Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

William Webb, an inmate at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, sued prison officials for failing to schedule court-ordered visits with his daughter. A Delaware family court had granted Webb visitation rights in October 2020, but since then, only one visit occurred in 2021, lasting fifteen minutes and concluding without incident. Webb filed a grievance through the prison’s internal process, which was returned unprocessed. He then wrote to three prison officials but received inadequate responses. Webb, representing himself, filed a lawsuit alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional right to reunification with his daughter.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Webb’s complaint under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). The court held that Webb failed to exhaust JTVCC’s internal grievance process and did not state a valid constitutional claim. The court also determined that allowing Webb to amend his complaint would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed the timeliness of Webb’s appeal, applying the prison mailbox rule to JTVCC’s electronic filing system. The court held that Webb’s notice of appeal was timely filed when he placed it in the designated mailbox on November 22, 2022. On the merits, the court found that Webb’s complaint did not definitively show a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and plausibly alleged a constitutional claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Webb v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that a Montana Probation Officer used excessive force during an encounter in a parking lot. The incident was captured by surveillance footage, which was later auto-deleted. Despite efforts to preserve the footage, the State failed to do so, leading to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the State for the loss of evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana found that the State acted recklessly in failing to preserve the footage but did not act with gross negligence or willfulness. Invoking its inherent authority, the district court sanctioned the State by instructing the jury that it was established as a matter of law that the officer used excessive force. The jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in damages for the excessive-force claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court committed legal error by relying on its inherent authority to impose sanctions. The appellate court determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) governs the loss of electronically stored information and the sanctions imposed. Rule 37(e)(2) allows for severe sanctions only if the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in litigation. The district court's findings confirmed that no such intent was present, making the sanctions unlawful.As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sanctions orders, reversed the verdict and judgment against the probation officer, vacated the award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, and remanded the case for a new trial on the excessive-force claim. View "GREGORY V. STATE OF MONTANA" on Justia Law

Kevin and Gretchen Higdon, residents of Missouri, opened a joint bank account in Missouri, which was later held by Equity Bank. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank obtained a judgment against Kevin in Missouri and sought to garnish the Higdons' account in Kansas to satisfy the judgment. The account was listed as "Joint (Right of Survivorship)" under Missouri law, which presumes a tenancy by the entirety for married couples, meaning the account could not be garnished for a judgment against only one spouse.The Johnson County District Court in Kansas denied the Higdons' motion to quash the garnishment, applying Kansas law, which does not recognize tenancy by the entirety. The court held that the account was a joint tenancy, allowing M & I Bank to garnish Kevin's half of the account. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, focusing on the procedural nature of garnishment under Kansas law.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the issue of account ownership was substantive, not procedural. The court applied the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which directs that the law of the state where the property interest was created (Missouri) should govern. Under Missouri law, the account was held as a tenancy by the entirety, and thus, M & I Bank could not garnish it for a judgment against Kevin alone.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case with directions to return the garnished funds to the Higdons, holding that Missouri law applied to the ownership of the account, preventing the garnishment. View "M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Higdon" on Justia Law

In this case, an automobile collision occurred on November 5, 2018, involving Raymond and Florence Trigger, who were struck by a truck driven by Benjamin C. Deese. Florence died at the scene, and Raymond succumbed to his injuries in January 2019. Jerald Brown, as the administrator of both estates, sued Deese for wrongful death, alleging negligence and wantonness. The jury awarded $50,000 for Florence's death and $1 for Raymond's death. Brown moved for a new trial, arguing that the $1 award was inadequate and violated equal protection principles. The Houston Circuit Court granted the motion for a new trial, and Deese appealed.The Houston Circuit Court had initially instructed the jury on negligence, wantonness, contributory negligence, and damages, including nominal damages. The jury's initial verdict awarded $0 for Raymond's death, which the court rejected, instructing the jury that a $0 award was not permissible. The jury then awarded $1 for Raymond's death. Brown's motion for a new trial argued that the $1 award was inadequate and inconsistent with the $50,000 award for Florence's death. The trial court granted the motion without stating reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's order. The Court held that the adequacy of punitive damages in wrongful-death cases is not subject to review, as established in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street. The Court also found that the jury's verdicts were not inconsistent, as the jury was instructed, without objection, that it could award different amounts for each death. The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdicts. View "Deese v. Brown" on Justia Law

Michael Hermalyn, a former employee of DraftKings, left his position to join a rival company, Fanatics, based in California. DraftKings, headquartered in Massachusetts, claimed that Hermalyn's new role violated a noncompete agreement he had signed, which included a Massachusetts choice-of-law provision and a one-year noncompete clause. DraftKings sued Hermalyn in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for breach of the noncompete agreement.The district court sided with DraftKings, applying Massachusetts law to determine the enforceability of the noncompete agreement. The court found the noncompete enforceable and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Hermalyn from competing against DraftKings in the United States for one year. Hermalyn appealed, arguing that California law, which generally bans noncompetes, should apply instead of Massachusetts law. Alternatively, he argued that if Massachusetts law applied, the injunction should exclude California.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether the district judge abused her discretion in granting the preliminary injunction and whether she made any legal errors in applying Massachusetts law. The appellate court found that Massachusetts law was correctly applied, noting that Massachusetts generally respects choice-of-law provisions unless they violate a fundamental policy of another state with a materially greater interest. The court concluded that Hermalyn failed to demonstrate that California's interest in banning noncompetes was materially greater than Massachusetts's interest in enforcing them.The First Circuit also upheld the scope of the preliminary injunction, rejecting Hermalyn's argument to exclude California. The court reasoned that excluding California would undermine the effectiveness of the injunction, as Hermalyn's role involved interacting with clients in states where online sports betting is legal. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision and awarded costs to DraftKings. View "DraftKings Inc. v. Hermalyn" on Justia Law

A lawyer representing an environmental group sought disability accommodations under California Rule of Court 1.100 due to his bipolar disorder. The accommodations requested included extensions of time for briefing deadlines and relief from procedural obligations in a case challenging the approval of a timber harvest plan by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE). The trial court had previously granted six similar requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had partially granted the environmental group's petition for a writ of mandate, finding deficiencies in CalFIRE's approval of the timber harvest plan regarding geologic, biologic, and cultural resources. However, the court rejected the group's claim that CalFIRE's delayed and incomplete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. Dissatisfied with this partial victory, the group appealed, arguing that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the seventh request for accommodation. The court noted that the trial court had already granted multiple extensions and that further delays would create an undue burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding. The appellate court emphasized that the environmental group had the option to retain additional counsel to avoid further delays, which it failed to do. The judgment was affirmed, and the respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

In this case, the Courier Journal requested multiple public records from the Shively Police Department (SPD) under the Open Records Act, following a fatal car crash involving a police chase. The requested records included dispatch reports, 911 calls, audio communications, dashcam and bodycam footage, and incident reports. SPD denied the request, citing the "law enforcement exemption" under KRS 61.878(1)(h), arguing that the records pertained to an ongoing criminal case and their release would harm the investigation.The Jefferson Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of SPD, granting summary judgment on the basis that the law enforcement exemption applied. The court found that SPD had met its burden of proof under the exemption, and thus, the records were exempt from disclosure. The Courier Journal appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that SPD had not sufficiently demonstrated that the records were exempt under the law enforcement exemption, the personal privacy exemption, or KRS 17.150(2). The appellate court vacated the summary judgment in favor of SPD and remanded the case for further proceedings, recommending an in camera review of the requested records.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that SPD failed to provide a concrete risk of harm associated with the release of the records, as required by the law enforcement exemption. The court also clarified that KRS 17.150(2) governs the disclosure of records post-prosecution and does not override the harm requirement of the law enforcement exemption. Additionally, the court found that SPD did not adequately justify withholding the records under the personal privacy exemption. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "SHIVELY POLICE DEPARTMENT V. COURIER JOURNAL, INC." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Dakota Miller, was injured when a vehicle crashed into a business he was patronizing, located on property owned by T & J Land Co., LLC. Miller filed a lawsuit against T & J Land nearly two years after the incident, alleging negligence and seeking punitive damages. He claimed the property owner failed to protect patrons from such accidents.The Knox Circuit Court dismissed Miller's lawsuit, ruling it was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims as per Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.140(1)(a). The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the two-year statute of limitations under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) applied, as Miller was a victim of a motor vehicle accident.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Court held that the MVRA's two-year statute of limitations did not apply to Miller's premises liability claim against T & J Land. The Court reasoned that the MVRA is intended for claims involving the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles, which was not the nature of Miller's claim. The Court emphasized that Miller's lawsuit was fundamentally about premises liability, not a motor vehicle accident, and thus fell under the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the Knox Circuit Court's order of dismissal, concluding that Miller's claims were indeed time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. View "T & J LAND CO., LLC V. MILLER" on Justia Law

Karen Richardson obtained a loan in 2008, secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust on her home. After a series of transfers, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC became the holder and servicer of the note. Nationstar appointed members of McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC (MWC) as substitute trustees. In 2015, Nationstar filed for judicial foreclosure, alleging Richardson defaulted on her mortgage. Richardson counterclaimed, challenging Nationstar's standing and alleging violations of lending laws. The Superior Court ruled in favor of Nationstar, and the property was sold in a foreclosure sale.Richardson opposed the ratification of the sale, arguing that Nationstar and MWC provided an incorrect payoff amount, constituting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The Superior Court ratified the sale, concluding that Richardson's right to cure the default had expired before the incorrect payoff amount was provided. Richardson's subsequent appeals were dismissed as moot.Richardson then filed a new suit against Nationstar, MWC, and the trustees, alleging wrongful foreclosure, fraud, and misrepresentation. The Superior Court dismissed her claims against Nationstar and others as barred by res judicata, but held her claims against MWC and the trustees in abeyance. Richardson amended her complaint, and the Superior Court dismissed it again on res judicata grounds, believing she had not disputed privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's dismissal on the issue of privity. The court held that MWC and the trustees had not sufficiently demonstrated privity with Nationstar to invoke res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address the privity issue and any other unresolved claims. View "Richardson v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman named Lisa was under a conservatorship due to being gravely disabled from a mental disorder. Her father, Scott, was appointed as her conservator and placed her in a skilled nursing facility. Scott signed two optional arbitration agreements with the facility on Lisa's behalf. After Lisa died, her parents sued the facility's owners and operators, alleging various claims including wrongful death. The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on the agreements Scott signed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition to compel arbitration. The court found no evidence that Scott had the authority to bind Lisa to the arbitration agreements for the successor claims. Additionally, the court found that neither Scott nor Lisa's mother, Marilyn, signed the agreements in their individual capacities, thus the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the conservatorship order did not give Scott the authority to sign the arbitration agreements on Lisa's behalf. The court reasoned that the conservatorship order did not explicitly or implicitly authorize Scott to waive Lisa's right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the court found that the wrongful death claim was not subject to arbitration because Scott did not sign the agreements in his individual capacity, and Marilyn did not sign them at all. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, denying the petition to compel arbitration. View "Enmark v. KC Community Care" on Justia Law