Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steven Holte and Sheldon Holte, as co-trustees of the Kermit and Ardella Family Mineral Trust, along with Ardella Holte, filed a lawsuit against Tiah E. Rigby, both individually and as the personal representative of Nathan Holte's estate. The case arose from Nathan Holte's misappropriation of trust income during his tenure as trustee. After Nathan's death, Rigby became the life beneficiary of Nathan's share of the trust income. The Holtes sought to offset Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated funds.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, ruled that the co-trustees could offset Rigby's distribution to recover the misappropriated trust income but could not offset her distribution to recoup non-trust money that Nathan had stolen from Ardella's personal accounts. Rigby appealed, arguing that she should not be held liable for her father's misdeeds, while the Holtes cross-appealed, seeking to offset Rigby's distribution further.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the co-trustees could not withhold Rigby's distribution to recoup the misappropriated trust income, as Rigby had no personal liability for Nathan's actions, and her beneficial interest vested upon Nathan's death. The court emphasized that the trust agreement required monthly distributions to life beneficiaries and that Nathan's life interest terminated upon his death, making it improper to offset against Rigby's distribution.The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that the co-trustees could not offset Rigby's distribution to recover the non-trust money stolen by Nathan, as Rigby was not involved in the theft and had no personal liability. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Holte v. Rigby" on Justia Law

Kyle Zittleman and ShanaLea Bibler were married in 2010 and had one child in 2012. They divorced in 2016, with a Wyoming court granting Zittleman primary residential responsibility. Bibler filed motions to modify residential responsibility and child support in 2018 and 2020, but Zittleman retained primary responsibility. Zittleman moved to North Dakota in 2019, and Bibler followed in 2022. In 2023, Bibler again moved to modify residential responsibility, citing her relocation, Zittleman’s alleged non-compliance with a judgment, and the child's worsening demeanor.The Morton County district court held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, limiting each party to two and a half hours for their case. Bibler used all her time before cross-examining two witnesses and argued this violated her due process rights. The district court found no material change in circumstances and denied her motion. Bibler appealed, claiming the time limitation and the court's findings were erroneous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for constitutional claims and under an abuse of discretion standard for procedural matters. The court found that the district court did not violate due process by limiting the hearing time, as both parties were notified and did not object or request additional time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the time limitation.The Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no material change in circumstances. The court noted that Bibler's move to North Dakota, Zittleman’s adherence to the judgment, and allegations of alienation did not constitute a material change. The court also found that the district court did not err in omitting a best interests analysis, as it was not required without a material change in circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Bibler's motion to modify residential responsibility. View "Zittleman v. Bibler" on Justia Law

Bradley Williams, an inmate, filed a Notice of Appeal from the Hardin Circuit Court's dismissal of his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence. He claims to have filed the notice and subsequent responses on time under the Prison Mailbox Rule, but the Court of Appeals did not receive them timely, leading to the dismissal of his appeal. Williams did not receive the dismissal order until months later, after the deadline for filing a motion for discretionary review had passed. He then filed a motion for reconsideration and two CR 60.02 motions, all of which were returned for various procedural deficiencies.The Hardin Circuit Court dismissed Williams' RCr 11.42 motion on November 28, 2023. Williams filed his Notice of Appeal on December 20, 2023, but it was not received until January 9, 2024, and filed on January 17, 2024. The Court of Appeals issued a show cause order on January 22, 2024, and dismissed the appeal on March 6, 2024, for untimeliness. Williams filed a motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2024, which was returned, as were his subsequent CR 60.02 motions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and denied Williams' petition for a writ of mandamus, stating that he has an available remedy at the Court of Appeals. The court held that Williams could file a motion to reinstate his appeal, demonstrating compliance with the Prison Mailbox Rule through prison mail logs. The court emphasized that the Court of Appeals should determine whether Williams complied with the rule and may conduct a hearing or delegate the matter to the trial court. The writ of mandamus was denied, but Williams was allowed to seek reinstatement of his appeal. View "WILLIAMS V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

Alyssa Baum and Justin Aldava have a child, H.A., born in Texas in June 2019. Baum and H.A. moved to Kentucky in November 2020 to escape domestic violence from Aldava. Baum filed for an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) and temporary custody in Jefferson Family Court, recounting an incident of domestic violence in October 2020. The court granted the EPO and later a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) after a hearing, despite Aldava not being served until April 2021. Aldava filed for custody in Texas, but the Texas court did not assert jurisdiction.The Jefferson Family Court held a hearing in April 2021 and issued a DVO, granting Baum temporary custody and prohibiting Aldava from contacting Baum and H.A. Aldava later moved to dismiss the DVO for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the family court denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the family court lacked personal jurisdiction over Aldava and that the DVO could not impose affirmative relief, such as temporary custody or firearm restrictions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that Kentucky courts could issue DVOs protecting petitioners and their children from domestic violence, even without personal jurisdiction over non-resident respondents. The court affirmed that Kentucky had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to grant temporary custody. The court also ruled that the DVO's restrictions on Aldava's firearm possession within Kentucky were valid and that entering the DVO into the Law Information Network of Kentucky (LINK) did not violate due process.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the family court's DVO in part, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BAUM V. ALDAVA" on Justia Law

A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law

Bruce Henry, who pled guilty to possessing child pornography in 2013, challenged Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4), which prohibits adult sex offenders convicted of a sex offense involving a child from residing or conducting overnight visits with a minor, including their own child. Henry, who has completed his prison term, married, and fathered a son, argued that the statute violated his First Amendment right of intimate association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Henry’s motion for a preliminary injunction but later partially granted his motion for summary judgment, finding the statute facially unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further Alabama’s compelling interest in protecting children and issued an injunction against its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the statute violated Henry’s fundamental right to live with his child. The court held that the statute was overinclusive, underinclusive, and not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. However, the court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in facially enjoining the statute, as Henry had not shown that it was unconstitutional in all its applications. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the City, alleging violations of the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and the California Constitution. The City maintains a website for public records requests but the Department of Water and Power (DWP) does not provide a specific method for such requests. Plaintiff, after receiving an erroneous water bill, submitted multiple records requests through the DWP website but received no response. She later posted a complaint on social media, which led to a phone call from a customer service representative but no records were provided.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the City’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the CPRA does not permit class claims and that plaintiff’s individual claim was insufficient because the City provides a method for submitting CPRA requests through its main website. The court also denied the City’s motion for sanctions, finding plaintiff’s arguments were not frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the trial court that the CPRA does not allow for class claims, as the statutory language and case law limit judicial relief to the individual who made the records request. However, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s individual claim was sufficient, as she alleged that she submitted a request for public records and the City failed to respond within the statutory period. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer as to the class claims and overruling the demurrer to plaintiff’s individual CPRA claim. View "Di Lauro v. City of Burbank" on Justia Law

AdvanFort Company, a maritime security firm based in Virginia, deployed a vessel, the Seaman Guard Virginia, for anti-piracy services in the Red Sea. In October 2013, the vessel docked at the Jeddah Shipyard in Saudi Arabia for repairs by Zamil Offshore Services Company. During the repairs, a fire broke out, which AdvanFort attributed to Zamil's personnel. AdvanFort sued Zamil and the Saudi Ports Authority in a Saudi court in 2014, but the court dismissed AdvanFort's claims and awarded partial damages to Zamil on its countersuit. In 2022, Zamil moved the vessel to a storage yard, claiming it was at risk of sinking, and later informed AdvanFort that it would dispose of the vessel if not retrieved.AdvanFort filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia in July 2023, alleging conversion, breach of bailment, negligence, and gross negligence against Zamil and the Ports Authority. Zamil moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that Saudi courts were a more appropriate forum. The Ports Authority did not appear, leading to a default entry against it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed AdvanFort's complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding that Saudi courts were available, adequate, and more convenient for the litigation. The court noted that the relevant events and evidence were located in Saudi Arabia and that the Saudi courts had jurisdiction over both defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Saudi Arabia was a more convenient forum and that the Saudi courts were both available and adequate for adjudicating AdvanFort's claims. The court also found no error in the district court's denial of limited discovery on forum non conveniens issues. View "AdvanFort Co. v. Zamil Offshore Services Co." on Justia Law

C.L., a twelve-year-old student, was invited by her teacher, Jenna Riep, to an after-school art club meeting, which turned out to be a Gender and Sexualities Alliance (GSA) meeting. During the meeting, a guest speaker, Kimberly Chambers, discussed gender identity and suggested that students uncomfortable with their bodies might be transgender. Chambers also warned students that it might not be safe to tell their parents about the meeting and provided her personal contact information for further communication. C.L. announced herself as transgender at the meeting and later informed her parents, who subsequently disenrolled her from the school. H.J., another student, had similar experiences and also faced emotional distress, leading her parents to disenroll her from the school.The parents of C.L. and H.J. sued the Poudre School District and its Board of Education, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment parental substantive-due-process rights. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The parents then moved to amend their complaint, focusing solely on a claim against the school district for monetary damages. The district court denied the motion to amend, concluding that the parents had failed to plausibly allege municipal liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the parents did not plausibly allege that the school district's official policy was the moving force behind their alleged injuries. The court found that the parents failed to establish a direct causal link between the district's policies and the constitutional injury they claimed. View "Lee v. Poudre School District R-1" on Justia Law

A former employee, Corbin Williams, worked as an insurance adjuster for Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, from 2014 until January 2022. Williams typically worked 84-hour weeks but was not paid overtime, violating the Labor Code. In March 2023, over a year after his employment ended, Williams notified the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency of his intent to pursue a PAGA action for these violations. He then filed a lawsuit seeking civil penalties on behalf of other current and former employees but not on his own behalf.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained a demurrer to Williams's complaint without leave to amend, finding the action time-barred. The court noted that Williams had not suffered any Labor Code violations within the one-year statute of limitations period before notifying the Agency, as his employment ended in January 2022. Consequently, the court did not address the defendant's alternative argument regarding Williams's standing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that to be a PAGA plaintiff, an individual must have a timely individual claim for at least one Labor Code violation. Since Williams's individual claims were time-barred, he could not satisfy this requirement. The court rejected Williams's arguments that other aggrieved employees' timely claims could substitute for his own untimely claims and that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, as Williams's proposed amendments would not cure the timeliness defect. View "Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Grp." on Justia Law