Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dylan H. initiated a legal proceeding to establish paternity of a minor child, P.C., against Brooke C., the child's natural mother. Brooke's partner, Brandon B., intervened, claiming paternity based on a notarized acknowledgment he had signed. Dylan then filed a third-party complaint to disestablish Brandon's paternity, alleging fraud and material mistake of fact. The district court for Nemaha County bifurcated the issues and held an evidentiary hearing on the disestablishment claim. The court found fraud and material mistake of fact, disestablishing Brandon's paternity, and later denied a motion for a new trial.The district court's decision to disestablish Brandon's paternity was appealed by Brooke and Brandon. They also appealed the denial of their motion for a new trial. However, the district court had not resolved all claims in the case, including Dylan's action to establish paternity, custody, and support. The Nebraska Court of Appeals had previously dismissed an appeal related to genetic testing, determining it was not filed within the required timeframe and did not affect a substantial right.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and determined that the orders appealed from did not resolve all claims and involved multiple parties, thus implicating Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1). This statute requires certification for an order to be appealable when it adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties. The district court had not provided such certification. Consequently, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the requirements for a final, appealable order under § 25-1315(1) were not met. View "Dylan H. v. Brooke" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a Nebraska legislative bill, L.B. 574, which regulates both abortion and gender-altering care. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., and its medical director, Sarah Traxler, M.D., argued that the bill violated the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution, which mandates that no bill shall contain more than one subject. The bill, titled "Let Them Grow Act," was initially introduced to prohibit gender-altering procedures for minors but was later amended to include provisions from a stalled bill, L.B. 626, which restricted abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy.The District Court for Lancaster County ruled that Traxler lacked standing but found the single subject challenge justiciable. The court concluded that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers. Planned Parenthood appealed, and Hilgers cross-appealed, arguing that the single subject challenge was a nonjusticiable political question.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution. The court reasoned that the bill's title, "public health and welfare," was sufficiently broad to encompass both the regulation of abortion and gender-altering care. The court found that all provisions of the bill were germane to the subject of public health and welfare, thus meeting the constitutional requirement. The court also rejected Hilgers' argument that the single subject challenge was nonjusticiable, reaffirming its authority to review legislative acts for constitutional compliance. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

A Catholic priest, Andrew J. Syring, sued the Archdiocese of Omaha, alleging defamation, tortious interference with prospective employment, slander per se, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. His claims stemmed from the Archdiocese publishing his name on a list of clergy with substantiated claims of sexual misconduct and a subsequent phone conversation where a church official referenced this list when discussing Syring's potential employment as a hospital chaplain.The District Court for Cuming County granted summary judgment for the Archdiocese on Syring's defamation claim, finding it barred by Nebraska’s one-year statute of limitations. The court ruled that the initial publication of the list in 2018 started the limitations period, and subsequent updates to the list did not constitute republication. The court also granted summary judgment on Syring's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, concluding that Syring failed to provide medical evidence of severe emotional distress.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the single publication rule applied to the Archdiocese's list, meaning the statute of limitations began with the initial publication. The court also found that the Archdiocese's conduct did not meet the high threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of Syring's claims for tortious interference, slander per se, and breach of fiduciary duty, citing the ministerial exception. This doctrine prevents courts from interfering with the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers, thus barring Syring's claims related to his employment and the Archdiocese's internal governance decisions. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, dismissing all of Syring's claims. View "Syring v. Archdiocese of Omaha" on Justia Law

In the first case, a young woman with severe headaches due to excess brain fluid had a shunt catheter implanted. She later returned to the emergency room with worsening symptoms, and a brain scan was performed. Dr. Swofford, a diagnostic radiologist, verified the scan results, but the emergency procedure to relieve her brain pressure failed, and she died. The plaintiff, representing the decedent's estate, sued Dr. Swofford and his practice for medical malpractice. The trial court ruled that the relevant specialty was diagnostic radiology, not neuroradiology, and thus excluded the plaintiff's neuroradiologist expert. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding neuroradiology to be the relevant specialty, allowing the expert to testify.In the second case, a plaintiff sued Dr. Colton for medical malpractice after multiple rhinoplasties resulted in a nasal deformity. Dr. Colton was certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Armstrong, had the same certifications but spent most of his time on otolaryngology. The trial court found the expert's qualifications unclear and denied a motion to strike his testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the relevant specialty was facial plastic and reconstructive surgery, and excluded the expert because he did not spend the majority of his time in that specialty.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed both cases. It held that the Woodard decision, which conflated "specialty" and "subspecialty," was incorrect. The Court clarified that "specialty" refers to general board certifications recognized by major certifying entities and does not require matching subspecialties. In Stokes, the Court affirmed that diagnostic radiology was the relevant specialty, allowing the neuroradiologist to testify. In Selliman, the Court remanded the case to determine whether facial plastic and reconstructive surgery is a subspecialty, requiring further fact-finding by the trial court. View "Estate Of Horn v. Swofford" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the law firm Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner and its former associate, Edward Festeryga. Abraham Watkins terminated Festeryga’s employment after discovering that he attempted to take clients and firm files to a new firm. Abraham Watkins sued Festeryga in Texas state court for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Festeryga moved to dismiss the suit under Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which stayed the expedited discovery sought by Abraham Watkins. Despite agreeing to produce certain documents, Festeryga filed a notice of removal to federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction as a Canadian citizen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas remanded the case back to state court. The district court did not address whether Festeryga had shown diversity of citizenship but concluded that Festeryga waived his right to remove by participating in state court proceedings, specifically by filing a TCPA motion to dismiss. The district court found that this action demonstrated an intent to invoke the jurisdiction of the state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had appellate jurisdiction over the remand order. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, citing its precedent in In re Weaver, which held that waiver-based remand orders are jurisdictional under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and thus unappealable under § 1447(d). The court noted that although it disagreed with the reasoning in Weaver, it was bound by the rule of orderliness to follow the precedent. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga" on Justia Law

A nonpartisan candidate filed a complaint challenging the primary election ballot in Hawaii, arguing that the requirement for voters to select a political preference violated the Hawaii Constitution and various state statutes. The plaintiff sought an order to redesign the ballot and declare the current ballot invalid.The State of Hawaii, Office of Elections, and the Chief Election Officer moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim or lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and found that the plaintiff's claims under HRS §§ 11-173.5, 11-174.5, and 91-14 were not valid because no election results had been posted, which is a prerequisite for these statutes. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge all statewide ballots under HRS § 11-172, as he was only a candidate in the Mayor's race in Honolulu. The court also determined that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a claim under HRS § 11-172 because the alleged ballot defects would not impact his nonpartisan race.The Supreme Court of Hawaii dismissed the election contest claims for failure to state a claim. The court also construed the complaint as a petition for a writ of mandamus but denied the petition, finding that the plaintiff did not establish a clear and indisputable right to the relief requested or a lack of other means to address the alleged wrong. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Dicks v. State " on Justia Law

Michele Tourangeau filed a complaint against her former employer, Nappi Distributors, alleging nine employment-related claims. Nappi moved for summary judgment on all claims, but the District Court denied the motion for all but one claim, leading to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of Nappi on all claims. Tourangeau then filed a motion for a new trial, citing juror bias and errors in jury instructions, which the District Court denied.Tourangeau appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. She argued that the District Court erred in not disqualifying a juror who allegedly displayed bias and failed to answer voir dire questions truthfully. The District Court had previously determined that the juror's conduct and Facebook activity did not demonstrate bias sufficient to warrant disqualification. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's handling of the juror bias allegations, noting that the District Court had appropriately assessed the juror's behavior and responses.Tourangeau also challenged the jury's verdict on one of her Equal Pay Act (EPA) claims, arguing that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence and that the District Court erred in not giving a specific jury instruction. The appellate court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that Nappi had provided sufficient evidence that the pay differential was based on a business decision unrelated to sex. The court also agreed with the District Court's refusal to give the requested jury instruction, as there was no evidence of a prior illegal practice of gender discrimination in hiring.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that there was no reversible error in the handling of the juror bias allegations or the EPA claim. View "Tourangeau v. Nappi Distributors" on Justia Law

The case involves Dianna Murphy, who sued Thomas Schaible, her financial advisor and brother-in-law, for breaching his fiduciary duty. Thomas managed an investment account jointly held by Dianna and her husband Michael. Amidst marital difficulties, Michael instructed Thomas to transfer $2.5 million from the joint account to a bank account in Colorado, which Michael then moved to a Mexican account solely under his control. Dianna was not informed of this transfer and claimed that Thomas failed to protect her interests, despite knowing about the couple's marital issues and her interest in dividing their assets.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado heard the case. The jury found Thomas liable for breaching his fiduciary duty and awarded Dianna $600,000 in economic damages. Thomas filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), arguing that Dianna suffered no legally compensable injury and that he did not breach any fiduciary duty by following Michael’s instructions. The district court denied this motion and awarded Dianna prejudgment interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Thomas breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform Dianna of the transfer and not advising her on steps to protect her interests. The court also upheld the award of prejudgment interest, rejecting Thomas’s procedural arguments. The court emphasized that fiduciary duties include the duty to inform and act impartially, which Thomas failed to do. The judgment against Thomas was affirmed, and the award of prejudgment interest was deemed procedurally sound. View "Murphy v. Schaible" on Justia Law

The case involves a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) brought by Relators against Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) and Native American Services Corporation (NASCO). The Relators allege that GAIC and NASCO fraudulently took control of DWG & Associates, Inc. (DWG), a company that had graduated from the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program but was still performing on 8(a) contracts. The 8(a) program is designed to help small, disadvantaged businesses compete for federal contracts. DWG, initially owned and controlled by a disadvantaged individual, Gose, lost its eligibility when GAIC and NASCO allegedly took over its ownership and control without notifying the SBA or seeking a waiver, as required by the program's regulations.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the Relators' claims with prejudice. The court found that DWG, having graduated from the 8(a) program, was no longer a "participant" and thus not subject to the program's ownership and control requirements. Consequently, the court ruled that Relators failed to allege any false claims. Additionally, the court held that fraudulent inducement related to bidding on government contracts was not actionable under the FCA and that Relators failed to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) for pleading fraud.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that a business that has graduated from the 8(a) program but is still performing on 8(a) contracts remains a "participant" and is subject to the program's ownership and control requirements. The court further held that submitting bids and claims for payment under these circumstances without notifying the SBA or obtaining a waiver could constitute an actionable claim under the FCA. The court also found that Relators' complaint met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) by providing sufficient details about the alleged fraudulent conduct, including the specific contracts, task orders, and the date DWG became ineligible to bid. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Berry v. Native American Services Corporation" on Justia Law

Peter Quach filed a lawsuit against California Commerce Club (Commerce Club) after being terminated from his job at the casino where he had worked for nearly 30 years. Quach's complaint included claims of wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and he demanded a jury trial. Commerce Club had previously provided Quach with a signed arbitration agreement from 2015, which mandated binding arbitration for employment-related disputes. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Commerce Club answered the complaint and engaged in extensive discovery, including propounding interrogatories and taking Quach’s deposition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Commerce Club’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Commerce Club had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation for 13 months. The court noted that Commerce Club had actively participated in discovery and requested a jury trial, actions inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. Commerce Club appealed, and the Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Quach had not shown sufficient prejudice from Commerce Club’s delay in seeking arbitration.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and abrogated the state’s arbitration-specific prejudice requirement, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The court held that under California law, as under federal law, courts should apply the same principles to determine waiver of the right to compel arbitration as they do for other contracts. The court concluded that Commerce Club had waived its right to compel arbitration by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc." on Justia Law