Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A private individual brought a qui tam action under the California False Claims Act (CFCA) against two construction-related entities, alleging they submitted false claims to local government agencies in connection with airport construction projects. The plaintiff followed the statutory procedure by filing the complaint under seal in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and mailing a copy to the Attorney General, as required by the CFCA. The complaint involved local (political subdivision) funds. The Attorney General, however, did not forward the complaint to the relevant local authorities and took no steps to intervene or extend the seal. After the 60-day sealing period expired without government action, the plaintiff served the defendants.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, holding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the CFCA’s sealing and service requirements. The trial court concluded the complaint should have remained under seal until the government notified the court of its decision to intervene, and that the plaintiff’s actions in unsealing and serving the complaint were premature. The court entered judgment dismissing the action with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that a qui tam plaintiff is not required to allege compliance with the CFCA’s sealing and service requirements to state a cause of action, nor does failure to comply automatically require dismissal. The court further held that the statutory scheme creates a default 60-day seal period, which lifts automatically unless the government requests an extension. Because the plaintiff filed the complaint under seal, served the Attorney General, and waited until after the seal lifted to serve the defendants, the plaintiff complied with the statute. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer. View "Albarghouti v. LA Gateway Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between neighbors in Illinois over a property line, with one party, Mr. Barker, seeking to quiet title to land upon which the Boettchers had built a garage. The Boettchers counterclaimed, asserting adverse possession and contesting the property’s boundaries. During this litigation, the Boettchers issued subpoenas to two employees of the United States Department of Agriculture for documents and testimony relating to farm acreage. The Department refused compliance, citing federal regulations, and when the Boettchers would not withdraw the subpoenas, the Department removed only the subpoena proceeding—not the entire case—to federal court under the federal officer removal statute.The Boettchers subsequently attempted to remove the entire state case to federal court, invoking both the general removal statute and federal question jurisdiction, arguing that federal law originally defined the disputed property lines. Mr. Barker moved to remand, arguing that the property dispute was governed by Illinois law. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois retained jurisdiction over the subpoena proceeding but remanded the property dispute to state court. The court later granted summary judgment to the Department of Agriculture, quashing the subpoenas.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), since federal officer jurisdiction was invoked. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the Department’s removal of only the subpoena proceeding was proper under the statute, and that there was no independent federal jurisdiction over the property dispute. The court also held that the district court properly quashed the subpoenas, as neither the state nor federal court had jurisdiction to enforce them against federal employees under the circumstances. The judgment was affirmed. View "Barker v Boettcher" on Justia Law

A condominium unit was owned by Diane Marchetti, who did not reside in the unit but allowed her daughter, Caroline Thibeault, and Thibeault’s son to occupy it. The condominium’s association initiated a foreclosure action against Marchetti alleging she was in default for failing to pay assessments, fines, and fees—some of which related to Thibeault’s alleged commercial use of the unit. Thibeault’s son has a disability, and both Thibeault and Marchetti asserted that the association had failed to provide reasonable accommodation under federal and state disability laws.After the foreclosure action commenced in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court, Marchetti filed an answer and raised several defenses, including alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act. Thibeault, who was not a party to the action, then moved to intervene, claiming both a direct interest in the property and statutory civil rights at stake. She sought intervention as of right or, alternatively, permissive intervention, arguing her interests were not adequately represented and that her defenses raised common questions of law and fact with the main action. The Superior Court denied her motion to intervene on both grounds, finding her interest insufficient and noting that her mother’s defenses already encompassed her concerns.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the order denying intervention. The court held that Thibeault did not satisfy the criteria for intervention as of right under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because she lacked a direct, legally protectable interest in the foreclosure action, her ability to protect her interests would not be impaired by denial, and her interests were adequately represented by Marchetti. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) because Thibeault’s participation would be duplicative and cause undue delay. The order denying intervention was affirmed. View "Oak Hill Condominiums v. Marchetti" on Justia Law

A group of students, their parents or guardians, and local school boards from several low-wealth and urban school districts in North Carolina brought suit against the State and the State Board of Education in 1994. They claimed that the State’s method of funding education deprived students in their districts of their constitutional right to the opportunity for a sound basic education, focusing on perceived inadequacies in the implementation and funding of the Basic Education Program (BEP) as it then existed. The plaintiffs did not allege that the statewide education system was unconstitutional on its face, but rather that it was unconstitutional as applied to their specific districts due to disparities in resource allocation.After various procedural developments, including intervention by additional parties and the dismissal of some claims, the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which previously clarified that the right at issue belonged only to students, not school boards. The Supreme Court held in Leandro v. State that the constitution guarantees every child the opportunity for a sound basic education, and remanded the case for as-applied determinations regarding whether that right was denied in the named districts. In Hoke County Board of Education v. State, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court finding that at-risk students in Hoke County had been deprived of their right, but otherwise found the statewide education system generally constitutional as then structured. The Supreme Court remanded for further as-applied proceedings in the other named districts, but no further trials occurred.Over time, the case’s subject matter shifted, and the trial court, with the parties’ acquiescence, began addressing a statewide, facial challenge to the current education system, including ordering the implementation of a statewide remedial plan without a new or amended complaint raising such a claim. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, reviewing an order entered on 17 April 2023, held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a facial challenge to the statewide education system, since no party had properly invoked jurisdiction over such a claim by amending the pleadings or following the statutory procedure. The Court vacated the trial court’s order and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that any orders entered after 24 July 2017, when the litigation’s nature changed, were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State" on Justia Law

After Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd. made a $6.5 million loan to Jet Midwest Group, LLC (JMG) for the purchase of a Boeing 737-700, JMG defaulted on repayment. Jet Midwest sued for breach of contract, and when it could not collect on its judgment due to JMG’s lack of funds, Jet Midwest brought claims under the Missouri Fraudulent Transfer Act against several individuals and entities (the Ohadi/Woolley defendants), alleging the improper transfer of assets to avoid payment. Following a bench trial, Jet Midwest prevailed on its claims, and the district court awarded money damages, interest, and set a schedule for further motions on attorney’s fees and costs.Previously, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri awarded Jet Midwest over $6.5 million in attorney’s fees and costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated this award, finding the district court had not properly performed a lodestar calculation for attorney’s fees and had not analyzed which costs were recoverable under federal law. On remand, Jet Midwest reduced its fee request but sought a multiplier; the district court ultimately awarded $5.8 million in attorney’s fees, granted prejudgment interest at 14 percent, and included expert witness fees and other litigation costs. Both sides appealed aspects of this award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly calculated and awarded $5.8 million in attorney’s fees but erred in awarding expert witness fees as part of attorney’s fees, as Jet Midwest failed to provide sufficient evidence that such fees were recoverable under the relevant standards. The Eighth Circuit also held that the district court erred in applying a 14 percent prejudgment interest rate and ordered that Missouri’s statutory rate of nine percent should apply. Additionally, the court clarified that, after August 6, 2020, the federal postjudgment interest rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) governs. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd v. Ohadi" on Justia Law

A mother and her minor daughter, both citizens of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2017 without valid entry documents. The mother applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that a criminal gang in El Salvador had repeatedly threatened her family with violence and kidnapping in attempts to extort money. Although her family partially complied with the gang’s demands and was not physically harmed, she asserted that returning to El Salvador would put her and her children at risk, as the gang had widespread influence and the Salvadoran government could not protect them.An immigration judge found the mother's testimony not credible due to inconsistencies and determined that, even if her testimony were credible, the threats did not amount to past persecution, the alleged social groups were not cognizable, and she could relocate within El Salvador. The judge denied all claims for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that she had not established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA also determined that her argument that the immigration judge was biased was waived because she raised it only in a conclusory manner and abandoned it in her appellate brief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision as the final agency action. The court held that the BIA properly applied its waiver rule and did not err in finding the due process claim waived, as the argument was inadequately raised and not meaningfully pursued. The court also concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the Department of Homeland Security’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion regarding enforcement priorities. The petition for review was denied. View "Quijano-Duran v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including a truck driver and employees, alleged that their employers or associated companies collected their biometric data, such as fingerprints or hand geometry, without complying with the requirements of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Each plaintiff claimed that every instance of data collection constituted a separate violation, resulting in potentially massive statutory damages. Some claims were brought as class actions, raising the possibility of billions in liability for the defendants.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the district judges addressed whether a 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20, which clarified that damages should be assessed per person rather than per scan, applied retroactively to cases pending when the amendment was enacted. The district courts determined that the amendment did not apply retroactively and certified this question for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the certified question de novo. The court considered Illinois’s established law of statutory retroactivity, which distinguishes between substantive and procedural (including remedial) changes. The Seventh Circuit held that the BIPA amendment was remedial because it addressed only the scope of available damages and did not alter the underlying substantive obligations or standards of liability. The court reasoned that, under Illinois law, remedial amendments apply to pending cases unless precluded by constitutional concerns, which were not present here.The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 2024 amendment to BIPA Section 20 applies retroactively to all pending cases. The court reversed the district courts’ rulings and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its holding. View "Clay v Union Pacific Railroad Company" on Justia Law

A company that designs and manufactures interactive technology products entered into reseller agreements with another company, granting the latter exclusive rights to sell its products in certain territories. Several years later, the manufacturer revoked the exclusivity, after which the reseller’s owner and his son developed a competing product. The manufacturer then terminated the reseller relationship. Subsequently, the reseller sued the manufacturer in South Carolina state court for various business torts and contract claims. The parties settled and executed a written agreement that broadly released and dismissed any and all claims and counterclaims that could have been brought in the litigation, including through a specific handwritten provision. Nevertheless, shortly after, the manufacturer initiated a federal lawsuit, alleging intellectual property violations related to the competing product.The state court dismissed the original action with prejudice, including all possible claims and counterclaims. In the federal action, the defendants argued that the settlement agreement and res judicata barred the new claims. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially allowed certain claims to proceed, but after further evidence and reconsideration, it granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the claims precluded by the settlement and the state court’s dismissal. A jury was then impaneled for trial on the defendants’ counterclaims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer’s claims were barred by res judicata based on the settlement and state court order, as the language of the agreement and the parties’ intent encompassed the intellectual property claims. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, its reconsideration of summary judgment, or the conduct of the trial, and affirmed the judgment in full. View "Clear Touch Interactive, Inc. v. The Ockers Company" on Justia Law

A man experiencing a severe mental health crisis was shot and killed by a law enforcement officer after a prolonged standoff at his family’s ranch. Family members had contacted emergency services, reporting his deteriorating condition, threats of suicide, and the presence of firearms. Multiple law enforcement agencies responded, including the Custer County Sheriff’s Office and the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP). After failed negotiation attempts, the NSP disabled the man’s vehicle, and as he exited and approached officers unarmed, he was fatally shot by an NSP officer.The personal representative of the decedent’s estate filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officers, the Sheriff’s Office, and the NSP training supervisor. Claims against the NSP officers in their official capacities were dismissed due to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as were claims against most officers in their individual capacities except for the officer who fired the shots. During discovery, the plaintiff served a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition subpoena on the non-party Nebraska State Patrol regarding officer training. The NSP moved to quash, citing state sovereign immunity. Both the magistrate judge and the district court denied the motion, relying on earlier circuit precedent that government entities are subject to federal discovery rules.Upon interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of NSP’s motion to quash. The appellate court held that state sovereign immunity does, in this instance, bar enforcement of the deposition subpoena because the requested discovery was disruptive and infringed on the state’s autonomy and resources. The court clarified that prior circuit statements to the contrary were non-binding dicta and not controlling. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. View "Mick v. Gibbons" on Justia Law

A group of anonymous individuals from Franklin and Delaware counties challenged two firearm-related ordinances enacted by the Columbus City Council in December 2022 and February 2023. The ordinances imposed restrictions on magazine capacity and required safe storage of firearms, among other provisions. The challengers argued that these ordinances violated Ohio’s firearm regulation preemption law and state constitutional protections for the right to keep and bear arms.The challengers filed suit in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of certain provisions of the ordinances. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, thereby barring the city from enforcing the contested provisions. The City of Columbus, along with city officials, appealed the trial court’s order to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The challengers moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the preliminary injunction was not a final, appealable order under Ohio law. The Fifth District agreed, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether state and municipal governments may immediately appeal orders that preliminarily enjoin enforcement of their laws. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), such a preliminary injunction constitutes a final order because it inflicts irreparable harm on the sovereign interests of the government, which cannot be remedied by appeal after a final judgment. Therefore, the order is immediately appealable. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Fifth District’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the city’s appeal. View "Doe v. Columbus" on Justia Law