Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jason Ziemann, the plaintiff, became involved in the operation of Grosz Wrecking, a business owned by his grandmother, Juanita Grosz, after her husband passed away. Ziemann moved into a home on the business property in 2014. In 2022, Grosz sought to evict Ziemann after he refused to purchase the home. Ziemann then sued Grosz, alleging they had an oral partnership agreement and sought a declaration of partnership, accounting, and dissolution, along with claims for breach of fiduciary duties and tortious interference with a business relationship. Grosz denied the partnership and counterclaimed for trespass.The District Court of McLean County denied Ziemann’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling factual issues existed regarding the partnership. The court granted Grosz’s motion, dismissing Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, citing inadmissible hearsay and lack of evidence for damages. After a bench trial, the court found the parties had formed a partnership with specific profit-sharing terms and dismissed Grosz’s trespass claim, allowing Ziemann to remain on the property until the business was dissolved. The court ordered the liquidation of partnership assets and awarded Ziemann costs.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s findings that a partnership existed and that Grosz contributed property to it. The court also upheld the dismissal of Grosz’s trespass claim and Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty. However, it reversed the lower court’s decision not to apply the default partnership winding up provisions under N.D.C.C. § 45-20-07. The case was remanded for the district court to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of costs and disbursements to Ziemann as the prevailing party. View "Ziemann v. Grosz" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

Mark Rath and Heather Zins share a child, A.J.O., born in 2004. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility, and Rath was ordered to pay child support. A.J.O. turned 18 in November 2022, ending Rath's ongoing support obligation, but he had accrued arrears. Rath was served with an order to show cause for civil contempt due to non-payment. After an evidentiary hearing, a judicial referee found Rath in contempt and ordered him to make monthly payments towards his arrears, with a suspended 20-day jail sentence contingent on a future hearing.Rath sought review by the District Court of Burleigh County, which adopted the judicial referee's findings. Rath appealed, arguing violations of his right to counsel, errors in child support calculations, and that the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the State's ability to collect more than fifty percent of his income. He also claimed the defense of laches and third-party standing should prevent enforcement of his obligations.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case under a clearly erroneous standard. The court held that Rath's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the contempt hearing did not result in immediate incarceration, and procedural safeguards were followed. The court also found that Rath's child support obligation continued despite temporary custody by the division of juvenile services and that the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support arrearages. Additionally, the court ruled that the State and Zins have standing to collect arrears even after the child reached the age of majority, and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not limit the State's collection efforts in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Burleigh County Social Service Board v. Rath" on Justia Law

Thomas Zundel attempted to purchase a firearm but was denied due to a 1990 simple assault charge in Jamestown Municipal Court, which was flagged in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The charge was noted as continued for a year pending counseling, with no conviction confirmed. Zundel's voluntary appeal to the FBI was denied because the final disposition of the case was missing. Zundel sought records from various agencies, but none had documentation beyond the initial arrest. He then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to close the case and restore his constitutional rights.The Jamestown Municipal Court and other respondents argued that Zundel had an adequate remedy in federal court, referencing Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that a federal suit would not adequately address the state court records issue. The court emphasized the municipal court's duty to maintain accurate records and noted that the missing record should have been retained permanently according to administrative rules.The North Dakota Supreme Court granted the petition in part, ordering the Jamestown Municipal Court to conduct a diligent inquiry to locate or reconstruct the missing record and document the results. The court denied Zundel's requests for declaratory relief regarding the nature of the 1990 charge and his right to possess a firearm, citing a lack of evidence in the record to make such determinations. The court's decision underscores the importance of accurate court records for due process and public accountability. View "Zundel v. City of Jamestown" on Justia Law

Trevor Davis filed a lawsuit against Deputy Christopher Allen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Allen violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during his arrest. Davis had several outstanding warrants for violent felonies, and when officers arrived to arrest him, he fled into a trailer. Deputy Allen used his police dog, Koda, to locate Davis inside the trailer. Despite Davis lying face-down with his hands over his head, Koda bit him, causing severe injury. Davis alleged that Allen failed to recall Koda after Davis had surrendered.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied Deputy Allen’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that there were material disputes of fact regarding the circumstances and timing of the use of the police dog, which precluded a finding of qualified immunity at this stage. Specifically, the court noted that a jury could find that a reasonable officer would have known that Davis had surrendered and that continuing to allow Koda to bite him constituted excessive force.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court noted that the district court’s denial of qualified immunity was based on disputed facts, which are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the reasonableness of Deputy Allen’s actions depended on resolving these factual disputes, such as whether Davis was visibly unarmed and compliant. The court concluded that it could not address the merits of the qualified immunity claim without first resolving these factual issues, which must be done by a jury. View "Davis v. Allen" on Justia Law

Samuel Hickman was electrocuted while working on a construction site when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Hickman and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against Boomers, LLC, its owner Michael Landon, and employee Colter James Johnson, alleging negligence and recklessness. Boomers moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Hickman argued that the accident fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The district court granted summary judgment for Boomers and denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration.The district court applied the 2020 amended version of Idaho Code section 72-209(3), which clarified the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception, and concluded that Boomers did not intend to harm Hickman or have actual knowledge that injury was substantially likely. Hickman appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and the standard from Gomez v. Crookham Co., which interpreted the exception to include conscious disregard of knowledge that an injury would result.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the pre-amendment version of section 72-209(3) and the Gomez standard should apply. The court found that the additional evidence submitted by Hickman in his motion for reconsideration created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johnson consciously disregarded the known risk of injury from the power lines. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hickman v. Boomers, LLC" on Justia Law

A Columbia County resident, Roderick McDaniel, was shot and killed by Deputy Charles McClinton outside an apartment complex in Magnolia, Arkansas. McDaniel was a suspect in a first-degree murder case, and an arrest warrant had been issued for him. Deputy McClinton encountered McDaniel in a white SUV, which matched the description of the vehicle used in the crime. When McDaniel attempted to flee by reversing into McClinton's patrol car and then accelerating forward, McClinton fired a single shot, killing McDaniel. A loaded handgun, later confirmed to be the murder weapon, was found near McDaniel.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied Deputy McClinton's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were material factual disputes, particularly regarding whether McDaniel was driving the SUV forward toward McClinton when he was shot. The court concluded that McClinton was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established that using deadly force against a suspect merely for fleeing, even in a vehicle, was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Deputy McClinton was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that McClinton had probable cause to believe McDaniel was a dangerous felon who had committed first-degree murder and was still armed. Therefore, using deadly force to prevent McDaniel's escape was constitutionally permissible. The court also noted that McClinton's conduct did not violate McDaniel's clearly established rights, as existing precedent did not clearly prohibit the use of deadly force in such circumstances. The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Deputy McClinton and dismiss the case. View "Arnold v. McClinton" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

Greg Phillips died on October 11, 2019, after receiving medical care from Dr. Anna Robbins at Logan Health. On April 22, 2021, Phillips' estate filed a medical malpractice claim with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), which issued a decision on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Phillips filed a complaint in the District Court alleging wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, a survivor’s claim, and respondeat superior. However, the complaint was not served on Logan Health. On February 10, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) adding claims of common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which was served on Logan Health on February 20, 2023.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court dismissed the FAC with prejudice on April 28, 2023, because Phillips failed to serve the original complaint within the six-month period required by § 25-3-106, MCA, and the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims under § 27-2-205, MCA, had expired. Phillips' motion to alter, amend, or set aside the dismissal was denied on June 13, 2023, as the court found that the statute of limitations resumed running after the six-month service deadline passed and that the FAC did not relate back to the original complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the six-month period for serving the complaint and that the FAC was filed outside the two-year limitations period. The court also determined that Logan Health's motion to dismiss did not constitute an appearance under § 25-3-106, MCA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips' post-judgment motion. View "Phillips v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing their minor son, sued a hospital and a doctor for medical malpractice after their baby suffered birth injuries during delivery. They sought $6,000,000 in damages. Under Puerto Rico law, damages would be capped at $150,000 if the doctor was a faculty member at the hospital at the time of the birth. The defendants claimed the doctor was a faculty member, but could not produce a contract to prove it. The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing and concluded that the doctor was a faculty member, thus applying the statutory cap on damages.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico adopted a magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which stated that the applicability of the statutory cap was a matter of law. The district court found that the doctor was a faculty member based on testimony and letters from the medical school, despite the absence of a contract. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the applicability of the statutory cap was a factual question that should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that whether the doctor was a faculty member at the time of the birth was a factual question requiring a jury's determination. The court found that the evidence was not one-sided enough to compel the district court's conclusion and that the district court improperly took the question from the jury. The First Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perez-Perez v. Hospital Episcopal San Lucas Inc." on Justia Law