Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

An employer engaged in the cybersecurity industry hired an employee for a marketing and sales position after recruiting him away from a competitor. The parties signed a written employment agreement that described a specific role and compensation structure. The employee alleged that the promised position did not actually exist and that he was instead given an entry-level sales role. Although the employee changed employers, he remained at his existing residence in Las Vegas throughout his employment.The employee sued the employer, claiming a violation of Nevada's employment-luring statute, NRS 613.010, which prohibits employers from inducing workers to change locations under false pretenses regarding employment terms. The employer moved for summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court, arguing that the statute did not apply because the employee had not physically relocated his residence. The employee countered that the statute applies when an employee changes their place of employment, not necessarily their residence. The district court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute’s civil cause of action provision supports the employee’s interpretation. The court also denied the employer’s later motion to strike the employee’s jury demand, ruling the employer had waived the argument by waiting too long to raise it.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 613.010 authorizes a civil cause of action when an employee changes their place of employment in response to false or deceptive representations by an employer, even if the employee does not change their place of residence. The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the jury demand. Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied the employer’s petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Field Effect Security, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from the design and installation of cabinetry in a luxury home in Charleston, South Carolina. Design Gaps, Inc., owned by David and Eva Glover, had a longstanding business relationship with Shelter, LLC, a general contractor operated by Ryan and Jenny Butler. After being dissatisfied with Design Gaps’ performance, the homeowners, Dr. Jason and Kacie Highsmith, and Shelter terminated their contract with Design Gaps and hired Distinctive Design & Construction LLC, owned by Bryan and Wendy Reiss, to complete the work. The Highsmiths and Shelter initiated arbitration against Design Gaps, which led to the arbitrator ruling in favor of the homeowners and Shelter on their claims, and against Design Gaps on its counterclaims, including those for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and unfair trade practices.After the arbitration, Design Gaps sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, but the court instead confirmed the award. Concurrently, Design Gaps filed a separate federal lawsuit against several parties, including some who were not part of the arbitration. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the new claims, or alternatively, that the claims failed on other grounds such as the statute of limitations and laches. The district court agreed, dismissing most claims based on preclusion or other legal bars, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The court held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied to bar most of Design Gaps’ claims, even against parties not directly involved in the arbitration but in privity with those who were. For the remaining claims, the court found they were properly dismissed on grounds such as the statute of limitations, waiver, or laches. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Design Gaps, Inc. v. Distinctive Design & Construction LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were divorced in 2018. Following the divorce, one party, Mr. Dasler, repeatedly attempted to relitigate matters that had already been resolved by final court orders, filing numerous motions for reconsideration and appeals, most of which were denied for lack of new arguments or facts. He also made unsubstantiated allegations against his former spouse, Ms. Knapp, and initiated related litigation in multiple courts over substantially similar issues. Based on this conduct, a trial court found that Mr. Dasler engaged in abusive litigation intended to harass or intimidate Ms. Knapp and issued an order restricting his ability to file further litigation against her without meeting certain conditions.Ms. Knapp then requested attorney’s fees and costs under Vermont’s abusive-litigation statute, 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), submitting detailed billing records to support her claim. Mr. Dasler objected, arguing that some fees were unrelated, excessive, and that he could not afford to pay them. The Vermont Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Family Division, reviewed the fees, applied the lodestar method, and limited the award to fees connected to the abusive litigation proceedings. The court found the fees reasonable, declined to adjust the amount based on Mr. Dasler’s financial circumstances, and awarded $5940 in attorney’s fees plus $30 in costs. Mr. Dasler’s motion for reconsideration, which argued the court was required to make specific findings regarding his ability to pay, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that when awarding attorney’s fees under 15 V.S.A. § 1184(b)(1), the proper standard is reasonableness and there is no requirement for individualized findings regarding the litigant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s analysis or fee award. The judgment in favor of Ms. Knapp was affirmed. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

A manufacturer of aircraft engines contracted with both the federal government and commercial clients. The contracts at issue were cost-plus agreements, requiring the government to reimburse the manufacturer for a share of overhead costs, calculated under federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), specifically CAS 418. The manufacturer used unique “collaboration agreements” with suppliers, involving payments tied to program revenues rather than direct part costs. A central dispute arose over whether certain costs, known as “Drag”—representing amounts paid by collaborators to compensate the manufacturer for shared expenses—should be included in the pool of overhead costs to be allocated, and over how to measure the material costs of parts for allocation purposes.After protracted disagreements and administrative decisions dating back to the 1990s, a contracting officer in 2013 determined that the manufacturer’s accounting violated CAS 418 and that Drag amounts should be excluded from the overhead pool. The manufacturer appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. The Board held in part for each side: it found the Drag agreement between the parties valid, so Drag need not be excluded, but rejected the manufacturer’s method for calculating material costs, settling on a “net revenue share” approach. The Board remanded to the parties to negotiate quantum (the amount owed), retaining jurisdiction if they failed to agree.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision on the material cost allocation base (CAS 418 Claim) because no final determination of quantum had been made. However, the court found the Board’s decision on the Drag Claim was final and reviewable. The Federal Circuit held that the Drag agreement was unenforceable against the government because it did not comply with required federal regulations for advance agreements, and therefore reversed the Board’s ruling on that point. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PRATT & WHITNEY" on Justia Law

A Texas truck driver was injured while making roadside repairs in Iowa when his parked semi was struck by another vehicle. After the accident, the driver retained a Texas attorney to pursue his personal injury claim. That attorney negotiated with the insurer for the other driver, ultimately agreeing to a settlement of $125,000 and requesting a release. However, the client did not sign the release and later replaced his attorney, claiming he had not authorized the settlement. The client then filed a lawsuit in Iowa, seeking additional compensation and naming the driver, the driver’s employer, and others as defendants.The defendants responded by moving to enforce the settlement agreement in the Iowa District Court for Warren County. The district court, acting as factfinder with no objection from either party, held a hearing, accepted evidence, and considered the client’s affidavit. The court found that the attorney was presumed to have settlement authority and that the client had not rebutted this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. The court enforced the settlement and dismissed the case upon payment of the agreed sum. The client’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the district court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review. The Supreme Court held that, because the client did not object to the district court’s procedure, the court properly acted as factfinder. The Supreme Court further held that the district court’s finding—that the attorney had authority to settle—was supported by substantial evidence, and thus the settlement agreement was enforceable. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "Recio v. Fridley" on Justia Law

The case involves a woman, M.S., who was the subject of a petition filed by the State in May 2024, alleging she was mentally ill and dangerous under Nebraska law. The petition was supported by statements from M.S.’ daughter, who described recent concerning behavior, including M.S. bringing a gun to her daughter’s home, appearing paranoid, and exhibiting signs of being out of touch with reality. M.S. was admitted to a psychiatric facility pending commitment proceedings, and a hearing was held before the Mental Health Board of the Fourth Judicial District. During the proceedings, M.S. was represented by counsel and objected to certain testimony on confrontation and hearsay grounds.The Mental Health Board overruled M.S.’ motion for a continuance and proceeded with the commitment hearing, where it heard testimony from a psychiatrist, M.S.’ daughter, and M.S. herself. The Board found, by clear and convincing evidence, that M.S. suffered from bipolar I disorder, manic with psychosis, and was dangerous to herself and others. The Board ordered inpatient treatment and authorized forced medication. M.S. appealed to the District Court for Douglas County, arguing that her rights to confrontation were violated, that inadmissible hearsay was admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her commitment. The district court affirmed the Board’s decision, ruling that any errors in admitting certain evidence were harmless because the facts were otherwise established in the record.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision. It held that confrontation rights under both the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, as extended by statute to mental health commitment proceedings, are trial rights that do not apply to pretrial hearings. The court further found that the challenged statements by family members were admissible under the medical purpose exception to the hearsay rule. The court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings that M.S. was mentally ill and dangerous, and that the treatment ordered was the least restrictive alternative. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Interest of M.S." on Justia Law

Two brothers operated a farming and cattle partnership, with one managing the finances and records and the other handling outside operations. The financial brother, assisted by his daughter, maintained control over the partnership’s handwritten ledgers and inventory records, while the other brother relied on the information provided. Over several years, the managing brother made false entries in the ledgers, diverted partnership income into personal accounts, and concealed certain ownership interests in partnership assets from his brother. Suspicious discrepancies surfaced when the outside-operating brother noticed substantial errors affecting his reported net worth, prompting him to seek dissolution of the partnership and to sue for damages.The District Court for Thurston County conducted a bench trial, hearing evidence from the parties and expert witnesses. It found that the managing brother and his daughter had exclusive control over the partnership’s finances and intentionally concealed information. The court concluded that the outside-operating brother could not reasonably have discovered the wrongdoing earlier, given his lack of access to original records and his trust in the managing brother. The court awarded damages to the plaintiff under several theories, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract, and imposed joint and several liability on both defendants.Upon appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal questions de novo. It held that the claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment were not barred by the statute of limitations, as discovery of the fraud occurred within the allowed period. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s determinations regarding liability, damages, and the denial of post-trial motions, upholding the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court specifically affirmed the joint and several liability for both defendants and the calculation of damages, rejecting the appellants’ arguments regarding settlements, contract defenses, and the statute of limitations. View "Sebade v. Sebade" on Justia Law

A municipal water and gas board entered into four contracts with a contractor to replace and expand gas lines in and around a city. The total project cost exceeded $4 million, and the contractor began work after being the sole bidder for each project phase. After paying the contractor over $2.8 million, the board ceased payments, leaving over $800,000 due for completed work. The board asserted it could not continue payments because the advertisement for sealed bids had not strictly complied with the version of the applicable Alabama statute in effect at the time the bids were solicited. The contractor then sued the board for breach of contract and other claims.The Franklin Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the board, finding, in effect, that strict compliance with the statutory advertising requirements was necessary and that the contracts were void due to noncompliance. The trial court denied the contractor’s postjudgment motion, and the contractor appealed.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with the advertising requirements for public works contracts under the relevant statute can satisfy the law’s objectives. The court distinguished this situation from prior precedent where there was a complete absence of competitive bidding and evidence of favoritism or corruption. Here, there was no such evidence, and the board had taken affirmative steps to advertise, including publication and online postings. The court concluded that the contractor presented substantial evidence of substantial compliance, creating a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pinpoint Locating, Inc. v. The Water Works and Gas Board of the City of Red Bay" on Justia Law

In this matter, a relator initially brought claims under the False Claims Act against a group of defendants for fraudulent conduct, later joined by the United States. After years of litigation, the district court imposed a receivership over the defendants’ assets and ultimately entered a large monetary judgment against them. The defendants satisfied the reduced judgment following an appeal, but the receivership remained active to resolve additional matters, including a claim by the Estate of Robert Johnson. Johnson had obtained a $200,000 wrongful death judgment in state court against a receivership entity and sought to intervene in the federal court to enforce the judgment, as the receivership order prevented execution in state court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted Johnson’s motion to intervene, subsequently granting summary judgment in his favor and directing payment of the state court judgment. The defendants appealed the order granting intervention before the district court had resolved their motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order. The district court’s intervention order was a preliminary step in addressing Johnson’s claim, not a final resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over the defendants’ interlocutory appeal from the order granting intervention. Citing established precedent, the Fifth Circuit determined that orders permitting intervention are generally not immediately appealable, as they are procedural steps toward a later final judgment on the intervenor’s claim. The court concluded that the intervention order was not a final, appealable order and that the appeal was premature. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court’s holding is that an order granting intervention, when not resolving the merits of the intervenor’s claim, is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. View "Johnson v. Stone County" on Justia Law

Villa Zinfandel, LLC purchased real property in Napa County from a party that acquired it at a foreclosure sale. Christopher Bearman was occupying the property at the time. Villa Zinfandel filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Bearman as a limited civil action, seeking possession and holdover damages, as required by law after purchasing foreclosed property. Meanwhile, a third party, Edward Sanchez, filed a separate unlimited civil action to set aside the trustee’s deed upon sale, alleging violations in the foreclosure process. Bearman moved to consolidate the two actions, arguing that the issues overlapped. The trial court ultimately consolidated both cases for all purposes.Following consolidation, the trial court granted summary adjudication against Sanchez on his claim to unwind the foreclosure, while Villa Zinfandel’s unlawful detainer claim proceeded to trial. At trial, Villa Zinfandel introduced recorded foreclosure documents and the trustee’s deed upon sale. Bearman objected to the admission of these documents, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay, and contended that Villa Zinfandel needed to prove the truth of the recorded statements, not just their existence. The trial court overruled these objections, took judicial notice of the documents’ existence (but not their truth), and found in favor of Villa Zinfandel, awarding damages exceeding the then-applicable $35,000 cap for limited civil actions.On appeal, Bearman argued to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, that the trial court erred by admitting the recorded documents and by awarding damages above the jurisdictional limit. The appellate court held that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the existence and facial contents of the recorded foreclosure documents and correctly applied legal presumptions regarding the regularity of the trustee’s sale. The court also held that, after consolidation for all purposes with an unlimited civil action, the case was no longer subject to the damages cap for limited civil actions. The judgment in favor of Villa Zinfandel was affirmed. View "Villa Zinfandel v. Bearman" on Justia Law