development properties. Marna contributed more financially than Jill, leading to a disparity in ownership interests. In 2014, Marna sold her interest to B&S Mississippi Holdings, LLC, managed by Michael Bollenbacher. Jill stopped making her required monthly contributions in December 2018.The Madison County Chancery Court disqualified Jill as a derivative plaintiff, realigned Livingston Holdings as a defendant, and dismissed several claims. The court found that Jill did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the company due to personal interests and economic antagonisms. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants and denied the Landrums' remaining claims after a bench trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision to disqualify Jill as a derivative plaintiff and exclude the Landrums' expert witness. The court found that Jill's personal interests and actions, such as failing to make required contributions and attempting to gain control of the company, justified her disqualification. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims for negligent omission, misstatement of material facts, civil conspiracy, fraud, and fraudulent concealment due to the Landrums' failure to cite legal authority.However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on the issues of remedies and attorneys' fees under the Second Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty between B&S and Jill. The court found that the chancellor erred in interpreting the Second MOU as providing an exclusive remedy and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Livingston is entitled to additional remedies and attorneys' fees. The court also remanded for factual findings on whether B&S breached its fiduciary duty to Jill regarding property distribution and tax loss allocation. View "Landrum v. Livingston Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners opened brokerage accounts with Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, managed by Coleman Devlin. Dissatisfied with Devlin's performance, they filed for arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, and violations of state and federal securities laws. After nearly two years of hearings, the arbitration panel ruled in favor of Stifel and Devlin without providing a detailed explanation, as the parties did not request an "explained decision."Petitioners moved to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, arguing that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, including federal securities law. The district court denied the motion, stating that the petitioners failed to meet the high standard required to prove manifest disregard of the law. The court noted that the petitioners were essentially rearguing their case from the arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters requires an independent jurisdictional basis beyond the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) itself for federal courts to have jurisdiction over petitions to vacate arbitration awards. Since the petitioners did not provide such a basis, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that claims of manifest disregard of federal law do not confer federal-question jurisdiction. View "Friedler v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Vincent Bell, a pretrial detainee with an amputated right leg, alleged that deputies used excessive force during a cell extraction and transfer at the San Francisco Jail. Bell claimed that Sergeant Yvette Williams did not provide him with a wheelchair or other mobility device, forcing him to hop on one leg until he fell. Deputies then carried him by his arms and leg, causing him pain and minor injuries. Bell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Bell on his excessive force claim against Williams and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the City and County of San Francisco. However, the jury did not find that Williams caused Bell physical or emotional harm. The jury awarded Bell $504,000 in compensatory damages against the City but not against Williams. The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the jury's verdict on Bell's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim and his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding substantial evidence supported these claims. However, the court reversed the district court's decision on Bell's Monell theory of liability, concluding that Bell did not present substantial evidence showing that the City's training was the product of deliberate indifference to a known risk. The court also vacated the jury's compensatory damages award, deeming it grossly excessive, and remanded for a remittitur or a new trial on damages. View "BELL V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

A former transportation security officer (TSO) with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) alleged that his termination was an act of retaliation under Title VII. The TSA terminated his employment for failing to cooperate in an investigation into whether he received illegal compensation for serving as a personal representative during internal agency investigations. The plaintiff argued that this reason was a pretext for retaliation due to his prior complaints to the TSA’s Equal Employment Office (EEO) about a hostile work environment and denial of Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the TSA’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual. The court noted that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s last EEO complaint and his termination (56 days) was not enough to establish pretext, especially given the concurrent timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the 56-day gap between the plaintiff’s final EEO complaint and his termination was insufficient by itself to show pretext. The court also noted that the timing of the plaintiff’s noncooperation with the investigation supported the TSA’s stated reason for termination. Additionally, the court found that other circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext. The court concluded that the TSA had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment and affirmed the summary judgment. View "KAMA V. MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

Phillip Robbin was removing a tree from a residential lot in the City of Berwyn when he was confronted by Sarah Lopez, a city inspector. Lopez berated Robbin using racial slurs, which led Robbin to demand disciplinary action against her. The Mayor of Berwyn denied Robbin's request for Lopez's termination, leading Robbin to sue the City, the Mayor, and Lopez for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Robbin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that he failed to state a federal claim. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to Robbin's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Robbin failed to allege a violation of a fundamental right and that the conduct described did not "shock the conscience," which are necessary elements for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that while Lopez's use of racial slurs was deplorable, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Robbin's complaint. View "Robbin v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

Duane Durr, diagnosed with mild cognitive impairment, appointed his step-daughter, Dawn Volden, as his attorney-in-fact in 2017, granting her broad discretion over his assets. Volden used Durr’s credit cards and checking account for various expenditures, some of which Durr later claimed were unauthorized. Durr filed a lawsuit against Volden in 2021, alleging she breached her fiduciary duties and seeking an accounting of her spending.The District Court of Cass County held a three-day bench trial in May 2023. The court found that while Volden owed Durr a fiduciary duty, the evidence was insufficient to prove she breached that duty. The court noted that some transactions seemed suspect but concluded that most were permitted under the power of attorney. The court dismissed Durr’s claims, finding he failed to prove Volden’s actions constituted willful misconduct or gross negligence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not applying the presumption of undue influence, which should be applied to transactions between parties in a confidential relationship, such as an attorney-in-fact and their principal. The Supreme Court held that Durr had met his burden by showing suspicious transactions and unaccounted-for withdrawals, shifting the burden to Volden to disprove the presumption of undue influence. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision, requiring the lower court to apply the correct legal standard and burden shift. View "Durr v. Volden" on Justia Law

Renae Gerszewski filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order (DCRO) against Conrad Rostvet, leading to a temporary DCRO and a scheduled hearing. Rostvet responded by filing his own petitions for DCROs against Renae and Wayne Gerszewski. The cases were consolidated, and the hearing was delayed for nearly six months due to continuances. The dispute centered around the use of a road running from the highway past Rostvet’s property to the Gerszewskis’ property.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, heard testimony about the ongoing conflict and issued an order granting Renae Gerszewski’s petition for a DCRO while denying Rostvet’s petitions. The court found that Rostvet’s actions, including stopping his vehicle to point at Renae, cultivating land near her, blocking the road, and pushing snow into the roadway, constituted disorderly conduct. Rostvet appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion and that his actions were constitutionally protected.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DCRO to Renae Gerszewski, as there were reasonable grounds to believe that Rostvet engaged in disorderly conduct. The court also found no error in the district court’s denial of Rostvet’s petitions, as he failed to show that the Gerszewskis engaged in disorderly conduct. Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected Rostvet’s arguments regarding judicial notice of documents and the delay in the hearing, noting that these issues were not properly raised in the lower court. View "Rostvet v. Gerszewski" on Justia Law

Keith and Latasha Warner were married in 2018 and have one child. In May 2022, Keith filed for divorce and requested primary residential responsibility. The parties initially agreed to an interim order granting equal residential responsibility. After mediation in August 2022, a summary agreement was prepared but not signed by either party. Keith served multiple documents to Latasha at an incorrect address, causing her to miss a scheduling conference and not receive a notice of trial. Despite this, the court mailed a scheduling order to her correct address, setting a trial date for June 5, 2023.At trial, Latasha requested a continuance to retain counsel, which the court denied. The court awarded primary residential responsibility to Keith. Latasha did not appeal the judgment but later moved for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60, arguing that Keith's misrepresentation about the mediation agreement prevented her from fairly preparing her case. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied her motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s denial of Latasha’s motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. The court found that the mediation agreement was not binding as it was not signed or approved by the court. The court also found that Keith’s counsel’s statement during trial was inaccurate but did not prevent Latasha from fairly preparing her case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Latasha’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and affirmed the decision. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

Brett Del Valle was sued by Alum Rock Riverside, LLC in California for breach of contract, resulting in a judgment against him for over $4 million. Alum Rock domesticated this judgment in Utah and recorded it with the Weber County Recorder’s Office. At the time of recording, the property in question was held by a revocable trust established by Brett and his wife, but the trust sold the property to the Mulligans before Alum Rock applied for a writ of execution to seize and sell the property.The Third District Court upheld the writ of execution despite the Mulligans' objections. They argued that Alum Rock failed to create a valid judgment lien because it did not record the judgment in the registry of judgments, that the writ was not available since the trust held the title when the judgment was domesticated, and that the court lacked jurisdiction as the property was in a different judicial district. The district court rejected these arguments, holding that recording the judgment with the county recorder was sufficient to create a lien, the writ was valid because Brett retained ownership indicia over the property, and the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that since July 1, 2002, a judgment lien is created by recording the judgment with the county recorder, not by filing it in the registry of judgments. The court also determined that Brett owned the property for purposes of the lien because he retained control over the trust. Finally, the court found no relevant limitation on the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ, even though the property was located in a different judicial district. View "Mulligan v. Alum Rock Riverside" on Justia Law

The relator, Jumaane Scott, filed an action requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the Toledo Correctional Institution (TCI) to produce public records. Scott claimed that between April and July 2023, he made four separate requests for public records, including body-camera footage from three different correction officers and a vegetarian diet menu. He alleged that TCI staff denied his requests or failed to respond. Scott sought the production of these records, statutory damages, and court costs.The case was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. TCI filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, leading to the issuance of an alternative writ. TCI conceded most of Scott’s factual allegations but argued that the requested body-camera footage did not exist. TCI’s evidence included an affidavit from Derek Burkhart, the warden’s assistant, stating that the footage was not saved and therefore did not exist. Scott did not provide contrary evidence to rebut this claim.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Scott’s request for a writ of mandamus, finding that the body-camera footage did not exist and that TCI had no obligation to produce nonexistent records. The court also denied Scott’s request for the vegetarian diet menu because his petition did not explicitly seek relief for that request. Additionally, the court denied Scott’s requests for statutory damages and court costs, concluding that Scott failed to demonstrate that TCI did not meet its obligations under the Public Records Act or acted in bad faith.In summary, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that TCI had no duty to produce nonexistent records and that Scott was not entitled to statutory damages or court costs. The court denied the writ of mandamus and all associated requests for relief. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst." on Justia Law