Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In January 2016, Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc. (McPeek) entered into an oral agreement with Nancy Polk, owner of Normandy Farm, LLC (Normandy), to train a horse named Daddy’s Lil’ Darling. McPeek was to receive monthly training fees, room and board fees, and 12% of the horse’s winnings. After Polk’s death in August 2018, her heirs decided to sell the horse, which fetched $3,500,000 at auction. McPeek claimed an additional 5% commission on the sale, asserting it was part of his oral agreement with Polk, although this term was not documented in writing.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Normandy, citing KRS 230.357(11), which requires a signed writing for any compensation related to the sale of a horse. The court found that McPeek’s claim for a 5% commission was barred by this statute, as there was no written agreement. The court also dismissed McPeek’s quantum meruit claim, stating that he had already been compensated for his training services and that exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief were not present.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that KRS 230.357(11) only applied to buyers, sellers, and their agents in horse transactions. The court reasoned that McPeek’s commission was for training services, not for the sale of the horse, and thus the statute did not apply.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that KRS 230.357(11) applies broadly to any form of compensation connected with the sale of a horse, including McPeek’s claimed commission. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language requires a signed writing for such compensation to be enforceable, and McPeek’s lack of a written agreement barred his claims. View "NORMANDY FARM, LLC V. KENNETH MCPEEK RACING STABLE, INC." on Justia Law

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sonya Porretto owns Porretto Beach in Galveston, Texas. After filing for bankruptcy in 2009, her case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. In 2020, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the Porretto Beach property back to her. In 2021, Porretto filed a lawsuit against the City of Galveston Park Board of Trustees, the City of Galveston, the Texas General Land Office (GLO), and its Commissioner, alleging that their actions constituted takings without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Porretto’s lawsuit. The court concluded that Porretto lacked standing to sue the GLO and its Commissioner because her complaint did not establish a causal link between their actions and her alleged injuries. The court also found that it lacked bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Porretto did not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her constitutional claims. Additionally, the court denied Porretto leave to amend her complaint and her motion for recusal of the presiding judge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the GLO and its Commissioner without prejudice, agreeing that Porretto lacked standing. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the Park Board and the City of Galveston, finding that the district court does have federal question jurisdiction over her constitutional claims despite her failure to cite § 1983. The case was remanded for the district court to consider alternative arguments for dismissal and the issue of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Porretto’s motion for recusal and her request for reassignment to a different judge. View "Porretto v. City of Galveston" on Justia Law

Daroush Ebrahimi, a prisoner serving a life sentence in Illinois, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. and Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui, alleging medical mistreatment. Ebrahimi was granted in forma pauperis status, indicating his inability to pay court fees. The district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Following this, Wexford and Dr. Siddiqui submitted a bill of costs totaling $5,243.45 for deposition transcripts, which Ebrahimi opposed, citing his indigency.The district court awarded the full amount of costs to the defendants. The court noted that Ebrahimi's prison trust fund account had a balance of $1,663.70 in July 2022, which had decreased to $936.84 by September 2022. The court concluded that Ebrahimi had not demonstrated an inability to pay the costs, either currently or in the future, despite his in forma pauperis status at the beginning of the lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to the defendants. The court emphasized that Ebrahimi failed to provide sufficient documentation to prove his inability to pay the costs. The appellate court also found that the district court provided an adequate explanation for its decision, noting that Ebrahimi had substantial funds in his account and had received ample funds since the litigation began. Thus, the assessment of costs against Ebrahimi was affirmed. View "Ebrahimi v. Siddiqui" on Justia Law

Aimee Sturgill, a registered nurse and devout Christian, objected to the American Red Cross's COVID-19 vaccination mandate, citing her religious beliefs. She requested a religious exemption, explaining that her faith required her to treat her body as a temple and avoid defiling it with the vaccine, which she believed could cause harm due to her blood clotting disorder. The Red Cross denied her request, stating that her objections were medically, not religiously, based and terminated her employment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Sturgill's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that she did not plausibly allege a prima facie case for a failure-to-accommodate claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court also concluded that Sturgill did not set forth a separate disparate-treatment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by requiring Sturgill to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage, which is not necessary under the plausibility standard set by Twombly and Iqbal. The appellate court found that Sturgill's complaint plausibly alleged that her refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine was an aspect of her religious observance or belief. However, the court agreed with the district court that Sturgill's complaint did not set forth a standalone disparate-treatment claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sturgill v. American Red Cross" on Justia Law

An attorney, Jeffrey Cogan, filed a federal lawsuit challenging an Arizona state court judgment against him for malicious prosecution. The state court judgment arose from Cogan's actions during a federal bankruptcy proceeding involving Arnaldo Trabucco. Cogan sought a declaration that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the malicious prosecution claim because it involved conduct exclusively within federal jurisdiction.The Arizona state court had granted partial summary judgment against Cogan, finding him liable for malicious prosecution and awarding $8 million in damages. Cogan appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the liability finding but vacated the damages award, remanding for a new trial on damages. Cogan then filed the federal lawsuit before the retrial, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Cogan's federal complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the malicious prosecution claim was completely preempted by federal law, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The court reasoned that state courts lack jurisdiction over malicious prosecution claims arising from federal bankruptcy proceedings, as established in MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc. Therefore, the state court judgment was subject to collateral attack in federal court.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Cogan's challenge to the state court judgment to proceed in federal court. View "COGAN V. TRABUCCO" on Justia Law

In Illinois, voters can cast their ballots by mail, and election officials can receive and count these ballots for up to two weeks after Election Day, provided they are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs, including Illinois voters and political candidates, challenged this procedure, arguing it unlawfully extends the voting period and dilutes their votes. They also claimed it forced them to spend additional resources on their campaigns beyond Election Day. The district court dismissed their claims, ruling that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and also rejected the claims on the merits.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. The court found that Plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient injury in fact, as their claims of vote dilution and additional campaign expenditures were deemed too speculative and generalized. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete and particularized injury. The court found that any potential vote dilution would affect all Illinois voters equally, making it a generalized grievance. Additionally, the court determined that the claimed campaign expenditures were speculative and not directly traceable to the Illinois ballot receipt procedure. Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Beverly Dale Jolly worked as an inspector at nuclear plants from 1980 to 1984, where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC. In 2016, Dale was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife Brenda sued multiple defendants, settling with all except Fisher and Crosby for $2,270,000. The jury awarded Dale $200,000 and Brenda $100,000. The Jollys filed a motion for a new trial nisi additur, claiming the verdicts were inadequate. The trial court granted the motion, increasing Dale's award to $1,580,000 and Brenda's to $290,000, while allowing Fisher and Crosby the option to reject the additur for a new trial.The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Fisher and Crosby appealed, questioning the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur and the partial denial of their motion for setoff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court applied the correct standard and procedure for a new trial nisi additur and whether it properly allocated the pretrial settlement proceeds for setoff purposes.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decisions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial nisi additur, finding the jury's verdicts inadequate but not grossly so. The court also upheld the trial court's allocation of the pretrial settlement proceeds, agreeing that the allocation was reasonable and that the setoff was correctly applied only to the same injury claims. The case was remanded for Fisher and Crosby to either accept the additur or opt for a new trial. View "Jolly v. Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC" on Justia Law

In the early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina issued collateralized bonds as part of a sovereign-debt-relief plan. Argentina retained reversionary interests in the collateral, which would revert to Argentina if the bonds were fully paid. However, Argentina defaulted on the bonds in 2001. Two decades later, holders of other defaulted Argentine bonds sought to attach these reversionary interests to satisfy judgments from Argentina’s default. They argued that the reversionary interests were used for commercial activity in the U.S., thus falling under an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the attachment of the reversionary interests. During the appeal, the bonds matured, and the district court ordered the turnover of the reversionary interests to the bondholders. Argentina appealed both the attachment and turnover orders, leading to a consolidated appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders. The court held that Argentina’s reversionary interests were not protected by the FSIA because Argentina used them in commercial activity in the U.S. The court also found Argentina’s arguments against the turnover under New York law to be meritless. Additionally, the court ordered the parties to resubmit their briefs and appendices with narrow redactions, as the reasons for sealing the case were no longer compelling. The court denied the motion to supplement the record and granted the motion to limit the scope of sealing. View "Attestor Master Value Fund LP v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

Thomas Merck applied for an entry-level position at Walmart and was given a conditional job offer pending a background check. Merck failed to disclose an old misdemeanor conviction, which was discovered during the background check. Walmart, through a third-party vendor, provided Merck with an incomplete version of the report, which indicated he was "not competitive" for the job. Walmart then revoked the job offer. Merck claimed that Walmart violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by not providing him with the full consumer report before taking adverse action.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially denied Walmart's motion to dismiss, finding that Merck had standing based on a procedural violation of the Act. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which clarified the requirements for standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Walmart renewed its motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Merck had not demonstrated a concrete injury as required by TransUnion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Merck failed to show he suffered adverse effects from the denial of the full consumer report. Specifically, Merck did not provide evidence that he could have used the withheld information to his benefit, such as changing the outcome of his job application or affecting his subsequent job search. The court also rejected Merck's analogy to procedural due process claims and traditional common-law harms, finding that the statutory duty under the Fair Credit Reporting Act did not closely resemble these traditional harms. Therefore, Merck did not have constitutional standing to sue Walmart. View "Merck v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law