Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Ex parte GBC International Bank
Michael Straus wired $60,000 to an account at GBC International Bank (GBC) owned by Apex Oil and Gas Trading, LLC (Apex). Apex allegedly failed to provide the services Straus paid for, withdrew the funds, and disappeared. Straus sued GBC in May 2024, claiming negligence and wantonness, alleging GBC closed Apex's account knowing Apex was engaged in fraud. Straus argued GBC's website acknowledged its obligations under the Patriot Act to prevent such fraud.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied GBC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. GBC then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. GBC argued it had no general or specific personal jurisdiction in Alabama, supported by an affidavit from its executive vice president and chief financial officer, Richard Holmes. Holmes stated GBC had no business operations, property, or targeted advertising in Alabama. Straus's response included an unsworn declaration, which the court found insufficient to establish jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that Straus's unilateral action of wiring money to GBC did not establish specific personal jurisdiction. GBC's general statements on its website about compliance with federal law did not constitute purposeful availment of conducting activities in Alabama. The court concluded that GBC did not have the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Therefore, the court granted GBC's petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss Straus's complaint. View "Ex parte GBC International Bank" on Justia Law
J.R.M.B. v. Alegent Creighton Health
A minor child, through his mother, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against an obstetrician, the clinic where the obstetrician was employed, and the hospital where he was born. The child suffered an obstetric brachial plexus injury during birth. The district court excluded the package insert for Pitocin used during the birth, ruling it was hearsay and lacked foundation. The child also argued that the court erred in not giving his requested jury instructions and giving other erroneous instructions, which he did not object to at trial.The District Court for Douglas County ruled in favor of the defendants. The jury found that the child had not met his burden of proof and rendered a general verdict for the defendants. The child appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could not determine the standard of care from the testimony of expert witnesses. This erroneous instruction was on a vital issue and misled the jury, prejudicially affecting a substantial right of the child. The court held that the error was of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, without addressing the remaining assignments of error, as they were unnecessary to adjudicate the case and might be tried differently on remand. View "J.R.M.B. v. Alegent Creighton Health" on Justia Law
Trabucco v. Rivera
Nickolas Trabucco parked at a gas station in Hernando, Mississippi, where Officer Andres Rivera was filling up his patrol car. Rivera approached Trabucco’s car, and after a brief interaction, Trabucco exited his vehicle. The subsequent events, partially obscured by the car, are disputed. Trabucco claimed Rivera grabbed and tackled him without provocation, while Rivera testified that Trabucco resisted and attempted to flee, prompting Rivera to tackle him. Surveillance footage showed Rivera restraining Trabucco, who continued to struggle. Rivera then used a taser on Trabucco, who fell and was subsequently arrested.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Trabucco sued Rivera under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force. The jury found that Rivera used excessive force but was entitled to qualified immunity. Trabucco’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Trabucco waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by not properly moving for judgment as a matter of law. The court found that Trabucco’s actions sufficiently alerted the court and Rivera to the sufficiency issue, allowing the court to consider the evidence. The court then held that Rivera’s use of force was not unreasonable in light of clearly established law, distinguishing this case from precedents like Trammell v. Fruge and Hanks v. Rogers due to factual differences. The court also found no error in the jury instructions and upheld the district court’s denial of Trabucco’s motion for a new trial, concluding that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Trabucco v. Rivera" on Justia Law
Abbas v. Bilal Neter-Nu
Franklyn Neter-Nu, a truck driver, visited Methodist Hospital in Gary, Indiana, complaining of nausea and vomiting. He was treated with IV fluids and medications, but the IV was twice found detached from his arm by Nurse Morgan Mittler, who then placed it in his right foot without proper training or a doctor's order. Neter-Nu later experienced pain in his foot, and despite an x-ray showing no issues, he was discharged. After traveling to Iowa, he sought emergency care for blackened toes and was eventually referred for a below-the-knee amputation.Neter-Nu filed a complaint against Dr. Zainab Abbas, Nurse Mittler, and Methodist Hospital, alleging negligence. A jury found in favor of Neter-Nu, awarding him $11,000,000, which was reduced to the statutory cap of $1,250,000. The trial court also awarded $79,993.40 in prejudgment interest. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, citing errors in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings, and remanded for a new trial.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and in its jury instructions, but these errors did not necessitate reversing the jury verdict due to joint-and-several liability. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Providers’ proposed jury instructions on superseding cause and hindsight, nor in excluding certain medical records and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict but reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and recalculate prejudgment interest based on the Providers’ statutory liability. View "Abbas v. Bilal Neter-Nu" on Justia Law
Eshagian v. Cepeda
Joseph Eshagian leased a residential unit in Van Nuys to Manuel Cepeda, who was required to pay $1,000 monthly rent. On December 20, 2022, Eshagian served Cepeda with a three-day notice to pay $8,000 in unpaid rent or quit. The notice did not specify the start date of the three-day period, nor did it clearly state that Cepeda would lose possession if he did not pay by a certain date. On December 27, 2022, Eshagian filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking possession, unpaid rent, holdover damages, and attorney fees. Cepeda filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Eshagian’s motion for terminating sanctions due to Cepeda’s failure to comply with discovery orders, struck Cepeda’s answer, and entered a default against him. A possession-only judgment was entered on May 3, 2023. Cepeda’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and he appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, which held the possession-only judgment was appealable and reversed the judgment, finding the three-day notice defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case to determine if a possession-only judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding is appealable when the landlord’s damages claims are unresolved. The court concluded that such a judgment is not appealable because it does not resolve all rights of the parties. However, the court treated Cepeda’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandate due to the uncertainty of the law on appealability at the time of filing.The court found the three-day notice invalid for failing to specify when and how Cepeda had to pay the rent and that he would lose possession if he did not cure the default. Consequently, the complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court dismissed the appeal, granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate the judgment in favor of Eshagian and enter a new judgment in favor of Cepeda. View "Eshagian v. Cepeda" on Justia Law
Riley v. Bondi
Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Riley sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be killed by a drug kingpin if returned to Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s order, allowing the removal order to be enforced.Riley filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within 30 days of the BIA’s decision but long after the DHS issued the final administrative review order (FARO). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a final order of removal is jurisdictional and that the final order of removal was the FARO, not the BIA’s decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The Court also held that the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Consequently, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Riley v. Bondi" on Justia Law
Smith v. Hippler
Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by the Fourth District Administrative District Judge (ADJ) in Idaho. This order prevents Smith from filing new litigation pro se in Idaho courts without obtaining prior permission from a judge. The determination arose from Smith's conduct in litigation concerning the administration of his mother Victoria H. Smith’s estate. Smith, a former attorney, was involved in contentious probate proceedings after his brother successfully challenged their mother's will, which had left the entire estate to Smith. The estate was subsequently administered as intestate, leading to multiple appeals and disciplinary actions against Smith by the Idaho State Bar.The district court found that Smith repeatedly filed frivolous and unmeritorious motions, including petitions to remove the personal representative (PR) and the PR’s counsel, motions to disqualify the district court judge, and objections to court orders. These actions were deemed to lack legal or factual basis and were intended to cause unnecessary delay. The PR of the estate moved to have Smith declared a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d)(3), which the district court supported, leading to the referral to the ADJ.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The court held that the ADJ did not abuse its discretion in declaring Smith a vexatious litigant. The ADJ acted within the legal standards set forth in Rule 59(d) and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. The court also found that Smith’s due process argument was not preserved for appeal as it was raised for the first time. The court declined to award attorney fees to the ADJ, concluding that Smith’s appeal, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous or unreasonable. View "Smith v. Hippler" on Justia Law
Ramlow v. Mitchell
Nicholas Roddy Ramlow and Amanda Marie Mitchell share custody of their minor son. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over their child custody case since 2016. In 2020, a temporary order was issued for the child to attend Kindergarten at Winton Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The parents later entered into a custody agreement that did not specify the child's school. In 2021, Mitchell moved to Pinehurst, Idaho, and enrolled the child in Pinehurst Elementary without informing Ramlow, who was under a no-contact order. Ramlow discovered the change in 2023 and attempted to enroll the child in Bryan Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, but the school secretary, Miriam McBenge, refused without both parents' consent or a court order.Ramlow filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus in the district court to allow the child's enrollment in Coeur d'Alene. The district court dismissed the petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), citing the ongoing child custody case in the magistrate court. Ramlow argued that the district court erred in its dismissal. McBenge and Mitchell requested the district court's decision be affirmed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the magistrate court was better positioned to resolve the issue of the child's school enrollment due to its ongoing jurisdiction over the custody case. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion and followed the appropriate legal standards. The case was remanded to the district court to amend the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to Mitchell under Idaho Code section 12-121, as Ramlow's appeal was deemed frivolous and without foundation. View "Ramlow v. Mitchell" on Justia Law
Fratello v. Mann
Katherine Fratello loaned Russell A. Mann $60,000 under a secured promissory note, with Mann agreeing to make monthly payments starting October 15, 2023. Mann provided a cashier’s check for $3,500 on September 29, 2023, claiming it covered the first two payments and other loans. Fratello disputed the validity of the check and considered Mann in default for missing the first two payments. She served Mann with a default notice on November 29, 2023, and filed a complaint on January 5, 2024, alleging Mann’s failure to make the required payments.Mann counterclaimed, asserting that Fratello breached their contract by not cashing the cashier’s check, which he claimed covered the first two payments. He argued that Fratello’s refusal to accept the payment and the subsequent default notice were unlawful. Fratello filed a special motion to dismiss Mann’s counterclaim under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the counterclaim was based on her protected petitioning activity, namely the default notice and the complaint.The Superior Court (Cumberland County) denied Fratello’s special motion to dismiss, concluding that the default notice was not petitioning activity and that Mann’s counterclaim was not based on Fratello’s filing of the complaint or any other petitioning activity. Fratello appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Mann’s counterclaim was based on Fratello’s refusal to accept the cashier’s check, not on her petitioning activity. Therefore, Fratello did not meet her burden to demonstrate that Mann’s counterclaim was based on protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Fratello v. Mann" on Justia Law
Breaux v. Worrell
Following Hurricane Ida in 2021, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to help restore power in Houma, Louisiana. LUS, in turn, requested help from the City of Wilson, North Carolina. Agreements were signed to facilitate emergency assistance, and the City of Wilson dispatched employees to Louisiana. Due to a shortage of hotels in Houma, the employees stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily. Kevin Worrell, a City of Wilson employee, was involved in a vehicle collision while driving from Houma to Lafayette, resulting in injuries to Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard.The plaintiffs filed separate negligence lawsuits in Louisiana state court, which were removed to the federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana. The cases were consolidated, and the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The district court granted summary judgment, finding statutory immunity, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the Act's immunity provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted the need to interpret the Louisiana emergency preparedness law and expressed doubt about its ability to make a reliable Erie guess. Consequently, the court certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether an employee of a city from another state working under an emergency assistance agreement is a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions, and (2) whether an individual providing emergency assistance is "engaging in emergency preparedness and recovery activities" while commuting from the recovery site to lodging. The Fifth Circuit will resolve the case based on the Louisiana Supreme Court's guidance. View "Breaux v. Worrell" on Justia Law