Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A woman sued her former attorneys for malpractice, alleging they failed to advocate for her interests during mediation, resulting in an unfavorable settlement for her and her business. The superior court granted summary judgment to the attorneys, concluding that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations and denied her motion to amend her complaint.The superior court ruled that the statute of limitations for the malpractice claim had expired, as the woman filed her suit more than three years after her injury occurred. The court also rejected her argument for tolling the limitations period under the continuous representation rule, concluding that her communications with the attorneys did not show continued representation in her personal capacity. Additionally, the court rejected her equitable estoppel argument, reasoning that the alleged conflicts of interest did not raise concerns under the Rules of Professional Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the continuous representation rule applies to legal malpractice claims, delaying the accrual of the claim until the attorney's representation in the matter ceases. The court found a genuine factual dispute about when the attorneys' representation ended, vacating the superior court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the attorneys are not barred by the doctrine of fraudulent estoppel from pleading the statute of limitations defense, as the woman failed to present evidence that her delay in filing suit was in reasonable reliance on the nondisclosure. Finally, the court vacated and remanded the superior court's decision to deny leave to amend the complaint, as the claims were not futile and leave to amend should have been granted. View "Sheldon-Lee v. Birch Horton Bittner, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC, a manufacturer and distributor of high-speed circular knitting machines, sued its former president and CEO, William Moody, and his associated entities, Nova Trading USA, Inc., and Nova Wingate Holdings, LLC. The lawsuit stemmed from an investigation by Pai Lung Machinery Mill Co. Ltd., which owns a majority interest in Vanguard Pai Lung, revealing alleged fraud and embezzlement by Moody. Plaintiffs brought sixteen claims, including fraud, conversion, embezzlement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment. Defendants counterclaimed with twelve claims primarily based on alleged breaches of contract.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, designated as a mandatory complex business case, heard the case. After a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on several claims, including fraud and conversion, defendants filed post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The business court ruled that several issues raised in the JNOV motion were not preserved because they were not included in the directed verdict motion. The court also denied defendants' other post-trial motions on the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court affirmed the business court's decision, endorsing the rule that to preserve an issue for a JNOV motion under Rule 50(b), the movant must have timely moved for a directed verdict on that same issue. The court agreed that the business court correctly determined that several of defendants' arguments were not preserved and properly rejected the remaining post-trial arguments on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and post-trial orders of the business court. View "Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Diana Delgado owed money on a department store credit card, and Midland Credit Management, Inc. purchased the debt and sued her in Minnesota state court. Delgado did not respond to the summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of Midland. Instead of seeking reconsideration or appealing the default judgment, Delgado filed a federal lawsuit against Midland, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, including that Midland tried to collect the debt without owning it.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Delgado's case, concluding that the issue of debt ownership had already been resolved in the state-court action and gave the default judgment issue-preclusive effect. Delgado appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a Minnesota state-court default judgment can have issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit. The court relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Herreid v. Deaver, which established that a default judgment is conclusive on the facts essential to its existence, even if the defendant did not participate in the proceedings. The court found that Midland's ownership of the debt was essential to the default judgment and that Delgado had a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue in state court.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the default judgment was a final determination on the merits and that applying collateral estoppel did not work an injustice in this case. View "Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Jahn Patric Kirlin and Sara Louise Kirlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Christian William Jones, Dr. Barclay A. Monaster, and Physicians Clinic Inc. d/b/a Methodist Physicians Clinic – Council Bluffs. Jahn Kirlin experienced severe neck pain and headaches, and despite seeking medical help, an MRI was delayed. Dr. Monaster, who had returned from treatment for alcohol abuse, refused to order an MRI, and Kirlin later suffered a stroke after a chiropractic adjustment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants altered medical records and that Dr. Monaster was intoxicated during treatment.The Pottawattamie County District Court initially dismissed the case due to a defective certificate of merit. The plaintiffs refiled with a new certificate, but the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed this decision, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed.Upon remand, the district court did not set new deadlines, leading to confusion about the applicable expert certification deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment again, arguing the plaintiffs missed the deadline. The district court agreed, finding no good cause to extend the deadline, and granted summary judgment to the defendants.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion by not finding good cause for the plaintiffs' delayed expert certification. The court noted the confusion about deadlines, lack of prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiffs' diligence, and the defendants' actions. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

Nancy Walker executed a will in 2011, leaving personal property to her stepchildren and sister, Beatrice Land, and specific real property to Beatrice. In 2020, Nancy executed a new will and a deed, leaving the same property to her stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes, and Magen's husband, Joseph Culpepper. Nancy died three weeks later. Beatrice contested the validity of the 2020 will and deed, claiming Nancy lacked testamentary capacity and was under undue influence.The Russell Circuit Court held a jury trial, which found the 2020 will and deed invalid. The court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict and denied post-judgment motions from the proponents of the 2020 will and deed. Beatrice's request for costs incurred in challenging the will was also denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court's judgment invalidating the 2020 will, finding sufficient evidence that Nancy lacked testamentary capacity. However, it reversed the judgment invalidating the 2020 deed, citing jurisdictional limitations. The court also reversed the denial of Beatrice's request for costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the amount of costs and attorney fees, and who should pay them. View "Boykin v. Land" on Justia Law

In August 2022, Rebecca Henderson and her minor son were involved in an automobile collision in Alabama. Henderson, a Kentucky resident, had an insurance policy from Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Kentucky Farm Bureau) that provided uninsured-motorist (UM) benefits. In July 2024, Henderson filed a complaint in the Baldwin Circuit Court, asserting a negligence/wantonness claim against the other driver, Trey Allan Knapp, and a claim for damages by contract against Kentucky Farm Bureau, alleging entitlement to UM benefits as Knapp had no liability insurance.Kentucky Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the Baldwin Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it, as it only does business in Kentucky and has no contacts with Alabama. The motion was supported by an affidavit from a Kentucky Farm Bureau employee. Henderson opposed the motion, arguing that the insurance policy provided nationwide coverage, thus establishing sufficient contacts with Alabama. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss without explanation, leading Kentucky Farm Bureau to petition the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and concluded that Kentucky Farm Bureau did not have sufficient contacts with Alabama to establish personal jurisdiction. The court noted that the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, and Kentucky Farm Bureau does not conduct business in Alabama. The court distinguished between providing liability coverage nationwide and being subject to contract claims in any state. Consequently, the court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss Henderson's claim against Kentucky Farm Bureau for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "In re: Henderson v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Earnest Charles Jones was severely injured by a bull on August 27, 2018, and was transported by helicopter to the University of South Alabama Hospital. During the transport, flight nurse Bryan Heath Wester allegedly removed a nasal-gastro tube from Jones's throat, causing further injuries. Nearly two years later, Ovetta Jones, on behalf of Earnest, filed a lawsuit against Wester and Air Evac EMS, Inc., alleging negligence and wantonness related to the care provided during the transport.The Dallas Circuit Court initially reviewed the case, where the Joneses filed their complaint on August 24, 2020. The complaint focused on the removal of the nasal-gastro tube by Wester. Nearly four years later, the Joneses amended their complaint to include new allegations that Wester had stolen and replaced ketamine with saline solution the day before the transport, and that other flight nurses failed to detect this and properly treat Earnest's pain. Air Evac moved for summary judgment, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred and did not relate back to the initial complaint. The trial court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the initial complaint. The amended complaint introduced entirely new facts and allegations, including actions by different individuals on a different day. Consequently, the amended complaint could not relate back to the initial complaint and was time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations and repose. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Air Evac's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the summary judgment and to enter an order granting the motion. View "Ex parte Air Evac EMS, Inc." on Justia Law

Kilvert, a Rhode Island company, acquired a commercial property and claimed that SBC Tower, a Delaware company, breached their lease agreement by failing to pay fifty percent of the payments received from subleases. Kilvert filed a Commercial Property Eviction Complaint in Rhode Island district court, seeking eviction and damages. SBC Tower removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diversity jurisdiction. Kilvert moved to remand, arguing that Rhode Island law grants exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes to state district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island agreed with Kilvert and granted the motion to remand, holding that Rhode Island law mandates that the state district court is the proper court for this action, making removal improper. SBC Tower appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the Rhode Island statute in question, R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8-3(a)(2), allocates jurisdiction among state courts and does not divest federal courts of jurisdiction in cases where diversity jurisdiction is present. The court held that the statute does not preclude removal to federal court and that the federal court has the authority to hear the case. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC" on Justia Law