Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In August 2021, a vehicle driven by Storm Griffith and owned by Isaias Luna-Cortez collided with a vehicle carrying Zoe Rivera and her daughter L.R. Rivera and L.R. filed a complaint against Griffith and Luna-Cortez, leading to court-annexed arbitration where Rivera and L.R. prevailed. Griffith and Luna-Cortez requested a trial de novo on October 25, 2022. The next day, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order amending the Nevada Short Trial Rules, increasing the maximum attorney fees a short trial judge could award from $3,000 to $15,000, effective January 1, 2023.The short trial was held on March 3, 2023, and Rivera and L.R. again prevailed. They filed for fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and the short trial judge awarded $15,000 in attorney fees to each respondent, totaling $30,000. The district court entered a final judgment consistent with this award. Griffith and Luna-Cortez appealed, arguing that the pre-amendment $3,000 cap should apply since they requested the trial de novo before the rule change.The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the amendment to NSTR 27(b)(4) was procedural, not substantive, as it did not create or remove any conditions under which fees could be awarded but merely increased the maximum amount. The court noted that procedural changes apply to pending cases unless they alter substantive rights. The court found that the parties had fair notice of the rule change, which was published 67 days before it took effect, and had ample opportunity to adjust their actions accordingly. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, applying the amended rule to the case. View "Griffith v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Julia McCreight and Rebecca Wester, were long-term employees of AuburnBank, each with over twenty years of service. McCreight, a mortgage loan originator, and Wester, a loan closer, were both terminated by Michael King, the mortgage department manager. McCreight was fired for sending an unauthorized loan approval letter to a borrower who did not qualify, while Wester was terminated for failing to verify a borrower’s employment status before closing a loan. Both women, over sixty years old at the time of their termination, claimed they were fired due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for their complaints about King’s behavior.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of AuburnBank and King on all counts. The court found that neither McCreight nor Wester provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of age and sex discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that McCreight and Wester failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that their terminations were due to illegal discrimination. The court clarified that mixed-motive theories of liability do not need to be explicitly pleaded in the complaint but must be raised by summary judgment. The court found that McCreight did not raise a mixed-motive theory at the district court level and failed to provide sufficient evidence for her single-motive theory. Similarly, Wester’s evidence was insufficient to support her claims. The court also held that both plaintiffs failed to show causation for their retaliation claims, as there was no evidence that the decision-makers knew about their discrimination complaints. View "McCreight v. AuburnBank" on Justia Law

In 1999, Marcus and Eunice Hollow Horn purchased a mobile home on a lot in Eagle Butte, South Dakota, and began paying rent to Oliver Leblanc, who claimed ownership. Later, Phyllis Miller claimed ownership and sold the lot to Eunice, providing a quit claim deed. Years later, Edward Hoffman, representing his deceased mother Theresa Hoffman's estate, claimed Theresa owned the lot and filed a quiet title action against the Hollow Horns. The Hollow Horns counterclaimed, asserting ownership by adverse possession.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Dewey County, South Dakota, denied Edward's claims and quieted title in favor of the Hollow Horns based on adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15 and SDCL 15-3-1. Edward appealed, challenging the court's findings on good faith and the admission of certain out-of-court statements.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision in part. The court held that Eunice had satisfied the elements of adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-15, including good faith possession and payment of taxes for ten years. The court found no clear error in the circuit court's findings and concluded that Edward failed to rebut the presumption of Eunice's good faith. The court also determined that any error in admitting out-of-court statements was harmless and did not affect the outcome.However, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment on the alternative claim for adverse possession under SDCL 15-3-1, as it was rendered moot by the ruling on SDCL 15-3-15. The case was remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the alternative claim. View "Hoffman V. Hollow Horn" on Justia Law

Joseph Mayor, a petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to direct the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) to rescind its order granting Ross Valley Sanitation District’s (Ross Valley) petition for reconsideration of an award of permanent disability. Mayor had been awarded total permanent disability by a workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) due to an industrial injury. Ross Valley filed a petition for reconsideration, but the Board acted on it more than 60 days after it was filed, which Mayor argued exceeded the Board’s jurisdiction under former section 5909 of the Labor Code.The WCJ issued the award on March 2, 2023, and Ross Valley filed for reconsideration on March 23, 2023. The Board did not act within the 60-day period mandated by former section 5909, which stated that a petition is deemed denied if not acted upon within 60 days. On August 14, 2023, the Board granted the petition for reconsideration, citing administrative irregularities and delays in receiving the petition. Mayor then filed for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Board lost jurisdiction after the 60-day period lapsed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Mayor, referencing the recent decision in Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., which held that the Board’s action after 60 days exceeded its jurisdiction. The court noted that the Legislature had amended section 5909 to start the 60-day deadline from when the Board receives the case file, not when the petition is filed, but this amendment did not apply retroactively. The court granted Mayor’s petition, directing the Board to rescind its orders and confirming that the WCJ’s award of permanent disability was final. View "Mayor v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The Montana Democratic Party (MDP) sought a writ of supervisory control over the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, after the court dissolved a temporary restraining order and denied MDP’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. MDP aimed to prevent Robert Barb from appearing on the general election ballot as the Montana Green Party’s 2024 U.S. Senate candidate, arguing that the District Court erred in its decision.The First Judicial District Court, presided over by Judge Michael McMahon, had previously denied MDP’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court found that MDP had not followed the statutory process for contesting nominations as outlined in § 13-36-102, MCA. The court concluded that MDP was unlikely to succeed on the merits and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. MDP appealed this decision and simultaneously filed a petition for a writ of supervisory control with the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that supervisory control was warranted due to the urgency of the upcoming election. However, the court ultimately concluded that the District Court did not err in its ruling, albeit for different reasons. The Supreme Court found that the terms "nomination" and "appointment" are distinct within the context of Montana election law. The court agreed with MDP that the procedure for contesting nominations did not apply to the appointment of a replacement candidate under § 13-10-327, MCA. However, the court also found that MDP failed to demonstrate that the Green Party violated its bylaws in appointing Barb, and thus, MDP was unlikely to succeed on the merits.The Montana Supreme Court denied MDP’s petition for a writ of supervisory control, affirming the lower court’s decision to allow Barb to appear on the ballot. View "Montana Democratic Party v. First Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lisa Wilson's late husband, Mason, purchased a home in Coventry, Rhode Island, financing it with a $150,000 mortgage. Both Mason and Lisa signed the mortgage agreement, but only Mason signed the promissory note. The mortgage agreement included covenants requiring the "Borrowers" to defend the title, pay property taxes, and discharge any superior liens. In 2007, Deutsche Bank acquired the mortgage and note. Mason defaulted on the mortgage payments, and the Wilsons failed to pay property taxes, leading to a tax sale in 2014. Birdsong Associates bought the property and later obtained a court decree extinguishing Deutsche Bank's mortgage lien. Birdsong then sold the property to Coventry IV-14, RIGP, which eventually sold it to Dunkin Engineering Solutions, LLC, a company formed by Mason's parents. After Mason's parents' deaths, Lisa became the sole owner of Dunkin.Deutsche Bank sued Lisa, Mason, and Dunkin in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging breach of the mortgage covenants and seeking equitable relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Lisa and Dunkin, finding that the mortgage agreement had been extinguished by the 2016 court decree and that Deutsche Bank had no remaining contractual rights. The court also rejected Deutsche Bank's equitable claims, concluding that there was no evidence of a scheme to benefit Lisa and Mason and that no benefit had accrued to Dunkin or Lisa from Deutsche Bank's payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the mortgage agreement did not unambiguously bind Lisa to the covenants, and thus, Deutsche Bank could not enforce those covenants against her. The court also found that Deutsche Bank failed to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship necessary for its equitable claims and that Deutsche Bank's payments did not unjustly enrich Dunkin or Lisa. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Dignity Health, operating as French Hospital Medical Center, filed a complaint against orthopedic surgeon Troy I. Mounts, M.D., and his corporation to recover an advance paid under their Physician Recruitment Agreement. Mounts filed a cross-complaint alleging retaliation for his complaints about patient care quality, interference with his economic opportunities, and unlawful business practices. Dignity responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, which the trial court initially denied. The appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the case for further consideration.Upon remand, the trial court concluded that Mounts had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court found that Dignity's actions were protected by the litigation privilege, the common interest privilege, and were barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the court granted Dignity's motion to strike the cross-complaint and ordered Mounts to pay Dignity's attorney fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that all of Mounts' claims were based on conduct protected by the litigation privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (b)) and the common interest privilege (Civil Code § 47, subd. (c)). The court also found that Dignity's actions were immune under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 11137) and that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court upheld the trial court's orders granting the motion to strike and awarding attorney fees to Dignity. View "Dignity Health v. Mounts" on Justia Law

Kimberly Diei, a pharmacy student at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, maintained social media accounts under a pseudonym where she posted about song lyrics, fashion, and sexuality. Her posts did not identify her as a student or affiliate her with the university. Despite this, the College of Pharmacy's Professional Conduct Committee investigated her social media activity following anonymous complaints. The Committee found her posts "sexual," "crude," and "vulgar," and ultimately voted to expel her. Diei appealed, and the Dean reversed the expulsion decision.Diei then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, asserting violations of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for emotional distress. The district court dismissed her complaint, ruling that her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to her graduation and that her remaining claims failed to state a claim for relief. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Diei's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot but found that her claims for damages were still viable. The court held that Diei plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation, as her social media posts were unrelated to her studies, caused no disruption, and were made under a pseudonym. The court also found that the district court improperly relied on documents not properly before it when dismissing Diei's complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Diei's claims for damages and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Diei's speech was protected by the First Amendment and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. View "Diei v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law

In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law