Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Adam Richardson, a citizen and taxpayer, petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for writs of quo warranto and mandamus, alleging that the Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) violated section 104.31, Florida Statutes, by advocating against a proposed constitutional amendment (Amendment 4) related to abortion rights. Richardson claimed that their actions, including statements on an AHCA webpage and social media, as well as participation in a public call and opinion piece, unlawfully interfered with the vote on Amendment 4.The lower courts did not review this case as it was directly brought to the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson argued that the respondents' actions violated a statute limiting political activities of state officers and employees, which he believed should be enforced through extraordinary writs.The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition. The court held that the writ of quo warranto is traditionally used to test the right of a person to hold an office or exercise a state-derived power, not to compel criminal prosecution or enable private enforcement of a criminal statute. The court found that Richardson's grievances were more about the merits of the respondents' actions rather than their authority to act. Additionally, the court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that Richardson did not establish a clear legal right or an indisputable legal duty on the part of the respondents, nor did he show that there was no other adequate remedy available. The court concluded that no further relief was required to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction and denied the petition without permitting a rehearing. View "Richardson v. Secretary, Florida Agency for Health Care Administration" on Justia Law

A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce's assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court's residual jurisdiction.The CIT dismissed JDI's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI's action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI's suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel's decision. Therefore, the CIT's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law

In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

Robert E. Lee Flade filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (BCLP), over disparaging remarks made on social media. Isaacs and the BCLP filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and petitions to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), seeking dismissal with prejudice, attorney’s fees, and sanctions. Before the trial court could hear these motions, Flade voluntarily dismissed his complaint without prejudice. Isaacs and the BCLP requested the court to adjudicate their TPPA petitions despite the dismissal, but the trial court declined, stating the nonsuit concluded the matter.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the TPPA petitions did not limit Flade’s right to a voluntary nonsuit under Rule 41.01(1). The court reasoned that the TPPA did not specifically limit the right to a nonsuit and that the mere filing of a TPPA petition did not create a vested right that would prevent a voluntary dismissal.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. The court held that the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is not subject to the provisions of the TPPA under Rule 41.01(1). It also concluded that there is no vested right to adjudication of a TPPA petition pending at the time of a voluntary nonsuit and that a TPPA petition does not constitute a counterclaim for purposes of Rule 41.01(1). Therefore, the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions after Flade voluntarily dismissed his complaint. View "Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee" on Justia Law

Autumn Scardina requested a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop to celebrate her gender transition. The shop, owned by Jack Phillips, refused to make the cake, citing the message as the reason. Scardina filed a discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found probable cause of discrimination. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission took jurisdiction but later dismissed the case as part of a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit filed by Phillips, without Scardina's participation.The district court took up Scardina's case after the Commission's dismissal and found that Phillips had violated Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), imposing a fine. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Phillips then appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court should not have heard Scardina's case. The court concluded that Scardina did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by CADA. Specifically, the court found that Scardina should have appealed the Commission's decision to close the administrative adjudication without issuing the required order. The court vacated the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case, stating that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "In re Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc." on Justia Law

Lena Johnson and her daughter, Katherine Grundhauser, died in a car accident in 2006. They co-owned a property in Butte, Montana, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Lena's estate was informally probated, and her son, Kenneth Johnson, was appointed personal representative. The estate's assets were distributed among Johnson's children and three of Katherine's children, with the remainder going to Johnson and Katherine's husband, Steven Grundhauser. The property in question was not resolved, and Johnson's children lived there rent-free.In 2020, Lena's will was discovered, which stated that all property should be divided equally between Katherine and Johnson or held in trust for their children if they predeceased Lena. This will contradicted the earlier distribution and indicated that the joint ownership of the property was for convenience only. Katherine's children and Steven Grundhauser petitioned for informal probate of Lena's estate, which was denied. Formal probate was opened in 2021 with Johnson as the personal representative. A mediation in 2022 led to a settlement agreement to buy out the interests of Katherine's children in the property.The Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, denied Katherine's estate's motion to intervene and for relief from judgment, finding that the estate was bound by the settlement agreement and that the doctrine of laches barred the motions. The court concluded that Grundhauser, as a petitioner, was aware of the settlement terms and had agreed to them.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed and remanded the case. It held that Katherine's estate should have been allowed to intervene as it had a valid legal interest in the property. The court found that the settlement agreement was based on a mutual mistake of law and that the district court's order was void for lack of jurisdiction and due process. The court also held that the doctrine of laches did not apply, as the delay in asserting the estate's rights was reasonable under the circumstances. View "In re Estate of Johnson" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

Armando P. Ibanez, a Mexican-American male, was employed by Texas A&M University–Kingsville (TAMUK) as an Assistant Professor of Communications/Radio-Television-Film. After five years, he applied for tenure and promotion to associate professor. TAMUK's requirements included the completion of at least two juried creative activities. Ibanez produced several creative works, but only one, a film titled "Men of Steel," was labeled as juried. His application for tenure and promotion was initially recommended by his departmental committee but was subsequently denied by the department chair, college committee, college dean, and provost, who cited his failure to meet the minimum requirements for juried creative activities.Ibanez appealed the decision, and an advisory committee found a prima facie case for reconsideration. The tenure appeals committee supported him, but the promotion appeals committee did not. Ultimately, the university president denied his tenure and promotion based on the negative recommendations and perceived lack of scholarship. Ibanez then sued TAMUK, alleging racial and national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of TAMUK, dismissing Ibanez’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Ibanez failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not meet TAMUK’s baseline tenure requirements of two juried creative activities. Additionally, the court found no genuine dispute of material fact suggesting that Ibanez was denied tenure under circumstances permitting an inference of discrimination. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of TAMUK. View "Ibanez v. Texas A&M" on Justia Law

Kiefer Production Company (KPC), a non-party, appealed adverse discovery orders related to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Keetons, co-trustees and co-personal representatives of Noma Rongey's estate. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) dismissed the appeal, stating the orders were not appealable. KPC then petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The district court had previously denied the Owners' motion to quash the subpoena and ordered KPC to produce financial documents to determine the value of Rongey's interest in KPC. The district court also placed Rongey's interest in pay status. COCA partially affirmed the district court's order but remanded the case to address the implications of Rongey's death and the scope of the documents requested. On remand, the district court denied KPC's renewed motion to quash and granted the Keetons' motion to compel the production of documents.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the discovery orders were appealable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering KPC to produce the documents. The court found that KPC, as a non-party, had a substantial right affected by the orders and that the orders conclusively determined the issue of document production. The court also held that KPC's financial documents, including tax returns, were relevant to determining the value of Rongey's interest in KPC and were therefore discoverable.The Supreme Court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, requiring KPC to comply with the subpoena. The court also held that KPC did not have standing to appeal the order placing Rongey's interest in pay status, as this issue was not final and was subject to further proceedings. View "ROYAL HOT SHOT INVESTMENTS v. KIEFER PRODUCTION CO." on Justia Law

In 2015, American Acceptance Co. sued Timothy Mayberry in small claims court for an unpaid balance of $2,084.48. Mayberry did not respond, leading to a default judgment against him. In 2022, Mayberry, who is incarcerated, moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming he was never served with the complaint or judgment and only learned about it during a prison review. The small claims court denied his motion, deeming it untimely and meritless.Mayberry appealed the decision. However, the trial court clerk failed to file a Notice of Completion of Clerk’s Record by the required deadline, and Mayberry did not move to compel the clerk to file the notice. Consequently, the Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte based on Appellate Rule 10(F), which states that failure to move to compel the clerk “shall subject the appeal to dismissal.” Mayberry’s subsequent motion to correct the error was denied by a divided motions panel.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the phrase “shall subject the appeal to dismissal” grants appellate courts discretion to dismiss an appeal but does not mandate dismissal. The court emphasized that cases should be decided on their merits rather than minor procedural violations unless the appellant acts in bad faith, the violation is egregious, or the appellee is prejudiced. Finding no sufficient basis for dismissal under these criteria, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Mayberry v. American Acceptance Co LLC" on Justia Law