Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves over 1,420 Peruvian citizens alleging environmental harm due to exposure to toxic substances from the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (LOMC) in Peru. The plaintiffs claim that Doe Run Resources Corporation and related entities, which purchased LOMC in 1997, failed to reduce lead emissions, resulting in unsafe lead levels and subsequent health issues. The plaintiffs argue that Doe Run's decision-making in the United States led to their injuries.Initially, the plaintiffs filed common law tort lawsuits in Missouri state court, which were removed to federal court and consolidated. The district court dismissed several claims and defendants but allowed the substantive negligence-based claims to proceed under Missouri law. Doe Run filed motions to dismiss based on international comity and to apply Peruvian law, both of which were denied by the district court. The court also denied summary judgment on the safe harbor defense and certified its choice-of-law and comity rulings for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal under the doctrine of international comity, as the harm occurred in Peru but the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri. The court also found that the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) between the United States and Peru did not require dismissal, as the plaintiffs' claims were not explicitly addressed by the TPA. Additionally, the court determined that traditional comity factors did not necessitate dismissal, as neither the State Department nor the government of Peru had asserted their positions, and there was no adequate alternative forum in Peru. Lastly, the court concluded that extraterritoriality principles did not warrant abstention, as the plaintiffs' claims were based on conduct within the United States.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Benjamin Nordquist appealed a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. The case involves a dispute over the recording of a quitclaim deed for a portion of land in Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision, Stutsman County, North Dakota. Diane and Duane Witzig originally owned the land, which was platted into three lots in 2014. Diane Witzig later conveyed these lots to Gannon Van Gilder and Levi Hintz. In 2022, Diane Witzig provided a quitclaim deed to Nordquist for a portion of the subdivision depicted as 6th Street SW on the plat map. Nordquist attempted to record this deed, but the Stutsman County Recorder refused, citing discrepancies in the property description and forwarded it to the Auditor.The District Court of Stutsman County denied Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description and thus required a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. The court also noted that the Auditor had discretion to request the land be replatted due to the irregularities in the property description and previous conveyances.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower court that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description, necessitating a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court improperly determined that the 2018 and 2021 deeds conveyed the north 60 feet of Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision. The Supreme Court held that property ownership should be determined in a separate proceeding involving all relevant parties. The court affirmed the denial of Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Nordquist had not demonstrated a clear legal right to compel the Auditor to issue the certificate of transfer. View "Nordquist v. Alonge" on Justia Law

**Summary:**The case involves the Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) challenging Senate Bill 174 (SB 174), a law enacted by the Utah Legislature that prohibits abortion at any stage of pregnancy except in three specific circumstances. PPAU argues that SB 174 violates several rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction to halt the law's enforcement while its constitutionality was litigated. The district court granted the preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing.The State of Utah petitioned for interlocutory review, presenting two primary arguments: that PPAU lacks standing to challenge the law and that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The State argued that PPAU did not have a personal stake in the dispute and that the district court erred in its application of the preliminary injunction standard.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that PPAU has standing to challenge SB 174, satisfying both traditional and third-party standing requirements. The court found that PPAU demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury, including the threat of criminal prosecution and economic harm, which would be redressed by enjoining the law. The court also concluded that PPAU could assert the rights of its patients due to the close relationship between PPAU and its patients and the genuine obstacles patients face in asserting their own rights.The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court determined that PPAU raised serious issues concerning the constitutionality of SB 174, which should be the subject of further litigation. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that PPAU would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of harms favored an injunction, and that an injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. The preliminary injunction remains in place while PPAU litigates its claims. View "Planned Parenthood Association v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Ontario filed an eminent domain action to acquire properties owned by We Buy Houses Any Condition, LLC, located near the Ontario International Airport. The City argued that the properties did not conform to land use requirements and suffered from airport-related impacts and blight. The City held a public hearing and adopted a resolution of necessity to commence eminent domain proceedings, citing the mitigation of airport impacts and elimination of blight as public uses. However, the resolution did not describe any specific proposed project.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted summary judgment in favor of We Buy Houses, finding that the City had not articulated a proposed project as required to exercise its power of eminent domain. The court concluded that the City’s resolution of necessity was insufficient because it did not describe a specific project, which is necessary to determine public interest, necessity, and compatibility with the greatest public good and least private injury. The court also granted We Buy Houses’s request for attorney fees, making certain reductions to the requested amounts.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the City failed to identify a proposed project with sufficient specificity in its resolution of necessity, as required by the Eminent Domain Law. The court found the City’s arguments unpersuasive and concluded that the trial court properly rejected the City’s effort to exercise eminent domain. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of attorney fees to We Buy Houses, affirming the fee award. View "City of Ontario v. We Buy Houses Any Condition" on Justia Law

In 2019, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (AB 218), which allowed plaintiffs to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities within a three-year window, even if those claims were previously barred by statutes of limitations or claim presentation requirements. A.M.M. filed a complaint against the West Contra Costa Unified School District, alleging sexual assaults by a District employee from 1979 to 1983. The District argued that reviving such claims constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds under the California Constitution. The trial court overruled the District’s demurrer, leading the District to seek writ review.The trial court sustained the demurrer for the first three causes of action but overruled it regarding the gift clause argument. The District then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. The appellate court issued an order to show cause, and both parties filed responses, including amicus curiae briefs from various entities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The court reasoned that the waiver did not create new substantive liability but merely removed a procedural barrier to existing claims. The court also found that AB 218 served a valid public purpose by providing relief to victims of childhood sexual assault, aligning with the state’s interest in public welfare. Additionally, the court ruled that the District lacked standing to assert due process claims under both the federal and California Constitutions. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Thompson Corrugated Systems, Inc. (TCS) entered into an oral agreement in 2004 to act as the North American sales representative for Engico, S.r.l., an Italian manufacturer of corrugated box machinery. TCS was to receive an 8% commission on sales, later modified to a sliding scale in 2012. Despite low sales, TCS procured two significant sales for Engico in 2005 and 2017. In 2016, Engico attempted to terminate the agreement due to low sales, but TCS resisted, citing market conditions. The parties renegotiated in 2018, agreeing that TCS would remain the representative until 2021 and continue to receive commissions. However, disputes arose over commissions for sales made in 2019 and 2020, leading TCS to sue Engico for breach of contract and other state law claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted partial summary judgment in favor of TCS, finding the 2004 oral agreement valid and enforceable. The court determined that the essential terms of the agreement, including the commission structure, territory, and services, were sufficiently definite. The court also found that the agreement was terminable at will under Illinois law. The remaining claims were left to the jury, which found Engico liable for breach of contract and awarded TCS damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the 2004 oral agreement contained sufficiently definite terms and that the Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of the 2018 agreement. The court concluded that the essential terms of the agreement were clear and that the deposition testimony satisfied the Statute of Frauds’ writing requirement. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thompson Corrugated Systems, Inc. v. Engico S.r.l." on Justia Law

In January 2019, Detective Lori Russ searched Connie Reguli’s private Facebook records, allegedly due to Russ’s dislike of Reguli’s criticism of the police. Reguli discovered the search a year later while preparing for her criminal trial but did not sue at that time. In July 2022, during her sentencing, Russ seemed to admit that Reguli’s speech motivated the search. Reguli then filed a First Amendment retaliation claim against Russ and her employer in November 2022 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Reguli’s claim as untimely, reasoning that the claim accrued when Reguli learned of the search in January 2020, not when she learned of Russ’s motivation in July 2022. The court applied Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, concluding that Reguli’s lawsuit was filed too late.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Reguli’s First Amendment retaliation claim accrued when she discovered the search in January 2020, as she knew of the injury and its cause at that time. The court rejected Reguli’s argument that the claim accrued only when she learned of Russ’s retaliatory motive, stating that the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury, not necessarily the motive behind it. The court also noted that Reguli did not renew her tolling argument on appeal, thus forfeiting it. View "Reguli v. Russ" on Justia Law

Shelly Blackston underwent a liposuction procedure performed by Dr. Alva Roy Heron, Jr. in Virginia. During the procedure, she experienced severe pain, which Dr. Heron attempted to alleviate with additional anesthesia. After returning to her home in Maryland, Blackston continued to suffer pain and developed an infection, leading to hospitalization and multiple surgeries. She filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a five-day trial, after which the jury found in favor of Blackston on both claims. The jury awarded her $2,300,900 in damages, including $2,000,000 in non-economic damages. Petitioners filed post-trial motions, including a motion for statutory remittitur, arguing that Maryland’s cap on non-economic damages should apply. The circuit court granted the motion in part, reducing the non-economic damages to $755,000, consistent with Maryland’s statutory cap.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Virginia’s damages cap applied because the injury occurred in Virginia where the procedure took place. The court reasoned that the infection, which constituted the injury, was introduced during the surgery in Virginia.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that Virginia substantive law applied under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which requires the application of the law of the state where the last element of the tort occurs. The court found sufficient evidence that Blackston suffered a cognizable injury during the surgery in Virginia, making Virginia’s damages cap applicable. Thus, the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed. View "Doctor's Weight Loss Centers, Inc. v. Blackston" on Justia Law

Michael Shipton, a middle-aged man with Type 2 diabetes, worked as an underground gas mechanic for Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE). Due to his diabetes, he periodically missed work and was granted intermittent Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave in August 2017 and January 2018 for hypoglycemia. In April 2018, Shipton took two days off for severe foot pain caused by neuropathy, but BGE informed him that his FMLA certification only covered hypoglycemia. After submitting a new medical certification for neuropathy, BGE approved his request. However, in June 2018, BGE terminated Shipton, citing conflicting medical documentation.Shipton filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in June 2020, alleging FMLA interference and retaliation against BGE, Exelon Corporation, Exelon Business Services Company (EBSC), and several individual defendants. The defendants argued that Shipton was terminated based on an honest belief that he misused FMLA leave and that his claims were time-barred. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no evidence of willful FMLA violations to extend the statute of limitations and concluding that BGE had a legitimate reason for termination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Shipton failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The court found that BGE had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination based on conflicting medical documentation and that Shipton did not provide sufficient evidence to show pretext. Additionally, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of Exelon, EBSC, and the individual defendants, concluding they were not Shipton’s "employer" under the FMLA. View "Shipton v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between SPS Corp I, Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditórios Não Padronizados (SPS), and General Motors Co. (GM). GM Brazil, a subsidiary of GM, sued the Brazilian government to recover tax overpayments made by car dealerships. After winning the right to recover, GM Brazil filed a claim with Brazil’s tax agency, Receita Federal do Brasil (RFB), to determine the exact amount. Meanwhile, SPS, as the assignee of thirty-five dealerships, sought to recover the tax overpayments from GM Brazil in Brazilian courts but faced adverse decisions regarding standing and preliminary discovery.The District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed SPS’s application for discovery against GM under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which allows for discovery in aid of foreign litigation. The District Court denied the request, citing the factors from the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. The court found that the discovery sought was within the jurisdictional reach of Brazilian courts, which had already denied similar requests by SPS. The court also noted that allowing the discovery would undermine the decisions of the Brazilian courts and lead to inefficiency.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, agreeing that the Intel factors weighed against granting SPS’s discovery request. The court emphasized that the Brazilian courts had jurisdiction over the requested documents and had already denied SPS’s requests. The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to respect the Brazilian courts’ rulings and to avoid circumventing foreign proof-gathering restrictions. View "SPS Corp I v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law