Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Joseph Rued, who reported a potential sexual abuse incident involving his son to Scott County Health and Human Services. The County investigated and concluded that no abuse had occurred. Rued requested reconsideration, but the County upheld its initial finding. Rued then appealed to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for a fair hearing, which was denied by the Commissioner based on a recommendation from a human services judge.Rued subsequently appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Scott County District Court. Under Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, an appeal must be served on the Commissioner and any adverse party of record within 30 days. Rued served the notice on the Commissioner but failed to serve Scott County. Despite this, a Scott County attorney appeared at the initial hearing and argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to serve the County. The district court ruled that the County had waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing and denied Rued’s request for appeal on the merits.The Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision, holding that the failure to serve the County deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did not address whether Rued was entitled to a hearing on the no-maltreatment determination.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 30-day time limit for serving a notice of appeal under section 256.045, subdivision 7, is a waivable limitations period, not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also clarified that adequate service of the notice of appeal is necessary for personal jurisdiction. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court to allow the County to either waive its defense related to the limitations period or move for dismissal on that basis. View "Rued vs. Commissioner of Human Services" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law

In August 2010, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University filed a suit to expropriate property in New Orleans for constructing an academic medical center. The property owners, Allen Bickham and others, were named as defendants. A default judgment was obtained in March 2011, setting compensation for the property. In October 2011, James Alderdice intervened, claiming a mortgage on the property and seeking damages for lack of notice and demolition of the building.The Orleans Civil District Court granted a peremptory exception of no right of action against Alderdice in March 2014, dismissing his intervention. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision in March 2015, allowing Alderdice to assert his rights as a mortgagee. Alderdice then moved for a status conference and later for a trial date. In March 2017, a joint motion to continue the trial without date was filed and granted. Subsequent motions were filed, including a motion to set for trial in March 2020. The Board moved to dismiss the intervention as abandoned in June 2023, arguing that no steps had been taken for over three years.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed whether the joint motion to continue trial without date constituted a "step" under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 561, which would interrupt the abandonment period. The Court held that such a motion is not a step as it does not hasten the case towards judgment. However, the Court found that the joint motion reflected the parties' intent to advance the lawsuit, thus waiving the abandonment claim. Additionally, the Court noted that the abandonment period was suspended due to the Covid-19 emergency, and Alderdice's motion to set for trial in March 2020 interrupted the abandonment period. The Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, denying the Board's motion to dismiss the case as abandoned. View "BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE VS. BICKHAM" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Rafael Antonio Mena Chavez, filed a lawsuit under the false name "Sergio Balboa" after sustaining injuries while working for Southern Recycling, LLC. Chavez used the alias to obtain employment and continued using it when seeking medical attention and workers' compensation benefits. He later filed a lawsuit against Metso Minerals Industries, Inc., alleging product liability and negligence. Southern Recycling and other intervenors joined the suit, claiming they had paid substantial workers' compensation benefits to "Sergio Balboa."The Orleans Civil District Court denied Metso's motion to dismiss the case, despite Metso's argument that Chavez's use of a false identity undermined the judicial process. The court found no fraud or willful deception at that stage and allowed the case to proceed. Metso's subsequent writ to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, was also denied. Metso then sought relief from the Louisiana Supreme Court.The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that courts have inherent authority to dismiss an action with prejudice when a petitioner’s conduct undermines the integrity of the judicial process. The court found that Chavez's prolonged use of a false identity was a calculated deception that harmed the judicial system and the defendants. The court dismissed Chavez's petition with prejudice and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the intervenors' petition survives the dismissal of Chavez's petition. View "CHAVEZ VS. METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES, INC." on Justia Law

In 2019, Huberto Martinez's vehicle slid off an icy highway in Shreveport, Louisiana, and was subsequently struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Salah Dahir and owned by Starr Carriers, LLC. Martinez and his passengers, Ada Licona, Rosa Rivera, and Salvador Flores, filed lawsuits against Dahir, Starr Carriers, and their insurer, American Transportation Group Risk Retention Group, Inc. (ATG), which had a policy limit of $1,000,000. Martinez settled his claims before trial, but the jury awarded substantial damages to the remaining plaintiffs, exceeding ATG's policy limit.The First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, denied the defendants' post-trial motions and rendered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $2,802,054.66 plus interest and costs. The defendants sought a suspensive appeal and requested a bond less than the entire judgment, citing their inability to secure such a bond. The trial court set the bond at the full judgment amount. ATG posted a bond for its remaining policy limits plus interest and costs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal denied ATG's request for supervisory review.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that an insurer is not required to post a bond exceeding its policy limits to secure a suspensive appeal. The court determined that requiring ATG to post a bond for the entire judgment would impair the contractual limits of liability and violate the contract clause of the state constitution. The court allowed ATG to post a bond up to its policy limits for a suspensive appeal and to devolutively appeal the remainder of the judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "MARTINEZ VS. AMERICAN TRANSPORT GROUP RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves an automobile accident that occurred on June 2, 2018, where Theresa Fisher's vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Steven Harter, Jr., causing a chain reaction. Steven Harter, Sr., was also named as a defendant because his son was a minor at the time. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, which allows legislators and legislative employees to obtain continuances or extensions of court dates.The 1st Judicial District Court upheld the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, and the appellate court declined the plaintiff’s application for supervisory review. The district court had previously granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding Steven Harter, Jr. negligent and his father vicariously liable. The court also dismissed the defendants' affirmative defenses of comparative and third-party fault. However, the district court denied the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of La. R.S. 13:4163, stating that the statute did not violate the separation of powers or any constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that La. R.S. 13:4163 is unconstitutional on its face because it usurps the judiciary's power to grant or deny continuances, violating the separation of powers doctrine. The court emphasized that the statute mandates courts to grant continuances ex parte, without a hearing, which undermines the courts' inherent authority to manage their dockets and ensure the fair administration of justice. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to conduct a contradictory hearing for all contested motions for continuance. View "FISHER VS. HARTER" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses, Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler, who have a minor daughter together. After their divorce, Dasler engaged in extensive litigation against Knapp, including multiple appeals, motions, and lawsuits in various courts. Knapp sought an order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing that his filings were intended to harass and burden her.The Windsor Unit, Family Division of the Superior Court issued a final divorce order in August 2018, awarding Knapp primary custody of their daughter. Dasler appealed this order, but it was affirmed. He continued to file various motions and appeals, including attempts to modify custody and hold Knapp in contempt, all of which were denied. Dasler also initiated lawsuits in New Hampshire and federal courts, which were dismissed. In March 2023, Knapp moved for sanctions against Dasler, claiming his filings were abusive, but the court denied the motion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division’s order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation. The court found that Dasler’s repetitive filings were made to harass and intimidate Knapp, meeting the criteria for abusive litigation under 15 V.S.A. § 1181. The court concluded that Dasler’s actions, including attempts to relitigate final orders and filing numerous motions for reconsideration, were abusive. The order restricted Dasler from filing motions or engaging in litigation against Knapp unless represented by a licensed attorney or with prefiling approval from the court. The court also dismissed Dasler’s pending motions as abusive and denied his claims that the court erred in its factual findings and procedural rulings. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

In 2012, two individuals, Moore and Lloyd, obtained a $185,000 judgment against Mikul and Sanders. They applied for a writ of execution to auction two properties owned by Mikul and Sanders, and they were the highest bidders for one parcel at $130,000. Mikul, who resided on the property, contested the sale, claiming ownership and arguing that the sale price was unconscionably low. The Shelby Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of Moore and Lloyd, granting them possession of the property. Mikul's subsequent appeals and motions to intervene were denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision without an opinion.Moore and Lloyd then filed an action in the Shelby Circuit Court seeking immediate possession of the property. The court granted their motion but stayed the execution of the judgment. Over the years, Moore and Lloyd filed multiple motions to dissolve the stay and sought writs of execution, but the court repeatedly denied their requests. In 2022, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that Moore and Lloyd had not argued that the stay was "immoderate" in the lower court and suggested they seek dissolution of the stay in the original action.Moore and Lloyd filed a motion to dissolve the stay in 2022, arguing it was immoderate. The Shelby Circuit Court, however, did not dissolve the stay and instead set the matter for a trial. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the stay, which had been in place for six years, was indefinite and without continued justification, making it immoderate and beyond the court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dissolve the stay and a writ of prohibition to vacate the orders setting the case for trial, limiting the court to issuing orders necessary to wind up the litigation. View "Ex parte Moore" on Justia Law

The case involves Meisam Sedighi, who sought reimbursement from his employer, Schnackel Engineers, Inc., for $3,000 he paid to an immigration attorney for the preparation and filing of a permanent labor certification application. Sedighi argued that under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b), Schnackel Engineers was responsible for these costs. Schnackel Engineers contended that Sedighi was to pursue his green card at his own expense, as stipulated in his employment contract, and that it did not agree to pay for the certification application.The small claims court of the county court for Douglas County ruled in favor of Sedighi, finding that Schnackel Engineers was responsible for the attorney fees under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b). Schnackel Engineers appealed to the district court for Douglas County, which reversed the small claims court's decision. The district court found that the employment contract controlled the parties' obligations and that Sedighi was responsible for his own green card expenses. It concluded that the Michigan immigration attorney represented Sedighi, not Schnackel Engineers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its appellate review. The Supreme Court noted that the small claims court's judgment was supported by competent evidence showing that Schnackel Engineers actively participated in the preparation and filing of the permanent labor certification application. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have presumed that the small claims court found the Michigan immigration attorney represented both Sedighi and Schnackel Engineers. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and directed it to reinstate the small claims court's judgment in favor of Sedighi. View "Sedighi v. Schnackel Engineers" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Kathleen Vita, alleged that New England Baptist Hospital (NEBH) and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. (BIDMC) violated the Massachusetts wiretap act by collecting and transmitting her browsing activities on their websites to third parties for advertising purposes without her consent. Vita accessed information about doctors and medical conditions on the hospitals' websites and claimed these interactions were "wire communications" protected by the wiretap act. She did not allege that private patient records or messages to healthcare providers were intercepted.The Superior Court denied the hospitals' motions to dismiss Vita's complaints, leading to the hospitals' appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the term "communication" in the wiretap act is ambiguous as applied to web browsing activities. The court found that the legislative history of the wiretap act focused on the secret interception of person-to-person conversations and messaging, particularly private ones, and did not clearly extend to interactions with websites. Given this ambiguity, the court applied the rule of lenity, which requires that any ambiguity in a criminal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant. Consequently, the court concluded that the wiretap act does not unambiguously prohibit the interception of web browsing activities and reversed the Superior Court's denial of the hospitals' motions to dismiss. View "Vita v. New England Baptist Hospital" on Justia Law