Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A former superintendent of a California school district, who later became an elected member of the district’s Board of Trustees, was subject to a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) requested by the district on behalf of three employees. These employees, who worked closely with the superintendent, reported that he engaged in a persistent course of conduct that included angry outbursts, threats of termination, intrusive and inappropriate text messages, stalking behaviors, and unsolicited photographs. The conduct caused substantial emotional distress and fear among the employees, leading them to seek mental health treatment and report his actions to the police. After his termination, the superintendent continued to interact with the employees in ways they perceived as intimidating, including the placement of campaign signs near their homes and the publication of internal documents on social media.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted a temporary restraining order and, after a multi-day hearing, issued a WVRO prohibiting the superintendent from harassing, disturbing the peace of, or contacting the three employees. The WVRO imposed restrictions on his proximity to the employees and their workplace, allowed his attendance at board meetings only under specific conditions, and included a provision barring him from commenting on the WVRO at board meetings. The order was set to last four years, subject to early termination if he was no longer associated with the district.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that an employer’s right to seek a WVRO on behalf of employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513, rejected arguments concerning insufficient evidence and violation of parental rights, and found sufficient evidence of a future threat of harassment. However, it determined that the WVRO’s prohibition on comments at board meetings was overbroad and violated First Amendment rights, and that the order’s four-year duration exceeded the statutory maximum. The court modified the order to remove the speech restriction and limit its duration to three years, then affirmed the WVRO as modified. View "Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause" on Justia Law

Following the 2020 presidential election, three individuals—Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun—formed an unincorporated association called the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) to investigate what they believed was widespread election fraud in Colorado. In 2021, USEIP organized volunteers to go door-to-door canvassing, asking voters questions about their voting history and, in some instances, about whom they voted for. The Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, the League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, the Voter Organizations) filed suit against USEIP and its founders, alleging that these canvassing activities constituted voter intimidation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations could not be sued under the statutes invoked: Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The district court then held a bench trial against the individual defendants. After the plaintiffs presented their case, the district court granted judgment on partial findings for the individuals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), finding insufficient evidence that any defendant engaged in voter intimidation. The court denied the defendants’ subsequent motion for attorney’s fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of USEIP, holding that unincorporated associations can be sued under both Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act and § 1985. The appellate court found that the district court’s exclusion of USEIP significantly narrowed the scope of relevant evidence at trial, affecting the plaintiffs’ substantial rights. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial against all defendants. The related appeal regarding attorney’s fees was dismissed as moot. View "Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP v. Smith" on Justia Law

Compeer, a group of federally chartered farm credit associations, entered into a master participation agreement with Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL), under which Compeer paid CAL $58 million in exchange for the right to receive all payments due on a set of agricultural loans CAL had originated to Famoso Hills Ranch in California. Under the agreement, CAL was to promptly remit any payments or proceeds received on these loans to Compeer. When Famoso refinanced its loans and paid off the balance to CAL, CAL failed to notify Compeer or transfer the payoff proceeds as required and instead concealed receipt of the funds and withheld them as a negotiation tactic, eventually claiming a right to offset based on alleged damages suffered.Arbitration proceedings commenced, resulting in an award in favor of Compeer, finding it was unconditionally entitled to the payoff proceeds and that CAL had no legal basis to withhold them. The arbitration panel found for Compeer on its claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Compeer moved in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to confirm the award and appoint a receiver to secure the funds. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it final and enforceable, and appointed a receiver due to CAL’s repeated noncompliance and attempts to dissipate the funds. CAL appealed, arguing the award was nonfinal, violated public policy, and the receivership was improper due to a forum-selection clause and lack of necessity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the arbitration award was final and confirmable, the public policy exception to vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act did not require setting aside the award given the alternative equitable bases for Compeer’s recovery, and the district court acted within its discretion in appointing a receiver due to CAL’s conduct and the inadequacy of alternative remedies. View "Compeer Financial, ACA v. Corp. Amer. Lending, Inc." on Justia Law

A married couple with ten minor children separated, and the mother filed for divorce. During the marriage, the father engaged in a pattern of severe and chronic domestic violence, which was witnessed and at times experienced by the children. The father pled guilty to several criminal charges, including felony child abuse and domestic violence-related offenses, resulting in incarceration at the time of the divorce proceedings. The mother sought and was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children. The divorce decree denied the father immediate visitation but established conditions for potential future contact. In dividing the marital property, the mother was awarded the marital home, while the father received the family business and was assigned nearly all marital debt, except for the home’s mortgage and related utilities.The District Court of Crook County held a bench trial and issued a divorce decree reflecting these terms. The father appealed, challenging, among other things, the division of property and debts, the restricted visitation, and aspects of the trial process. In his briefs, the father raised numerous issues but failed to provide developed legal arguments or cite authorities connecting the issues to the facts of his case. The mother responded that the appeal lacked cogent legal argument and requested attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. Applying longstanding Wyoming law, the court found the father’s briefs did not comply with the requirement to present cogent arguments and pertinent authority. The court summarily affirmed the district court’s decree of divorce, declining to award attorney fees but granting costs to the mother. The main holding is that an appeal may be summarily affirmed when the appellant fails to present cogent argument or relevant authority, as required by the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Idler v. Idler" on Justia Law

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

Several individuals who were former students at an elementary school within a California school district alleged that a school counselor sexually assaulted them between 1993 and 2001. These plaintiffs initially filed lawsuits regarding the alleged abuse in California state court, then voluntarily dismissed those actions without prejudice. On the same day as those state court dismissals, they filed a similar action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging both state and federal claims. Before the federal court ruled on the defendant school district’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs again voluntarily dismissed the case, this time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), designating the dismissal as without prejudice.Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a new action in California state court based on the same underlying facts. The school district demurred, arguing that the so-called two-dismissal rule in Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B)—which states that a plaintiff who twice voluntarily dismisses claims is subject to an adjudication on the merits—operated as a bar to the new state court action. The Yuba County Superior Court agreed, sustaining the district’s demurrer without leave to amend, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in a split decision, holding that the federal procedural rule precluded the state court claims.The Supreme Court of California reversed. The court held that Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B) is a procedural rule that limits a plaintiff’s ability to refile the same claim in federal court but does not itself create a rule of claim preclusion applicable in state courts. Therefore, a second voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(B) does not bar a subsequent suit on the same state law claims in California state court. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Delores Gibson created the Gibson Family Limited Partnership (GFLP) to distribute farmland to her children, with herself as general partner and her sons, Michael and Greg Gibson, as equal limited partners. Michael initiated multiple lawsuits regarding GFLP, including claims of breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence. In this third action, Michael alleged that Delores was unduly influenced by Greg and Joan Gibson, challenging a land transaction favoring Greg and implicating Robert Ronayne, an attorney involved in the sale. Michael’s central claim was that Delores lacked capacity, with Greg acting as de facto general partner and violating fiduciary duties.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, reviewed repeated discovery abuses by Michael’s counsel, including improper subpoenas for Delores’s medical records while a motion to quash was pending. The subpoenas failed to comply with the requirements of SDCL 15-6-45 (Rule 45). Michael’s counsel advanced an unsustainable interpretation of Rule 45(b), arguing that unless the court ruled on a motion to quash before the subpoena’s compliance date, he was entitled to the records. The court found that Michael’s counsel disregarded the rules, failed to accept responsibility, and obtained privileged medical records improperly.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the case as a sanction under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure. The Court held that Rule 45(b) requires forestalling compliance with subpoenas until the court has acted on a timely motion to quash, and that Michael’s counsel’s conduct constituted an egregious violation justifying dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal with prejudice and denial of the motion to reconsider. View "Gibson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A married couple contracted with a design company to oversee renovations to their vacation rental property. After the company ended its work prematurely, the couple sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the company countersued for breach of contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. Before trial, the couple submitted a proposal for settlement to the company, offering to resolve all claims for a single lump sum. The company rejected this proposal, and after trial, the jury awarded the couple damages on their breach of contract claim. The company received nothing on its counterclaims.Following the verdict, the couple moved for attorney’s fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, which allows fees when a plaintiff’s settlement proposal is rejected and the plaintiff prevails by a sufficient margin. The Circuit Court denied their motion, finding the proposal for settlement invalid because it did not allocate the settlement amount separately to each plaintiff, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that apportionment was not required for a joint proposal involving a unified, single claim.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case because the Fourth District’s decision conflicted with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Cobb v. Durando. The Supreme Court held that Rule 1.442(c)(3) requires apportionment for all joint proposals, even those involving a single, unified claim. The Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, approved the Second District’s approach in Cobb, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The holding requires strict compliance with the apportionment requirement in joint proposals for settlement under Florida law. View "Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen" on Justia Law

A motorcyclist suffered severe injuries after crashing on Avenue V in Birmingham due to a defect in the road. He submitted a notice of claim to the City of Birmingham within six months as required by state law and later filed a negligence lawsuit, alleging the City failed to repair the defect after being notified. The key factual dispute involved whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect prior to the accident.The Jefferson Circuit Court reviewed the case and, after discovery, denied the City’s initial motion for summary judgment. The City later renewed its motion, attaching new evidence and seeking to strike some of the plaintiff’s evidence. The trial court struck several items, including an affidavit, an unsworn witness statement, and a patient-care report, but again denied summary judgment. The City’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting it to petition for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petition, focusing on whether the City was entitled to municipal immunity. Applying a de novo standard, the court found that the admissible evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. The court held that the plaintiff’s remaining evidence was speculative and insufficient to overcome the City’s prima facie case for immunity. The court granted the City’s petition, issued the writ of mandamus, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying summary judgment and instead grant summary judgment in favor of the City. View "In re: Stoudmire v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who had received traffic citations under a local ordinance enacted by the City of Tuskegee permitting automated photographic enforcement of traffic laws brought suit against the City, certain city officials, and JENOPTIK, the company involved in the installation and operation of the enforcement devices. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the ordinance, raised constitutional concerns, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, including tort claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. The City later enacted resolutions cancelling outstanding citations, refunding fines, and ultimately suspending enforcement of the ordinance.The case was initially filed in the Macon Circuit Court. The City and JENOPTIK moved to dismiss, arguing lack of a justiciable controversy, mootness, lack of standing, and other grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction over JENOPTIK. The trial court denied these motions to dismiss, treating them as motions under Rule 12 and excluding extraneous materials, but did not provide detailed reasoning.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the plaintiffs either paid the fines or failed to contest the citations under the administrative procedures provided in the ordinance, and because the City subsequently nullified the citations and provided for reimbursement, their claims challenging the legality of the ordinance were moot. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss those claims. However, the Supreme Court denied the petitions insofar as they sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ tort claims, holding that the City and JENOPTIK did not demonstrate a clear right to mandamus relief on those claims at this stage. The Court likewise declined to dismiss the tort claims against JENOPTIK for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the current record. View "In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee" on Justia Law