Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen residing in Beirut, Lebanon, filed a defamation lawsuit against three media companies based in Dubai. The companies broadcast a news story on their Arabic language channels, which was rebroadcast in the U.S. via DISH Network and republished on their website and YouTube channel. The plaintiff alleged that the story falsely accused him of helping a Hezbollah leader launder money. The defendants moved to quash the lawsuit, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them due to insufficient contacts with the state.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to quash, finding that the defendants did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to justify jurisdiction. The court noted that the defendants' primary audience was in the Middle East and North Africa, and their U.S. viewership, including California, was minimal. The court also found that the plaintiff's connections to California were not strong enough to establish jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the California forum. The court emphasized that the defendants' broadcast was not specifically targeted at California but was part of a broader international distribution. The court also noted that the plaintiff's primary professional and personal connections were in Lebanon, not California, and thus the brunt of any harm from the alleged defamation would be felt in Lebanon. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was expressly aimed at California, as required under the "effects test" from Calder v. Jones. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that further discovery was unlikely to produce evidence establishing jurisdiction. View "Safieddine v. MBC FZ" on Justia Law

Stanford Clacks, an African American truck driver, was employed by Kwik Trip, Inc. and experienced racial harassment from fellow employees. During his training, Clacks was harassed by two trainers, Tom Roerkohl and Brett Nechkash, who used racial epithets and made derogatory remarks. Clacks reported these incidents to his supervisor, Sean Clements, but did not initially specify the racial nature of the harassment. After completing his training, Clacks continued to face sporadic racial harassment, including receiving a racially charged note from Nechkash. Clacks went on voluntary pandemic leave in March 2020 and later reported the harassment to Kwik Trip’s Human Resources department, prompting an investigation that led to the termination of the offending employees. Kwik Trip offered Clacks his job back or a severance package, both of which he declined.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of Kwik Trip on all claims. The court applied the sham-affidavit rule to exclude parts of an affidavit Clacks submitted in opposition to summary judgment, finding it contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. The court found that Clacks did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims of a hostile work environment and retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the sham-affidavit rule and that Clacks did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims. Specifically, the court found that Kwik Trip took reasonable steps to address the harassment once it was reported and that Clacks did not suffer an adverse employment action as he was offered his job back. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Kwik Trip liable for a hostile work environment or retaliation. View "Clacks v. Kwik Trip, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose pending criminal charges for sexually abusing his niece. He was naturalized in October 2009 and later pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his naturalization, which was granted in 2022. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, charging Castillo with removability for a child abuse conviction. The NTA was filed in the Cleveland Immigration Court, and hearings were conducted remotely.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Castillo’s application for cancellation of removal. Castillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing he was not removable because he was a U.S. citizen at the time of his conviction. The BIA applied Sixth Circuit law, as the NTA was filed in Cleveland, and dismissed the appeal. Castillo filed three petitions for review in the Third Circuit, asserting that venue was proper there because the IJ completed the proceedings while he was detained in Pennsylvania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine the proper venue for Castillo’s petitions. The court concluded that the IJ completed the proceedings in Cleveland, Ohio, where the NTA was filed and administrative venue vested. Therefore, venue did not lie in the Third Circuit but in the Sixth Circuit. The Third Circuit held that it had the inherent power to transfer the case to the appropriate venue and decided to transfer Castillo’s petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. View "Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves a coalition of states led by Washington suing the FDA over its 2023 REMS, which eliminated in-person dispensing requirements for the abortion drug mifepristone. Washington argues that the FDA should have further reduced restrictions on the drug, claiming that the remaining requirements impose unnecessary hurdles. Idaho, leading another coalition of states, sought to intervene, arguing that the elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement would harm its interests by making the drug easier to obtain and harder to police, potentially increasing Medicaid costs and endangering maternal health and fetal life.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied Idaho's motion to intervene. The court found that Idaho did not have a significantly protectable interest that would be impaired by the litigation, as its complaint concerned different aspects of the 2023 REMS. The court also denied permissive intervention, concluding that Idaho's claims did not share common questions of law or fact with Washington's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Idaho's motion to intervene as of right. The Ninth Circuit held that Idaho must independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because it sought different relief from Washington. The court concluded that Idaho's complaint did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact that was fairly traceable to the FDA's revised safe-use restrictions. Idaho's alleged economic injuries, law enforcement burdens, and quasi-sovereign interests were deemed too speculative or indirect to confer standing. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the portion of the appeal concerning the denial of permissive intervention. View "STATE OF WASHINGTON V. FDA" on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in April 2017 between Ryan McCullough and Joseph Bennett, where McCullough alleged Bennett was at fault. McCullough initially filed a lawsuit on January 15, 2018, but it was dismissed without prejudice on February 28, 2018, due to unclaimed service. He refiled on June 27, 2018, and obtained service by publication, but the court dismissed this second complaint without prejudice on November 27, 2018, for failure to prosecute. McCullough filed a third complaint on September 12, 2019, after the statute of limitations expired but within one year of the second dismissal.The trial court dismissed the third complaint, agreeing with Bennett that it was time-barred since the statute of limitations had expired. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the saving statute applied by its plain terms, allowing McCullough to refile within one year of the second dismissal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Second District's decision. The court held that under the plain language of Ohio’s saving statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), McCullough’s third complaint was timely. The statute allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year after a previous action fails otherwise than on the merits. The court rejected Bennett’s argument for a “one-use” limitation on the saving statute, noting that the statute’s text does not support such a restriction. The court also dismissed Bennett’s argument that the saving statute could not apply because the second complaint was dismissed before the statute of limitations expired, clarifying that the current version of the statute does not include this requirement. Finally, the court found that the saving statute applied despite the service issues with the second complaint, as the third complaint was filed within the statutory period allowed. View "McCullough v. Bennett" on Justia Law

In January 2021, Julius Lamart Hodges, an inmate at the Prince William-Manassas Adult Detention Center, volunteered to work in the kitchen during a COVID-19 outbreak while most inmates quarantined. Hodges did not contract COVID-19 but claimed that his exposure to the virus constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He also alleged that his working conditions were harsh and that he was retaliated against for filing grievances about these conditions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Hodges’s complaint. The court found that Hodges failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because he voluntarily chose to work and could have opted to quarantine. The court also dismissed his First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding that Hodges did not plausibly allege a causal connection between his grievances and any adverse action taken by the prison officials.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that Hodges’s Eighth Amendment claim failed because he voluntarily exposed himself to the conditions he complained about, and thus, the prison officials did not inflict those conditions upon him. The court also found that Hodges’s First Amendment retaliation claim was insufficient because he did not adequately allege a causal relationship between his grievances and the denial of his Work Release application. The court noted that the temporal gap between his grievance and the adverse action was too long to support an inference of causation.The Fourth Circuit modified the district court’s dismissal to be without prejudice, allowing Hodges the opportunity to amend his complaint if he could address the deficiencies identified by the court. View "Hodges v. Meletis" on Justia Law

Sumontinee Sridej, a Thai citizen, was accused of defrauding her employer in Thailand of approximately $4 million worth of electronics between 2013 and 2015. She left Thailand in January 2015 and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In 2022, Thailand requested her extradition under the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States. The U.S. government filed a complaint seeking her arrest and extradition, and a magistrate judge certified her extradition in January 2023. Sridej then filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her extradition, which the district court denied, allowing her to renew her claim after the Secretary of State made a formal extradition determination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Sridej’s habeas corpus petition and her subsequent motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). The district court found that the Secretary of State had granted Thailand’s extradition request and that the Secretary had considered whether Sridej would face a risk of torture if extradited, as required by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its implementing regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of State had properly considered the risk of torture in compliance with CAT’s regulations. The court found that a declaration by an Attorney Adviser at the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Department of State was sufficient to establish that the Secretary had fulfilled his obligations. The court also held that the declaration did not need to be signed by the Secretary or a senior official and did not require a case-specific explanation for the extradition decision due to the doctrines of separation of powers and non-inquiry. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sridej’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN" on Justia Law

Jo Spence, a licensed attorney, was terminated from her position at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) after eleven years. She claimed her termination was retaliatory, following her filing of internal discrimination complaints and whistleblower disclosures. Spence alleged discrimination based on race, sex, and age, and also claimed the VA engaged in illegal preferential hiring practices. She filed a complaint in the district court after the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) upheld her termination, citing her poor performance.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed most of Spence’s claims for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment on her remaining claim. The court found that Spence, despite being pro se, was not entitled to the leniency typically afforded to pro se litigants due to her legal training and experience. The court dismissed her initial lengthy complaints and allowed her to amend them multiple times, but ultimately dismissed her claims with prejudice for failing to comply with the court’s page limits and pleading requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not apply to licensed attorneys. It found that Spence failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claims of retaliation and discrimination, and that her termination was supported by substantial evidence of poor performance. The court also upheld the district court’s dismissal of her claims with prejudice, noting Spence’s repeated failure to comply with court rules and orders. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Spence v. DVA" on Justia Law

Craig Wood was indicted on charges of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country. The government needed to prove Wood's Indian status to secure a conviction. To do so, they introduced a "Certificate of Indian Blood" from the Seneca-Cayuga Nation, authenticated by a "Certificate of Authenticity." Wood objected, arguing he was not given reasonable pre-trial notice of the Authenticity Certificate, as required by Rule 902(11), and thus had no fair opportunity to challenge it.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma overruled Wood's objection, admitting the Indian Blood Certificate into evidence. The court did not address the notice requirement under Rule 902(11) and based its decision solely on the fact that the same individual signed both certificates. Wood was subsequently convicted on both charges by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's decision to admit the Indian Blood Certificate without proper notice was manifestly unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that Rule 902(11) requires reasonable pre-trial written notice to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence. The court concluded that the district court's failure to consider the notice requirement was an abuse of discretion.The Tenth Circuit also determined that the error was not harmless. The improperly admitted Indian Blood Certificate was the only direct evidence of Wood's Indian status, which was crucial for the jurisdictional requirement. The court noted that the government's argument that M.M.'s testimony about Wood's Indian status was sufficient was unconvincing and did not meet the required standard for harmless error.As a result, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, vacated Wood's convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

John H. Mack Jr., serving a life sentence for aggravated murder, filed a mandamus action to compel the Richland County Sheriff’s Office to produce records responsive to his public-records request. Mack also sought statutory damages. His request included eight categories of records related to the seizure of his property and a separate incident.The sheriff’s office argued that three of the eight categories were exempt under R.C. 149.43(B)(8), which restricts incarcerated individuals from obtaining public records related to criminal investigations or prosecutions without a finding from the sentencing judge. The sheriff’s office also claimed to have provided records responsive to the remaining categories, rendering those parts of Mack’s request moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It found that Mack’s claim was moot regarding five categories of records that had already been provided. The court agreed with the sheriff’s office that Mack had not complied with the statutory requirements for obtaining records related to his criminal investigation or prosecution for two categories. However, the court found insufficient evidence to support the sheriff’s office’s claim that no records existed for the eighth category. The court granted a limited writ ordering the sheriff’s office to either produce records responsive to the eighth category or certify that no such records exist. Mack’s request for statutory damages was denied due to lack of argument in his merit brief.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ as moot for five categories, denied the writ for two categories due to noncompliance with R.C. 149.43(B)(8), and granted a limited writ for the remaining category, ordering the sheriff’s office to produce the records or certify their nonexistence. The request for statutory damages was denied. View "State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law