Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jaime Morales, a Sheriff’s Deputy with the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, was shot and paralyzed during a law enforcement operation to apprehend a bank robbery suspect in September 2018. Morales filed a negligence suit against several employees of the City of Georgetown and the Georgetown Police Department, alleging that their actions led to his injuries. The case centers on whether the government defendants are immune from suit.The Scott Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were immune from Morales’s claims. The court found that Officer Joseph Enricco and Lieutenant James Wagoner were entitled to qualified official immunity for their discretionary actions, and that the City and the Georgetown Police Department were immune from vicarious liability and negligence claims.The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of Lt. Wagoner’s actions were ministerial and not protected by qualified official immunity. The court also found that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held vicariously liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions and directly liable for their own negligence.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court held that Officer Enricco’s decision to fire his weapon was discretionary and protected by qualified official immunity. However, it found that Lt. Wagoner had a ministerial duty to formulate a plan to apprehend the suspect and to enforce certain training requirements, making him potentially liable for negligence. The court also ruled that the City and the Georgetown Police Department could be held liable for Lt. Wagoner’s ministerial actions but were immune from direct negligence claims related to training and personnel selection. View "MORALES V. CITY OF GEORGETOWN, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

On April 25, 2018, John Crawford stopped his tanker truck on the shoulder of Interstate 71 to remove loose dogs from the roadway. Kentucky State Trooper Michael Gonterman arrived to assist, parking his cruiser with flashing lights. Shortly after, three vehicles approached: a Nissan Altima, a box truck driven by James Baumhower, and a tractor trailer driven by Teddy Seery. Traffic slowed, and Baumhower swerved into the right lane to avoid the Altima, followed by Seery, who collided with Baumhower’s truck. The collision caused the box truck to flip and slide, pinning Crawford and knocking Gonterman off the bridge, resulting in severe injuries to Gonterman and Crawford’s death.The Henry Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the Firefighter’s Rule, which bars claims by public employees injured while responding to specific risks inherent in their duties. The court found all three prongs of the rule met: the defendants were similarly situated to other drivers, Gonterman was responding to a specific risk, and the accident arose from that risk. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defendants did not meet the first and third prongs, as they had no connection to the loose dogs and the accident was independent of the specific risk.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It clarified that the Firefighter’s Rule does not extend to independent and intervening negligence unrelated to the specific risk that necessitated the public employee’s presence. The court held that the negligence of Seery and Baumhower was independent of the hazard posed by the loose dogs, thus the rule did not bar Gonterman’s claims. The case was remanded to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "WOOSTER MOTOR WAYS, INC. V. GONTERMAN" on Justia Law

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

Blake Wentworth, a former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Information Practices Act (IPA). Wentworth claimed that the Regents failed to engage in the interactive process, provide reasonable accommodations, and invaded his privacy by leaking information about student complaints and his disability accommodations to the media.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on three of Wentworth’s causes of action under FEHA and IPA, denied his motion to compel discovery responses, and denied his request for a retrial on a cause of action for which the jury left the verdict form blank. The court also denied Wentworth’s post-judgment request for attorney’s fees and costs.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary adjudication on the claims for failure to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations, finding that the Regents had offered reasonable accommodations and engaged in the interactive process in good faith. However, the court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy cause of action, finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents violated the IPA by leaking a letter about student complaints and disclosing information about Wentworth’s disability accommodation.The court also reversed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, remanding for further proceedings to determine whether Wentworth was the prevailing party under the IPA and whether he was entitled to fees under the catalyst theory. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Wentworth’s motion for a retrial on the personnel file cause of action, finding that Wentworth had forfeited his right to object to the verdict form by failing to raise the issue before the jury was discharged. View "Wentworth v. UC Regents" on Justia Law

Two electors, Faith Genser and Frank Matis, submitted mail-in ballots for the 2024 Primary Election without the required Secrecy Envelopes. The Butler County Board of Elections identified the defect and notified the electors that their mail-in ballots would not be counted. The electors then cast provisional ballots on Election Day. The Board did not count these provisional ballots, leading the electors to file a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County.The trial court dismissed the petition, upholding the Board's decision. It concluded that the Election Code did not support counting provisional ballots when a defective mail-in ballot had been submitted. The court emphasized that the Election Code's requirements for mail-in ballots were mandatory and that the Board's role was to ensure compliance with these requirements during canvassing.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the electors' provisional ballots should be counted. It found ambiguity in the Election Code's language regarding when a ballot is considered "cast" or "voted." The court interpreted the provisions to mean that a ballot must be valid and counted to preclude the counting of a provisional ballot. It concluded that the General Assembly intended to allow voters to remedy their circumstances when their initial mail-in ballot was invalid or incomplete.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. It held that the Election Code required the Board to count the electors' provisional ballots because their mail-in ballots were void due to the lack of Secrecy Envelopes. The Court emphasized that a void ballot has no legal effect and that the Election Code's provisions aim to prevent double voting while ensuring that every qualified voter has the opportunity to cast a vote. View "Genser v. Butler County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia), a Pennsylvania-based insurer, brought claims of malpractice, indemnity, and contribution against Martin O’Leary, Kimberly Forrester, and the Sedgwick LLP Liquidating Trust (Sedgwick Defendants). The Sedgwick Defendants, former employees of the now-bankrupt Sedgwick LLP, had provided legal services to Philadelphia. The claims arose from a Montana class action lawsuit involving Gateway Hospitality, Inc. (Gateway), which Philadelphia had insured. Sedgwick advised Philadelphia to deny coverage to Gateway, leading to a settlement where Gateway paid approximately four million dollars to class members.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County granted the Sedgwick Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The court found that Philadelphia failed to establish that the Sedgwick Defendants had sufficient contacts with Montana to warrant jurisdiction. Philadelphia appealed this decision, arguing that the Sedgwick Defendants' actions related to the Montana lawsuit should subject them to Montana's jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the Sedgwick Defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Montana to establish personal jurisdiction. The Sedgwick Defendants' actions, including providing legal advice and sending a denial letter from California to Ohio, did not constitute transacting business or committing a tort in Montana. The court concluded that the Sedgwick Defendants' conduct did not create a substantial connection with Montana, and thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not appropriate. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v O'Leary" on Justia Law

Boris Bergus and Agustin Florian, both doctors, were colleagues and later co-investors in a company managed by Florian's brother-in-law, Edgardo Jose Antonio Castro Baca. Bergus invested in the company in 2012 and 2014, purchasing stock. Years later, after their relationship deteriorated, Bergus sued Florian, alleging that Florian had omitted material information about the investments, violating the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act (MUSA). The trial featured testimony from Bergus, Florian, and Baca. The district court precluded Florian from cross-examining Bergus about a 2013 state medical board finding that Bergus had misrepresented his medical credentials. The jury found in favor of Bergus regarding the 2012 investment but not the 2014 investment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Bergus for the 2012 investment, awarding him $125,000 plus interest, totaling $202,506.85, and additional attorney's fees and costs, bringing the total judgment to $751,234.86. The court dismissed Florian's counterclaim for abuse of process, suggesting it be litigated in state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed several issues, including the district court's limitation on Florian's cross-examination of Bergus. The appellate court found that the district court abused its discretion by precluding cross-examination about Bergus's misrepresentations of his medical credentials, which were probative of his character for truthfulness. The court concluded that this error was not harmless, as the case hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.The First Circuit vacated the judgment regarding the 2012 investment and remanded for a new trial on that issue. The jury's verdict on the 2014 investment remained intact. The appellate court did not address Florian's other arguments due to the need for a new trial. View "Bergus v. Florian" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law