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Scott and Anne Davison appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DeBest Plumbing (DeBest). In 2012, the Davisons hired Gould Custom Builders, Inc. (Gould) to perform an extensive remodel of their vacation home in Idaho. Gould hired DeBest as the plumbing subcontractor. A bathtub installed by DeBest developed a leak that caused significant damage before it was noticed and repaired. The Davisons sought damages based upon the contract between Gould and DeBest and for negligence. The district court granted DeBest’s motion for summary judgment on the contract claims because the Davisons were not in privity of contract with DeBest. Later, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of DeBest on the negligence claim, finding that the Davisons had failed to comply with the requirements of the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), Idaho Code sections 6-2501–2504. On appeal, the Davisons argued they satisfied the requirements of NORA because DeBest received actual notice of the claim and sent a representative to inspect the damage. Finding that the Davidsons satisfied the requirements of NORA when they gave DeBest actual notice, and DeBest had an opportunity to inspect the defect, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred in granting DeBest's motion for summary judgment on the Davidsons' negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed as to negligence, but affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Davison v. DeBest Plumbing" on Justia Law

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Little Sisters of the Poor, a Roman Catholic congregation serving the elderly poor of all backgrounds, operates homes for the elderly, all of which adhere to the same religious beliefs. A religious nonprofit corporation that operates a Little Sisters home in Pittsburgh sought to intervene in litigation challenging regulations promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4). That litigation was instituted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, challenging interim final rules, providing for “religious” and “moral “ exemptions to the Act's "contraceptive mandate" for “entities, and individuals, with sincerely held religious beliefs objecting to contraceptive or sterilization coverage,” including “for-profit entities that are not closely-held.” The Third Circuit reversed the denial of their motion. Little Sisters’ interest in the regulations is neither novel nor isolated; it has been involved in Affordable Care Act litigation for years. Little Sisters’ interest in preserving the religious exemption is concrete and capable of definition; the relationships among the organization's various homes indicate a unique interest compared to other religious objectors who might wish to intervene. Those interests are significantly protectable. Little Sisters have demonstrated that they may be “practically disadvantaged by the disposition of the action” and have established that their interests are not adequately represented by the federal government. View "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. President United States" on Justia Law

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In 2007, plaintiffs-appellants, Taracorp and Tara and Kelly Barlean, (collectively Taracorp) obtained a default judgment against defendants-appellees, Jeff Dailey and AJ's Bargain World in Colorado. Three days later, Taracorp sought to collect on the judgment by filing a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtors in Pottawatomie County, Oklahoma. Taracorp abandoned the Pottawatomie case, but re-filed the Colorado judgment in Marshall County, Oklahoma, nearly nine years later in 2016. The judgment debtors sought to quash the Colorado judgment because Oklahoma's five year limitation for enforcing judgments had lapsed. The trial court agreed, and quashed the Colorado judgment. Taracorp appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the Colorado judgment, enforceable in Colorado for twenty years after the judgment, was also enforceable in Oklahoma by re-filing it a second time in Oklahoma, after Oklahoma's five year limitation period for enforcing judgments lapsed. The Supreme Court held that when a judgment creditor seeks to enforce a Colorado judgment a second time in Oklahoma, after Oklahoma's limitation period has lapsed on the original judgment, the underlying original Colorado judgment enforceable for twenty years may be enforced in Oklahoma. View "Taracorp v. Dailey" on Justia Law

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Oil States sued Greene's Energy for infringement of a patent relating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. Greene’s challenged the patent’s validity in court and petitioned the Patent Office for inter partes review, 35 U.S.C. 311-319. The district court issued a claim-construction order favoring Oil States; the Board concluded that Oil States’ claims were unpatentable. The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of inter partes review. The Supreme Court affirmed. Inter partes review does not violate Article III. Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. Inter partes review falls within the public-rights doctrine. Patents are “public franchises” and granting patents is a constitutional function that can be carried out by the executive or legislative departments without “judicial determination.’ Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as granting a patent. Patents remain “subject to [the Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court. The similarities between the procedures used in inter partes review and judicial procedures does not suggest that inter partes review violates Article III. The Court noted that its decision “should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” When Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” View "Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Petitioners sought compensation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. 1350, based on terrorist acts committed abroad. They alleged that those acts were in part facilitated by Arab Bank, a Jordanian institution with a New York branch. They claimed that the bank used that branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions that benefited terrorists through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and to launder money for a Texas-based charity allegedly affiliated with Hamas. The Second Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case. Foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS, which is "strictly jurisdictional” and does not provide or define a cause of action for international law violations. The Court noted that after the Second Circuit permitted plaintiffs to bring ATS actions based on human-rights laws, Congress enacted the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act, creating an express cause of action for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing. ATS suits then became more frequent but “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to [ATS] claims.” Separation-of-powers concerns that counsel against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force to the ATS, which implicates foreign-policy concerns. Courts must exercise “great caution” before recognizing new forms of liability under the ATS. In this case. the only alleged connections to the United States, the CHIPS transaction and a brief allegation about a Texas charity, are “relatively minor” and the litigation has caused diplomatic tensions with Jordan, a critical ally. View "Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC" on Justia Law

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The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Representative Doug Lamborn could not appear on the primary ballot in his district because of a problem with his ballot petitions. The Court ruled a petition circulator working for Lamborn’s campaign did not live in the state at the time, rendering the signatures he gathered invalid and moving Lamborn below the threshold for ballot access in his district. The Supreme Court concluded the district erred when it focused on the challenged circulator’s subjective intent to move back to Colorado, rather than the test set forth in section 1-2-102, C.R.S. (2017) when determining the circulator’s residency. In applying the correct test to the essentially undisputed facts here, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held the Colorado Secretary of State could not certify Representative Lamborn to the 2018 primary ballot for Colorado’s Fifth Congressional District. View "Kuhn v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and cross-defendant IIG Wireless, Inc. (IIG) obtained a judgment of $401,860 against defendant and cross-complainant John Yi. IIG also sued Lauren Kim, Yi’s fiancee, who moved for and was granted a nonsuit during trial. Yi obtained a judgment on his cross-complaint for $122,000, resulting in a final judgment of $279,860 in IIG’s favor. Yi appealed the judgment and the court’s denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Before IIG’s official formation, Yi had been doing business with MetroPCS and was the owner of several out-of-state dealers. Yi, Jimmy Hu, and Seung Lee founded IIG to become another dealer for MetroPCS with stores in southern California. Between June 2007, when IIG was formed, and the end of 2008, the company opened 30 stores. Yi signed personal guarantees with MetroPCS for product to sell, as well as the leases for the retail locations, while Hu and Lee did not. IIG claims Yi committed numerous other misdeeds during his time as CEO, including directing IIG to issue payments of $48,000 to Kim, who was his girlfriend at the time. In sum, Yi argued there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict, the court made numerous errors with respect to the introduction of evidence and its conduct of the trial, and the damage award of $122,000 on his crosscomplaint was inadequate. IIG argued there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, the JNOV was properly denied, and the damage award on the cross-complaint should be reduced. In its cross-appeal, IIG argued the trial court should not have granted nonsuit as to Kim. Further, IIG contended the trial court erred by denying its motion to amend the complaint and to admit certain expert testimony. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded neither the appeal nor the cross-appeal had any merit, and therefore affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "IIG Wireless v. Yi" on Justia Law

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At issue was what findings a court must make in order to require attorney’s fees to be paid to an adverse party who was subjected to proceedings that were brought in bad faith or lacked substantial justification and what the appropriate means are for calculating attorney’s fees when a court determines that a party’s complaint includes claims that have substantial justification and claims that lack substantial justification. Respondents prevailed in having the trial judge dispose of Petitioner’s claims after the close of the evidence. The hearing judge found no substantial justification for each of Petitioner’s claims against Respondents and awarded $300,000 in attorney’s fees to Respondents. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that there was substantial justification as to some of Petitioner’s claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hearing judge (1) did not commit clear error in finding no substantial justification for the claims brought by Petitioner; but (2) abused his discretion in assessing $300,000 in attorney’s fees against Petitioner without articulating how he calculated his fees. View "Christian v. Maternal-Fetal Medicine Associates of Maryland, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of copyright infringement claims brought by a monkey over selfies he took on a wildlife photographer's unattended camera. Naruto, a crested macaque, took several photos of himself on the camera, and the photographer and Wildlife Personalities subsequently published the Monkey Selfies in a book. PETA filed suit as next friend to Naruto, alleging copyright infringement. The panel held that the complaint included facts sufficient to establish Article III standing because it alleged that Naruto was the author and owner of the photographs and had suffered concrete and particularized economic harms; the monkey's Article III standing was not dependent on the sufficiency of PETA; but Naruto lacked statutory standing because the Copyright Act did not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. Finally, the panel granted defendants' request for attorneys' fees on appeal. View "Naruto v. Slater" on Justia Law

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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Richard Hayes developed a subdivision called Mountain View Estates on land jointly owned by him and his wife, Nadine Hayes, in the Town of Manchester. The subdivision grew to include forty residential homes, a school building, and a chiropractic clinic on forty-four lots. From the sale of the first lot in about 1981 until his death in 2004, Richard Hayes paid for maintenance and plowing of the roads that ran through the subdivision and maintained the subdivision’s sewer system and the portion of the water system that he and his wife still owned, without charge to the homeowners. Following the Hayes’ deaths in 2004, a probate proceeding was opened and the Hayes’ adult children, Jeffrey Hayes and Deborah Hayes McGraw, were appointed coadministrators of their estates. The co-administrators sent a letter to the homeowners in the subdivision stating that effective immediately, the homeowners would be responsible for maintaining and plowing the subdivision’s roads. The homeowners refused to assume responsibility for the road maintenance. The homeowners intervened in the probate proceedings of the Hayes’ estates to protect their rights regarding the subdivision. The estates appealed the trial court’s decision that the estates were obligated, based on an agreement between the developers and the homeowners, to continue to maintain and repair the roads and water and sewer systems until the town accepted the dedication of the infrastructure. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s findings and conclusions, and remanded the matter to the trial court for remand to the probate division for further proceedings. View "Hayes v. Mountain View Estates Homeowners Association" on Justia Law