Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2017, an investment entity loaned approximately 160 million Chinese yuan to an individual, who failed to repay the loan. The lender obtained an arbitral award against the borrower from the Beijing Arbitration Commission for around 150 million yuan. A Singaporean court later ordered the borrower to pay the award, but he still did not comply. The lender, knowing the borrower had been living in California for about two years, sought to enforce the foreign arbitral award in the United States under the Federal Arbitration Act by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Attempts to serve process directly on the borrower at his California residence were unsuccessful. Eventually, the petition was left with another adult at the residence, mailed, and emailed to the borrower, who later acknowledged receiving notice.The borrower moved to dismiss the case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because his domicile was China and the underlying dispute had no connection to California. He did not raise a defense under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process. The district court found that it had general personal jurisdiction over the borrower based on his physical presence in California and confirmed the arbitral award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that presence-based personal jurisdiction be conditioned on service of process on the defendant’s person; other means of service are sufficient if the defendant is physically present in the forum state. The court declined to address the sufficiency of service of process because the borrower had waived this argument by not raising it in district court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "SHENZHEN ZEHUIJIN INVESTMENT CENTER V. YINGKUI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private organization, brought suit under California’s Proposition 65 against several companies, alleging they failed to warn consumers about exposure to a chemical, DINP, in certain clutch and wallet products. Prior to this lawsuit, another private enforcer had brought a similar Proposition 65 action involving the same or similar products and chemical exposure, which resulted in a consent judgment requiring reformulation or labeling of the products and payment of civil penalties. The plaintiff in the current case argued that the earlier action did not specifically include the wallet and clutch products in its notice, and therefore the consent judgment should not bar its claims.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the case. The court found the action was barred by res judicata, relying on the consent judgment from the prior Proposition 65 action, and also concluded there were defects in the plaintiff’s presuit notice. The court reasoned that both private enforcers, in bringing Proposition 65 claims, represented the public interest, creating privity between them. It also noted that even if the earlier notice had defects, the proper time to challenge that was before the consent judgment became final.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff was in privity with the prior enforcer because both acted in the public interest under Proposition 65, and that common-law res judicata principles apply to consent judgments in such cases. The court determined that any alleged defect in the earlier notice did not prevent the consent judgment from having claim-preclusive effect. The appellate court did not address the separate issue of defects in the plaintiff’s own presuit notice, as the res judicata ground was dispositive. View "Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC" on Justia Law

On the evening of June 24, 2018, following Chicago’s Pride Parade, Breah Bedford and her friends were on the sidewalk outside a bar owned by Joseph Plewa. After Plewa and his staff ordered the group to move and a confrontation ensued, Plewa dragged one of Bedford’s friends into the bar’s vestibule. Bedford attempted to intervene using objects she had on hand. Chicago police officers arrived, and Officer Brandon DeWitt approached Bedford from behind and shoved her to the ground, after which she suffered seizure-like symptoms. Bedford was taken to a hospital, where she was diagnosed with psychogenic non-epileptiform seizures. During her admission, a nurse reported that Bedford was combative and made a threatening racial comment.Bedford and her friend later sued Plewa, his business, Officer DeWitt, and others, alleging excessive force and state-law claims. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, dismissed some claims at summary judgment and narrowed the issues for trial. At trial, the jury found in favor of Bedford’s friend against Plewa and his business, awarding damages, but rejected all of Bedford’s claims. Bedford appealed, arguing that five evidentiary rulings by the district court undermined the verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and found none. The court held that admitting expert testimony regarding malingering, nurse testimony about Bedford’s hospital behavior, evidence of the police use-of-force model, and the exclusion of certain video audio and prior use-of-force incidents were all within the district court’s discretion and did not affect the trial’s outcome. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Bedford v Dewitt" on Justia Law

A pregnant patient was admitted to a medical center, where she suffered an anaphylactic reaction to medication administered for a streptococcus infection. Her treating physician and hospital staff provided various treatments but did not administer epinephrine, a standard treatment for anaphylaxis. The patient’s child was born with severe brain injuries, which the plaintiff alleged were caused by the anaphylactic episode and the defendants’ failure to use epinephrine. The plaintiff sued the physician and medical entities for healthcare liability, contending that the physician’s decision not to use epinephrine fell below the standard of care and that the hospital staff was negligent in monitoring.After an initial trial ended in a defense verdict but was set aside due to evidentiary errors, a second jury trial again resulted in a verdict for the defendants. Following the second trial, it was discovered that a juror had, during deliberations, conducted personal research by reading an EpiPen warning label at home and shared its contents with the other jurors. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing this extraneous information affected the verdict. The Circuit Court for Knox County denied the motion, ruling the plaintiff had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the jury was influenced by the information.On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard and that prejudice should be presumed when jurors are exposed to extraneous, material information. The defendants then sought review.The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that, in civil cases involving the constitutional right to a jury trial, courts must use a burden-shifting framework: the party challenging a verdict must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information, which triggers a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The party defending the verdict must then show there is no reasonable possibility the information altered the verdict. The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for the trial court to apply this framework. View "Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Roussis" on Justia Law

A shareholder of a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco sought to inspect a range of corporate records pursuant to California Corporations Code sections 1600 and 1601. The shareholder, a California resident, held over 11% of the company’s voting shares and had not received financial records for several years. After his written demand for inspection was denied by the corporation, which cited a lack of applicability of California law, he petitioned the San Francisco Superior Court for a writ of mandate to compel inspection. Meanwhile, the corporation initiated a separate action in the Delaware Court of Chancery seeking a declaration that Delaware law governed inspection rights.The San Francisco Superior Court granted the corporation’s motion to stay the California action, relying on a forum selection clause in the corporation’s bylaws that designated the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum for internal affairs claims. The trial court concluded that, under Delaware law, a shareholder’s inspection rights were matters of internal corporate affairs and thus fell within the scope of the forum selection clause. The court also determined that enforcing the clause did not violate California public policy, reasoning that Delaware law provided shareholders inspection rights for a proper purpose.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the decision. It held that while the forum selection clause did apply to the shareholder’s claims, enforcement of the clause would violate California public policy because California law provides unwaivable statutory rights to inspect corporate records that cannot be limited by bylaws or articles. The court found the corporation had not met its burden to show that Delaware law would provide the same or greater rights as California. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the stay order and remanded with directions to deny the corporation’s motion to stay. View "Salamon v. Orchid Global, Inc." on Justia Law

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims.Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on allegations by a Minnesota-based health insurer that several related pharmaceutical companies carried out an unlawful scheme involving the distribution and sale of repackaged and adulterated oncology drugs. The scheme allegedly involved breaking sterile seals on medication vials, pooling overfill amounts—which were not intended for patient use—and creating pre-filled syringes that were then sold to healthcare providers. These syringes were ultimately administered to cancer patients, including many insured under programs operated by the plaintiff. The defendants did not themselves submit claims for reimbursement, but the plaintiff asserts it paid for treatments using these adulterated drugs, unaware of their compromised quality.Prior to this lawsuit, the scheme was the subject of other civil actions and federal investigations, including qui tam actions and a federal criminal prosecution. The defendants disclosed these investigations in annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the events received media attention beginning in 2012. In 2017, a related company pleaded guilty to federal charges, admitting to the repackaging scheme, and paid significant fines and settlements. The plaintiff filed suit in 2023, asserting claims for common-law fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of several Minnesota consumer protection statutes. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint, finding the claims were barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It concluded that publicly available disclosures and the plaintiff’s own allegations established that the plaintiff should have discovered its causes of action no later than 2016. Because the plaintiff did not file suit until 2023, its claims were untimely. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation" on Justia Law

A noncitizen who arrived in the United States from Cambodia as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in Rhode Island state court in 1996 of a controlled substance offense. This conviction led to deportation proceedings, and an immigration judge found him deportable in 1998. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 1999. Over twenty years later, the Rhode Island prosecutor dismissed his conviction in 2020, citing equitable reasons. The noncitizen then unsuccessfully filed his first motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, which denied it as untimely and found no substantive or procedural defect in the original conviction.Following this, the noncitizen obtained a consent order from the Rhode Island Superior Court in 2023, vacating his prior plea and sentence based on a violation of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, which relates to due process in plea colloquies. In April 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, this time invoking the BIA’s sua sponte authority. The BIA again denied reopening, treating the motion as statutory, finding it time and number barred, and concluding he failed to demonstrate due diligence or a defect in the conviction.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the BIA committed legal error by mischaracterizing the second motion as statutory rather than sua sponte. The appellate court held that sua sponte motions are not subject to the same time and number limitations or equitable tolling standards as statutory motions. The court also found that the BIA erred by overlooking the Superior Court's order, which clearly indicated the conviction was vacated due to a procedural defect. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kim v. Blanche" on Justia Law

Three children, through their representatives, brought claims against a religious organization, individual clergy, and others after their father, Paul Adams, sexually abused them over several years. During the abuse, Paul disclosed his actions to two bishops of his church—first in private meetings and then in a formal disciplinary council where other church members were present. The bishops considered these disclosures confidential under church doctrine and did not report Paul’s admissions to authorities. Years later, law enforcement discovered evidence of the abuse, leading to criminal charges against Paul and his wife. After learning about Paul’s prior disclosures to church officials, the children sued the church and the clergy for, among other things, failing to report the abuse as required by Arizona law.The Cochise County Superior Court granted summary judgment to the church defendants, holding that the bishops’ knowledge of the abuse came exclusively from confidential religious communications. The court found that, under Arizona’s reporting statute and the so-called “clergy exemption,” the bishops were not required to report the abuse because they determined withholding the information was “reasonable and necessary” under the concepts of their religion. The court also ruled that it was not the role of the court or a jury to second-guess the clergy’s interpretation of their religious doctrine.The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s decision, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the communications were truly confidential, whether the clergy-penitent privilege was waived by the presence of non-clergy, and whether church doctrine actually required non-reporting.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for the church defendants. The court held that the First Amendment prohibits courts and juries from examining whether clergy properly applied religious doctrine in deciding not to report abuse under the reporting statute. It further ruled that, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, factfinders must defer to a religious institution’s definitions of “confession,” “confidential communication,” and “clergy.” The court concluded that all statutory requirements for the clergy exemption were met and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "DOE v THE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Two software development companies became involved in a dispute after a UK bank, Metro Bank PLC, hired one company, Arkeyo LLC, to create software for its coin-counting machines. Years later, as Arkeyo’s product became outdated, Metro Bank engaged Saggezza UK (a subsidiary of Saggezza, Inc.) to build replacement software. During development, Metro Bank provided Saggezza with an Arkeyo-operated touchscreen computer for reference. Arkeyo later alleged that Saggezza, Inc. infringed its copyrights and trade secrets, interfered with its contract and business relationship with Metro Bank, and converted Arkeyo’s property.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for Saggezza, Inc. on all claims, ruling that Arkeyo did not show Saggezza, Inc. was responsible for the alleged infringement or tortious acts—these, if they occurred, were committed by Saggezza UK, which was not a defendant. The district court also denied Arkeyo’s motions for sanctions and for reconsideration based on purportedly new evidence, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Saggezza, Inc. under federal statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that Arkeyo’s copyright claims failed because there was no evidence of copying. The trade secret claims failed due to Arkeyo’s public disclosure of its software and the generic nature of the alleged secrets. The tortious interference claims were rejected because Saggezza’s competitive conduct was not “wrongful” under Illinois law, and the conversion claim failed since Arkeyo did not own or demand the property. The appellate court also affirmed the denial of sanctions, the denial of reconsideration, and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Arkeyo LLC v Saggezza, Inc." on Justia Law