Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Keith Edward Myers posted a negative online review about the legal services provided by Jerry M. Blevins. Blevins, representing himself, sued Myers in the Elmore Circuit Court for defamation per se, invasion of privacy, wantonness, and negligence, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court sealed the case record and, after unsuccessful attempts to serve Myers, allowed service by publication. Myers did not respond, leading to a default judgment awarding Blevins $500,000 in compensatory damages, $1.5 million in punitive damages, and a permanent injunction against Myers.Myers later appeared in court, filing motions to unseal the record and set aside the default judgment, arguing improper service and venue, among other issues. The trial court unsealed the record but did not rule on the motion to set aside the default judgment. Myers filed for bankruptcy, temporarily staying proceedings, but the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Myers then filed a notice of appeal and a renewed motion to stop execution on his property, which the trial court granted, staying execution pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court dismissed Myers's direct appeal as untimely regarding the default judgment and premature concerning the Rule 60(b) motion, which remained pending in the trial court. The court also dismissed Myers's challenge to the sealing of the record, noting that the trial court had already unsealed it, rendering the issue moot.Blevins's petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court's order quashing writs of execution was also dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court's resolution of the direct appeal allowed trial court proceedings, including Blevins's execution efforts, to resume, thus granting Blevins the relief he sought. View "Myers v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Bobby Stevenson, a prisoner at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, claims he was forced to labor in the prison’s agricultural fields despite severe ankle pain caused by two broken surgical screws. He alleges that two prison physicians, Dr. Randy Lavespere and Dr. Paul M. Tocé, refused to fix the screws or relieve him from field labor. Stevenson asserts that the broken screws caused him tremendous pain and secondary injuries, and that the physicians ignored his complaints and medical recommendations for surgery.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana reviewed the case. The magistrate judge allowed Stevenson to file an amended complaint and recommended denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, which argued for qualified immunity. The district court accepted this recommendation and denied the motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Stevenson sufficiently alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by ignoring his severe medical needs and forcing him to work despite his condition. The court also determined that the defendants had fair warning from existing case law that their actions were unconstitutional. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, rejecting the defendants' claim of qualified immunity. View "Stevenson v. Toce" on Justia Law

Amy Rae, a school nurse employed by Woburn Public Schools (WPS), alleged that she faced retaliatory harassment due to her advocacy for students with disabilities and complaints about her own mistreatment. Rae claimed that the harassment, primarily by Kennedy Middle School Principal Carl Nelson, began in 2011 and continued for over a decade. She filed a lawsuit in November 2022, asserting claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Massachusetts's antidiscrimination statute (Chapter 151B), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Rae's complaint on May 5, 2023, ruling that she failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted. The court found that Rae could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine to save her untimely discrimination claims and dismissed her timely state and federal discrimination claims on other grounds.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that Rae could not invoke the continuing violations doctrine to rescue her time-barred claims, as her allegations included discrete acts of retaliation that accrued separately. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Rae's timely ADA, Section 504, and Chapter 151B claims, concluding that Rae did not plausibly allege severe or pervasive harassment necessary to sustain a retaliatory harassment claim. The court noted that Rae's allegations of two incidents within the actionable period were insufficient to meet the standard for severe or pervasive harassment. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Rae's complaint. View "Rae v. Woburn Public Schools" on Justia Law

David Meinhardt, a police officer, was suspended for 44 hours by the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, a decision upheld by the City of Sunnyvale Personnel Board. Meinhardt filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, challenging the suspension. On August 6, 2020, the court issued an order denying the petition. The City served Meinhardt with a notice of entry of this order on August 14, 2020. Subsequently, on September 25, 2020, the court entered a formal judgment, which Meinhardt served on the City on September 22, 2020.The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dismissed Meinhardt's appeal as untimely, holding that the August 6 order was the final judgment from which the appeal should have been taken. The court reasoned that the order was sufficiently final to constitute the judgment, thus starting the 60-day period for filing an appeal.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve the issue of when the time to appeal begins in administrative mandate proceedings. The court held that the time to appeal starts with the entry of a formal judgment or the service of notice of entry of judgment, not with the filing of an order or other ruling. The court emphasized the importance of clear, bright-line rules to avoid confusion and ensure that parties do not inadvertently forfeit their right to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, finding that Meinhardt's appeal, filed within 60 days of the entry of the formal judgment, was timely. View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

Thomas Labs, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, sued Amber Marie Dukes and her veterinary supply company for money owed on products delivered. During the litigation, Dukes died, and her counsel filed a notice of death but did not serve any nonparty successors or representatives. Thomas Labs moved to substitute Dukes' trust and trustee, Jason Hilliard, as parties, which the district court granted. Later, Dukes' will was filed in probate court, appointing her brother, Lynn Hill, as personal representative. Dukes' counsel then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither Hilliard nor the trust were proper representatives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against Dukes, concluding that the 180-day deadline for substitution under NRCP 25(a) had passed. The court found that service of the notice of death on the parties alone triggered the deadline, even though no court-appointed executor or administrator existed when the notice was filed. The district court also denied Thomas Labs' motion to substitute a special administrator, Shara Berry, as untimely.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified that under NRCP 25(a), when a decedent's attorney files a notice of death, they must serve the notice on nonparty successors or representatives to start the 180-day deadline for substitution. The court also noted that NRS 7.075 requires the decedent's attorney to file a motion to substitute a proper party within 90 days of the client's death. The Supreme Court found that the 180-day deadline never started because Dukes' counsel failed to serve the nonparty successors or representatives. Consequently, the district court's dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for the substitution of a special administrator for Dukes. View "THOMAS LABS, LLC VS. DUKES" on Justia Law

Retailers House of CB USA, LLC, and Chinese Laundry Lifestyle, LLC, leased commercial space at the Miracle Mile Shops, operated by PHWLV, LLC, which also runs the Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino. On July 8, 2017, a fire-suppression pipe burst, causing significant water damage to the retailers' stores and inventory. The retailers sued PHWLV for negligence in maintaining the fire-suppression system.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the retailers on the elements of duty and breach, concluding that PHWLV had a duty to prevent items on its property from damaging others' property and had breached this duty. The case proceeded to a jury trial on causation and damages, resulting in a verdict awarding House of CB $3,133,755.56 and Chinese Laundry $411,581.41. The district court denied PHWLV's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the jury verdict, also awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest to House of CB.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its formulation of PHWLV's duty. The appropriate standard of care was the duty to use reasonable care in servicing and inspecting the fire-suppression system and responding to issues arising from failures within the system. The court reversed the district court's judgment on the jury verdict, vacated the post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also denied PHWLV's request to reassign the case to a different judicial department. View "PHWLV, LLC VS. HOUSE OF CB USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles contracted with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to modernize the billing system for the Department of Water and Power (LADWP). The rollout in 2013 resulted in billing errors, leading the City to sue PwC in 2015, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. Concurrently, a class action was filed against the City by Antwon Jones, represented by attorney Jack Landskroner, for overbilling. Discovery revealed that the City’s special counsel had orchestrated the class action to settle claims favorably for the City while planning to recover costs from PwC.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found the City engaged in extensive discovery abuse to conceal its misconduct, including withholding documents and providing false testimony. The court imposed $2.5 million in monetary sanctions against the City under the Civil Discovery Act, specifically sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, which allow sanctions for discovery misuse.The California Court of Appeal reversed the sanctions, interpreting the Civil Discovery Act as not granting general authority to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct beyond specific discovery methods. The appellate court held that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 do not independently authorize sanctions but must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the Act.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the trial court did have the authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for the City’s pattern of discovery abuse. The Supreme Court clarified that these sections provide general authority to sanction discovery misuse, including systemic abuses not covered by specific discovery method provisions. View "City of Los Angeles v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP" on Justia Law

In February 2016, two Seattle police officers, Scott Miller and Michael Spaulding, fatally shot Che Andre Taylor during an attempted arrest. Kshama Sawant, a Seattle City Council member, publicly referred to the incident as a "blatant murder" and later reiterated that Taylor was "murdered by the police." Following an inquest, prosecutors declined to file charges against the officers due to insufficient evidence of malice. Miller and Spaulding subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging defamation and outrage under state law, as well as a federal defamation claim against Sawant.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the federal defamation claim but retained jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court later granted Sawant's motion for summary judgment on the state law claims and awarded her expert witness deposition expenses, including fees for preparation time. Miller and Spaulding appealed the decision, challenging the award of expert witness fees and the admissibility of the expert's opinions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows for the recovery of reasonable expenses for time an expert witness spends preparing for a deposition. The court joined other circuits in concluding that such preparation fees are recoverable under Rule 26. The court found that the expert witness deposition preparation fees awarded to Sawant were reasonable and did not result in manifest injustice. The Ninth Circuit also noted that objections to the admissibility of the expert's opinions did not negate the obligation to pay a reasonable fee under Rule 26. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and the award of expert witness deposition expenses. View "Miller v. Sawant" on Justia Law

Michael Mayes filed a complaint against American Hallmark Insurance Company in state court. American Hallmark received a copy of the complaint and removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction before being formally served. Mayes moved to remand the case, arguing that removal was improper because American Hallmark had not yet been formally served.A magistrate judge concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) does not require formal service before removal and recommended denying the motion to remand. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed the issue de novo and agreed with the magistrate judge’s interpretation, denying Mayes’ motion to remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a defendant may remove a state-court civil action once it receives a copy of the complaint, without waiting for formal service. The court clarified that the statute sets a deadline for removal but does not establish a "window" that prohibits removal before formal service. The court also noted that the statutory context and precedent from other circuit courts support this interpretation. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Mayes' motion to remand. View "Mayes v. American Hallmark Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Leslie Torgerson, a non-Indian, and Terri Torgerson, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe (SWO), were married in South Dakota. Terri filed for divorce in the SWO tribal court, while Leslie filed for divorce in Roberts County. Leslie moved to dismiss the tribal court proceedings, arguing lack of jurisdiction and improper service, but the tribal court denied his motion. Subsequently, Terri moved to dismiss Leslie’s state court proceedings, and the circuit court granted her motion, recognizing the tribal court’s order under the principle of full faith and credit. Leslie appealed this decision.The circuit court concluded that it shared concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal court over the divorce but deferred to the tribal court’s order, which it believed had obtained valid personal jurisdiction first. The court also found that the tribal court’s order was entitled to full faith and credit, despite Leslie’s arguments to the contrary.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the circuit court erred in extending full faith and credit to the tribal court’s order. Instead, the court should have applied the principles of comity under SDCL 1-1-25, which requires clear and convincing evidence that the tribal court had proper jurisdiction and that the order was obtained through a fair process. The Supreme Court found that the tribal court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Leslie, a non-Indian, and that the tribal court’s order did not meet the requirements for comity. Consequently, the tribal court’s order was not enforceable, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Leslie’s divorce action was reversed. View "Torgerson v. Torgerson" on Justia Law