Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The County Commissioners of Boulder County and the City of Boulder filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy companies, alleging that the defendants' fossil fuel activities contributed to climate change, causing harm to Boulder’s property and residents. Boulder sought damages for public and private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, claiming that the defendants knowingly contributed to climate change while misleading the public about its impacts.The case was initially filed in Boulder County District Court but was removed to federal district court by the defendants. The federal district court remanded the case back to state court, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision. The Boulder County District Court then denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their arguments that Boulder's claims were preempted by federal law, including the Clean Air Act (CAA) and federal common law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that Boulder's claims were not preempted by federal law. The court held that the CAA displaced federal common law in this area, and thus, federal common law did not preempt Boulder's state law claims. The court also determined that the CAA did not preempt Boulder's claims under principles of express, field, or conflict preemption. Consequently, the court discharged the order to show cause and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of Boulder's claims. View "Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

A mother was shot and killed by a deputy sheriff while her young children watched. The mother, who had been acting erratically and wielding a knife, advanced towards the deputies despite repeated requests to drop the weapon. The lead deputy fired his service pistol after a backup deputy's taser failed to stop her. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the deputies and Nevada County, claiming the use of force was unreasonable.The trial court ruled that the lead deputy acted reasonably and granted summary judgment in his favor, but allowed the claims against the backup deputy to proceed, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude his actions were unreasonable. The backup deputy and the County petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have granted their summary judgment motion as well.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court emphasized the need to assess reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering the split-second decisions officers must make. The court concluded that the backup deputy acted reasonably as a matter of law, noting that the mother advanced towards the deputies with a deadly weapon and that the backup deputy's use of a taser was a reasonable response under the circumstances.The court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its partial denial of the summary judgment motion and to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety, thus ruling in favor of the backup deputy and the County. View "County of Nevada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP and other plaintiffs incurred cleanup costs at a site on the Kalamazoo River in Michigan due to pollution from paper mills. In 1995, Georgia-Pacific and other companies formed the Kalamazoo River Study Group (KRSG) and sought a declaration of shared liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA § 107. In 1998, the district court declared KRSG members, including Georgia-Pacific, liable for the entire cost of response activities at the site. Subsequent judgments in 2000 and 2003 confirmed this liability.In 2010, Georgia-Pacific filed a lawsuit against NCR Corporation, International Paper Company, and Weyerhaeuser Company, asserting claims under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f) for cleanup costs. The district court found NCR and International Paper liable and apportioned liability among the parties. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Georgia-Pacific’s § 113(f) claims were time-barred and that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue § 107(a) claims for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment.On remand, the district court vacated its judgment under § 113(f) but re-entered a declaratory judgment under § 107, declaring Georgia-Pacific, International Paper, and Weyerhaeuser liable for future response costs. International Paper and Weyerhaeuser appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s declaratory judgment under § 107. The court held that Georgia-Pacific could not pursue a § 107(a) claim for costs within the scope of the 1998 judgment, as those costs were recoverable only under § 113(f). The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the scope of the 1998 judgment and allowed Georgia-Pacific to bring § 107(a) claims for costs outside that scope. View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

John Doe, a convicted sex offender, challenged the enforcement of Tennessee's sex-offender statutes against him, arguing that the requirements imposed by these statutes constituted retroactive punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Tennessee's sex-offender statutes require offenders to register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, update their personal information quarterly, limit where they can live and work, and allow the state to publish information about registrants. Doe committed his offenses before the passage of the 2004 statutes and sought to prevent Tennessee officials from enforcing these laws against him.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee issued a preliminary injunction barring Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes against Doe. This decision was influenced by a related case, Does #1–9 v. Lee, where the district court had issued a similar injunction for nine other convicted sex offenders. After the Sixth Circuit reviewed Does #1–9, it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the governor and directed the trial court to modify its injunction against the director, stating that the district court had misinterpreted precedent and that only specific provisions of the sex-offender statutes could be enjoined.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's refusal to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction following the Does #1–9 decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by not dissolving or modifying the injunction, as the Does #1–9 decision clarified that the injunction was overly broad. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order administratively closing the case and remanded for proceedings consistent with the Does #1–9 opinion, instructing the district court to determine which specific provisions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes could be enjoined. View "Doe v. Lee" on Justia Law

On December 15, 2015, police officers responded to a hostage situation at Eagle Nation Cycles in Neenah, Wisconsin. Initial reports indicated a lone gunman had fired a shot and was threatening to kill hostages. When officers attempted to enter the shop, they were met with gunfire and heavy smoke, leading them to suspect an ambush. Several hostages escaped, and the officers detained and questioned them, transporting two to the police station. Three of these hostages later sued the City of Neenah and multiple officers, claiming their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizures were violated.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found the plaintiffs' detention reasonable and ruled that no constitutional violation occurred. Additionally, the court held that qualified immunity shielded the officers from liability. The court also dismissed Sergeant Angela Eichmann from the suit due to her lack of involvement in the alleged misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances of a violent hostage situation. The court found that the officers were justified in temporarily detaining the plaintiffs to ascertain their identities and ensure safety. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Sergeant Eichmann, as there was no evidence of her direct involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. The court did not address the issue of qualified immunity, as it concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. View "Moderson v. City of Neenah" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Anthony D’Armiento and Susan Scharpf filed a class action lawsuit against several major shipbuilders and naval-engineering consultancies, alleging a "no-poach" conspiracy to suppress wages by agreeing not to recruit each other’s employees. The plaintiffs, who had not worked for any defendant since 2013, claimed that this conspiracy was concealed through a "non-ink-to-paper" agreement, which they only discovered in April 2023 through an investigation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the case, ruling that it was barred by the Sherman Act’s four-year statute of limitations. The court found that the alleged "non-ink-to-paper" agreement did not constitute an affirmative act of fraudulent concealment that would toll the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that an agreement deliberately kept unwritten to avoid detection could qualify as an affirmative act of concealment. The court emphasized that fraudulent concealment can include acts of omission, such as avoiding the creation of written evidence. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants engaged in affirmative acts of concealment by maintaining a secret, unwritten no-poach agreement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations met the relaxed Rule 9(b) standard for pleading fraudulent concealment with particularity. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged due diligence, as they were not on inquiry notice of the conspiracy until the investigation in 2023. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Scharpf v. General Dynamics Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

The case involves the appellant, Gregory Smith, challenging the Municipality of Anchorage's decision to abate unauthorized campsites in Davis Park. The Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) outlines procedures for campsite abatement, including posting a notice and allowing for an appeal to the superior court. In June 2022, the Municipality posted a notice in Davis Park, advising that the area was not legal for storage or shelter and that any personal property would be removed and disposed of as waste after ten days. Smith and five others appealed the abatement, arguing it violated due process and the Eighth Amendment.The superior court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Municipality that its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the legal sufficiency of the posted notice, not the abatement decision itself. The court noted that the appellants did not challenge the notice's compliance with the Code, thus leaving no issues for the court to decide. The court also observed that the appellants' claims were not without merit and suggested that a civil suit could address their concerns.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court's jurisdiction was not limited to the notice's legal sufficiency. The court held that the superior court has jurisdiction to review the substantive decision to abate the campsite, including constitutional challenges. The court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the constitutional issues raised by Smith. The court also directed the superior court to determine if the administrative record was sufficient for meaningful appellate review and to take necessary steps to ensure it has an adequate record. View "Smith v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Micayla Augustyn, a student at Wall High School, received special education services under an individualized education plan (IEP). As she neared the end of her fourth year, a dispute arose between her mother and the Wall Township Board of Education regarding her graduation. The Board wanted her to graduate, while her mother believed she needed another year due to the Board's failure to implement required accommodations. Mediation failed, and Augustyn filed a Petition for Due Process before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), claiming the Board failed to provide a free and appropriate education (FAPE) as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The ALJ dismissed her grade revision claim, stating it was not suitable for a special education due process hearing. Augustyn appealed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which ruled in her favor, stating that a due process hearing was the appropriate venue for her grade revision claim. The District Court remanded the matter for further proceedings and awarded Augustyn attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA, but significantly reduced the fee amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that Augustyn was a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees, as she successfully vindicated her statutory right to a due process hearing. However, the court found that the District Court erred in reducing the fee award based on improper considerations, such as the Board's financial ability to pay and the procedural nature of Augustyn's victory. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order and remanded for a recalculation of the appropriate lodestar reductions. View "Augustyn v. Wall Township Board of Education" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Doreen Miller entered into a contract with Foundation, Elevation & Repair, LLC (FER) in 2010 for home elevation and foundation work. They also hired Direct Source Home Renovation, LLC (DSHR), owned by the same individual as FER. The Millers' home was allegedly damaged before the renovation was completed, leading them to fire FER. In 2012, FER filed a petition against the Millers for specific performance and declaratory judgment. The Millers responded with exceptions, claiming they were denied a certificate of occupancy due to the damage.After a period of inactivity, the Millers reset their exceptions in 2015, leading to a consent judgment dismissing FER's actions. In 2016, the Millers filed exceptions, an answer, affirmative defenses, and a reconventional demand against FER, including third-party demands against DSHR. After another period of inactivity, the Millers obtained a default judgment against FER and DSHR in 2019. In 2022, the Millers filed a motion to confirm the default judgment, which was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, FER and DSHR filed a motion to dismiss the Millers' action on grounds of abandonment, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Millers' claims against FER but reversed the dismissal against DSHR, finding that DSHR's filing of an answer after the abandonment period constituted a waiver of abandonment. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal's decision. The Supreme Court held that DSHR's general denial answer did not constitute a renunciation of abandonment, as it did not clearly demonstrate an intent to proceed with the litigation. The court reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of DSHR, dismissing the Millers' claims as abandoned. View "FOUNDATION ELEVATION & REPAIR, LLC VS. MILLER" on Justia Law