Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Chiya Lloyd, filed a complaint against FedLoan Servicing LLC, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Trans Union, LLC, and Experian Information Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The case centered around Lloyd's nine federal student loans serviced by FedLoan, which reported to Experian that Lloyd's payments for certain months were overdue. Lloyd disputed these delinquencies, and Experian requested further information from FedLoan. After several rounds of disputes and investigations, all delinquent marks were removed from Lloyd's credit report. However, Lloyd initiated a civil action against the defendants, alleging that FedLoan failed to properly investigate the accuracy of the information it reported to Experian, and Experian failed to follow its procedures to discover FedLoan’s mistakes.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Experian, finding that Lloyd could not show Experian failed to follow reasonable procedures or conduct a reasonable reinvestigation. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of FedLoan, concluding that Lloyd did not present sufficient evidence of damage to support her claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Experian had followed the steps set forth by the FCRA for conducting a reinvestigation, and Lloyd failed to show that Experian did not satisfy its statutory requirements. The court also found that Lloyd failed to present a cognizable claim against Experian. Regarding FedLoan, the court found that Lloyd failed to present evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find that FedLoan’s investigation was unreasonable. The court also found that Lloyd failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a jury question that she sustained actual damages from FedLoan’s reporting. Therefore, her claim failed. View "Lloyd v. FedLoan Servicing" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land between two neighboring property owners in Park County, Wyoming. The appellants, Michael and Michelle Sellers, purchased a 12-acre property that was adjacent to a 4-acre parcel owned by the appellees, Phyllis Claudson, William Pond, Pamela Pond, and Peggy Lou Pond Paul. During the purchase, the Sellers discovered that a portion of their property was located on the Ponds' side of a boundary fence. The Ponds filed a lawsuit to claim ownership of this portion of land based on adverse possession.The District Court of Park County initially heard the case. The Ponds and the Sellers filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of the Ponds, finding that they had adversely possessed the disputed property. The Sellers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Ponds had established a prima facie case for adverse possession. They had shown actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed property, which was hostile and under claim of right or color of title. The Sellers failed to rebut this claim by showing permissive use of the property through neighborly accommodation. The court also rejected the Sellers' argument that the Ponds could only have adversely possessed the areas of the property containing buildings, as the Sellers had not raised this issue in the lower court. View "Sellers v. Claudson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tax appraisal dispute involving Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and Travis Central Appraisal District (the District). The Landfill owns 344 acres of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, the District appraised the market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform taxation but did not claim that the District’s appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. The appraisal review board reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety percent. The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject property’s true market value.The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge it made before the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider market value. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that a trial court’s review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court concluded that the Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC. v. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The Vagts family, who own and operate a dairy farm in West Union, Iowa, filed a nuisance suit against Northern Natural Gas Company (NNG). NNG operates a natural gas pipeline that runs under the Vagts' property and uses a cathodic protection system, which runs an electrical current through the pipeline to prevent corrosion. The Vagts alleged that stray voltage from the cathodic protection system distressed their dairy herd and caused them damages. The jury awarded the Vagts a total of $4.75 million in damages. NNG appealed, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury on nuisance without including negligence as an element of the claim and in denying NNG’s motion for remittitur.The district court held that negligence was not an element of the nuisance claim and instructed the jury accordingly. The jury found that the stray voltage from the cathodic protection system was definitely offensive, seriously annoying, and intolerable, that the stray voltage interfered with the Vagts’ normal use of land in the local community, and that this constituted a nuisance. The jury awarded the Vagts $3 million in economic damages, $1.25 million for personal inconvenience, annoyance, and discomfort, and $500,000 for the loss of use and enjoyment of land.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that under the controlling statute and precedents, negligence is not an element of a nuisance claim. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disturb the jury's verdict on damages. The court concluded that the jury's verdict was supported by the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. View "Vagts v. Northern Natural Gas Company" on Justia Law

In this case, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison, and Brian L. Mann were disputing modifications to their stipulated dissolution decree. The main issues in the case revolved around child custody, visitation, child support, and attorney fees.Prior to this case, the couple had been granted joint legal and physical custody of their two children. However, after Brian was convicted of stalking Asia, she sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. She argued that Brian's conviction constituted domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, and as such, the court should take specific actions to protect her and the children.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that Brian's conviction for stalking did not constitute domestic intimate partner abuse under the Parenting Act, as the act requires that bodily injury be attempted, caused, or credibly threatened. The court found no evidence of this in Brian's conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Asia's request for sole custody of the children.The court also found no error in the lower court's decisions regarding child support, health insurance, and attorney fees. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to allow Brian to choose between two school districts for the children's enrollment.Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to vacate the portion of the dissolution decree that found Brian stood in loco parentis to Asia's child from a previous relationship, Maleah. The court found that the lower court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act to modify the California child custody judgment as to Maleah. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a property deed. Earnest Coprich and Bessie Elizabeth Jones, who have known each other for about 50 years, disagreed over the terms of a property sale. Coprich claimed that he sold his residence to Jones for $15,000, while Jones contended that the sale price was $10,000. After Jones moved into the property and made several improvements, Coprich filed a complaint seeking to set aside the deed. He alleged that he was mentally incompetent at the time of signing the deed and that he was coerced and defrauded by Jones. Jones denied these allegations and asserted that she had purchased the property and occupied it since the transaction.The Montgomery Circuit Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Jones. The court found that Coprich failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his incompetence or that Jones had committed fraud or misrepresentation. Coprich's postjudgment motion to vacate the order was summarily denied by the court. Coprich then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, determined that the Court of Civil Appeals should have jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that the case is a "civil case" as defined by § 12-3-10 and that the "amount involved" does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000. Therefore, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Coprich v. Jones" on Justia Law

David McGilvray, a former investigator for the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (the Medical Board), was terminated for sending a sexually explicit email to his coworkers. Following his termination, the Medical Board requested the Local Government Health Insurance Board (the Insurance Board) to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits. McGilvray, claiming he had retired before the Medical Board ratified his termination, sought retiree-health-insurance benefits. His request was denied by the Insurance Board on the grounds that he had been fired for cause and had not retired.McGilvray filed two lawsuits in an attempt to obtain retiree-health-insurance benefits. The first lawsuit was against the executive director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board. The Montgomery Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him, ruling that his claims were time-barred. In the second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the members of the Medical Board in both their official and individual capacities. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed this suit based on the doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that McGilvray's breach-of-contract claim, seeking damages from the Medical Board defendants in their official capacities, was barred by State immunity. Furthermore, the court ruled that all of his other claims were barred by res judicata, as they arose from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his request for retiree-health-insurance benefits. View "McGilvray v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Three Black citizens of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Darryl Carter, Diane Johnson, and Theresa Hawthorne, were struck from jury duty during voir dire in 2015. They alleged that their removal violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the Caddo Parish prosecutors peremptorily struck them based on their race. The plaintiffs joined an ongoing litigation challenging the Caddo District Attorney's alleged custom of racially biased peremptory strikes. They sued District Attorney James E. Stewart, in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The district court dismissed all plaintiffs except Carter, Johnson, and Hawthorne. The District Attorney then moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, leading to a de novo review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs could not establish a predicate constitutional violation, which is necessary for a Monell claim. The prosecutors had provided race-neutral explanations for each plaintiff's dismissal. For Carter, the prosecutor noted his expressed bias against evidence from Shreveport. For Johnson, the prosecutor highlighted her potential bias against the police department due to a family member's felony conviction. For Hawthorne, the prosecutor found her colloquies with defense counsel problematic due to her preconceived notions about firearm possession. The court found these explanations sufficient and not merely pretexts for race-based dismissals. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' statistical evidence did not prove discriminatory motive. Without an underlying Equal Protection claim, the plaintiffs' Monell claim failed. View "Pipkins v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves Cailin Hardell, who sued Adrian Vanzyl, Waleed Mohsen, and Blumberg Capital for sexual assault and battery, sexual harassment, and retaliation, among other claims, related to an incident in Miami, Florida in March 2022. Vanzyl, a non-resident defendant, moved to quash service of summons of the first amended complaint, arguing that he had insufficient contacts with California for the trial court to exercise either specific or general personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed and also denied Hardell’s request to conduct jurisdictional discovery.The trial court's decision was based on its finding that Vanzyl was not domiciled or continuously and systematically present in California in March 2022, and that Vanzyl had insufficient suit-related contacts with California. Hardell appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its findings and that it should have granted her request for jurisdictional discovery.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four concluded that the connection between Hardell’s claims against Vanzyl and his contacts with California was too attenuated to support specific jurisdiction. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether it could exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl notwithstanding its finding that he was not domiciled in California in March 2022, and that it abused its discretion in denying Hardell’s request for discovery. The case was remanded, with Hardell being allowed to conduct limited discovery addressing whether the trial court may exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl. View "Hardell v. Vanzyl" on Justia Law