Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Woodsonia Hwy 281, LLC (Woodsonia) owned a retail shopping mall in Grand Island, Nebraska, and leased space to American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (AMC). Woodsonia planned to redevelop the mall and sought to terminate AMC's lease under the eminent domain provisions of the lease agreement. Woodsonia claimed that the lease was terminated after conveying AMC's leasehold interest to the Community Redevelopment Authority (CRA) under threat of condemnation. AMC disputed the termination, arguing that the conditions for termination under the lease were not met.The County Court for Hall County overruled AMC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the lease was terminated under the eminent domain provisions and granted Woodsonia restitution of the premises. AMC appealed to the District Court for Hall County, which affirmed the County Court's decision, reasoning that the lease provisions allowed Woodsonia to transfer AMC's leasehold interest under threat of condemnation.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the forcible entry and detainer action presented a title dispute, as the court needed to resolve whether AMC's leasehold interest was validly terminated. The court held that such a title dispute could not be determined in a forcible entry and detainer action, which is limited to determining the immediate right of possession without addressing title issues. Consequently, the County Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have dismissed the action.The Nebraska Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case with directions to vacate the County Court's judgment and dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Woodsonia Hwy 281 v. American Multi-Cinema" on Justia Law

Alex Lancaster, who operates an adult foster care program in his home, received a correction order from Olmsted County on behalf of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) after a home inspection. The correction order cited two violations: failure to provide resident access to the upstairs living room and dining area. Lancaster did not request reconsideration of the correction order within the 20-day deadline.Lancaster appealed the correction order to the Minnesota Court of Appeals by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, determining that the correction order was not a quasi-judicial decision and therefore not appealable by writ of certiorari. Lancaster then petitioned for further review.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether a DHS correction order is appealable by writ of certiorari. The court held that a correction order is not a judicial or quasi-judicial decision because it does not bind and irrevocably fix the legal rights of the license holder. Instead, it merely notifies the license holder of alleged violations and the possibility of future sanctions if the violations are not corrected. As a result, the correction order does not meet the criteria for a quasi-judicial decision, which includes a binding decision regarding a disputed claim.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of Lancaster’s appeal, concluding that the correction order was not appealable by writ of certiorari. View "Lancaster vs. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Bradley Dobbs filed a complaint against Dollar General Corporation on November 21, 2022, alleging that on November 13, 2020, he was falsely accused of shoplifting by the store manager, Devan Callahan, in front of other customers and his granddaughter. Dobbs claimed that this false accusation caused him embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress, leading to medical treatment for anxiety, stress, and depression. He sought $74,000 in damages for the wrongful, negligent, and malicious infliction of emotional and mental distress by Dollar General's employee.The Pike County County Court initially granted Dollar General's motion to dismiss due to Dobbs's failure to timely respond. However, the court set aside this judgment after Dobbs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and for an extension of time to respond. After a hearing, the trial court found that the three-year statute of limitations for negligence applied and denied Dollar General's motion to dismiss. Dollar General then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted, along with a motion to stay the trial court proceedings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and determined that Dobbs's claim was essentially one of defamation, specifically slander, rather than negligence. The court held that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation applied, as the substance of Dobbs's claim was that Dollar General falsely accused him of shoplifting in the presence of others. Since Dobbs filed his complaint more than one year after the incident, the court found the claim to be time-barred. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's order and rendered judgment in favor of Dollar General, dismissing Dobbs's complaint. View "Dollar General Corporation v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

Jessica Johnson filed a negligence action against Evan Unruh one day before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Johnson attempted to serve Unruh 121 days after filing the complaint and simultaneously filed a motion for an enlargement of time to serve him, which the trial court granted. Unruh filed two motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process, both of which were denied by the trial court. Unruh then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially denied Unruh's motions to dismiss, finding that Johnson's motion for an enlargement of time was timely and that her subsequent service attempts were valid. The trial court concluded that Johnson's service on August 13, 2021, was within the extended time frame granted by the court.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and agreed with Unruh that the trial court erred in granting Johnson's motion for an enlargement of time. The court found that Johnson failed to show good cause for her delay in serving Unruh within the 120-day period required by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The court noted that Johnson did not attempt to serve Unruh until after the 120-day deadline had expired and did not provide specific details or evidence of attempts to serve him within the initial period.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the statute of limitations for Johnson's negligence claim had expired, as she failed to properly serve Unruh within the required time frame. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's decision and rendered a judgment dismissing Johnson's negligence claim with prejudice. View "Unruh v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The incumbent candidate, Vern Gavin, lost the election to challenger Wanda Evers. Gavin filed a petition for judicial review in the Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming Evers was an unqualified elector due to her residency outside the district and citing several voting irregularities. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Gavin's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to his appeal.The Hinds County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case. Gavin challenged Evers's residency, noting her voting address was transferred outside the district and back within it, and she claimed a homestead exemption at a Jackson address. The Hinds County Executive Committee certified Evers as a candidate despite Gavin's challenge. Evers defeated Gavin in the runoff election. Gavin filed a contest of the election and a petition for judicial review, requesting a special election due to alleged irregularities and disputing Evers's residency qualification. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the election irregularities and dismissed the residency claim, finding Evers met the two-year residency requirement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court affirmed the circuit court's rulings, finding no error. The court held that Gavin received proper notice of the summary judgment motion and that the circuit court did not err in considering both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. The court also upheld the exclusion of certain affidavits as hearsay and irrelevant. The court found that Gavin failed to present evidence of election irregularities affecting the outcome and that Evers met the residency requirement. The court also affirmed the denial of Gavin's motion for reconsideration, finding the new evidence presented was cumulative and for impeachment purposes only. View "Gavin v. Evers" on Justia Law

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union and Quality Custom Distribution guaranteed that the top 80% of senior employees would receive at least 40 paid hours per week. During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Starbucks stores in or near Chicago closed or reduced their hours, resulting in senior employees averaging only 30 hours a week. The Union demanded that the employer make up the difference, but the employer refused, citing an exception for Acts of God.The dispute was taken to an arbitrator, who ruled in favor of the Union. The arbitrator determined that while epidemics might be considered Acts of God, the reduction in work was primarily due to the Governor of Illinois' orders, which were not Acts of God. The employer then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to nullify the arbitrator's decision. The district court judge declined to nullify the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that as long as the arbitrator interprets the contract, the award must stand. The arbitrator had interpreted the contract's "Act of God" clause, concluding it did not cover the Governor's orders. The court emphasized that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to ensuring the arbitrator interpreted the contract, not whether the interpretation was correct. The court also noted that the employer's conduct in the litigation process imposed unnecessary costs and ordered the employer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. View "Quality Custom Distribution Services LLC v International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 710" on Justia Law

A.J. began experiencing auditory hallucinations around 2010, leading to multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. Diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, he was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on various charges. The criminal court vacated the incompetency order and directed the Public Guardian to investigate an LPS conservatorship. The Public Guardian filed a petition, citing A.J.'s grave disability due to mental health and substance abuse disorders. A.J.'s psychiatrist and social worker testified about his lack of insight into his illness, unwillingness to take medication, and history of aggressive behavior.The trial court appointed a temporary conservator in 2024. During a jury trial, the social worker and psychiatrist testified about A.J.'s inability to maintain housing due to his mental illness and aggressive behavior. The jury found A.J. gravely disabled. The trial court then appointed the Public Guardian as his conservator, granting the power to place him in a psychiatric or other state-licensed facility.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. A.J. argued that the Public Guardian's closing argument improperly suggested he was unable to provide shelter due to past involuntary detentions and that the trial court improperly delegated the duty to designate the least restrictive placement. The court disagreed with A.J.'s first argument, finding no authority to support his claim and noting that the Public Guardian's argument was based on multiple factors. However, the court agreed that the trial court failed to designate the least restrictive placement, as required by law. The court remanded the case for the trial court to designate the least restrictive placement but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "In re Conservatorship of the Person of A.J." on Justia Law

A constable, Deborah Martinez-Garibay, was fatally shot while attempting to serve a writ of restitution to a tenant who had threatened a resident with a gun. The tenant also killed Angela Fox, who was accompanying Garibay, and another individual before taking his own life. Angela's surviving spouse, William Fox, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Garibay's spouse, Pima County, and the Arizona Constable Ethics, Standards and Training Board, alleging negligence and gross negligence on Garibay's part.The Superior Court of Pima County denied Garibay's spouse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and owed no duty to Angela. The Court of Appeals accepted special action jurisdiction and reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that Garibay was judicially immune from liability as her actions did not constitute "misconduct" under A.R.S. § 11-449.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to determine whether the common law doctrine of judicial immunity shields constables from liability under A.R.S. § 11-449. The court held that § 11-449 limits, rather than abrogates, judicial immunity. It concluded that a constable who engages in "misconduct" in the service or execution of a writ is subject to liability. The court defined "misconduct" as an intentional violation of an applicable rule, standard, or norm, rather than mere negligence or gross negligence.The court found that Fox's complaint did not allege that Garibay engaged in "misconduct" as defined by the statute, but rather that she was negligent or grossly negligent. Therefore, the court concluded that Garibay was entitled to judicial immunity and reversed the lower court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GARIBAY v FOX" on Justia Law

James and Amber May hired RES Construction to build their home in Sioux Falls. RES subcontracted First Rate Excavate, Inc. to install the septic system and construct the foundation. The Mays alleged that the foundation was installed several feet below grade level, causing significant drainage and septic issues that damaged their home, yard, and neighboring properties. They sued First Rate for negligence. The circuit court dismissed the claim based on the economic loss doctrine, and the Mays appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County, South Dakota, dismissed the Mays' negligence claim, citing the economic loss doctrine, which limits remedies for purely economic losses to those specified in a contract. The court reasoned that the Mays lacked privity of contract with First Rate and that their claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the economic loss doctrine should not be expanded beyond claims arising from transactions involving the sale of defective goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court noted that the doctrine is designed to prevent parties from circumventing contract remedies by seeking tort remedies for economic losses. Since the Mays' claim was based on negligence and not on a UCC transaction, the economic loss doctrine did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the lack of privity between the Mays and First Rate further precluded the application of the economic loss doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "May v. First Rate Excavate" on Justia Law