Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A former student at a New Orleans university was reported by a fellow student for stalking after a school-sponsored trip to Honduras. The report included allegations that he had made threatening statements about his ability to build bombs and use chemical agents, and referenced chemical burns. Based on this report, a warrant was issued and he was arrested for misdemeanor stalking. After his arrest, a university police officer gave statements to the campus newspaper, which published articles suggesting he possessed chemical materials capable of killing people and had made threatening posts on social media. The student withdrew from the university shortly after his arrest, and the criminal case was later dismissed with no charges related to weapons or chemicals.The student filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting various claims including defamation and negligence against the university. The university responded by filing a special motion to strike under Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute (Article 971), which provides an expedited procedure for dismissal of claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court denied the motion, holding that Article 971 does not apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that Article 971 conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 because it imposes additional procedural requirements not found in the federal rules, such as burden-shifting and limitations on discovery. As a result, the court concluded that Article 971 does not apply in federal court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the university’s special motion to strike. View "Sahs v. Loyola Univ New Orleans" on Justia Law

A former police officer for a federally recognized Indian tribe was terminated from his position and subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against several of his superior officers and the tribe's general counsel. His claims, brought against these individuals in their personal capacities, included federal civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(2), and 1985(3), a Bivens claim, and a state tort claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. He did not sue the tribe itself. The complaint alleged that the defendants treated him less favorably than Native American employees, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, interfered with his court testimony, and conspired to deprive him of due process in his employment and reputation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the action. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity, and, alternatively, that the tribe was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that could not be joined due to tribal sovereign immunity. The court did not address arguments regarding tribal sovereign immunity or qualified immunity as independent grounds for dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking money damages from tribal officials in their individual capacities where any judgment would not operate against the tribe itself. The court further held that the individual defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity, as the functions at issue—personnel and employment decisions—were not historically protected by such immunity at common law. Additionally, the tribe was not a required party under Rule 19 because it lacked a legally protected interest that could be impaired by the litigation’s outcome. The court remanded for the district court to address any qualified immunity defenses in the first instance. View "ERWINE V. WESTBROOK" on Justia Law

Snap, a Delaware corporation, sued Vertical Raise, an Idaho LLC, and an individual, alleging tortious interference, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition. Liability was resolved in Snap’s favor on summary judgment. At trial, the jury awarded Snap $750,000 in unjust enrichment damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. However, the district court mistakenly entered judgment for $800,000, not $1,000,000. Snap sought an additur or new trial and discretionary costs. The district court granted both: costs were awarded, and the damages were increased via additur, but without giving Vertical Raise the option to accept or reject it.Vertical Raise appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, which in the prior case, Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical Raise, LLC, 173 Idaho 499, 544 P.3d 714 (2024), affirmed the costs award, reversed the grant of additur or new trial, and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter an amended judgment accordingly. After remand, Vertical Raise’s surety bond paid the judgment and costs, but not post-judgment interest. Disputes arose over whether interest accrued from the dates of the original and amended judgments, or only from the post-remand judgment.In the present appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred by awarding post-judgment interest starting from the entry dates of the original and amended judgments. The Court held that post-judgment interest accrues from the dates when the original and amended judgments were entered, not from the date of the post-remand judgment, even if later judgments modify the amount owed. The Third Amended Judgment was affirmed. The Court also awarded Snap its attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121, finding Vertical Raise’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. Costs on appeal were awarded as a matter of course. View "SNAP! MOBILE v. VERTICAL RAISE" on Justia Law

An individual Nebraska resident, voter, and taxpayer sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of two medical cannabis laws enacted by voter-approved initiatives in the November 2024 general election. He named as defendants the Governor, other state officials, members of the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission, and the sponsors of the initiatives. The plaintiff alleged the laws violated the federal Supremacy Clause, improperly delegated regulatory authority in violation of Nebraska’s separation of powers, and were otherwise unconstitutional. He further claimed public officials and agencies would expend state funds and resources to implement these laws, and that this expenditure was unlawful.Previously, before the laws passed, the same individual brought a preelection challenge to the legal sufficiency of the initiative petitions in the District Court for Lancaster County. That challenge was rejected, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. After the election, he filed a new action in the same district court, seeking to enjoin the Governor from certifying the measures. The district court denied his request for a temporary restraining order. Once the laws were certified and enacted, he amended his complaint several times, ultimately alleging taxpayer standing, standing for a matter of great public concern, and standing under a Nebraska statute governing initiative challenges. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending he lacked standing.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit. Specifically, it concluded he did not have taxpayer standing, as his allegations of incidental expenditures and government employee time spent implementing the laws did not amount to illegal expenditures sufficient to confer standing under Nebraska law. The Court also found he did not qualify for any exception for matters of great public concern. The order dismissing his complaint without prejudice was affirmed. View "Kuehn v. Pillen" on Justia Law

A woman brought a civil lawsuit against her uncle and godfather, alleging years of sexual abuse that began when she was a minor. The defendant was previously convicted in a criminal court for related offenses and was incarcerated. After his conviction, the plaintiff filed the civil suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries resulting from the abuse. The defendant initially had legal representation using personal funds, but those funds became inaccessible due to a blocked account ordered by a family court during concurrent divorce proceedings. When his accessible funds were depleted, the defendant began representing himself. He sought access to the blocked funds to retain new counsel but experienced significant delays in obtaining a family court order to release the money.The Superior Court of Alameda County presided over the civil trial, during which the defendant appeared remotely from prison. Despite repeated requests for continuances to secure counsel after finally gaining access to some funds, the trial court denied these requests. The trial proceeded, and a jury found the defendant liable for several torts, awarding the plaintiff substantial compensatory and punitive damages.Upon appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, determined that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by denying his continuance requests, given his indigency, incarceration, and the fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues, including punitive damages. The court clarified that the plaintiff is entitled to retry all issues. The court did not address other trial errors or the excessiveness of damages due to its disposition. The appellate court also explained that the trial court did not err in admitting school photographs of the plaintiff, which may be relevant upon retrial. View "Mary D. v. McCauley" on Justia Law

Sponsors of a ballot initiative in Nebraska sought to have their proposed constitutional amendment, which would protect the powers of initiative and referendum, placed on the November 2026 general election ballot. The initiative aimed to require a four-fifths vote of the Legislature to amend, repeal, or impair laws enacted by initiative after November 2, 2004, and to similarly restrict the Legislature’s authority over laws affecting the initiative and referendum process itself. It also imposed a requirement that any laws facilitating or safeguarding the process advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means and prohibited legislative acts that would condition, restrict, burden, or impair these reserved powers.After the sponsors collected sufficient signatures, the Nebraska Secretary of State reviewed the measure. Following an objection by a current and a former state senator, the Secretary determined that the initiative violated Nebraska’s constitutional single subject rule and announced that he would not place it on the ballot.The sponsors filed an emergency application for a writ of mandamus directly with the Nebraska Supreme Court, asking the court to compel the Secretary to certify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary argued that he was obligated to withhold ballot placement because the initiative contained more than one subject, contrary to the Nebraska Constitution. The Nebraska Supreme Court, exercising original jurisdiction, reviewed the matter de novo as a question of law.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the proposed initiative violated the single subject rule because it addressed at least two distinct subjects: limiting legislative power over both the initiative process and the substance of laws enacted by initiative. The court concluded that these subjects were not naturally and necessarily connected. Accordingly, the court denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved its alternative writ, holding that the Secretary had no duty to place the initiative on the ballot. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Evnen" on Justia Law

Three individuals deposited approximately $85,000 into a joint account with a bank. When one of the depositors became subject to a civil judgment in an unrelated matter, the judgment creditor garnished the account. The bank paid about $38,000 from the joint account to the creditor without seeking the depositors’ permission. The depositors sued the bank for breach of contract and fiduciary duty in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which compelled arbitration under the account agreement. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the bank and awarded attorney fees. After the award, the bank sought confirmation of the arbitration award. The depositors’ attorney missed the 30-day deadline to seek judicial review due to a family emergency, specifically the unexpected death of his stepson.The depositors’ counsel filed a motion for nunc pro tunc relief in the Court of Common Pleas, requesting an extension to file for review. The court granted an additional 20 days. Counsel filed the belated appeal, and the court vacated the attorney fee award but otherwise affirmed the arbitration award. The bank appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, after remanding for an unrelated issue, considered cross-appeals. The depositors argued due process violations during arbitration, while the bank contended the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the award after the statutory deadline and erred in granting nunc pro tunc relief.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the “non-negligent happenstance” exception to statutory filing deadlines—established in Bass v. Commonwealth—remained viable and whether it applied to the attorney’s family emergency. The Court held that the statutory 30-day period in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7342(b) is mandatory and not subject to an equitable, non-negligent-happenstance exception absent express statutory language. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, disapproving Bass as a basis for extending arbitration review deadlines without legislative authorization. View "Carr v. First Commonwealth Bank" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an incarcerated individual at Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Michigan, sought to challenge the withholding of a book authored by his sister from his mail. The book, which addressed childhood sexual assault, was rejected by a mailroom clerk on the grounds that it allegedly encouraged or provided instruction in criminal activity. After receiving notice of the rejection, the plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. There was a dispute between the parties regarding the timing and number of hearings, but ultimately, the plaintiff claimed he did not receive the hearing report detailing the final decision until May 9, 2022. He then filed a grievance that same day, alleging unjust censorship and procedural due process violations.The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) maintains a multi-step grievance process for prisoner complaints, and under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust these remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff’s grievances were denied at each step by MDOC as untimely, based on the department’s interpretation that the grievance should have been filed within five business days of the April 5, 2022, hearing. After exhausting the MDOC process, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies due to untimeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and applied de novo review. The court held that the defendant, as the party asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust, did not meet the burden of proving that no genuine dispute existed regarding when the plaintiff received notice of the final decision. The court found that a genuine dispute of material fact remained about the timing of the plaintiff’s awareness of the unresolved issue. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tubbs v. Payton" on Justia Law

A Michigan marijuana grower entered into a contract with two subsidiaries of a larger company to supply all marijuana grown in its 2020 and 2021 harvests. At the time of contracting, the grower was licensed by Michigan to produce medical marijuana, while the buyers held both medical and recreational licenses. The contract required the marijuana to meet recreational testing standards, and the buyers paid a deposit. After the initial shipment, the buyers refused further deliveries due to a price drop, prompting the grower to sell the remaining harvests to other entities at lower prices.The grower sued the buyers for breach of contract in Michigan state court, seeking lost profits. The buyers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, raised counterclaims, and asserted that the contract was unenforceable due to federal illegality. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the buyers’ illegality defense and allowed the case to proceed to trial. A jury found the buyers liable and awarded substantial damages to the grower. The buyers renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law and requested a new trial, again arguing federal illegality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that federal courts cannot enforce contracts founded on agreements to commit conduct that is explicitly prohibited by federal law, such as distribution and possession of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act. Because the contract was not limited to medical use and encompassed conduct criminalized under federal law, the court found the contract unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the buyers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Hello Farms Licensing MI, LLC v. GR Vending MI, LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant, Alexander Gallo, acting without counsel, brought suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Latham & Watkins LLP, the District of Columbia, and Attorney General Brian Schwalb. He alleged misconduct in prior litigation related to an eviction dispute during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the earlier case, Mr. Gallo attempted to evict a foreclosed homeowner but was prevented from doing so by a pandemic-related moratorium. He sued the District under several legal theories, but those claims were dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.After the federal appellate proceedings but before the D.C. Circuit issued its decision, Mr. Gallo filed the current lawsuit in the Superior Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged fraudulent litigation tactics used by the defendants in the previous case. He also moved for a preliminary injunction. The District opposed the injunction, arguing he was unlikely to succeed on the merits; Latham did not respond. The Superior Court denied the preliminary injunction and, without a hearing or prior notice to Mr. Gallo, dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), issuing a brief, unexplained order.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that it is reversible error for the Superior Court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6) without providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to respond. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gallo v. Schwalb" on Justia Law