Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A fire damaged a hotel owned by Shri Ganesai, LLC, which had an insurance policy with AmGuard Insurance Company. The policy also covered the mortgagee, Academy Bank, N.A. AmGuard denied Shri's claim, suspecting arson by Shri's principal, Alex Patel. During the investigation, the building suffered additional damage from vandalism and frozen pipes. Shri and Academy sued AmGuard for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages for the fire, vandalism, and freeze damage.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied AmGuard's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. AmGuard appealed, challenging the viability of Academy's vexatious-refusal claim, the exclusion of certain evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding damages from vandalism and frozen pipes. The district court had granted summary judgment to AmGuard on Shri's vexatious-refusal claim but allowed the remaining claims to proceed to trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Academy's vexatious-refusal claim was viable despite the settlement of the underlying breach-of-contract claim, as AmGuard's delay in payment constituted vexatious conduct. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's exclusion of certain evidence, including the testimony of a witness and parts of Patel's deposition. Additionally, the court ruled that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings on the timing and extent of the vandalism and freeze damage, and that the expert testimony admitted was reliable. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying AmGuard's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. View "Academy Bank, N.A. v. Amguard Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, the estate and family members of Yael Botvin, sued their former lawyers for legal malpractice. Yael Botvin was killed in a 1997 Hamas suicide bombing. In 2005, the plaintiffs hired the law firm Heideman Nudelman & Kalik, P.C. to sue Iran for sponsoring the attack. They won default judgments but only after nearly eight years, which prevented them from participating in a 2012 settlement agreement that disbursed Iranian assets seized in the U.S. The plaintiffs allege that the lawyers' negligence caused the delay, resulting in a lower recovery.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding that while the plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the alleged negligence was a but-for cause of their lower recovery, they did not adequately plead proximate cause due to a lack of foreseeability. The court found that the specific sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs' reduced recovery was not foreseeable.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiffs' reduced recovery was a foreseeable result of the lawyers' alleged negligence. The court emphasized that the foreseeability requirement does not demand that the precise injury or method of harm be foreseen, only that the type of harm be foreseeable. The court concluded that the question of foreseeability in this case raised a jury question based on the facts alleged. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Estate of Botvin v. Heideman, Nudelman & Kalik, P.C." on Justia Law

A Florida resident, Sheri Sawyer, acting as the personal representative of her deceased son Thomas's estate, filed a product-liability lawsuit against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit Court. The case arose from a fatal single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, Alabama, where a tire manufactured by Cooper Tire allegedly experienced tread separation, causing the vehicle to crash. The tire was purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin, the mother of the driver, Joseph Coggin, both Alabama residents.Cooper Tire moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Alabama courts lacked specific personal jurisdiction over it due to insufficient suit-related contacts with Alabama. Sawyer countered that Cooper Tire's extensive business activities in Alabama, including the sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in question, established sufficient contacts. While the motion was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that specific personal jurisdiction could exist even without a direct causal link between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiff's claims.The Mobile Circuit Court granted Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, concluding that Sawyer failed to show that Cooper Tire sold, distributed, or marketed the specific tire model in Alabama within three years before the accident. The court also noted that neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama residents, reducing Alabama's interest in providing a forum for the case. Sawyer appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court's decision, applying the analytical framework from Ford. The court held that Cooper Tire's sale, distribution, and advertising of the tire model in Alabama "related to" Sawyer's claims, establishing specific personal jurisdiction. The court also found that the trial court's focus on the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts and Sawyer's residency was not dispositive. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company" on Justia Law

In 2014, several homeowners' associations sued Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC (BCSS), alleging that a rate increase violated a 1991 agreement between a real-estate developer and BCSS. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and specific performance of the agreement. The case has been brought before the Supreme Court of Alabama multiple times, with BCSS repeatedly questioning whether the plaintiffs are successors in interest to the original contract party.The Baldwin Circuit Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of BCSS, stating that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed this decision in 2016, clarifying that the issue was not one of standing but whether the plaintiffs were real parties in interest. On remand, BCSS continued to challenge the plaintiffs' status, leading to multiple nonfinal rulings and additional appellate proceedings. The circuit court denied BCSS's summary judgment motions on this issue multiple times, including in August 2023.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed BCSS's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the circuit court to grant summary judgment in its favor. The Court clarified that the real-party-in-interest question does not implicate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction and is not appropriate for mandamus review. The Court emphasized that such issues should be resolved through a final judgment by the trial court. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied BCSS's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC" on Justia Law

Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

Levi Werley was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike. After the insurance of the driver who struck him did not fully compensate for his injuries, Levi’s parents sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under their own automobile insurance policies. Their insurer, Mid-Century Insurance Company, paid $250,000 under one policy but denied an additional $250,000 under another policy, citing a household vehicle exclusion. The Werleys argued that this exclusion was invalid and unenforceable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the Werleys, ruling that the household vehicle exclusion was invalid under Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The court held that the exclusion acted as a de facto waiver of stacking, which is not permissible under the MVFRL. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Werleys, entitling them to the additional UIM benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the District Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the household vehicle exclusion in the Multi-Vehicle Policy was valid and enforceable. The court distinguished this case from precedents like Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnification Co. and Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., noting that the Werleys had never paid premiums for UIM coverage on the dirt bike. The court emphasized that exclusions limiting UIM coverage are generally enforceable unless they act as impermissible de facto waivers of stacking, which was not the case here. The Third Circuit remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Mid-Century. View "Mid-Century Insurance Co v. Werley" on Justia Law

In two separate class actions, Kenneth Hasson and Jordan Schnur alleged that FullStory, Inc. and Papa John’s International, Inc. unlawfully wiretapped their online communications using FullStory’s Session Replay Code. This code intercepts detailed user interactions on websites without user consent. Hasson, a Pennsylvania resident, claimed FullStory wiretapped him while he browsed Mattress Firm’s website. Schnur, also from Pennsylvania, alleged similar wiretapping by Papa John’s website.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Hasson’s case, the court found that FullStory, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. The court denied Hasson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. In Schnur’s case, the court ruled that Papa John’s, also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not expressly aim its conduct at Pennsylvania, despite operating numerous restaurants in the state.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these dismissals. The court affirmed the dismissal in Schnur’s case, agreeing that Schnur failed to show that Papa John’s expressly aimed its conduct at Pennsylvania under the Calder “effects” test. The court noted that merely operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania does not establish personal jurisdiction.However, the court vacated the dismissal in Hasson’s case and remanded it for further consideration. The court held that the District Court should have also considered whether personal jurisdiction was proper under the traditional test as articulated in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. This test examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The court instructed the District Court to reassess FullStory’s contacts with Pennsylvania under this framework. View "Hasson v. Fullstory Inc" on Justia Law

During a night of civil unrest in Des Moines, Iowa, police and Polk County deputies arrested 14 individuals. The arrestees claimed their Fourth Amendment rights were violated and sued 53 defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court issued a comprehensive opinion with around 800 rulings on various motions for summary judgment and qualified immunity, leading to multiple appeals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied qualified immunity to several officers and granted summary judgment to some plaintiffs. The Des Moines defendants appealed these decisions, arguing they had probable cause to arrest anyone in the vicinity of the protests for misdemeanors such as participation in a riot, unlawful assembly, and failure to disperse. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause for these arrests, as they did not provide specific evidence linking the plaintiffs to violent behavior or failure to disperse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions de novo. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Officers Herman, Holtan, and McCarthy on Klingenberg's unlawful arrest claim, and dismissed Officer Lawler's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also dismissed appeals from Captain Hardy and other officers regarding Lard's and DeBrossard's unlawful arrest claims and Lard's excessive force claim. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Patton group on their unlawful arrest claims and denied qualified immunity to the Des Moines defendants on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims. Additionally, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their phone seizure claims against Officer Youngblut and denied him qualified immunity.The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Smith on Timberlake's unlawful arrest claim, finding no clearly established duty for Smith to ensure the lawfulness of the arrest before taking custody. Finally, the court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Holtan and Deputy Callahan on Dunn's and Fugate's unlawful arrest claims, concluding they had arguable probable cause under Iowa's failure to disperse statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Dunn v. Does" on Justia Law

Farnsworth Coleman, the sole member of Coleman Consulting, LLC (CC), entered into a written Confidentiality Agreement with Domtar A.W. LLC (Domtar A.W.) in November 2016 to provide consulting services for a pulp mill in Ashdown, Arkansas. CC was compensated for its services and expenses at an agreed hourly rate. CC later claimed that an oral agreement was made with Domtar A.W. for additional compensation based on a percentage of increased profits from CC's recommendations, which Domtar A.W. denied. CC filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after Domtar A.W. terminated the consulting services in May 2017.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Domtar A.W., concluding that the Arkansas statute of frauds barred CC's breach of contract claim because the alleged oral agreement could not be performed within one year. The court also found that CC failed to prove its unjust enrichment claim, as CC had been fully compensated for its services under the written agreement. CC's motion for reconsideration, based on newly discovered evidence, was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the oral agreement was subject to the statute of frauds and could not be performed within one year. The court also found that the part performance and detrimental reliance exceptions to the statute of frauds did not apply. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting that CC had been paid for its services and could not use unjust enrichment to enforce an unenforceable oral contract. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was also affirmed, as CC failed to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the new evidence. View "Coleman Consulting, LLC v. Domtar Corporation" on Justia Law

A fire damaged a malt beverage store owned by A Maxon Company, LLC (AMC). Acuity Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment to determine coverage under an insurance policy listing Greg and Tammy Weatherspoon as additional loss payees. The Weatherspoons counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Weatherspoons’ counterclaim, determining that the insurance policy terms prevented the Weatherspoons from recovering damages unless AMC successfully asserted a claim. The jury found that AMC principal, Russel Maxon, had intentionally started the fire, excluding coverage under AMC’s policy. The Weatherspoons appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Corson County, South Dakota, initially denied the Weatherspoons’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance contract was unambiguous and that the Weatherspoons’ claim was dependent on AMC’s claim. The court also denied Acuity’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual disputes suitable for a jury. At trial, the court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Weatherspoons could not recover under the policy because AMC’s claim was excluded due to Russel’s intentional act.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy’s Loss Payable Clause only allowed the Weatherspoons to collect if AMC could collect, and since the jury found that Russel intentionally started the fire, AMC was precluded from recovering. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony from Special Agent Derek Hill and allowing the impeachment of Tracy Maxon with prior inconsistent statements. The court concluded that the Weatherspoons’ arguments regarding ambiguity and third-party beneficiary status were unavailing. View "Acuity Insurance V. A Maxon Company" on Justia Law