Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In the early morning of December 21, 2019, Corey Spiller went to assist his girlfriend, Dashanelle Moore, after her minor car accident on a Houston expressway. While conversing with officers at the scene, Sergeant Jared Lindsay arrived and directed Moore to a nearby truck stop for further procedures, instructing Spiller to follow in his car. When Spiller questioned the officers about Moore, Lindsay became enraged, seized Spiller by the neck, and slammed him onto a parked car, leading to a scuffle where Spiller was tased and arrested. The charges against Spiller were later dropped.Spiller filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lindsay, Harris County, Harris County Constable Precinct 7, and Chief Constable May Walker, alleging excessive force, false arrest, bystander liability, retaliation, and ADA violations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed claims against Harris County, Precinct 7, and Walker for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for Lindsay on the basis of qualified immunity. Spiller appealed, challenging the summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment excessive force, false arrest, First Amendment retaliation, and bystander liability claims against Lindsay, and the dismissal of his Monell claim against Harris County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Lindsay on the excessive force claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Lindsay's use of force was excessive and whether Spiller's actions justified such force. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings on the false arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims, concluding that Lindsay had probable cause for Spiller’s arrest. The court also upheld the dismissal of Spiller’s Monell claim against Harris County for failing to allege specific facts linking his injury to a county policy or custom. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Spiller v. Harris County" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing employment discrimination dispute between a well-known columnist, T.J. Simers, and his former employer, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC. Simers was demoted in 2013 and subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging constructive termination and age and disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The litigation spanned nine years and included three jury trials. The first trial resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding significant economic and noneconomic damages. However, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the constructive termination claim and ordered a new trial on noneconomic damages. Both parties appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, necessitating a second trial.In the second trial, the jury awarded Simers $15.4 million in noneconomic damages, but the trial court granted a new trial due to misconduct by Simers's counsel during closing arguments and the excessive nature of the damages awarded. The third trial focused solely on the amount of noneconomic damages, resulting in a $1.25 million award, which matched a pre-trial settlement offer made by the defendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County awarded Simers $3,264,906 in attorney fees and $210,882.55 in costs, but excluded fees and costs incurred after the defendant's settlement offer. The defendant appealed, arguing that fees for the second trial and the unsuccessful appeal should not be awarded due to counsel's misconduct and the unrelated nature of the work. The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking recovery of appellate fees despite the trial court's ruling.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's order. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in awarding fees for the second trial and the appeal, noting that the trial court had considered the misconduct and the overall reasonableness of the fees. The court also upheld the exclusion of post-offer fees and costs, in line with statutory requirements under section 998. View "Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC" on Justia Law

Richard Wade, the former president, CEO, and director of Vertical Computer Systems, Inc., was sued in April 2020 by the company's chief technical officer and several shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Wade's address was initially listed as "3717 Cole Avenue, Apt. 293, Dallas, Texas 75204." After a year, the claims against Wade were severed into a separate action, and the trial court ordered binding arbitration. Wade's attorney later filed a motion to withdraw, listing Wade's address as "3717 Cole Ave., Apt. 277, Dallas, Texas 75204." Notice of the trial was sent to this incorrect address.The trial court scheduled a bench trial for April 19, 2022, and Wade appeared pro se but did not present any evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them over $21 million. Wade filed a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that he did not receive proper notice of the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and found that Wade did not receive proper notice of the trial setting, which violated his due process rights. The court noted that the notice was sent to an incorrect address and that Wade had informed the trial court of this issue. The court held that proceeding to trial without proper notice was reversible error and that Wade was entitled to a new trial. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wade v. Vertical Computer Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

Sutter’s Place, Inc., which operates Bay 101 Casino, challenged the City of San Jose's annual cardroom regulation fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax imposed without voter approval and violated due process. The fee was equally divided between Bay 101 and Casino M8trix, the only two cardrooms in the city. The plaintiff contended that the fee included costs outside the constitutional exception for regulatory charges and that the equal allocation was unfair.The Santa Clara County Superior Court held a bench trial and found the fee valid, covering reasonable regulatory costs and fairly allocated between the cardrooms. The court determined the fee was for regulatory functions, the amount was necessary to cover costs, and the equal allocation was reasonable given the equal number of tables and benefits to both cardrooms. The court also excluded certain expert testimony from the plaintiff and denied a separate due process trial.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It upheld the trial court's finding that the equal allocation of the fee was reasonable but reversed the judgment on other grounds. The appellate court found the trial court erred by not specifically determining whether all costs included in the fee fell within the constitutional exception for regulatory charges. The case was remanded for the trial court to identify and exclude any non-permissible costs from the fee and to conduct further proceedings on the due process claim if necessary. The appellate court also reversed the award of costs to the city and directed the trial court to reassess costs after applying the correct legal standards. View "Sutter's Place, Inc. v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

The case involves a historic Black burial ground in Montgomery County, Maryland, known as Moses Cemetery. The land, which contains the remains of many individuals, including formerly enslaved persons, was sold and developed into an apartment complex and parking lot in the 1960s. The development process desecrated the burial ground, and it is likely that human remains are still interred there. The current owner of the property is the Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County (HOC). The plaintiffs, including descendants of those buried in Moses Cemetery and a local church, sought to challenge HOC's plan to sell the land to a developer.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale and later issued a writ of mandamus compelling HOC to file an action under Maryland's Business Regulation Article § 5-505 before selling the property. The court found that there was overwhelming evidence of the burial ground's existence and that many bodies likely remain on the property.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that § 5-505 is an optional procedure for selling burial grounds and does not impose a mandatory duty on HOC to file an action before selling the land. The Appellate Court reasoned that the statute is designed to allow certain burial grounds to be sold free from claims but does not require this procedure to be followed in all cases.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and reversed it in part. The Court held that the common law of burial places in Maryland provides an appropriate framework for disputes regarding burial grounds and that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court, allowing the plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for relief based on an alleged violation of specific rights protected under the common law of burial places. The Court also held that § 5-505 does not abrogate the common law of burial places and provides an optional procedure for selling burial grounds. View "BETHESDA AFRICAN CEMETERY COALITION, v. HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tommy Coleman and Jason Perkins, who worked as oil and gas pipeline inspectors for System One Holdings, LLC, were paid a flat daily rate without overtime compensation, even when working over forty hours a week. They filed a lawsuit claiming this violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and sought unpaid overtime on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly compensated inspectors.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. System One moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The plaintiffs countered that they fell under the transportation workers' exemption to the FAA. The District Court, following the precedent set in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., ordered limited discovery into the arbitrability of the claims before deciding on the motion to compel arbitration. System One's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the District Court's order. The Third Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the District Court's order did not formally deny the motion to compel arbitration but rather deferred its decision pending limited discovery. The court emphasized that the FAA permits appeals from specific types of orders, and the order in question did not fall within those categories. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coleman v. System One Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

Wanda Bowling entered into a contract with the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission to manage its information technology functions. When the contract ended, Bowling allegedly withheld login information for three online accounts, leading the Commission to sue for breach of contract. Bowling counterclaimed for libel and misclassification of her employment status. The district court dismissed the misclassification counterclaim and granted summary judgment to the Commission on all other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Bowling's counterclaim for misclassification and denied her motion to amend it, citing untimeliness. The court also granted summary judgment to the Commission on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Bowling's login information constituted intellectual property and that she had breached the contract by not certifying the erasure of confidential information. The court awarded the Commission $956.67 in damages. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment on Bowling's libel counterclaim, citing a qualified privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission had adequately alleged damages exceeding $75,000. However, the appellate court found that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether the login information constituted intellectual property or other materials covered by the contract, and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the damages. Therefore, it reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Bowling's motion to amend her counterclaim for misclassification, finding no abuse of discretion.On the libel counterclaim, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on a qualified privilege without giving Bowling notice. However, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the Commission's statements were substantially true. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Robert Guthrie, a former employee of Rainbow Fencing Inc. (RFI), filed a lawsuit seeking unpaid wages and statutory damages for RFI's failure to provide wage notices and wage statements as required by New York law. Guthrie worked as a welder for RFI from 2014 to 2021 and claimed he was not paid for overtime hours. The district court entered a default judgment for the unpaid wages but dismissed Guthrie's claim for statutory damages, ruling that he lacked standing because he did not allege an injury-in-fact resulting from the failure to provide the required notices and statements.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially reviewed the case. The court granted a default judgment for Guthrie's unpaid wages but dismissed his claim for statutory damages due to lack of standing. The court concluded that Guthrie did not allege a concrete injury-in-fact caused by the absence of wage notices and statements, which is necessary to meet the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Guthrie lacked standing to pursue statutory damages. The appellate court held that a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury-in-fact resulting from the statutory violation to have standing. Guthrie's general claims about potential harms did not suffice, as he failed to link these potential harms to any actual injury he experienced. Therefore, the court concluded that Guthrie did not meet the requirements for Article III standing and affirmed the dismissal of his claim for statutory damages. View "Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc." on Justia Law