Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Several environmental organizations filed a citizen suit against private timber companies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), alleging that the companies' planned logging project in Oregon would harm marbled murrelets, a species of threatened birds. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction against the logging project. The timber companies appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' notice of the suit was invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ESA's citizen-suit notice requirement is not jurisdictional, but a claims-processing rule subject to waiver and forfeiture. The court found that the timber companies possibly forfeited their challenge to the notice letter, but decided to address the issue and concluded that the notice was sufficient.The court also held that the district court correctly applied the standard for "actual injury" under the ESA. The court found that the timber companies' planned actions would "harm" marbled murrelets, as the logging project would significantly impair the birds' breeding patterns by removing their habitat. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had established proximate causation under the ESA, and thus, the permanent injunction against the logging project was upheld. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Scott Timber Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a clerical error by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that resulted in a taxpayer, Jeffrey Page, receiving a tax refund check significantly larger than he was entitled to. Page returned only a portion of the excess refund, prompting the United States government to sue under 26 U.S.C. § 7405 to recover the outstanding balance. Page did not respond to the lawsuit, leading the government to move for default judgment. However, the district court denied the motion and dismissed the complaint as untimely, arguing that the two-year limitations period began when Page received the refund check.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of when the two-year limitations period began. The appellate court held that the limitations period to sue to recover an erroneous refund starts on the date the erroneous refund check clears the Federal Reserve and payment to the taxpayer is authorized by the Treasury. As Page's refund check cleared less than two years before the government sued, the appellate court held that the complaint was timely and that the district court erred by dismissing it. The appellate court also noted that the district court had improperly shifted the burden to the government to prove at the pleading stage that its claim against Page was timely. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Page" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Independent School District 194 and its superintendent. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights by discriminating against their political viewpoints. The controversy arose when the school district allowed the display of Black Lives Matter (BLM) posters in classrooms but rejected requests to display "All Lives Matter" and "Blue Lives Matter" posters and shirts. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims and denied the unnamed plaintiffs' motion to proceed under pseudonyms.The district court ruled that the unnamed plaintiffs had not sufficiently established a threat of a hostile public reaction to their lawsuit that would warrant anonymity. It also concluded that the BLM posters constituted government speech that is not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The plaintiffs appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to proceed under pseudonyms, finding that the unnamed plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence of a compelling fear of retaliation. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to allow a court to draw the plausible inference that the BLM posters are expressions of private persons, not government speech. The court also found that the district had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing the display of BLM posters but rejecting "All Lives Matter" and "Blue Lives Matter" posters and shirts. View "Cajune v. Independent School District 194" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a foreclosure judgment. The plaintiff, Susanne P. Wahba, had a loan secured by a mortgage on her property. The defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., acquired the loan and later counterclaimed to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the setting of new law days. On remand, the plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion to reset the law days, arguing that the judgment of strict foreclosure did not account for the substantial increase in property values that had occurred during the appeal. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to revisit the merits of the strict foreclosure judgment, as it was bound by the Appellate Court’s rescript order requiring the setting of new law days. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal with the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from entertaining the plaintiff’s request to modify the judgment of strict foreclosure and order a foreclosure by sale. The court also held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court lacked authority to entertain the plaintiff’s request. The court further held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was required to file a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to present evidence that the value of the subject property had substantially increased since the date of the original judgment before the trial court could exercise that authority. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wahba v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A man convicted of murder sued his former attorney and law firm for legal malpractice and fraud, alleging they failed to properly represent him in a federal civil rights action and a state habeas action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims related to the habeas action, concluding they were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the legal malpractice claim but reversed with respect to the fraud claim.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Court's reliance on a previous case that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malpractice action renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justiciability that implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the question was whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal malpractice. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed with respect to the plaintiff's claim of criminal malpractice and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooke v. Williams" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

A group of medical providers sued a former employee for breach of an employment agreement. The employee counterclaimed, alleging he was owed unpaid wages and bonuses. The providers initially raised "failure to state a claim" as their sole affirmative defense. However, after nearly four years of litigation, they attempted to argue for the first time that the contract was illegal and therefore void. The lower court found that the providers had waived this affirmative defense and issued a judgment in favor of the employee. The providers appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the providers' claim of illegality.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals. It held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in striking the providers' last-minute effort to raise a new affirmative defense. The court noted that the providers had failed to raise the illegality defense in their initial responsive pleading and did not seek to amend their answer in a timely manner. Furthermore, the providers did not raise the illegality defense until after the trial court had already awarded summary judgment to the employee on the issue of breach of contract, more than ten months after the close of discovery, more than nine months after the lower court's deadline for filing dispositive motions, and almost four years after the original lawsuit was filed. The court concluded that the record was sufficient to support a finding that the providers' delay was unjustified and prejudicial. The court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's order striking the illegality affirmative defense, and remanded the case to the Court of Civil Appeals to resolve any remaining undecided issues raised in the appeal. View "Tulsa Ambulatory Procedure Center v. Olmstead" on Justia Law

This case involves a marital dissolution proceeding between Monique Covington Moore and Charles Moore. During the discovery process, Covington served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on non-parties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC. Both companies objected and refused to comply with most of the subpoenas’ demands. Covington then filed a motion to compel their compliance. The trial court granted the motion in substantial part and ordered each company to pay Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions.The companies appealed, raising several claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings. They argued about the timeliness of Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer, the sufficiency of her attempts to meet and confer with Acendi, and the reasonableness of the monetary sanctions award, among other matters.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three agreed with only one of their contentions. It held that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed were not compensable as discovery sanctions because they were not incurred as part of the necessary costs of bringing the motions. Therefore, the court reversed the orders in part and remanded for redetermination of the sanctions awards. In all other respects, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "In re Marriage of Moore" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants, collectively referred to as "Challengers", who appealed judgments declaring section 67.1175.1 of the Missouri Statutes constitutionally invalid. This provision, in conjunction with section 67.1177, required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity, which was deemed to violate article VI, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court attempted to rectify the constitutional invalidity by modifying section 67.1175.1. The Challengers, however, argued that despite the modification, the sections still required a political subdivision to grant public money to a private entity in violation of the constitution. They further argued that the entire statutory scheme must be struck down because the sections were not severable.The circuit court had declared section 67.1175.1 constitutionally invalid because it mandated the lake area business districts to transfer tax funds to the advisory board, a private nonprofit entity. The court modified the section by removing the phrase "which shall be a nonprofit entity". The Challengers appealed this decision, arguing that the modified sections still violated the constitution.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the circuit court erred in modifying section 67.1175.1. The court concluded that the section, as modified, and section 67.1177, still required political subdivisions to grant public money to a private entity, violating the Missouri Constitution. The court also concluded that the void provisions were not severable from the remaining provisions of the statutory scheme. As a result, the entire statutory scheme was declared constitutionally invalid. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the Supreme Court entered the judgment the circuit court should have entered, declaring sections 67.1170, 67.1175, 67.1177, and 67.1170 constitutionally invalid and void in their entireties. View "Salamun v. The Camden County Clerk" on Justia Law

The case involves Xingfei Luo, who twice sought a restraining order against Professor Eugene Volokh under the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Luo wanted to prevent Volokh from identifying her in his writings. After the trial court dismissed the first petition, Luo moved to "strike" exhibits she filed in support of that failed petition. The trial court denied that motion and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude her from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. Luo appealed these orders. The second case involves Luo’s second petition for a restraining order where the trial court granted Volokh’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion and dismissed Luo’s second petition. Luo also appealed from a subsequent order granting Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in her second petition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Luo's first petition for a restraining order, concluding that the alleged harmful conduct was "likely protected free speech." The court also found that the alleged facts did not comprise acts of violence, threats of violence, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed the petitioner and caused substantial emotional distress. Luo did not appeal from the order discharging that petition. However, Luo filed an "ex parte application for an order to strike and withdraw improperly filed exhibits." The trial court denied Luo’s ex parte motion to “strike” her exhibits because Luo had not completed the proper forms for submitting an ex parte motion. Luo filed a new motion and Volokh again opposed it, and also filed a separate motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. The trial court denied Luo’s motion to strike her exhibits and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the order granting Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Luo’s second petition. The court dismissed Luo’s appeals as to the trial court’s ruling on her motion to strike exhibits in her first petition and the court’s granting of Volokh’s motions in both cases to use her actual name. The court concluded that these rulings are based on nonappealable orders. View "Luo v. Volokh" on Justia Law